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Abstract 
This thesis is a critique of Paul Tillich's ontology. It demonstrates inconsistency in 
Tillich's theological system, exposed by the microcosmic/macrocosmic theme, implicit in 
his theology. 
The thesis suggests that Tillich intuited the relationship between God and humanity in 
microcosmic/macrocosmic terms, but his tightly reasoned arguments stifled the intuition, 
causing the microcosmic theme to remain hidden under the more explicit concerns of his 
system. 
The thesis establishes the powerful microcosmic theme underlying Tillich's system, in 
which creaturely life is imbued with the Principles of divine life. This intimacy, coupled 
with inconsistency in Tillich's theology with regard to human freedom and estrangement, 
generates doubt about Tillich's assertion that creaturely estrangement from its divine 
ground is ontological in nature. 
In view of the fact that separation and estrangement are not merely idiosyncratic of 
Tillichian thought, but are entrenched in the western Christian tradition, the thesis looks 
outside that tradition to assess the validity of Tillich's claim with respect to the 
ontological nature of estrangement. To this end, the Chinese tradition is engaged, in 
order to ascertain the extent to which estrangement features in the ontology pertaining to 
a principal theme in that tradition, the Tao. 
In its exploration of the Tao through the two texts ofthe Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu, the 
thesis notes the absence of the theme of estrangement. In light of this, Tillich's insistence 
upon the ontological nature of estrangement is challenged on the grounds that if 
estrangement is truly ontological, it will be so for the whole of humankind, not solely for 
one particular tradition. 
Having shown Tillich's ontological assumption to be questionable, the thesis proceeds to 
consider the impact of the removal ofthe theme of estrangement from his system. It 
demonstrates that its removal not only permits the implicit microcosmic theme to be 
brought to the fore, but also transforms his theology from one based upon dualistic 
consciousness, with the inherent tensions and ambiguities that such awareness inevitably 
creates, to one based upon integration and holism. 
The thesis does not seek to offer a comparative study ofthe ontologies pertaining to 
Tillich and the Tao. Rather, it utilises the Tao as the means by which the researcher looks 
beyond Tillichian theology and the western tradition in which it was entrenched, in order 
to return to that theology with fresh insight. This is in accord with Tillich's own method 
of correlation, where he engages with that which lies beyond the finite creature, in order 
to gain fuller understanding of the nature of that creature. 
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Introduction 
This thesis is a critique of Paul Tillich's ontology. It demonstrates inconsistency in 
Tillich's theological system, caused by his failure to go deeply enough into the nature 
of the relationship between divine life and human life. 
The thesis argues that Tillich's theology is based upon an intuition of the microcosmic-
macrocosmic relationship between God and humanity. However, Tillich's insistence 
upon tightly reasoned argument stifles the intuition fuelling his thought in the depths of 
his unconscious, and leads to his failure to integrate intuition with reason. This, in turn, 
prevents his sytem from expressing a higher level of consciousness, which would have. 
resulted if he had been able consciously to acknowledge the microcosmic theme he 
intuited. The consequence of this failure is the production of a system based upon 
tension and ambiguity. The thesis contends that if he had been able to integrate 
intuition with reason, the resulting theology would have been characterised by clarity 
and flow, rather than ambiguity and tension. 
Crucial to the argument of the thesis is the establishment of the microcosmic theme 
underlying Tillich's system, for without it, the inconsistency in his ontology would go 
unnoticed. Thus, the purpose of Part One is to establish the microcosmic theme, which 
it does in three stages. 
First, Chapter One demonstrates TilIich's intuitive understanding of the intimate 
relationship between divine life and creaturely life, to the extent that the rhythm of the 
divine life provides the pulse that imbues the creature with life. The pulse is triadic and 
is derived from the trinitarian nature of the divine life itself. The three Principles of the 
divine life - Godhead, Logos and Spirit - provide the structure upon which creaturely 
life is based. Tillich's method of correlation is shown to be the instrument through 
which he establishes the dynamic relationship between the rhythm of the divine life and 
finite life. 
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Next, Chapter Two establishes the presence of the microcosmic theme in the classical 
heritage, to which Tillich makes repeated direct reference in his three volumes of 
Systematic Theology. 1 
Finally, Chapter Three demonstrates the way in which the microcosmic theme is 
present in Tillich's system, and shows his dialectical methodology to concur with the 
dialectical approach of microcosmic thinkers of the Middle Ages and Renaissance. It is 
argued that Tillich's extensive use of triadic formulation in both the content and the 
structure of his system expresses his intuition of the divine living in and through the 
human being. 
Triadic formulation evokes spiralling imagery, which, it is argued, is characteristic of 
the microcosmic themes of the Middle Ages and Renaissance. Thus, triadic 
formulation supports the argument for a microcosmic theme underlying his entire 
theological system. 
In Part Two, the microcosmic theme is shown to expose inconsistency in Tillich's 
system with regard to ontological estrangement and the creature's ground of being. The 
connection in Tillich's system between the ground of being and the creature's 
unconscious depths is established and shown to demonstrate the close association of his 
ontology with psychology. Through this connection, the thesis establishes that for 
Tillich, creature1y Fall is symbolic not only of the ontological separation between the 
Creator and the creature, but also of the psychological separation between human 
consciousness and unconsciousness. 
In Chapter Four, the focus upon the psychological aspect of the Fall symbol exposes 
ambiguity in his understanding of eros as "the urge toward the reunion of the 
separated.,,2 It is proposed that to overcome the ambiguity, 'reunion' must be replaced 
with 'union.' However, to do so requires the abandonment of Tillich's notion of 
1 Paul TilIich, Systematic Theology 1, (Chicago, the University of Chicago Press, 1951); Paul 
TilIich Systematic Theology 2, (Chicago, the University of Ch icago Press, 1957); Paul TiJIich, 
Systematic Theology 3, (Chicago, the University of Chicago Press, 1963). 
2 Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol.3, p.137. 
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ontological estrangement. In light of these ambiguities and inconsistencies, serious 
doubts about the value of Tillich's insistence upon ontological estrangement begin to 
be raised. 
The thesis acknowledges that Tillich's insistence upon ontological estrangement is the 
product of his entrenchment in the western Christian theological tradition, with its 
assumption of the state of separation between humanity and the divine. Therefore, to 
have doubts about Tillich's insistence upon ontological estrangement is also to have 
doubts about the broader Christian assumption of creaturely separation from God. The 
microcosmic theme underlying Tillich's system reveals his theology to have an 
overwhelming sense of connection between the lives of the divine and the creature. 
Therefore, it is necessary to consider whether ontological estrangement is a necessary 
element in his theology, or whether it impedes the sense of connection that the 
microcosmic theme highlights. 
In view of the fact that separation is intrinsic to Tillich's Christian heritage, it is 
necessary to step out of the Christian tradition, in order to assess the value of the 
ontological nature of estrangement for his system as a whole. To this end, the thesis 
engages with the Tao of the Chinese tradition. 
The reasons for the selection of this particular tradition are both academic and personal. 
In academic terms, the Tao offers a perspective based upon a 
microcosmic/macrocosmic appreciation of life. Moreover, it is an appreciation that has 
no sense of separation or estrangement. As the microcosmic theme found to be 
underlying Tillich's system unearths inconsistency in his theology with regard to 
estrangement, the Tao, in this respect, becomes an interesting conversation partner. 
Fundamental to the microcosmic theme pertaining to the Tao is the close connection 
between the phenomenal and noumenal aspects of life.3 Interestingly, the microcosmic 
theme underlying Tillich's theology shows Tillich to have a similar sense of 
particularity in relation to unity. However, whereas the noumenal aspect of the Tao is 
3 Thomas In-Sing Leung, 'Tao and Logos',Journal a/Chinese Philosophy, 25.1, (1998), p.139. 
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present in the heart of life, Tillich's noumenal appreciation of the unity of the divine 
life has to be expressed in terms of transcendence and separation from life.4 
Thus, there is both resonance and dissonance between the philosophy pertaining to the 
Tao and Tillichian theology. As with any good conversation partner, differences as 
well as similarities are essential for a dynamic conversation to take place, and for these 
reasons, on the academic level, the Tao of the Chinese tradition may be seen to be a 
suitable one into which to step. 
There are also personal reasons for selecting the Chinese tradition. 'Having been 
married to a Chinese man for twenty years and having two children who are therefore, 
both Chinese and European, it was natural for the researcher to opt for the Chinese 
tradition, when stepping out of the western Christian tradition. Through her marriage, 
the researcher has been able to recognise the importance of preserving the cultural 
integrity of both marriage partners. As a European, I cannot become Chinese, any 
more than my husband, as a Chinese, can become European. At the same time, over 
the years, there has been a gradual and profound assimilation of each other's cultural 
values, which, far from diluting our individual senses of identity, has enhanced and 
enriched them. 
In view of this understanding and experience in marriage, the researcher considered a 
conversation between Tillich and Chinese philosophy pertaining to the Tao to be one 
that would be fruitful and dynamic. 
The Tao is explored in Chapter Five by examining the way it is expounded in two 
classical Chinese texts: the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu. These particular texts have 
been selected for this purpose on the basis of their well-established status as two of the 
most authoritative and formative texts on the Tao. s It should be noted from the outset 
that in this thesis, examination of the texts pertains strictly to their presentation of the 
4 For fuller discussion of this point, see pp. 192-194 below. 
5 Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, transl. D.C.Lau (Hong kong, The Chinese University Press, 1963), 
p.ix; Fung Yu-Lan, A Short History o/Chinese Philosophy, (London, New York, the Free 
Press, 1948), p. 104. 
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Tao, rather than to their illumination of Taoist philosophy. In view of the purpose of 
our exploration of Chinese philosophy, namely, to assess the validity of Tillich's 
assertion that creaturely estrangement is ontological in nature, an attempt to examine 
the vastness of the Taoist philosophical tradition would far exceed the scope of this 
thesis. 
However, to seek to examine the wisdom pertaining specifically to the Tao contained in 
these texts is more appropriate to the purpose of the research project, for in that 
examination, themes common to both the Tao as communicated through the two texts 
and to Tillichian theology are established. For example, in both the Lao Tzu and the 
Chuang Tzu, the Tao is presented in microcosmic/macrocosmic terms - a point of 
obvious contact with the microcosmic theme of Tillichian theology established in this 
thesis. 
Furthermore, the Chinese texts' use of paradoxical and symbolic language with regard 
to the Tao provides interesting material for comparison with Tillich's understanding of 
paradox and symbolism. Using Nicholas Cusanus' De Docta Ignorantia as a mediating 
agent,6 the thesis establishes that the similarity between the Chinese texts and Tillichian 
theology in these respects is superficial, and that both are quite distinct at a 
fundamental level. 
Other interesting points of contact are explored, including the theme of spontaneity 
(ziran, in the Chinese texts) present in both Tillichian theology and the two Chinese 
texts; the noumenal and phenomenal aspects of the Tao in relation to the transcendent 
and immanent aspects of the Creator in Tillichian theology, and the theme of 
integration present in both the Chinese texts and Tillich's system. 
In Chapter Six, the ontological implications of the Chinese texts' presentation of the 
Tao are explored. Discovered is a microcosmic/macrocosmic understanding of reality 
6 In Chapter Two, Tillich's acknowledgement in Systematic Theology 1, pp.260-261 of the 
microcosmic theme present in the work ofNicholas Cusanus is noted. The establishment of 
Cusanus as part of the classical tradition in which Tillich was rooted provides the authority for 
employing Cusanus as a mediating agent here between the Chinese texts and Tillich. 
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in which the theme of estrangement plays no role whatsoever. Moreover, allusions to 
ontology in those texts are more precisely onto-cosmology / cosmo-ontology, for the 
absence of estrangement is so profound that ontology cannot be separated from 
cosmology.7 
The exploration also reveals the Chinese texts to use symbolism not only to point 
beyond the limitations of language, but also to point beyond the limitations of 
conceptual thought. 8 In short, the symbolism of the Chinese texts is shown to shock the 
reader into a non-dualistic state of awareness, in which all conscious distinctions fall 
away, so that the human being, as the microcosm of the universe, integrates with the 
macrocosmic process of that universe - the process in both the microcosm and the 
macrocosm being the Tao. 
Thus, the exploration into the Chinese texts in Part Two establishes the powerful sense 
of interrelationship between the microcosm of the human being and the macrocosm of 
the universe, an interrelationship based upon the dynamic flow of the Tao in its 
macrocosmic and microcosmic aspects. In this relationship, not only is there no sense 
of estrangement between the human being and the Tao in its noumenal aspect, but there 
is also a strong sense in which the human being is empowered by it. 
In this way, the thesis is able to assert that Tillich's assumption that human 
estrangement is ontological in nature is not validated by the Chinese texts under 
consideration. For this reason, it is possible to challenge Tillich's claim in this respect, 
a challenge that is necessary, in order to alleviate his system of its ambiguity and 
tension. 
However, also discovered is a profound distinction between the understanding of 
reality presented in the Chinese texts and that presented in Tillich's system. The 
7 The terms onto-cosmology and cosmo-ontology are taken from Cheng, Chung-Ying, 'Chinese 
Metahysics as Non-metaphysics: Confucian and Taoist Insights into the Nature of Reality', 
Understanding the Chinese Mind: The Philosophical Roots, ed. R.E.Allinson, (Hong Kong, 
Oxford University Press, 1989), p.175 of pp.167 -208. 
s See p.l99 below. 
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examination of the Chinese texts reveals their dismissal of the value of human 
consciousness in the forming and shaping of reality. Reality is the enigma of the Tao; 
recognition of this reality is attained only when human clinging to conceptual 
awareness is relinquished. 
This is shown to contrast starkly with Tillich's perception of the unique role of human 
consciousness in the grasping and shaping of reality, a role given to humanity through 
the logos structure of its internal and external being. 
Thus, although exploration of the Chinese texts provides us with the evidence 
necessary to challenge Tillich's assertion about the ontological nature of human 
estrangement, it does not offer any solutions with regard to overcoming the ambiguity 
and tension within Tillich's theological system. 
Having provided evidence in Part Two of a tradition in which estrangement plays no 
role whatsoever, in Part Three, the thesis is able to challenge Tillich's claim that human 
estrangement from the ground of being is ontological in nature. To attribute 
ontological status to estrangement is to make a claim applicable to humanity as a 
species, not simply to those within the Christian fold. That there exists a tradition in 
which estrangement is absent provides the basis upon which Tillich's assumption may 
be challenged. 
On this basis, the thesis goes on to consider why Tillich insisted upon the ontological 
nature of estrangement, when the microcosmic theme implicit in his system 
accentuated the holistic and dynamically integrative relationship between humanity and 
the ground of being. 
Reflecting upon the limitations of conceptual thought as presented in the Chinese texts, 
Chapter Seven presents the contention that Tillich highlighted the theme of separation 
because his system was the product of dualistic consciousness, a state of awareness in 
which conceptual thought predominates at the expense of the more sensory and 
intuitive aspects of human functioning. 
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Moving away from the Chinese texts, the chapter goes on to consider the effect of 
removing the theme of estrangement from Tillich' s system on his understanding of the 
creature/Creator relationship. It is suggested that by so doing, the themes of holism and 
integration, accentuated by the implicit allusions to the microcosm-macrocosmic 
relationship between human life and Divine life, are brought to the fore, and the 
ambiguities and tension of his system diminish. 
The thesis concludes by reflecting upon the power of the microcosmic theme to bring 
Tillichian theology to a different level of consciousness, one in which the themes of 
holism and integration predominate. 
Methodology 
This thesis is not a comparative study of Tillichian theology and Chinese philosophy 
pertaining to the Tao. Rather, it is a critique of Tillichian ontology, which uses a very 
specific aspect of the Chinese tradition as the means by which distance can be created 
from Tillichian ontology, in order for that ontology to be reflected upon. 
This then, is a methodology that is consistent with Tillich's own method of correlation. 
Just as Tillich raises questions about existence that are addressed by reference to that 
which stands beyond existence, so this thesis raises questions about Tillichian ontology 
by going beyond the Christian fold in which his ontology is situated. Moreover, just as 
Tillich uses the beyond to return to the fold of human existence with fresh 
understanding, so this thesis uses the beyond represented by the Chinese tradition as the 
means by which fresh insight can be brought back to Tillichian theology.9 
As Tillichian ontology is criticised in this thesis on the basis of its lack of integration, 
the methodology employed must be one based upon integration. Just as in Tillich's 
method of correlation, the limitation of finitude can only be made fully clear from the 
perspective of the infinite, so too, the lack of integration in Tillich's work can only be 
9 See pp.l7-20 below for an in-depth discussion ofTillich's method of correlation. 
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recognised from the standpoint of integration. For this reason, an original 
methodological approach has been utilised to examine Tillich's theological system. 
In view of the fact that Tillich's lack of integration is argued to be derived from his 
excessive use of rational system at the expense of the more intuitive aspects of his 
being, the methodological approach employed in this thesis has required that the 
researcher utilise her intuitive and rational faculties to equal degrees, in order to 
examine and criticise Tillich's theological system. To achieve this, an intrinsic part of 
the methodology has been the researcher's practice of meditation as the means of 
accessing intuitive insights into Tillichian theology. 
Through meditation in the early stages of the project, a mandala was drawn by the 
researcher, which established intuitively and diagrammatically the presence of the 
microcosmic theme underlying Tillich's system. IO This mandala, then, provided the 
direction for the entire project, as the researcher sought to make conceptual sense of 
what she could see intuitively .. 
A mandala is both a psychological and a religious symbol, in which an individual is 
drawn progressively to its centre. I I Carl Jung describes it as a symbol of wholeness 
representing the union of opposites in both psychological and religious terms. It is a 
symbol that springs spontaneously from the unconscious, and often takes the shape of a 
circular diagram with a central point that has an integrative function within the circle. 
Mandalas are found in the Far East and are also found in the Christian art of the Middle 
Ages, in which Christ is depicted at the centre, often with the four evangelists making a 
square around the centre. 12 
The diagram resulting from the analysis of Tillich's theological system would appear to 
10 See Appendix 1. 
11 In my attempt to understand the nature of the diagram I had drawn, I contacted theologian 
and Jungian Analyst, John Dourley. He advised me to maintain my critical consciousness, but 
to allow the mandala to lead me to its centre. 
12 C.G. Jung, Jung on the East. (Routledge, London, 1995), p.93. 
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accord with the Christian mandalas of the Middle ages, in that Christ is depicted as the 
central symbol. However, unlike those of the Middle Ages, it is not the four 
evangelists that surround Christ, but rather the remaining four central symbols of his 
system, namely, Logos, God, Spirit, and Kingdom of God. 
The mandala has been the means by which the researcher has progressed, through 
immersion in primary texts, from the externals of Tillich's system to its heart, in which 
the figure of Jesus as the Christ functions as pivotal. It has also been the vehicle 
through which the researcher has sought uncommon conversation partners for 
Tillichian theology. Such partners include not only the Chinese texts of the Lao Tzu 
and the Chuang Tzu , but also the ideas of Carl Jung and Jacob Boehme. 
The progression of the study has been spiralling in nature, due to the obscurity of the 
less conscious methods employed in the study, and due also to the demands of a 
microcosmic theme. Such a theme requires the connection with the macrocosm to be 
ever present and this therefore, demands the dimension of depth, which Tillich would 
regard as the vertical dimension, to be actively involved in the progression from the 
externals of Tillich's system to the centre.13 The resulting thesis may be seen both as 
critical reflection upon, and as an expression of, the mandala produced in the early 
stages of research. In this respect, the methodological approach of the thesis is original. 
Thesis Structure 
The methodological approach outlined above has an inevitable impact upon the 
structure of the thesis. As mentioned above, the researcher discovered whilst 
conducting her study that the more unconscious methods employed led her to think in a 
spiralling, circumambulatory way. That is to say, the following of intuitions demanded 
an exploration of the issues of the project that were initially very obscure, but would be 
clarified by thinking 'around' and meditating upon the subject. The diagram of the 
\3 The significance ofthe dimension of depth for a spiralling way of thinking is discussed in 
depth in Chapter Three. 
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mandala produced by the researcher when studying in-depth Tillich's Systematic 
Theology illustrates the importance of spiralling circumambulation in the conducting of 
the study. 14 
Spiralling circumambulation is therefore, integral to the structure of the thesis itself. 
The reasons for this are twofold: firstly, it is the consequence of the researcher's 
determination to allow the unconscious depths to influence the final writing of the 
study as much as they influenced the earlier stages of research. Secondly, it is the 
structure that is necessary for an analysis of a theology rooted in a microcosmic theme. 
Such a theme is one that expresses integration. If a theology is based upon integration, 
it is necessary to show the way in which the key motifs of the theology interrelate. It 
follows that the understanding of one motif demands a thorough understanding of all 
others. To adopt a more conventional analytical approach, in which one key motif is 
discussed in-depth in isolation from its relation to others, would be to lose the 
integration essential to a microcosmic theme. 
The only way to proceed, then, is to begin by highlighting the interrelation of the key 
motifs without defining them all at the outset. Thus, for example, the significance of 
.. 
the symbol theme in Tillich's theology is acknowledged in Chapter One in relation to 
his method of correlation, but is not discussed in detail until Chapter Three, as a full 
understanding of symbol requires some initial background into the method of 
correlation and other key themes., Equally, the dimension of spirit, although 
acknowledged as being critical in its transcending function within the ontological 
structure of being, is not discussed in depth until the end of the detailed analysis of that 
structure. 
The way in which this thesis has been structured therefore, requires patience of the 
reader, but it is hoped that the patience will be rewarded by the gaining of a very new 
insight into Tillichian theology. It is also anticipated that the new insight, derived from 
an immersion in the primary texts, and gained through the researcher's independent 
critical reflection upon those texts, sheds new light upon the arguments of some of the 
14 See Appendix 1. 
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secondary literature in this area. For example, in Chapter Three, the thesis 
demonstrates that Kelsey's observations about the structure of Tillich's Systematic 
Theology are also relevant to the content of the system. This is a point not made by 
Kelsey himself, but one that is brought into relief through the recognition of the 
microcosmic theme underlying Tillich's thinking. Furthermore, in the same chapter, 
the microcosmic theme exposes the superficiality of Hamilton's critique of Tillich's 
ontology. 
Moreover, the thesis offers fresh insight into some of the arguments contained in the 
secondary literature pertaining to the Chinese material. For example, in Chapter Five, 
Doeringer's highlighting of the similarity between Tillichian symbolism and the 
symbolism in the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu is questioned. By establishing TiIlich's 
connection with the thinking of Nicholas Cusanus in Chapter Two, and by drawing 
parallels between Tillichian and Cusanan symbolism in Chapter Five, the thesis shows 
Doeringer's observations to be somewhat superficial. 
Finally, the establishing of the microcosmic theme underlying Tillichian theology 
provides a very useful instrument for engaging in Tillichian-Taoist dialogue. In view 
of the powerfully microcosmic nature of the Tao acknowledged in this thesis, the 
discovery of the presence of a similar theme implicit in Tillich's theology makes 
possible a point of contact between the two that has hitherto been difficult to 
establish. IS 
15 In the early stages of this research project, Prof. Lai, at the Chinese University of Hong 
Kong, made it clear to me the difficulty I would find in establishing a point of contact between 
TiIlichian theology and Taoist philosophy. His advice to me to consider Confucianism rather 
than Taoism was sound advice indeed, for this thesis confirms his view of the very profound 
points of departure between Tillichian theology and Taoist philosophy. Only the establishing of 
a microcosmic theme implicit in Tillich's system has permitted the researcher to engage with 
the Chinese texts. In view of the extent of popularity of Tillichian theology among Chinese 
Christian theological scholars, it is my hope that the originality of this thesis in unearthing the 
microcosmic theme will present scholars of Chinese philosophy as well as Chinese Christian 
scholars with a new way of engaging with Tillichian theology. 
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The spiralling structure of the thesis is reflected in the weighting of the three parts. Part 
One is by far the largest, followed by Part Two, with Part Three representing an 
extremely small proportion of the whole. This should not be regarded as a structural 
imbalance, but rather as the inevitable shape of work that circumambulates to the centre 
of Tillichian theology. The structure depicts the process of filtration that a spiralling 
methodology demands. It also requires that the reader retains all that has gone before, 
for the progression is one of clarification. Thus, Part Three should be read as the final 
clarification of Parts One and Two. Equally, Part One should be read with the 
expectation of clarification in the parts that follow. The structure leads the reader to the 
heart of Tillichian theology, just as one might be led to the centre ofa spiral, and just as 
meditation upon a mandala draws one to the centre of the image, where integration 
finds full expression. 
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. Part One 
Establishing the Microcosmic Theme in 
Tillich's Theological System and 
Heritage 
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Chapter One 
Divine Life & Finite Life 
This chapter establishes Tillich's intuitive understanding of the intimate relationship 
between divine life and creaturely life. This will be used in Chapter Three as the 
basis of the microcosmic theme argued to underlie Tillich's theological system. 
The present chapter offers a detailed analysis of the nature of the dynamics 
perceived by Tillich to be present in the depths of human existence. It explores his 
method of correlation in light of the dynamics and shows it to be the means by 
which he expresses the resonance between the life of the divine and that of the 
human being. It argues that finitude is rooted in the dynamic rhythm of the divine 
life. It is a rhythm that pulsates through the creature, despite the creature's 
qualitative separation from the divine, providing the creature with the power and 
structure to live creatively. 
The chapter is divided into three sections. Section One examines Tillich's 
understanding of the dynamics of the divine life. In Section Two, the concept of 
dynamism in relation to the ontological structure of being is discussed in light of 
Tillich's appreciation of the divine life. Section Three discusses how the dynamics 
of finite life are conditioned by the categories of time, space, causality and 
substance and the way in which finite life is connected to that of the divine, despite 
the confines imposed upon finitude by the categories. 
Reference is made at various points in the chapter to Tillich's use of symbolism in 
his theology. However, despite the references, a detailed analysis of his notion of 
symbolic language is delayed until Chapter Three. There are two reasons for this: 
firstly, symbol pertains more to the theme of depth in his theology than to the theme 
of dynamics. Indeed, we will see later that symbol functions to connect the 
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dimension of depth with the here and now of everyday living. As Chapter Three 
provides detailed analysis of his understanding of the notion of depth, it is more 
appropriate to discuss symbol there than in the present chapter, although detailed 
analysis here would, admittedly, enhance our understanding of the relation between 
the divine and the finite. 
It seems to be a characteristic of Tillichian theology that a thorough understanding 
of one key theme is impossible without an equally thorough understanding of the 
others. As discussed in the Thesis Introduction, this is characteristic of a 
microcosmic theme, and Tillich's style in this respect would lend weight to the view 
that such a theme is present, albeit implicitly, in his theological system. For this, 
the second reason, it is important not to attempt to analyse themes as they arise, in 
isolation of their function within his system as a whole, for by so doing, the 
integrated hue of his theology begins to fade. With this in mind, it is hoped that the 
reader approaches each chapter as part of an integrated whole rather than as a self-
sufficient unit. 
Section One: The Divine Life 
Paul Tillich was a theologian dedicated to making the Christian message 
meaningful to modem humanity. He realised the importance of entrenching that 
message in the very fabric of existence, not allowing it to be removed from the 
events and circumstance of everyday life. At the same time, it had to be understood 
as delivering more than merely the sum total of existential circumstances. The 
message had to communicate a dimension that lay beyond existence at the same 
time as being rooted in it. 
This is the paradox that Tillich's theology works around. The principal question 
that Tillich asks in his theology is: what is the connection between the Christian 
message and modem life? 
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The Method of Correlation 
He applies a particular method in his three volumes of Systematic Theology to 
address that question /6 He raises questions about existence that are answered in 
terms of the divine, and in this way, demonstrates the relation between the divine 
and the finite creature. This, he calls the method of correlation, which is present in 
both the content and structure of his system. 
Kelsey argues that an examination of Tillich's three volumes of Systematic 
Theology reveals a five-part division. 17 Each part raises a question or a set of 
questions concerned with existence. Answers are provided in the form of symbols 
that act as the channel between humanity and the divine: Logos, God, Spirit, Jesus 
as the Christ, and the Kingdom of God. For example, in Part One, the question 
raised is about the possibility of there being indubitable truth. IS Tillich answers it in 
terms of the symbol, Logos. Through humanity's reasoning faculty, The Logos 
principle of the divine life is present in its existential form, expressed by Tillich as 
logos. For that reason, he concludes that indubitable truth can be grasped by 
humanity through logos, which he describes as a symbol correlating Creator and 
creature. 
The five-part division of the structure of his system correlates with the five symbols 
identified by Tillich as communicating the Creator/creature relationship. Hence, the 
method of correlation is applied both to the content and the structure of his 
theological system. 
By correlation, Tillich means three things: Firstly, he refers to the correspondence 
between "religious symbols and that which is symbolised by them". 19 In this 
respect, correlation deals with the issue of religious knowledge, i.e. how can 
humanity in existence have knowledge of the divine? 
16 TilIich, Systematic Theology, 1, pp.59-66. 
17 Kelsey, The Fabric of Paul Tillich's Theology, p.13. 
18 Ibid., p.14. 
19 Tillich, Systematic Theology I, p.60. 
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Secondly, correlation refers to the logical connection between human concepts and 
those of the divine.2o This is concerned with what humanity can say about God, i.e. 
how can humanity use the same language to talk meaningfully about the world and 
about God? 
Finally, it refers to the factual sense in which the divine reveals itself to humanity 
and the way that humanity receives that manifestation,21 i.e. where is the meeting 
point between the two? Tillich addresses these issues and questions and finds their 
answers in the divine lije?2 
The Divine Life 
For Tillich, the divine life is the unity of three principles: Godhead, Logos and 
Spirit. Godhead refers to the raw power and abysmal majesty of the divine, to the 
God that is beyond good and evil. Logos refers to the ordering principle of God, 
which gives meaning and structure to the creative power of Godhead. Without 
Logos, Tillich argues, Godhead would be chaotic and demonic. Spirit, the third 
principle, is not simply one principle among three, but the uniting principle that 
makes God what God is. It is the principle in God that unites the other two 
principles of power and meaning and makes them creative.23 
Although Tillich depicts the divine life as consisting of three principles, he does not 
intend to portray a divided God. God's power and structure are not isolated from 
each other, but are expressions of "moments" of structured and ordered dynamism 
of the divine life.24 Divine life is power that is meaningful. Thus Tillich speaks of 
God as the "unity of power and meaning".zs There is no tension in God because the 
three principles are non-differentiated within the divine life. Power and structure do 
20 Ibid., pp.243-245. 
21 Ibid., p.61. 
22 Ibid., p.21!. 
23 Ibid., p.250. 
24 Ibid., p.250. 
25 Ibid., p.250. 
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not stand apart in the divine life, but are blended by means of Spirit. That is not to 
say that there is a dilution of either principle: in the blend, both remain pure and 
utter to provide a blend that is purely and utterly creative. 
When speaking of the power of God we speak symbolically of a moment in the 
divine life, and when speaking of the structure of God we again speak symbolically 
of another moment. When speaking of divine moments we must remind ourselves 
that we speak, once again, symbolically. Through his symbolism, Tillich depicts 
the particular aspects of the unity that is divine life. 
TiIlich goes further and claims that in addition to having Spirit, God is Spirit.26 
Here, he attempts to depict the sheer non-differentiated quality of God. Spirit is the 
unifying principle of power and meaning. The particular aspects of the divine, 
expressed through the three principles, find union in Spirit. 
In so far as three principles can be discerned in the divine life, then God has Spirit. 
Here, Tillich communicates the particular aspects of the divine unity, thus 
portraying God's dynamism: God is three principles that pulsate in unity. In 
contrast, when stating that God is Spirit, he highlights the unitary aspect of the 
divine. Thus, by claiming that God both has and is Spirit, Tillich points his readers 
to the dynamism and the unity of God. God is thoroughly dynamic, thoroughly 
meaningful and thoroughly unified. 
Once again, we must remember that he speaks symbolically. For him, our 
knowledge of divine life is derived entirely from our finite position. We know it in 
terms of what we know of our own humanity, in terms of the symbolic nature of 
religious language and in terms of what God chooses to reveal to us. When we 
speak about God, we speak symbolically.27 That is, we speak of that which lies 
beyond in a state of awareness of our limitation. As we are tied to existence, we 
26 Ibid., p.251: "God has the Spirit as he has the logos" and p.250: " ... God is the living God 
because he is Spirit". 
27 Ibid., p.242. 
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address God through the veil of finitude. We do not know God as God is per se, 
only as God is in relation to us. We can discern the divine life only through the 
very same veil of finitude. Thus, humanity must reach out to a misty God with a 
hazy face. Our view is inevitably distorted and our language ambiguous. This is 
the finite aspect of the correlation between finite life and divine life. 
However, Tillich's method of correlation does not simply intend to show the way in 
which the existential creature reaches out to God; it also shows the way in which 
God reaches out to the existential creature. To understand the method of correlation 
in terms of humanity's reaching out and finding answers alone is to misunderstand 
the nature of the method. Humanity can reach out to God because God has given 
the authority for it by providing the ground in which the existential creature is 
rooted.28 In order to understand the precise way in which the creature is rooted in 
the divine life and is thus, authorised to reach out to God, it is necessary to consider 
in detail the nature of the divine life as it relates to the creature. 
28 TiJlich, Systematic Theology 1, p.235. 
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The Divine Life as the Ground of Being 
Tillich describes the being of God as being itself29 God is not subject to the 
limitations of finitude and existence. As being itself, God is the creative source of 
all that has being, but exceeds all that has being because God's creativity eternally 
overcomes the possibility of the negation of being. Participation in the possibility 
of non-being is a characteristic of all existential beings. Existence means limitation, 
the ultimate limitation being finitude - death. God, as the source of being. 
"infinitely transcends every finite being,,30 because non-being rests dependent upon 
being. Without being, there could be no possibility of not being. The dynamic of 
existence is the power to be over against the power not to be. The dynamic of God, 
however, is purely the power to be. The power not to be is swallowed up in the 
total unity of being that is God. 
However, this does not mean that non-being stands apart from, or in opposition to 
the divine life. The notion that God does not participate in non-being because God 
is being should not be taken as confirmation that creaturely existence is left in a 
limbo between two polar forces. Rather, Tillich wishes to depict the utterly 
comprehensive way in which all that is and all that is not is embraced in the divine 
life. The threat of non-being is an existential threat rooted in the very fabric of 
being without ever overpowering being. The process of the divine life has integral 
to it the threat of non-being. The threat is functional within the whole process of 
the divine life and because of its function, it fulfils rather than defeats being. He 
wishes to show non-being as a phase in the life of the divine, but one that is 
temporal in nature. 
Tillich achieves this by depicting the divine life as an eternal process of emanation 
and return within the unity that is God.31 The dynamic is oscillatory in nature, in 
which there is a simultaneous movement out of God and then back into God. It 
must be described as simultaneous as a reminder that God is not tied to the realm of 
29 Ibid" p.235. 
30 Ibid" p.23 7. 
31 Ibid., p.251. 
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time and space. Of course, the obvious question must be asked: where does God go 
when moving away from God-self? We perhaps flinch at the blatantly existential 
nature of this question, for it presupposes the reality of time and space. Inevitably, 
language is based upon such presuppositions because it is rooted in existential soil 
and the categories that tie us to that realm.32 
The movement in the divine life is qualitatively different from that of existence: it is 
movement beyond time and space. It is therefore, a non-corporeal movement that 
lies beyond finite comprehension. Tillich does not perceive God as a mass, moving 
from one place to another, but more as energy, sheer dialectical dynamism, which, 
in logical terms, moves away from God-self but, in the reality of the divine life 
itself, remains in eternal unity. Tillich suggests that Spirit proceeds from the divine 
ground in order to actualise what is potential, and simultaneously returns to the 
ground. This is the process of the divine life. Divine emanation is the phase of the 
process that makes actual what is potential in that ground. In this phase, divine 
fullness is demonstrated by becoming something definite. Here, the threat of non-
being is brought into play. The infinite ground of being expresses itself as finite 
and then simultaneously takes that finite expression back into the divine ground. In 
such a process Tillich argues: 
... the divine fullness is posited in the divine life as something definite.33 
In short, finitude is situated within the unity of God. 
Thus, finite life is an integral part of the divine life. It is a vital phase in the process 
of divine life, in which divine power is given form and expression that posits the 
fullness of God. Finitude lives within the divine life and functions to bring about 
the actualisation of the divine life. It participates in the dialectical process of the 
divine life and, consequently, participates in the principles that constitute divine 
life. 
32 Ibid., p.192. 
33 Tillich, Systematic Theology 1, p.251. 
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Thus, for Tillich, the existential creature is authorised to reach out to God on the 
grounds that finite life is cradled in the life of the divine. The ground of creaturely 
existence is the very ground of being itself. 
Tillich's authority to define God as the unity of power and meaning also lies in the 
divine root of existential being. If the ground of existential being is being itself, 
namely, God, the structure of existential being must also be grounded in God. 
Tillich's theology describes the ontological structure of being as consisting of the 
tense dialectical dynamic between power (i.e potential) and meaning (i.e. structure). 
He builds up this structure from observations and analysis of the existential 
situation. He concludes that as existence is rooted in the life of the divine, the very 
same dialectical dynamic between power and meaning is derived from the dynamic 
of the divine life itself. 
Thus, we begin to see that Tillich's method of correlation is entrenched in the very 
heart of the relationship between existential being and the ground of that being. 
The two are so intimately connected that the structure of the finite is the repeated 
pattern of that of the divine life and, therefore, the understanding of the structure 
underpinning finitude gives us authority to understand the structure of the divine 
life. That having been said, Tillich does not suggest that we can know God. All we 
can know is what the divine life authorises us to know; we can know only that 
which can be discerned through existence. To speak of the divine life as being the 
unity of power and meaning, Tillich speaks as an existential being discerning God. 
He speaks therefore, at a distance, for, as we have seen, although grounded in the 
divine life, finitude is part of the divine emanation. Humanity grasps only God in 
God's outward movement, but God holds firmly humanity in the totality of the 
movement because God takes the finite back to God-self. 
Thus, humanity discerns God as the unity of power and meaning. This is the 
infinite ground of being, but this is not the God beyond the infinite.34 The God 
34 Ibid., p.252. 
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beyond the infinite refers to the reality that is God's and as such is not discernable 
to the outsider that is humanity. Although finitude is part of the divine life, it is not 
the totality of that life. In that respect, finitude is an outsider. Thus, Tillich prefers 
to speak of the ground of being, or humanity's ultimate concern,35 rather than to 
speak of God, in order to maintain the distinction between discernable God and the 
internal reality of God. In his theology, he seeks to show the face of God in relation 
to existence, and the method of correlation is the means by which he portrays it. 
By refusing to address the nature of the God beyond the infinite, Tillich points to 
the ultimate ineffability of God. At the same time, by speaking of God in terms of 
correlation, Tillich avoids the danger of suggesting that humanity reaches its 
ultimate concern through human effort alone. The method of correlation shows the 
way in which finitude owes its being to the source of being, and that the life of that 
source has finitude as integral to it. In other words, through his method of 
correlation, Tillich shows the intimate relationship between the finite and the 
divine, both from the perspective of the finite and from that of the divine. 
Finitude and the divine resonate. However, let us be clear as to the nature of the 
resonance. Finitude is rooted in the life of the divine and thus, participates in the 
very structure of that life. Finitude owes its very being to the source that sustains it, 
"the ground of [its] being", in Tillich's words.36 However, this does not imply that 
God needs the creature in the way that the creature needs its source. The resonance 
between God and creature is not based upon mutual need. Whilst beings participate 
in being in terms of need and dependence, it would be a distortion to suggest that 
being participates in beings in the same way. However, there would be no 
distortion in the suggestion that being participates in beings per se. In so far as 
being enters beings, then it could be said that being participates in beings. The 
source gives of itself to that which is nourished by it in the same way as the mother 
gives of herself to the newly born infant. Through her milk she sustains the child. 
Through the structure and power of meaning, the divine sustains the finite. The 
35 Ibid., p.ll. 
36 Ibid., p.116. 
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resonance between the finite and divine, then, is not one of mutual need, but one of 
mutual participation. The creature participates as the sustained. the Creator as the 
Sustainer. 
In so far as God sustains, could it not be argued that God needs that which needs 
sustenance? If it is the creature that God sustains, then, could it not be deduced that 
God therefore, needs the creature? On the surface, perhaps this could be concluded. 
But we should dig deeper than the surface here. If we return to the analogy of the 
mother and child, it would be inaccurate to suggest that the mother needs the child 
and therefore, the child is born. The mother is not a mother until the child is born 
and the need to sustain the child does not present itself prior to its birth. What 
happens in the creative act of childbirth is the spontaneous and synchronous mutual 
participation of a transcendent nature: by giving birth to the child, the woman 
becomes a mother. As a woman. the potential for motherhood is there, but as a pre-
maternal woman, motherhood is potential only. With the birth of the child, potential 
is transcended into actualisation and the potential for motherhood becomes actual. 
At the same time, the pre-natal infant becomes transformed through the process of 
birth into an individual in need of that which gave it life. It experiences the 
transcendence from potential individual being to actual individual being. 
Potential life becomes actualised only through the process of birth, as does the 
potential for motherhood. Therefore, the process of birth is not the result of a 
mutual need between mother and child. Rather, it represents the mutual 
participation in transformation and transcendence of woman and foetus. 
If we return to the notion of God, can the above analogy help us to understand 
Tillich's conception of the resonance between God the Creator, and the creature? 
To suggest that God needs a creature in order to satisfy the divine need to sustain 
and, indeed, creates the creature in order to satisfy the need to create is far too 
simplistic. Tillich points toward a third element when speaking of the resonance 
between the Creator and the creature. There is no causal relationship. Instead, 
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Tillich speaks of a mutual and synchronous participation in which both the creature 
and the Creator move from potential to actualisation: 
The ultimate can become actual only through the concrete, 
through that which is preliminary and transitory.37 
This transformation is brought about by the presence of Spirit, through which the 
creature drives beyond itself and reaches out to the Creator, and the Creator 
responds and sustains the creature. In this way, the creature works to fulfil the 
purpose of life to make actual what is potential and the Creator is manifest as 
Sustainer so that the process may be fulfilled. In this way, God may be perceived 
not as controlling and dominating, but as that which sustains the creature through 
the creature's participation in the divine life. By establishing the divine life as the 
ground in which existential life is rooted, he establishes the involvement of the three 
divine principles in creaturely life. By depicting the Spirit as the third element in 
the relationship between creature and the Creator, Tillich shows God's participation 
in the creature and the creature's participation in God. He is able to show the 
creative nature of that mutual participation in terms of actualisation of potential on 
both sides. At the same time, by showing that God not only has Spirit, but also is 
Spirit, Tillich maintains the creative source of this mutual participation as God and 
not as something other than God. 
In Tillich's theology, then, we are able to move away from a paternalistic view of 
God, in which the Creator and Sustainer controls the creature through reward and 
punishment, and, instead, move toward a view which shows the resonance between 
Creator and created, Sustainer and sustained. We are able to see that the created 
and the sustained are also dynamically involved in the full expression of the divine. 
Such a view, as we shall see later,38 reminds humanity that its freedom in life is not 
just a piece of divine lip service, but is utterly real and essential for both the process 
of actualisation of humanity and of the divine. 
37 Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1, p.218. 
38 See Ch.3, below. 
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Established so far is the way in which Tillich's method of correlation expresses the 
resonance between the life of the divine and that of finitude, which takes place in 
the depths of existence. The divine life is a rhythmical process of emanation and 
return, operating within the unity of that life. The divine process of outward 
movement and return pulsates within finite life, imbuing humanity with creativity 
and structure. Thus, Tillich's God is energy that fuels the process of life in both its 
divine and finite expressions. 
Tillich's depiction of the divine life provides the backdrop for the whole of his 
theological system. Without an understanding of the triadic nature of the divine 
life, consisting of the three principles of Logos, Godhead and Spirit, it is impossible 
fully to understand the triadic themes that permeate his theology. The triadic nature 
of the divine life is expressed in terms of the dynamic dialectic of divine power in 
relation to divine structure that works creatively through their unification in the 
Spirit of God. Only when we appreciate this triadic relationship, can we understand 
the importance of the dynamic dialectic that he depicts so vividly in his theology. 
Section Two: The Ontological Structure of Being 
The previous section focused upon the divine life, establishing its dynamic, triadic 
nature, in which finitude is grounded, and demonstrating that finite existence has in 
its depths the same triadic pulse that gives finite being the authority to point toward 
the divine. Creator and creature resonate with each other not through mutual need, 
but through mutual participation. 
It is now necessary to turn our attention away from the divine life to that of the 
finite creature, in order to establish the way in which finite life operates in the light 
of its grounding in that of the divine. 
For Tillich, the divine life consists of the unity of the dynamic triadic relationship of 
the three principles of Godhead, Logos and Spirit. Each principle is an energy, 
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which functions as an expression of the divine life. The two polar forces of 
Godhead and Logos are united by the principle of Spirit, which makes the power 
and structure of the divine creative. The creativity of the divine drives it away from 
God-self, into the birthing process of actualisation, and this movement within the 
divine life facilitates the creation of actual life. 
Finitude is thus born out of the creative dynamic of Spirit in the divine life. As 
Spirit, the two other forces of the divine life are present as a unity. However, the 
birth into finitude marks the separation of the united divine forces. In other words, 
the ontological structure that lies behind existence consists of the same polar forces 
and creative force of the divine life, but the polar forces are no longer in alignment. 
Divine emanation reveals the separated nature of the polar forces of the divine. The 
consequence of this for Tillich is that the ontological structure of being is triadic in 
nature, as is the divine life, but is characterised by tension and ambiguity rather than 
h d · 39 by armony an unIty. 
So, what precisely does Tillich mean by the ontological structure?40 In his analysis 
of the term, he focuses upon life from the perspective of existence. Tillich reflects 
upon the meaning of the term, liJe41 and he argues that the notion oflife has that of 
death incorporated into it. Life is understood in the light of that which restricts it, 
death. Without death, the meaning of life would not be asked. Life, therefore, is 
coloured by the polarity oflife and death.42 
Life embraces the polar forces of life and death and the dialectical dynamic between 
both poles represents the process of the actualisation ofbeing.43 To understand this, 
and to see the way in which creaturely life is grounded in that of the divine, we 
must analyse Tillich's understanding of being. 
39 The triadic structure consists of the dialectical forces of self and world, which work 
dialectically to form reality. 
40 Tillich, Systematic Theology I, p.168. 
41 TiIIich, Systematic Theology 3, p.ll. 
42 Ibid., p.ll. 
43 Tillich, Systematic Theology 1, p.241. 
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Being 
Tillich speaks of two aspects of being in his system, essential and existential.44 
Essential being refers to the potential that lies within being. 45 It refers to the 
dynamic aspect of everything that has life. This leads on to the existential aspect, 
which refers to actuality. Actualisation of potential takes place in existence. For the 
potential tree to become actual, it must exist. Thus, actualisation means the coming 
into existence of potential. If we meet talented children we say they have much 
potential. We can observe something within them that could grow and become their 
outward expression. But for this to happen, the children need to live and work in a 
particular way for the potential to find expression. Thus, for Tillich, potential 
depends upon existence for its manifestation. Equally, existence could not be 
without the power to be, namely, potential. Without potential, nothing could 
become actual. Hence, there is a resonance between essential (Le. potential) being 
and existential (i.e. actual) being. 
This reiterates the same polar relationship that pertains to the polar forces in the 
divine life. Just as there is resonance between the polar forces of divine power and 
structure, so too, there is resonance between the power and structure of being. 
Essential being represents the power of being and existential being represents the 
structure of being. Thus, by speaking of the two aspects of being, Tillich establishes 
the correlation between the polar forces of the divine life and existential life. 
Life, then, is a mixture of essential and existential being. We have seen that there is 
mutual dependence of one force upon the other, but their mutual resistance should 
also be highlighted. The power to be is thrusting and dynamic in nature. It is the 
dynamis of Aristotelian thought.46 By definition, it is without structure, like a fire 
free of constraint. Actuality, on the other hand, represents constraint: it is structured 
by the constraints of the categories: time, space, causality and substance. It is the 
44 Tillich, Systematic Theology 3, p.12. 
45 Ibid., p. J 2: Tillich cites as an example the potential of a tree as being 'tree hood '. 
46 Ibid., p.l2. 
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energeia of Aristotelian thought. 47 There IS, therefore, an inevitable tension 
between the two forces: the former insatiable in appetite, the latter restrictive in 
nature. As life consists of a mixture of these two forces, it is characterised by the 
tension generated by them. 
We saw earlier that life incorporates death in its definition. What, then, is the 
connection between life and death on the one hand, and essential and existential 
being on the other? 
Death represents the negation of being. Potential is the power of being. Actuality is 
the reality of being as it resonates with the negation of being. Here, we unearth in 
Tillich's thinking yet another triadic construction based upon two polar forces and a 
unifying principle. It reiterates the triadic construction found in the divine life. This 
requires further explanation. 
Tillich wishes to show that life deals with a paradox: in so far as life can only be 
understood in relation to death, the meaning of life incorporates both being and the 
negation of being. Life has contained within itself its own negation (death). The 
paradox at the heart of life is, how can life affirm itself through its own negation? 
This paradox, however, is not new to us, for we have encountered it in the divine 
life. We saw that the divine moves away from itself whilst remaining within 
itself.48 What we have at the creaturely level is simply a reiteration of the same 
paradox. 
Just as in the divine life, Tillich provides a unifying principle, so too, in creaturely 
life, there is a unifying principle: the reality of being. However, this unifying 
principle is qualitatively different from that found in the divine life. Spirit is the 
principle in the divine life that creatively unifies the two polar forces by working 
through them to bring them into alignment within the divine life. The reality of 
being however, should be regarded as a unifying principle that lacks the creative 
471bid., p.12. 
48 See p.21 above. 
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power to align the polar forces it embraces. It is unifying in so far as it 
accommodates the dialectical dynamic between the polar forces of being and non-
being, but it is unable to convert the tension generated between them into a creative 
dynamic. In other words, the reality of being allows us to understand the dialectical 
nature of being but it does not, as it stands in itself, allow us creatively to overcome 
it. It requires the Spirit principle, the creative principle of God, to imbue it before 
the reality of being can itself operate in a creative way.49 
Thus, death represents the restricting principle of life. Without death, life would 
have no constraint. It would be potential, un-harnessed and undirected. Death 
symbolises the existential state of every creature. Life as the polarity of death 
symbolises the essential state of every creature, the power to be. Life, then, as it 
incorporates death in its own definition, symbolises the dialectical relationship 
between essential being and existential being. Life, as it incorporates death, is the 
creaturely experience of the dialectical relationship between the polar forces of 
essential and existential being. 
Let us return to our original question: what is the connection between life and death 
on the one hand, and essential and existential being on the other? We can say that 
life and death are the ways in which the creature experiences the dialectical 
dynamic between the polar forces of essential and existential being. Life, 
incorporating death in itself, on the one hand, expresses the power of being and, on 
the other, expresses the constraint of that power. In this regard, life and death are 
existential manifestations of the dialectical tension that takes place at the 
ontological level between essential and existential being. 
However, life and death are not simply expressions of a force. They are also an 
integral part of an ongoing process, namely, the process of divine emanation and 
return. The actualisation of the polarities of power and structure happens in the life 
and death of the creature. Thus, creaturely existence influences the way in which 
49 See p.67 below. 
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the divine life is actualised. The creature is not merely a puppet moving according 
to divine laws; rather, the way in which the divine returns to itself is determined by 
the way in which the life of the creature is lived. In this regard, existence provides 
the vehicle through which the actualisation of being is worked out. 
Thus, the relation between life and death on the one hand, and essential and 
existential being on the other, depicts the resonance between divine and creaturely 
life that Tillich expresses through his method of correlation. His whole theological 
system revolves around the appreciation of the relationship between the divine and 
the creature - a relationship of mutual participation. 
Tilich uses the term ontological structure of being to explain the dynamic structure 
underpinning creaturely existence. Through this structure, he connects the divine 
life with that of the creature and shows how the forces of the divine life are present 
in every aspect of life, from the inorganic to the human realms. Furthermore, 
through it, he shows how the divine forces work dialectically through the basic 
ontological polarity of self and world, in order to bring about the actualisation of 
creaturely potential. This, in turn, brings about the actualisation of the potential of 
being itself. Let us now consider what Tillich means by the polarity of self and 
world. 
The Self-World Correlation 
Tillich suggests that the ontological question, "what is being itself?" presupposes 
the subject that asks the question, and the object about which the question is asked, 
i.e. the ontological structure of being presupposes the presence of subject and 
object.5o He goes on to suggest that the subject/object structure itself presupposes a 
structure consisting of the dialectical relation between self and world. Let us 
consider how he arrives at this. 
50 Tillich, Systematic Theology 1, p.164. 
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Tillich argues that talk about self requires the capacity to stand apart, in some way, 
from self. I do not know who I am if I exist in isolation. To use an analogy, if I 
live in a forest and never venture from it, how do I know that I live in a forest? In a 
similar vein, Tillich argues that the knowledge of self comes from self-reflection, 
which requires an object upon which the self can project, in order to gain the 
reflection. He suggests that the object for the self is the world, i.e. that in which the 
self participates and, at the same time, retires from in the process of reflection. 
Only human beings can have a world because only we have the capacity for self-
awareness,51 provided through our ability to reason. 52 Humanity turns environment 
into world by means of reason, which imbues the environment with meaning and 
structure. The structure provided through reason functions both to centre the 
individual and to make the world a structured whole. 53 
Tillich goes on to describe the way in which the individual becomes centred and the 
world becomes a structured whole by means ofthis basic self-world correlation. To 
do this, he breaks down the ontological structure further by discussing three sets of 
ontological elements that operate within the basic structure. 
The Ontological Elements of Being 
Tillich sees life as a dynamic process in which potential is made actual. 
Actualisation is achieved in a dynamic rhythm derived from that of the divine life: 
the rhythm consists of three phases: self-identity, self-alteration and the return to 
one's self. We have already referred to these phases in the divine life of emanation 
and return within divine unity. Because being is rooted in that life, being itself is 
comprised of the same three phases. 
51 Ibid., pp.168-171. 
52 Ibid., pp.81,82. 
53 TilIich, Systematic Theology 1, p.171-172. 
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Tillich goes on to suggest that life has three functions or three purposes: self-
integration, self-creation and self-transcendence,54 and these Tillich refers to as the 
ontological elements of being. Life has a three-fold purpose that is achieved 
through the three-phased rhythm of the dynamic forces that underpin it. The rhythm 
is the ontological structure of being that drives life toward the fulfilment of its three 
purposes. This idea evokes a sense of dynamic analogous to the forces of the sea, 
which drive the ebb and flow of the tide and determine the nature and power of the 
waves on the shore. The force is hidden within, behind and under that which 
. manifests it. What we see on the shore are the tide and the waves, not the forces 
that drive them. Equally, the ontological structure of being is, for Tillich, hidden 
behind, within and under life, and life is driven by it to fulfil the three functions of 
self-integration, self-creation and self-transcendence. Let us now discuss in detail 
the nature of the three functions of life. 
The Individual and the Centring Dynamic 
Self-integration is the first function, or purpose of life, brought about by a 
dialectical process present in life. 
The human being develops through the rhythm of the ontological structure: a person 
lives in a state of constant movement from self-identity to self-alteration, back to 
self.55 This movement is made possible by the polar forces of life, which, for the 
individual, are expressed in terms of the polar forces of individualisation and 
participation.56 Tillich argues that there is a constant struggle between one's desire 
to be an individual and one's need to be part of a group. This reiterates the self-
world correlation that underscores the functions of the ontological elements. He 
traces the inevitability of this tension back to the instinctive human drive to 
actualise oneself. He suggests that this instinct drives the human being to draw 
everything in to itself and to have everything for itself. However, because the 
54 Tillich, Systematic Theology 3, pp.30 -32. 
ss Ibid., p.30. 
S6 Tillich, Systematic Theology 1, pp.174-178. 
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human being is a social creature, what restricts this drive is the presence of another 
human being. If one is to actualise one's humanity fully, it is necessary to 
recognise the humanity of another because only by so doing can one's own full 
humanity be acknowledged and therefore, actualised. Only by using the eyes of 
another may we see who we really are. Tillich claims that this is what makes 
humanity a moral creature.57 
Thus, our drive to actualise ourselves is restricted by our need to be with others. 
Our social structure challenges and harnesses our drive for self-fulfilment. Equally, 
there would be no social structure without the drive. Here we see, once again, the 
dialectical dynamic that is characteristic of Tillichian theology. The polar force of 
individualisation (the expression of dynamis at the individual level) is in dialectical 
relation to the polar force of participation (the expression of energeia at the 
individual level). 
Tillich goes on to suggest that through the tension the individual works through the 
rhythmical phases of the ontological structure (i.e. self-identity - self-alteration -
return-to-self): as a group participant, the needs of the self are surrendered to the 
values of the greater organism. This would represent the self-alteration phase of the 
ontological rhythm. However, the process of self-integration requires the experience 
of being a participant to be integrated with the experience of being a self. When 
this is achieved, the individual enters the return-to-self phase of the ontological 
rhythm. 
The process of self-integration represents a centring dynamic. That is to say, 
through this process the individual becomes increasingly centred and integrated. 58 
The rhythm of self-identity, through self-alteration, back to self is expressed in a 
circular movement. With regard to self-integration, this function of life corresponds 
57 TiIlich, Systematic Theology.3, pp.38,40. 
58 For a deeper appreciation of TiIlich's understanding of 'centring', see pp.66,67, below. 
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to the self-identity phase of the ontological rhythm and it works through the 
fundamental self-world correlation. 59 
One question remains unanswered at this stage: What is it that turns dialectical 
tension between polar forces into a creative integration of the self? The key to this 
lies in the spiritual dimension present in the life process. This dimension is of such 
pivotal significance for Tillich's theology that it would be inappropriate to discuss 
its role in the process of self-integration without having provided a detailed analysis 
of it first. It is necessary, therefore, to refrain from referring to the dimension of the 
spirit at this stage, even though it leaves this important question unanswered 
temporarily. Once again, we see the closely interrelated nature of Tillich's key 
concepts, and it is hoped that the reader appreciates the need to circumambulate 
them, in order not to destroy their interrelatedness through excessive analytical 
dissection. 
Culture and the Horizontal Dynamic 
The second function of life is self-creation. This function builds upon the first, self-
integration, which was concerned with the centring of the individual. This is 
achieved by the perpetual integration of the tension generated by the polar forces of 
individualisation and participation present in the life of the individual. The 
individual develops a moral sense through this tension and the greater the 
integration of the individual, the greater the sense of morality. 
Tillich then discusses the individual from the perspective of the society in which 
s/he lives, developing the idea of the social need of the individual. One's 
individuality is expressed within the context of society. Equally, the more involved 
in society one becomes, the greater the degree of personal integration. In other 
words, individuality needs society, in order to find expression.60 Once again, the 
resonance between the basic ontological polar forces of dynamis and energeia is 
59 Tillich, Systematic Theology 3, p.30. 
60 Tillich, Systematic Theology 1, pp.181-182. 
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displayed. In the first function of life, the polar forces are expressed in terms of the 
dialectical dynamic between individualisation and participation; in the second 
function, Tillich refers to them in terms of dynamics and/arm. 
The second function focuses upon culture rather than the individual. However, an 
awareness that culture emerges out of the collective of individuals is very much 
present here, reiterating, once again, the self-world correlation, underlying the way 
in which the ontological elements function. In this function, culture accommodates 
life as it drives horizontally toward the new.61 Whereas in the first function of life, 
the emphasis was upon the maintenance of the self (i.e. the self-identity phase of the 
basic ontological rhythm), in the second phase, emphasis is upon self-alteration (the 
movement away-from-self phase). As self-alteration predominates, life moves 
toward the new. Thus, the dynamic in this function is horizontal. 62 However, 
Tillich insists that such a movement is only possible if it is based upon the first 
function of life, the centring function. Self-alteration may only be creative if the 
dynamics of self-integration perpetuate within it.63 
We begin to see how the first and second functions of life interrelate. TilIich insists 
upon the presence of the centring function within the second function, so that the 
horizontal movement of life, indicated by the second function, is a centred 
horizontal movement. At the same time, the centring movement of the first 
function depends as much upon the second function as does the second upon the 
first. It is within culture that the individual finds self-expression. The more 
involved in groups the individual becomes, the more fully integrated s/he becomes. 
Thus, self-integration is an ongoing process that becomes more refined as culture 
develops. Equally, culture is able to develop only through this ongoing process. 
Once again, can we see the idea of resonance and the correlation between self and 
world in Tillich's theology. 
61 Tillich, Systematic Theology 3, pJO, 31. 
62 Ibid., p.31. 
63 Ibid., p.31. 
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Cultural expression drives toward the new by following the same pattern observed 
in the first function of life. The dialectical dynamic between dynamics and form 
provides the tension through which the self grows. Self-growth is what Tillich 
means by the term self-creation. Dynamics refers to the power to make actual. 
Form is what makes the power actual. Growth is a dynamic, a power, a potential. 
But growth, as with any potential, needs form because form is "what makes a thing 
what it is".64 
The drive toward the new means a breaking through old forms and this, in turn, 
implies a moment of chaos. Tillich speaks of the chaotic aspect of creativity when 
discussing the second function of life.65 For him, the moment of chaos is a critical 
point, the point at which life may resist creation and fall back into the old, or the 
point where life may destroy itself in its attempt to reach the new form.66 This 
would be the negation of life in its horizontal movement and, as the negation, it is 
an integral part of the process of the actualisation of life. Alternatively, through the 
chaos of the crisis there may be the creative acceptance of the new, which is what 
TiIlich means by self-creation. As with the process of self-integration, the question 
as to what it is that determines whether or not there is a creative growth can only be 
answered with reference to the dimension of the spirit and, therefore, must remain 
unanswered until a detailed discussion of this dimension has been undertaken. 
Religion and the Vertical Dynamic 
The third function of life is self-transcendence. Here, the movement is not of a 
circular nature, as in the first function of life, nor of a horizontal nature, as in the 
second, but is of a vertical nature.67 It corresponds to the return-to-self phase of the 
basic ontological rhythm. Self-transcendence is born out of the dialectical tension 
between the polar forces ofJreedom and destiny. 
64 Ibid., p.50. 
65 TilIich, Systematic Theology 3, pp. 50,51: " ... there is a moment of 'chaos' between the old 
and the new form, a moment of no-longer-form and not-yet-form." 
66 Ibid., p.S1. 
67 Ibid., p.31. 
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Tillich points out that self-transcendence takes place in all the functions of life: in 
the first function, transcendence of the self takes place in the process of self-
integration. Likewise, in the second function, self-creation is transcendence at the 
horizontal level. 68 However, the self-transcendence that takes place in the third 
function of life is qualitatively different from the previous two: the third function of 
life is concerned with the transcendence of finitude itself. 
Just as the first function focuses upon the self-identity phase of the ontological 
rhythm, and the second upon the self-alteration phase, so the third function 
necessarily focuses upon the return-to-self phase. This is the self-transcending 
phase, where being reaches its full actualisation. If we refer to the divine life, it is 
the phase in which the divine takes the creature back into itself. In creaturely terms, 
it is the phase in which the creature reaches out for the divine and comes to 
understand its finitude in terms of the infinite. In divine terms, it is the phase in 
which the divine life is fulfilled through the creature. This is the point of crescendo 
in Tillich's theology. It is the point at which the correlation between Creator and 
creature becomes most powerful. The creature reaches out to God and God takes 
the creature in to itself. It is the point at which the divine is recognised by the 
creature as Creator. Tillich describes this crescendo in the following way: 
Man is the mirror in which the relation of everything finite to 
h . fi' b . 69 t e m mIte ecomes consclous. 
Tillich explains that the self-transcendence of life is the pointing toward the 
sublime/o the majestic; it is the movement toward greatness, the movement beyond 
oneself and, therefore, the movement of finite life beyond itself toward the infinite. 
In the third stage, the movement finds expression in religion. Religious traditions 
are the creature's attempt to go beyond finitude and to commune with that which 
68 Ibid., p.31. 
69 Ibid., p.87. 
70 Ibid., p.31. 
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lies beyond. The expression of dynamis at this level is freedom and that of energeia 
is destiny. 
The third function of life does not suggest a movement away from life itself and an 
escape toward the divine. On the contrary, life transcends itself within life by 
pointing to that which goes beyond life. This is only paradoxical if it is assumed 
that what is beyond has no connection with life. We have already learned this not 
to be the case. For Tillich, there is an intimate connection between divine and finite 
life. Life transcends itself by recognising that in which it is grounded, namely, the 
ground of being itself. For that reason, self-transcendence is not to be conceived as 
a movement up and away from self, but as a movement up and down through the 
depths of self.71 That is what Tillich intends when he depicts the third function of 
life as vertical movement. He wishes us to see that which goes beyond in the sense 
of that which embraces us rather than in the sense of that which escapes us. The 
vertical depicts distance, yes, in terms of looking beyond, but it also depicts 
intimacy, in terms of looking down through our depths. It evokes a sense of the 
smallness of creaturely life being cocooned in infinity rather than being separated 
from it. Just as the cocoon is inevitably larger than that which it houses, so too, the 
infinite goes beyond the finite that dwells within it. 
However, let us guard against too much dependence upon spatial analogies when 
speaking about the relation of the divine or the infinite to the finite. Tillich does not 
speak in spatial or temporal terms when he refers to vertical movement, but speaks 
symbolically of the qualitative distance and the qualitative intimacy of the divine 
relation to the creature. There is no denial of life or attempted escape from it in the 
transcendence of life. On the contrary, the relation between the divine and the 
creature is worked out in the very fabric of life. Thus, the third function is the 
affirmation of life through the affirmation of that which goes beyond it. Religion, 
then, as the transcendence of life, is the creaturely recognition of the divine 
involvement in existence. 
71 Paul Tillich, The Meaning of Health (Chicago, Exploration Press, 1984), p.200. 
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So, what is the precise relationship between the two previous functions of life and 
the third? Tillich explains that, once again, there is a resonating relationship. The 
first two functions build up to the third: through the process of self-integration and 
self-creation, there is a movement toward that which lies beyond life. Without self-
awareness and self-growth, the creature would not be capable of searching for that 
which lies beyond finitude. At the same time, however, the first two functions may 
only be effected as a result of the third. Self-integration and self-creation are 
possible because of the presence of the divine in life. Before we can fully 
understand this, let us be reminded of the principles involved in the process of the 
divine life. 
We learned earlier that the divine life consists of three principles: Power, Structure 
and Spirit. The dialectical character of the relationship between the first two polar 
forces is unified in and through the third principle. The third, then, is not simply 
another principle that stands apart from the other two, but that which makes sense 
of the dialectic of the polar forces. It functions to provide the unification that is 
God. Thus, it can be said that Spirit works in and through the polar forces of Power 
and Structure as the unifying principle. 
Tillich applies exactly the same formula to his three functions of life. The dialectic 
between the polar forces of the first function of life is unified, not by self-
integration, but by the dimension of spirit channelled through the third function of 
life.72 The unifying function of the spirit results in self-integration. Equally, in the 
second function of life, the polar forces of dynamics and form are unified by the 
dimension of spirit, which, again, is channelled through the third function of life.73 
The result of the imbuing of spirit is self-creation. Finally, the dialectic between the 
polar forces of the third function of life, under the dimension of spirit, results in 
self-transcendence. In other words, for Tillich, the third function of life opens the 
channel for the divine Spirit to flow through and into all three functions of life. 
72 TiIlich uses spirit with a lower case s when speaking of the dimension of spirit in existence 
and Spirit with an upper case S when speaking of the principle pertaining to the divine life. 
73 Tillich, Systematic Theology 3, p.96. 
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Without this, there would be no transcending element in any of the functions, for 
the transcending elements are expressions of the unifying principle of Spirit that 
flows from the divine life itself. The Spirit represents the symbolic blood of the 
divine life flowing into the arteries of creaturely life. 
The symbolic flowing of divine blood, however, should not be conceived in terms 
of active God and passive creature. Just as in the body of any living being, blood 
alone does not give life, so too, divine blood requires creaturely form for the blood 
to perform its function. Only through the total function of life, which Tillich breaks 
down into three types (Le. self-integration, self-creation and self-transcendence), 
can the channel for the Spirit be opened. The third function of life depends upon 
the previous two, and vice versa. The resonance here is reiterated in the relation of 
Spirit to creaturely life. The third function of life is not to be perceived as the best 
or final function. Such terminology creates a sense of distinction between the third 
and the previous two functions. There is no causal relationship here, but one of 
resonance and synchronicity. It is resonance born out of tension, and through each 
stage of the resonance there is a magnification, a surge, a swell, a crescendo. The 
swell reaches its peak and hiatus in the third function, where the channel for Spirit 
is opened and the tension within the functions of life is transcended through the 
flow of Spirit. 
Perhaps this can be understood more clearly with an analogy. Sitting by the 
seashore watching a rough sea, one is struck by the power that drives it. A wave 
forms as the manifestation of the hidden forces of the sea. As it continues to build 
up with tremendous power, it reaches a point beyond which it can build no more 
and so collapses with a great sense of release. This release exhibits a change in the 
expression of the forces from tension to dynamic forward movement. The energy 
that was released in the flow is now gathered in the ebb in anticipation of the next 
great surge of tension that is manifested in the next huge wave. 
The analogy of the sea perhaps helps us to feel Tillich's sense of tension with 
regard to life and sense of magnification that he expresses through his interpretation 
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of the three functions of life. It helps us to understand the way in which the third 
function brings life to its hiatus by being the channel for that which turns tension 
into flow, namely, the Spirit. It also helps us to see that the driving of life beyond 
itself takes place within itself: the flow of the sea is not a running away of the sea 
from itself; it is rather part of the process of the dynamics of the sea. So too, the 
transcendence of life is not a running way from life, but a transformation within it. 
However, the analogy fails to demonstrate the resonating relationship between 
divine and creaturely life, which is such a vital part of Tillich's theology. The 
hiatus in creaturely life is possible only through the involvement of the divine in its 
life. Only through the Spirit does the transformation of creaturely life come. 
Equally though, only through the tension of creaturely life does the desire and drive 
for transformation appear. When this tension reaches its peak, the imbuing of the 
Spirit into the life of the creature brings about transformation. 
The sea analogy also fails to depict the symbolism of Tillich's language and the 
need to understand the process of life in both categorical and non-categorical terms. 
Language is spatial and temporal, substantial and causal in nature. Thus, when it is 
used, there is the inevitable problem that the ideas or experience for which language 
is the expression, will be understood in terms of time, space, causality and 
substance. The problem with the sea as an analogy for Tillich's understanding of 
creaturely life in relation to the divine is that, while creaturely life is subject to the 
categories of time, space, causality and substance, the divine life is not. Therefore, 
Tillich has to find a way of relating the creature, which is under the conditioning 
influence of the categories, to the Creator, which is not subject to the same 
conditions. His solution is to use categorical language, the only language that we 
have at our disposal, in a symbolic way. 
Through the ontological structure of being and the elements that reside within the 
structure, Tillich explains how the creature reaches out to that which lies beyond 
existence. It is able to do so because the creature is cradled in the divine life itself. 
For this reason, the dynamic forces that drive God away from God-self are the very 
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forces that drive the creature beyond itself. Tillich uses the method of correlation to 
depict this synchrony between the Creator and the creature and to show that through 
it, the Creator participates in the creature as Sustainer and the creature participates 
in the Creator as the sustained. This resonance brings about the actualisation of 
being, a process conducted through life and one that is as vital for the Creator as it 
is for the creature. The actualisation of being is an eternal requirement, which takes 
place within the world of time, space, causality and substance. 
Section Three: The Categories of Existence 
So far, we have discussed the dynamics of the divine life and those of creaturely 
life. We have learned that Tillich describes creaturely life as the mixture of essential 
and existential elements of being. As such, life is the process in which being is 
actualised, a process driven by the tension generated by the polar forces of divine 
power and structure. In contrast, there is no tension in the divine life between the 
polar forces because of the unifying function of the third principle, Spirit. 
Existence is a process in which the two polar forces of power and structure74 resist 
each other in the absence of their unifying principle of Spirit. Their mutual 
resistance represents mutual negation. Thus, being in existence is threatened by its 
negation, non-being. The creature in existence lives in the tension between being 
and non-being. Its very life is threatened by the negation of life, namely death. In 
every aspect of life, the expression of being is accompanied by its negation, and the 
tension of these poles characterises existence. Life is thus, a mixture of being and 
non-being. 
Despite acknowledging the distinction between the lives of the divine and creature 
in terms of the unity of the three principles in the divine life and their separation in 
creaturely life, we have not yet fully considered the cause of this. The purpose of 
74 'Structure' is also defined as 'meaning' in Tillichian theology. 
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the current section is to explore this matter and then to consider precisely how 
creaturely life is connected to that of the divine. 
Life is lived under the conditions of time, space, causality and substance. Tillich 
refers to these as the categories of existence that condition every living thing. 
According to Tillich, they are the structures that surround and penetrate finite being 
and finite thinking.75 Self-awareness is derived from our existence in a temporal, 
spatial, causal and substantial form and is based upon movement away from self. 
Movement from and to presupposes the conditions of time and space. It also 
presupposes substance; a sense of I as distinct from not-I. Furthermore, it 
presupposes causality; the movement away from self toward that which is not self 
triggers an awareness of self. 
The categories, then, "are the forms in which the mind grasp[s] and shape[s] 
reality".76 As reason is the means by which we comprehend and act in reality, it is 
also bound by the categories. To speak in a reasonable way is to speak through the 
categories. However, the categories are not only the forms of reason; they are the 
forms of being itself, present in everything that has being. We have already learned 
that that which has being is finitude. Therefore, to say that the categories are forms 
of everything that exists is to say that they are forms of finitude. Hence, they 
embrace the affirmative and negative elements of finitude and are the means by 
which being is both affirmed and negated. 
The basic ontological structure of being presupposes the self-world dialectic. In 
Tillich's words, "self and environment determine each other." 77 In every 
experience there is something that 'has' and something that is 'had,.78 That is to 
say, self-relatedness implies participation in that which is not self (Le. world) and 
the bringing of the experience of that participation back to the self. Thus, life and 
75 TiIlich, Systematic Theology 1, p.165. 
76 Ibid., p.192. 
77 Ibid., p.170. 
78 Ibid., p.169. 
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the process of actualisation is one of perpetual participation and return. There is, 
therefore, also perpetual affirmation and negation. On the one hand, participation in 
the world implies a movement away from self (i.e. a denial of self and an 
affirmation of world), and on the other hand, individualisation implies a return to 
one's self and a movement away from world (i.e. a denial of world and an 
affirmation of self). In other words, there is a positive and a negative expression of 
being from the "inside", i.e. from the perspective of the self, and from the "outside", 
i.e. from the perspective of the world, and each expression is shaped by the 
categories.79 Each category expresses at the same time a union with being and with 
non-being (that is what is expressed through the affirmation and negation of the 
world), and a union with anxiety and with courage (that is what is expressed 
through the affirmation and negation of the self). What does Tillich mean here? 
The categories have a relation to being and non-being because they are forms of 
finitude that are integral to every finite thing. They have a relation to being because 
finitude participates in being, and to non-being because finitude also participates in 
non-being. Finitude is finite being. Being is made finite by the limitation imposed 
by non-being. Finitude is also rooted in the basic ontological structure of being, 
which, as we have seen, is made up of the basic self-world correlation. Thus, the 
categories are integral to finitude as it is expressed as self and as it is expressed as 
world. The self-pole of the correlation represents the centring principle of being: 
only a self in relation to the world can be centred: we have seen the need for the two 
poles in the centring process in our analysis of the first set of ontological structural 
elements. Equally, the world-pole of the correlation represents the structured 
wholeness of being: the world is whole when it consists of centred selves. We have 
seen that the movement toward wholeness takes place throughout the dynamic 
dialectic of all three sets of ontological elements. Therefore, what is discerned 
through the self-world correlation is the actualisation of being from the 'inside' (i.e. 
from the perspective of the self) and from the 'outside' (Le. from the perspective of 
the world). The categories allow us to express the process of actualisation of being 
79 Tillich, Systematic Theology 1, p.193. 
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from the "inside" and from the "outside". They express this process in both 
negative and positive terms with regard to both the self and the world. 
For Tillich, with regard to the world, time is the "central category of finitude"so and 
has both a negative and a positive element. In negative terms, everything that is 
temporal is transitory. The present is simply a boundary that moves between past 
and future. In this light, the present can be seen as illusory and so if to be means to 
be present, then non-being conquers being.81 In positive terms on the other hand, the 
movement characteristic of time illustrates its creative aspect. 
With regard to self, time, in so far as it is transitory, generates anxiety. We 
recognise that our own lives are as transitory as everything else experienced in life 
and so suffer the anxiety of knowing that we must die. However, the correlate to 
this anxiety is the courage to affirm the 'now' of life. It is the present that is real to 
us and it is through the present that we are able to affirm the creativity oflife. 
Tillich regards space as being implied in the present. "Time creates the present 
through its union with space".82 One can be in the present, only if one has a space 
in which to be. Again, like time, the category of space has both negative and 
positive elements. The space that a finite being has is never hislher own. There is 
no permanent home for any finite being, for we are mortal. We live in a house, or a 
region for a limited period of time. For that reason, what we call ours is not ours 
permanently: it may be ours for the duration of our lives, but after we have gone, 
our space will be taken up by others. This sense of not having a final space 
generates anxiety for the creature. Thus, the desire for security is a characteristic of 
creaturely existence: just as an animal will fight to protect its domain, so will the 
human being. Tillich argues that this need for security is present in every life-
process. 83 Out of this fundamental insecurity comes the positive element. The 
80 Ibid., p.193. 
81 Ibid., p.193. 
82 Ibid., p.194. 
83 Ibid., p.195. 
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creature learns to affirm the space it has at present. There is an acceptance of the 
transitory nature of the space, out of which comes courage to enjoy its presence 
there. This acceptance is itself a kind of security. Thus time and space are 
ambiguous because they express both being and non-being in their positive and 
negative elements. 
Causality likewise expresses being and non-being. By looking for that which 
precedes a thing or event, causality points to the power of being and so affirms 
being. However, the fact that it is possible to point to that which precedes 
something or some event is also to show that the power is derived from something 
other than the event or thing itself. Thus, the powerlessness of the thing or event is 
illustrated and this is the negative element of the category of causality. 
Substance, the fourth category, points to the unchangeable that underlies all that 
changes. It refers to the stability underpinning the "flux of appearances". 84 As with 
the other three categories, substance has positive and negative elements. Every 
change that is experienced in existence generates anxiety about the loss of 
substance. This anxiety is most profound at the approach of death, when the 
individual has to face up to the complete loss of self. This is the anxious element of 
substance. This anxiety however, is balanced by courage that is found in the 
acceptance of the inevitability of the loss of substance. 
So we have seen that the categories, for Tillich, are the forms encapsulating both the 
internal and the external world of the human being. As a result, our understanding 
of reality is determined by time, space, causality and substance and, as such, is 
ambiguous. The ambiguity is derived from the fact that the categories are the 
categories of finitude and so relate not simply to being, but to non-being as well, for 
finitude means being in relation to non-being. In other words, the categories are 
84 Tillich, Systematic Theology 1, p.197. 
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ontological in nature;85 they are the forms that underpin existence. Life is, therefore, 
inevitably ambiguous. 
Earlier, we saw the way in which finite life participates in the divine life. It is 
necessary now to consider the following question: If the categories belong to and 
underpin finitude and if humanity is unable to escape them, how is it possible for 
the creature to participate in the divine life? In other words, what is it that connects 
the existential creature with God? To answer these questions it is necessary to 
consider Tillich's understanding of the nature of reason and logos. 
Reason and the Categories 
We have seen in Tillich's description of the three Principles of the divine life that 
Logos functions to give meaning and structure to the creative power of the 
Godhead.86 We have also seen the way in which finitude participates in the divine 
life. The three divine principles are present in the life of the finite being; the rhythm 
of the life of being itself provides the rhythm for the life of the finite being. In 
terms of the structure of finitude, then, the Logos principle of being itself is present 
in finite being. Tillich recognises its presence through the structure of reason in 
finite being. Reason links the structure of finitude with the structure of being itself 
and is part of the very fabric of being. 
Tillich draws a careful distinction between ontological reason and epistemological 
reason and it is to a consideration of each that we must now turn. 
8S Ibid., p.164. 
86 Ibid., p.251. 
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Ontological Reason 
Tillich defines ontological reason as the structuring principle of being, in which all 
that is finite participates.87 In so far as it is derived from the divine life, ontological 
reason is Logos. However, in so far as it is Logos that participates in finite being, it 
is Logos that is separated from the other two principles of Power and Spirit that 
make up the divine life. It is, therefore, wrong to suggest that ontological reason is 
identical to Logos in the divine life. Unlike ontological reason, Logos in the divine 
life is part of a trinitarian unity. Nevertheless, ontological reason is derived from 
Logos, and therefore, from the divine trinity. Tillich thus, equates ontological 
reason with what he describes as logos, not Logos. By using the lower case, Tillich 
wishes to highlight the essential difference between Logos and logos and, at the 
same time, by using the same word, he establishes their essential connection. 
Ontological reason is Logos embraced by time, space, causality and substance. It is 
Logos in separation from its unity with Power and Spirit. It is Logos searching for 
reunion. 
Thus, ontological reason is derived from, but also distinct from Logos. The 
ontological structure of being is derived from Logos, but with a character of its own 
determined by its participation in both being and non-being. Unlike the Logos 
principle of the divine life, ontological reason participates in the conditions of 
finitude: it is determined by the four categories of time, space, causality and 
substance and therefore, operates within a frame of ambiguity. Tillich states: 
... reason, if actualised in self and world, is dependent on the 
destructive structures of existence and the saving structures of 
life.88 
Ontological reason is both the structure of the world and the structure of the mind. 
In other words, just as the categories influence both the external and the internal 
world of the creature, so does ontological reason. Because of this resonance 
87 Tillich, Systematic Theology I, pp.171-172. 
88 Ibid., p.74. 
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between self and world, it is possible for the mind to grasp and shape reality. By 
establishing this, Tillich avoids the trap of solipsism when he speaks of the mind 
grasping and shaping reality. Reality is as much mind as it is world. That is not to 
say that reality is all in the mind. On the contrary, because of the resonance 
between the internal reality of the self and the external reality of the world, when 
we speak of the mind, we speak of reality because we speak of mind as it resonates 
with the world. Equally, when we speak of world we speak, again, of reality 
because we speak of world as it resonates with mind. This is not solipsism. For 
Tillich, the self cannot exist without the world and neither can the world without the 
self. 
If we forget the basic ontological polarity of self and world, then we may accuse 
Tillich of solipsism. But if we do, we must equally accuse ourselves of 
misunderstanding him at a fundamental level. The self-world polarity is a 
resonating one, not a mutually exclusive one, although mutual resistance is an 
essential component of that resonance. Self and world should be regarded as mirror 
images not of a static nature, but of a thoroughly dynamic kind. It is not that we see 
the same image through each, but that the same dynamic process is reflected in each 
and when the one looks at the other, something is added to the consciousness of that 
process. 
Epistemological Reason 
Tillich describes Epistemological reason, technical reason, as an instrument for the 
expression of ontological reason. 89 It is "the knowledge of knowing", 90 which 
contrasts with ontological reason, "the knowledge of being".91 Epistemology is 
concerned to find "the means for ends".92 It is properly the tool for ontological 
reason and when it is aligned with the latter, there is harmonious accord between 
89 Ibid., p.73. 
90 Ibid., p.71. 
91 Ibid., p.71. 
92 Ibid., p.73. 
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them. As long as epistemological reason is aligned with the logos of ontological 
reason, the searching for means for ends will be done in the service of God. 
However, if epistemological reason becomes severed from ontological reason, we 
have a situation in which the power to search is unleashed from its controlling 
structure. Tillich asserts: 
Technical reason ... dehumanises man if it is separated from 
ontological reason. And, beyond this, technical reason itself is 
impoverished and corrupted if it is not continually nourished by 
ontological reason.93 
Technical reason, which, unlike ontological reason, can never know the nature of 
things, operates upon presuppositions that lie beyond its ability to grasp. If both 
types of reason are separated, technical reason operates in ignorance of the 
presuppositions upon which it depends. 
The great discoveries of the nineteenth century aroused a sense of confidence in the 
human ability to understand. Scientific discoveries showed humanity its power to 
control its world. This great awakening is an important period in world history. 
However, Tillich highlights the danger of going too far in our assumptions that the 
process of reasoning can find solutions to all of our problems and questions. It can 
only work for us ifit acts as a channel for ontological reason. We must never forget 
our own alignment not simply in relation to our world, but in relation to that which 
created, sustains and directs us. Only ontological reason may keep our connection 
with being itself and so to imagine that epistemological reason has the creative 
source of power wholly within itself is to run the risk of severing our umbilical cord 
with the ground of our being. This is a threat that Tillich wishes us to guard 
• 94 
agamst. 
93 Tillich, Systematic Theology 1, p.73. 
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Thus, reason in finitude is present in both the ontological and the epistemological 
sense. Ontological reason provides us with our understanding of who we are, while 
epistemological reason equips us with the capacity to realise our full potential 
through the acquisition of skills. As long as the ends to the means are in relation to 
God, then, the actualisation of being will proceed through technical reason. 
However, as finite being is being in existence, it is being in ambiguity. The 
alignment so necessary for a harmonious resonance between creaturely life and 
divine life is threatened at every moment by the negation of being. This threat is as 
present in the relationship between ontological and epistemological reason as it is in 
every other aspect of finite life. The threat of a separation between the two is an 
example of the effect that the threat of non-being has in existence. 
Reason and the Self-World Correlation 
Tillich argues that humanity's capacity to think in a self-conscious way sets it apart 
from the rest of creaturely existence. This ability is derived from the logos structure 
of the mind, without which the human being would not be able to develop a sense 
of self because there would be no sense of world. In other words, without the logos 
structure of the mind, there would be no self-world correlation. Equally, without 
the self-world correlation, the logos dynamic would not operate in existence. Once 
again, resonance is the theme underlying Tillich's ideas. Let us be clear that we 
speak in terms of correlation between the self and world through existential logos. 
This is the logos present through the ontological structure of being: it is present in 
the form of ontological and epistemological reason. It is not the Logos of the divine 
life, for that is part of the trinitarian unity that is God. Existential logos is reason 
present in the world and in the mind. Tillich defines the former as objective reason 
and the latter as subjective reason. Thus, existential reason (or logos) consists of 
subjective and objective reason and by virtue of the basic dynamic ontological 
relationship between self and world, it is reason of a dynamic nature. 
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Essential and Existential Ontological Reason 
Existential logos or reason, then, is the logos of finitude. Tillich, however, makes it 
clear that it is not totally severed from that which goes beyond existence. He speaks 
of essential reason, namely, reason imbued with the logos of being. Here, he 
speaks in terms of ontological reason rather than technical reason and he seems to 
suggest that a distinction must be made not only between ontological reason and 
epistemological reason, but also within ontological reason itself: there is existential 
ontological reason, discussed above, and then there is essential ontological reason, 
which Tillich equates with the content of revelation. 
Essential ontological reason is imbued with the logos of being. That is not to say 
that it is equated with Logos: Tillich would never suggest this because he is acutely 
aware of the sheer qualitative difference between divine life and finite life. Instead, 
he attempts to mark out a route through which Logos filters into existence, which 
leads him inevitably into the depiction of a form of hierarchical order of the 
different forms of reason. It is most probable that this was not a deliberate intention 
on his part; in his discussion of the multi-dimensional unity of life, he deliberately 
offers a language that does not smack of hierarchy.95 However, in his depiction of 
the relationship of essential ontological reason and existential ontological reason, it 
is hard not to understand them in a hierarchical way. He would seem to suggest that 
the logos of being imbues essential ontological reason: it appears that the two are 
synonymous at this level. However, at the level of existential ontological reason, it 
would seem that the synonymity has been lost. As existence consists of a mixture 
of being and non-being, reason in existence cannot be an expression of pure being: 
it expresses non-being as well. Existential reason may point toward essential 
reason, but in view of its existential nature, it lacks the clarity of that from which it 
is derived. 
As was noted earlier, it was probably not the intention of Tillich to suggest a 
hierarchical order, but his particular use of language perhaps made it inevitable. If 
95 TiIlich, Systematic Theology 3, p.15. 
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we use another type of imagery here, however, the hierarchical image dissipates, 
somewhat. It is possible to understand Tillich's ideas about the nature of the 
relationship between essential and existential reason in terms of alignment. Let us 
regard essential reason as being rational structure in total alignment with the power 
of being. In this light, existential reason is rational structure pulled out of alignment 
with the power of being by the clouding presence of non-being. It is confused by 
the disturbance generated by the negative force of non-being. 
The idea of alignment perhaps helps us to appreciate Tillich's vision of the divine 
life. Perhaps when he speaks of the union of the trinitarian forces of Power, 
Structure and Spirit, he refers to the three principles in alignment, in harmonious 
union. Just as when the individual colours that make up a spectrum of light are 
aligned, there is the clarity of light, so too, when the three principles of the divine 
life are aligned, there is God. It would follow from this that existential being is that 
which is not aligned; the dynamic forces of being are pulled out of alignment by the 
negative forces of non-being. Thus, what is unified in the divine life is fragmented 
in finite life.96 
Reason in its existential form is thus reason limited by the categories of existence 
and clouded by the presence of the negative force of non-being. Existential reason is 
ambiguous. Life, as it participates in the rational structure of being, is ambiguous 
and consciousness of reality is ambiguous because of the limitations of reason in 
existence. 
Tillich asserts, as we have seen, that the process of actualisation of being, which 
takes place in existence, does so through the dynamic correlation between self and 
world. A sense of self is possible only if one is able to stand apart from self. This 
is achieved only if there is a world which one can enter. At the same time, the 
ability to stand outside oneself requires the capacity for reflection. The rational 
structure of the mind makes this possible. Thus, if we consider the way in which 
96 The suggestion here is not that Tillich himself was consciously aware of such imagery, but 
that it can be invoked from his ideas and can help to shed light upon his theology. 
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the self-world correlation is expressed through the ontological structural elements of 
being, it is plain that the interplay of the polar forces is built upon the structure of 
reason. There would be no centring dynamic between the polar forces of 
individualisation and participation without the presence of reason because the sense 
of self in relation to world lies at the heart of that dynamic and the importance of 
reason in that fundamental polarity has already been demonstrated. To put things 
simply: if I cannot think reflectively, I can have no sense of self over against 
another being. Therefore, I am not able to be a centred participant in a group or to 
withdraw from the group in order to express my individuality. As the other polar 
elements of dynamics and form, freedom and destiny are built upon the fabric of the 
centring dynamic of the first set of polarities, the role of reason in the ontological 
structure of being, as expressed through the elements of that structure, can be seen 
to be pivotal. 
However, there is something else that operates in the dialectical dynamic of the 
ontological structure, which has not yet been addressed. We have seen that reason 
provides the structure within which the actualisation of being can be realised in 
existence. We have not yet considered what it is that provides the drive for the 
dynamic. We have seen that the rhythm of the divine life is reiterated in finite life, 
but that is not sufficient to explain the powerful driving force that appears as a 
strong theme in Tillichian theology. So where are we to look in order to understand 
this driving dynamic? We must turn to his idea of eros. 
Eros and the Categories 
Tillich describes eros as the classical name for the inner dynamics by which life is 
driven toward fulfilment.97 It is a quality of love that represents the drive toward 
value and is present in human passion and striving. He makes reference to Plato's 
appreciation of eros as that which drives the mind toward the true.98 For Tillich, 
97 Tillich, Systematic Theology 3, p.56. 
98 Tillich, Systematic Theology 1, p.72. 
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eros is an energy that provides the movement of the inferior in terms of power and 
meaning toward the superior. It is desire "for the summum bonum" and passion for 
fulfilment. 99 
Eros is the "urge toward the reunion of the separated". lOO It is a dynamic of a 
wholly finite nature, for finitude is based upon the divine principles in separation 
and such separation generates the ambiguity of life in existence. This contrasts 
starkly with the unity of the divine life, from which finitude is derived and in which 
it is cradled. Eros is the urge for the reunion of those principles as they are in the 
divine life. 
Eros, then, is a vital concept in Tillichian theology because it is derived from his 
appreciation of the relation of divine life to finite life. It is that dynamic in life that 
drives the creature to go beyond itself in search of the union that is not possible in 
existence. Eros is the driving force of reason in its ontological sense and, as such, 
permeates the very structure of existence to the core. We noted earlier that logos is 
Logos searching for reunion. Perhaps now we can appreciate the way in which the 
search is conducted: eros harnessed to the structure of logos is the vehicle by which 
the creature reaches beyond creaturely limitations. 
As it is a quality of finite life, eros is also conditioned by the limitations of the 
categories and therefore, is subject to the ambiguities of existence. Eros is 
threatened at every moment by the negative forces of non-being, which distort it as 
it drives toward ultimate good. 
Tillich cites as an example of the possible distortion of eros, the notion of 
concupiscence. This he defines as "the unlimited desire to draw the whole of reality 
into one's self,.IOI He argues that in such a state, the eros of the human being 
strives not for reunion, but to draw into oneself that which is not one's own. There 
99 Ibid., p.281. 
100 TilIich, Systematic Theology 3, p.137. 
101 TilIich, Systematic Theology 2, p.52. 
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is a seeking of one's own pleasure through the exploitation of other beings. 102 In 
such a situation, the drive of eros in its distortion generates a vortex, in which the 
ego of the individual stands out of a moral relation to others and draws them into 
what slhe considers to be hislher world. This world however, is distorted because, 
by failing to recognise the humanity of those whom the individual draws in, slhe 
fails also to recognise hislher own. Thus, concupiscence expresses a collapse in the 
basic resonance between self and world. 
Eros and Agape 
Tillich suggests that the only way distortion of the power of eros can be overcome 
is by the alignment of eros with a love not conditioned by the categories, namely, 
by alignment with agape. For Tillich, "Love as agape is a creation of the Spiritual 
Presence which conquers the ambiguities of all other kinds of love."I03 In other 
words, just as Spirit is the uniting principle of God, so too, the involvement of the 
Spiritual Presence in finite life realigns that which is distorted by the ambiguities of 
existence. Agape is the expression in love of the principle of Spirit: through agape, 
the drive of eros may be realigned with the "summum bonum", for which it 
properly seeks. 104 Thus, it is through agape that eros may overcome the threat of 
non-being. 
For Tillich, eros does not stand in conflict with agape. It is wrong to interpret eros 
as fleshly, selfish desire in opposition to the selfless agapeic love of God. Of 
course, eros can be selfish and apparently in conflict with agape, as we have seen in 
the example of concupiscence, but such conflict is only apparent: Eros cannot 
threaten agape. Just as there is a qualitative difference between finite life and that 
of the divine, so too, is there a similar difference between eros and agape. Equally 
however, just as finite life participates in that of the divine, so too, does eros 
participate in agape. 
)02 Ibid., p.54. 
)03 Tillich, Systematic Theology 3, p.137. 
)04 Tillich, Systematic Theology 1, p.281. 
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Apparent conflict occurs when eros is out of alignment with that in which it 
participates. The Nazi drive to exterminate the Jewish people would seem to 
provide sound grounds for arguing that eros stands in conflict with apape. Surely, 
the love of God found an equal counterpart in eros, if the atrocities of the Holocaust 
were allowed to take place? But such atrocities do not point toward the conflict 
between eros and agape because eros is derived from agape. Rather, such events 
occur when eros has become distorted, the effect of the ambiguities of finite life. 
When creaturely drive toward the summum bonum loses sight of that ultimate good, 
the drive goes wild. Just as epistemological reason must be directed by ontological 
reason in order for there to be a creative actualisation of potential within existence, 
so too, the drive of eros must be directed by the light of agape. Thus, Tillich states: 
Eros and agape cannot contradict each other. 105 
Eros is the dynamic in existence that drives the creature to seek the ultimate good 
and, as such, is a drive conditioned by the categories and made ambiguous by the 
dynamics of life. What authorises eros to drive toward the ultimate good is not an 
inherent quality of its own, but its derivation from, and subjection to the loving 
Spiritual presence of agape. There is a correlation between eros and agape: without 
agape, eros is directionless and so cannot drive toward the summum bonum. 
Equally, without the drive toward that ultimate good, the love of the divine could 
not be made actual. In so far as eros is subject to the threat of non-being, it is, at 
every moment, ambiguous. Its creative drive is threatened by the destructive forces 
of non-being, making eros volatile. However, through its correlation with agape, 
eros overcomes the negative forces and drives creatively toward the reunion of that 
which has been separated. 
One question must be asked at this point: in what way is agape present in the life of 
the finite being? How is it possible for that which is beyond the limitations of the 
105 Tillich, Systematic Theology 2, p.129. 
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categories to be involved in existence? This question will be answered, at least 
partially, in the next section. 
Spirit and the Categories 
Tillich defines humanity as "bearer of the spirit,,)06 and describes spirit as the "unity 
of power and meaning".107 We have already encountered such a unity in the divine 
life, in which Tillich defines God as the unity of power and meaning. He goes on to 
state that God both has and is Spirit. Thus, Spirit is also defined as the unity of 
power and meaning. We may be forgiven therefore, if, at first glance, we assume 
that humanity, as the bearer of spirit, is the bearer of the divine. However, on closer 
inspection we see that humanity is not bearer of Spirit, but bearer of spirit. Once 
again, as with logos and Logos, Tillich uses upper and lower case to make a 
distinction between the divine and finite lives and at the same time, by using the 
same word, he draws our attention to the essential connection between them. This 
paradox of the distinction and yet connection between Spirit and spirit brings us 
back to one of the central questions of Tillich's theology, referred to earlier, 
namely, how is it possible for the creature to participate in the divine life? Before 
we can address that question, it is necessary to examine precisely what Tillich 
means when he attributes the title bearer of spirit to humanity. 
His notion of humanity as the bearer of spirit is derived from his understanding of 
the way in which all life exists in total interdependence, which he refers to as the 
multi-dimensional unity of life. 108 An examination of this term, therefore, is a 
necessary prerequisite for an examination of the term spirit. 
106 TiJlich, Systematic Theology 3, p.25. 
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The Multi-Dimensional Unity of Life 
When Tillich speaks of existence and finite life, he has in his mind not simply the 
life of humanity, but of all that lives, from the inorganic to the human being. All 
categories of living things relate to each other and this he terms the multi-
dimensional unity of life. 
All encountered reality can be identified as belonging to different realms. A realm 
indicates a section of life in which a particular dimension is predominant. 109 He 
distinguishes several obvious dimensions: the inorganic, organic, psychological and 
spiritual. The criterion for establishing a dimension is revealed in the way in which 
time, space, causality and substance change under its predominance. He argues that 
things are not in time and space, but rather have a time and space. 11 0 
He suggests that when one dimension supercedes another, the categories of the 
preceding dimension are built upon. Thus, the multi-dimensional unity of life refers 
to the way in which everything in life contributes to, and is a part of the overall 
unity of life. It is an understanding that transcends the notion of fixed time and 
fixed space. Although subjection to the categories is universal for all living beings, 
their expression is by no means of a uniform nature. 
Tillich defines life as the actualisation of potential. I11 In order to explain the 
process involved in this actualisation, he chooses terminology that presents the 
process of life as a unified whole. Deliberately, he chooses not to speak of the 
levels of existence, as he argues that this generates a sense of hierarchy, which tends 
toward a confrontational understanding of life: hierarchy suggests rank and rigidity, 
superior and inferior levels and thus, tends to deny the dynamic aspect of life. 
Instead, Tillich adopts the terms realm and dimension, as they provide a more 
flexible, dynamic and interrelated image. 
109 Ibid., p.16. 
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A realm is a section in life in which a particular dimension predominates. He cites 
as examples the realms of vegetable, animal and history. What distinguishes one 
from another is the dimension of life that predominates in each. Tillich suggests that 
all dimensions are potentially present in each realm, but not all are actualised. There 
are many different dimensions, the most fundamental being the inorganic. This is 
the first condition for the actualisation of every dimension, the foundation 
dimension. Without it, according to Tillich, all realms would dissolve. 112 The 
second dimension, the organic, evolves out of the inorganic and predominates in the 
vegetable realm. However, the inorganic does not disappear. On the contrary, in the 
vegetable realm, the inorganic is still present but through evolution, a constellation 
of inorganic factors causes the dimension of the organic to find expression. Thus 
the vegetable realm is characterised by the predominance of the organic dimension, 
which evolves out of the inorganic. For this reason, Tillich argues that it is wrong 
to suggest that the organic is a dimension superior to that of the inorganic because 
without the latter the former would not have emerged. Neither is the realm of 
matter inferior to that of the vegetable. The realms are differentiated by the way the 
categories of time, space, causality and substance operate as the result of the 
predominance of a new dimension. 
Tillich also wishes to guard against drawing too clear a distinction between realms. 
There is no clear delineation because of the evolutionary way in which they are 
born. The realms are too dynamic and perpetually evolving for it to be possible 
neatly to characterise all that exists into one realm or another. Instead, Tillich 
suggests that we can only speak in very broad terms. He argues that while it is 
perhaps defensible to state that the organic dimension predominates in the vegetable 
realm, at the same time, it must be acknowledged that it also predominates in parts 
of the animal realm. With some animals however, (for example, in monkey and ape 
species), it is the psychological dimension that can be seen to predominate. Out of 
the constellation of psychological factors emerges the dimension of the spirit, which 
112 Ibid., p.19. 
63 
is predominant in the realm of history - the human realm. I 13 Although the psychic 
dimension begins to appear in the animal realm, it is not fully actualised until the 
historical realm, the realm of the human being. So, Tillich argues that the spiritual 
dimension predominates in the realm of humanity out of the constellation of psychic 
factors. 
Important to remember here is the dynamic aspect of the dimensions and realms. 
Tillich lived in a period of history greatly influenced by the thinking of Darwin and 
his theory of evolution. Tillich acknowledges this theory when claiming that the 
predominance of a particular dimension is something that emerges over millions, if 
not billions of years. He says: 
Billions of years may have passed before the inorganic realm 
permitted the appearance of objects in the organic dimension, 
and millions of years before the organic realm permitted the 
appearance of a being with language. Again, it took tens of 
thousands of years before the being with the power of language 
became the historical man whom we know as ourselves. 1 14 
In these words, Tillich emphasises that the spiritual dimension did not come to 
predominate with the appearance of the first homo-sapien. Rather, the psychic 
dimension had to evolve to such an extent that human psyche and historical 
circumstance were both ripe for the shift into a new dimension, namely, the 
spiritual. This is important because it is an illustration of the way in which Tillich 
regards the spiritual dimension to be part of the process of evolving consciousness 
that begins not simply with the first primitive human being, but with the inorganic 
dimension in the realm of matter. The dimension of the spirit has integral to it all 
other dimensions, but it adds to those dimensions by actualising what was only 
potential in them. Just like a set of Russian dolls, all dimensions are interlinked; the 
dimension of spirit is the product of the constellation of psychic factors, which, in 
113 Ibid., p.21. 
114 TilIich, Systematic Theology 3, p.l6. 
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turn, is the product of a constellation of organic factors, and so we go on until we 
reach the most basic, most fundamental dimension of the inorganic. The dimension 
of spirit is the actualisation of all that is potential in the inorganic dimension. 
Once again, we see the idea of resonance in Tillich's understanding of the process 
of the actualisation of potential. The dimension of spirit resonates with that of the 
inorganic. There is mutual participation. If we consider in more detail how the 
dimension of the spirit comes to predominate in the realm of history, we learn that 
spirit is related to the psyche through the personal centre, 115 which makes sense of 
the psychological material around us. Every thought is based upon what we sense 
and experience consciously and unconsciously. Without it, there would be no 
content for the thinking process. The personal centre is not the same as the 
psychological contents that it processes, although, at the same time, it is the centre 
for those contents, the integrating principle of the psyche. 
When all psychological contents have been integrated into a whole, we can say that 
the contents have been transcended. Tillich calls this transcendence a manifestation 
of spirit. It is perhaps easy to see why he chooses the term spirit here, if we remind 
ourselves of his understanding of Spirit in the divine life, in which it is the unifying 
principle that integrates the opposition of the dynamics of power and structure in 
the divine life. It is the principle of divine creativity. In just the same way, spirit in 
the human being is the unifying principle. It is' manifested in the unity of the 
personal centre. In Tillich's words: 
If the dimension of the spirit dominates a life process, the 
psychological centre offers its own contents to the unity of the 
personal centre. I 16 
In this sense, Tillich asserts that humanity is the bearer of spirit. 
115 Ibid., p.27. 
116 Tillich, Systematic Theology 3, p.27. 
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To summarise, we have seen that in Tillich's view, life is a united whole, comprised 
of different realms in which different dimensions predominate. No realm is 
superior to the others, although each builds upon the foundations laid by those that 
precede it. Humanity belongs to the historical realm, in which the dimension of 
spirit predominates. This is the dimension in which all that is potential in other 
realms is made actual. Humanity's role in this respect is expressed in the title, 
bearer of spirit. By virtue of the fact that the emergence of this dimension stands 
dependent upon all preceding dimensions, humanity is the bearer of spirit not just 
for itself, but for all realms of life. If the purpose of the realm of matter is to 
provide the foundation for all that builds upon it, then the purpose and duty of those 
in the historical realm is to bear spirit for that upon which it is built. 
The unity of life is one that is unified out of resonance and mutual participation. 
There is no king-pin and no under-dog. When each realm actualises potential to its 
limit, another realm is born to continue the process. As the new realms emerge, the 
positions of those preceding become clearer. When foundations of a building are 
laid, it is not until the building has been built that they can clearly be identified as 
foundations. As they are the first things to be built, initially, they are not 
foundations. Only when they have been built upon do they begin to fulfil their 
function as foundations, and only when the building has been completed do they 
function fully as foundations. In the same way, in the process of actualisation, there 
is no dying off of realms, but a progressive clarification of the function of each in 
the light of those that follow. The duty of humanity, as bearer of spirit, is to shine 
the light of Spirit onto life so that the participation of each realm may be clarified. 
Clarification is the process of evolving consciousness and this is what is meant by 
the actualisation of potential being, so closely connected with the multi-dimensional 
unity of being. Perhaps now we are in a position to return to spirit as it relates to 
the categories. 
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The Dimension of spirit 
The dimension of spirit is the unifying dimension, through which all others become 
integrated into the unifying wholeness of life. It is the dimension in which all that 
remains potential is actualised and the duty of humanity, as bearer of spirit, is to 
bring about the fulfilment of the actualisation process. This process is one of 
expanding consciousness and it falls to the human being to be the vehicle for this 
because consciousness of the spiritual dimension is possible only through the 
structure of reason, in which the human psyche is housed. Such a structure is 
necessary for spiritual consciousness because it is the structure not only of the 
human psyche, but also of the world external to the human being. Reason is the 
structuring principle of being and therefore, permeates everything that has life. 
Only humanity, in whom the same structuring principle predominates, has the 
capacity to bring to full consciousness the potential of the structure of reason, 
namely, the dimension of spirit. It is important to reiterate the relationship between 
reason and spirit in order to be clear as to the precise way in which consciousness of 
the potential of reason brings about the manifestation of the dimension of spirit. 
As we have already seen, the structure of reason makes possible a sense of self and 
world. Through this self-world correlation the human being becomes self-aware and 
as a consequence, becomes socially aware. Only the human being is capable of self-
consciousness, and by virtue of its correlation with the world, self-consciousness 
also means world-consciousness. 
The human being develops such consciousness by means of the personal centre, the 
house in each individual in which all experiences and senses, both conscious and 
unconscious, are integrated. The integration represents a transcending of each of the 
individual experiences, so that the personal centre is more than the sum total of the 
experiences themselves. The personal centre, structured out of reason, is that centre 
in which the dynamic of eros becomes creative. The desire to make sense of 
experience is the drive of eros; the ability to make sense of experience is the 
presence of the structure of reason. Therefore, the personal centre is that in which 
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eros and the structure of reason creatively integrate with each other. The product of 
this integration is the emergence of the predominance of the dimension of spirit. 
However, the spirit is not only the offspring of this integration, it is also the 
principle present in the personal centre that integrates eros with reason. It is, if you 
like, the unifying ingredient, the creative principle that brings about transcendence 
and works through both the drive of eros and the structure of reason. It cannot be 
distinguished from the elements through which it works but, at the same time, 
without it, transformation would not occur. It is so empty that it can only be seen 
through the effect of the unification of two forces or principles. 
Thus, spirit is the creative unifying principle in life, which is brought to self-
consciousness through the life of the human being. As such, it is the principle in 
existence that mirrors the creative unifying principle of the divine life. The 
description of the spirit in the preceding paragraph is reminiscent of the description 
of the Spirit in the section on the divine life: both spirit and Spirit are creative 
unifying principles. Both creatively unify power (the eros of finite life and the 
Godhead of divine life) and reason (the logos of finite life and the Logos of divine 
life). So, we come to the inevitable question: what is the difference between spirit 
and Spirit? 
We have already seen that logos is Logos separated from the creative unity of the 
divine life by the categories of time, space, causality and substance. Eros is the 
power of God separated by the categories from the creative unity of the divine life. 
It also follows that spirit is divine Spirit conditioned by the categories. 
It is important to appreciate however, that spirit is not Spirit in separation, as logos 
and eros have been described, because Spirit is the unifying principle in both the 
divine life and that of the finite creature. There is, nevertheless, a distinction to be 
drawn between finite spirit and divine Spirit and it is the influence of the categories 
that draws it. The dimension of spirit is Spirit in time, space, causality and 
substance. The categories are the barriers which creaturely life cannot escape. 
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There is, thus, a gulf between spirit and Spirit that the creature can never bridge. 
However, in Tillichian theology, although the gulf remains unbridgeable, as the 
divine reaches out to the finite through the creative principle of Spirit, humanity is 
able to reach out and grasp in the dimension of spirit, and to glimpse that which is 
offered through the veil imposed by the categories. An eternal fragment is received 
and an eternal moment is experienced, sufficient to nourish the dimension of spirit 
within existence. That nourishment, in turn, sustains not only humanity, but all that 
lives. 
For Tillich, divine life reaches out to finite life through Jesus as the Christ. 1 17 He is 
the bridge between finite existence and the divine, but not a bridge made by the 
former. He represents the love of the latter for the former because through Jesus as 
the Christ, God moves away from the unity that is God into the separation that is 
finitude, in order that through the consciousness that is finitude, the potential that is 
God is made actual. 
Finitude does not stand independently of divine life; it is born out of the creative 
movement away from divine unity and, as such, always stands apart from that unity. 
However, through Jesus as the Christ, the dimension of spirit is nourished by the 
Spirit of divine life, allowing finitude to move closer to the unity of the divine 
through an evolving consciousness of the divine nature of life. 
To conclude, what makes the distinction between divine life and creaturely life 
inevitable and unbridgeable is the conditioning influence of the categories of time, 
space, causality and substance, by which all that exists is bound. However, despite 
the qualitative difference between divine life and that of the creature, there is a 
point of connection in Tillichian theology between the two, a connection sought 
through the question posed earlier in this section, how is it possible for the creature 
to participate in the divine life? 
117 TiIlich, Systematic Theology 2, p. 93. 
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The creature participates in the divine life because finite life is an essential element 
of that life. The creature was created by, and continues to be sustained by the 
divine. The dynamic processes in existential life echo those of divine life, but the 
echo has undergone transformation upon its return. Finite life is not passive in 
relation to that in which it is grounded; on the contrary, there is a qualitative 
difference between divine and finite life, and the relationship is based upon mutual 
participation. Finite life stands alone and separated from the divine by virtue of the 
conditioning quality of the categories of time, space, causality and substance. At 
the same time, however, the dynamics of divine life resonate with those of finite life 
and through this resonance, finitude seeks out the source of its being. The dynamic 
forces of power and structure, united in Spirit, work in existential life, as they do in 
the life of the divine. However, they work ambiguously and through tension in the 
former as the consequence of the effect of the inescapable categories of existence. 
This contrasts starkly with the way in which the powers are unified through Spirit in 
the life of the divine. 
The drive for reunification of that which is separated is derived from the ground of 
finite being and through that drive, reunification is achieved fragmentarily and 
fleetingly at every moment of transcendence in life. Such moments begin in the 
personal centre of every individual and ripple out into every aspect of reality in 
which the individual is involved. They are experienced through the integration of 
the rational structure of the psyche with the drive of eros. The point at which the 
two become one represents the point at which spirit is made manifest. In this way, 
the unifying principle of Spirit of the divine life finds expression within existence 
and, through this presence, finite life participates in divine life. 
Conclusion 
In the introduction to this chapter, it was suggested that Tillich discovered the 
presence of dynamic forces lying behind the events and circumstance of existence 
that drove history and therefore, all that lived in history in a particular direction. He 
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used these dynamic forces to find a language that would express the healing power 
of the Christian message to modernity. 
He perceived a driving force as well as a structuring dynamic to underlie life, and 
both were grounded in the dynamic of the divine life itself. The three divine 
principles of Godhead, Logos and Spirit expressed the dynamic forces of power, 
structure and unity, which, for Tillich, presented themselves as phases in the divine 
life. The three were in union and inseparable. The union was dynamic in nature 
and characterised by an eternal emanation and return within God. The rhythm of 
the interplay of the divine forces in union was a pulsating one, which gave life to 
finite being. The pulse of the divine became the pulse of being in existence. Finite 
life was rooted in divine life, but in the movement-away-from-God phase of that 
life. Thus, finite life was life in separation: creaturely life represented the divine 
life in separation from itself and creaturely life in separation from the Creator. The 
creature was separated from God but, at the same time, grounded in God. TiIIich's 
theology used dynamic principles to attempt to work through this paradox; 
creaturely life was not static, but a dynamic process that was a vital element of the 
divine pulse. Created in the movement-away-from-God phase of that pulse, finite 
life made manifest the dynamic divine forces in separation from each other. Thus 
the movement-away-from-God phase was a breaking down of union and a 
manifestation of the components of that union. The dynamic structure of finite 
being was therefore, the presence of manifested forces in separation, searching for 
reunion. 
This is perhaps the first correlation in Tillichian theology, although, Tillich himself 
was perhaps not fully conscious of it. The process of finite life is one in which 
dynamic forces make actual what is potential through the tense, oscillating dynamic 
generated by polar forces. Humanity brings to consciousness this process through 
the logos structure of mind and lives to complete the actualisation process. 
The process of actualisation of being is therefore, one of consciousness of being. 
For this to take place, there must be that which negates being, as Tillich's theology 
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is based upon the fundamental principle of the self-world correlation: consciousness 
of self requires a separation from self in order for self to become manifest. This 
self-world correlation is at the heart of Tillich's understanding of the divine life: 
God must stand in separation from God, in order for God to become consciously 
God. Thus Tillich's method of correlation is the instrument he uses to express the 
dynamic rhythm of divine life in relation to finite life. Indeed, this very relation is 
based upon correlation; there is a mutual participation and resonance in which 
creature reaches out in need of sustenance to the divine and the divine embraces the 
creature as Sustainer. Creaturely need is satisfied by the presence of Spirit in 
existence, accessible, albeit in a fragmentary way, through the dimension of spirit in 
history, and by means of the sustenance of Spirit, human consciousness of the 
Eternal Presence in time and space makes manifest that which is hidden in the unity 
of God. 
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Chapter 2 
The Theme of Microcosm in the Renaissance 
Tillich makes fifteen references to the term microcosm in his three volumes of 
Systematic Theology. 118 In one of these, he ponders the issue of humanity's 
relationship to the world and to all creaturely existence. He considers this 
relationship with regard to humanity's role in saving the whole creaturely world. 
When Christian theology speaks of the fall of the world, what precisely does it 
mean? Is it the world of humanity alone or does it include every creature that lives 
in that world? Tillich suggests that this is perplexing for the modem day because it 
is steeped in the idea of individualism. He claims that we have "half-forgotten" a 
theological truth that antiquity took for granted, of which we must be reminded. if 
we are to begin to address the issues with regard to the fall of the world and its 
salvation. What is that half-forgotten theological truth? Tillich answers this in the 
following way: 
What happens in the microcosm happens by mutual 
participation in the macrocosmos, for being itself is one. 119 
Through these words, Tillich wishes to remind modernity of an understanding of 
life present in previous periods but which became half-lost in the individualism of 
modernity. So, where are we to look in our history to find that understanding of 
life? Tillich himself provides the answer, for in his system he makes repeated 
reference to the theme of microcosm present in the thinking of Nicholas Cusanus, 
Paracelsus, Jacob Boehme, Leibniz and Schelling.120 
118 See p.IIS, footnote 227 below. 
119 Tillich, Systematic Theology 1, p.261. 
120 Ibid., pp.260-261. 
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The thinkers above, cited by Tillich, span a period of four hundred years. Cusanus, 
Paracelsus and Boehme are considered to be among the most influential thinkers of 
the Renaissance period, while Leibniz and Schelling made their marks on the ideas 
of the Enlightenment and beyond. Tillich suggests that their ideas shared a 
common ground: they all portrayed a sense of humanity as microcosm. The fact 
that these thinkers spanned such a huge period would suggest that the theme of 
microcosm was one deeply embedded in the world-view of the eras in which these 
men lived. 
This chapter offers an exploration of the theme of microcosm present in the 
classical thinking of the Renaissance through exploration of the microcosmic 
perceptions of Cusanus, Paracelsus and Boehme. It aims to establish ideas 
characteristic of the microcosmic motif of the period, which will be used in Chapter 
Three to evaluate the extent to which such a motif is implicitly present in Tillich's 
theological system. 
The Renaissance period is selected for two reasons: firstly, Tillich refers directly to 
its microcosmic perspective by citing the names of Cusanus, Paracelsus and 
Boehme in this respect. However, as he also refers to the Enlightenment by citing 
the names of Leibniz and ScheIling, this is not reason enough to consider the 
Renaissance period without also considering the Enlightenment. This brings us to 
our second reason: the Renaissance gives powerful expression to microcosm, a 
theme that had its roots in the period preceding the Renaissance, and which 
gradually lost its voice with the dawn of the Enlightenment. The Renaissance, then, 
may be seen as the period in which the microcosmic theme enjoys a certain vigour, 
which it gradually loses with the emergence of Enlightenment thinking. As the aim 
of the chapter is simply to establish the presence of the microcosmic theme in the 
classical tradition in which Tillich was rooted, it is sensible to turn to the era in 
which the theme thrived, rather than to one that witnessed its demise. Consequently, 
Leibniz and Schelling's positions in the Enlightenment period render their 
microcosmic perceptions to be beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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As history is dynamic in nature, it would be somewhat of a distortion to discuss 
Renaissance microcosm without making any reference to the roots of the theme. 
For this reason, the chapter begins by offering introductory background to the 
microcosm of the Renaissance by outlining the microcosmic theme present in the 
Middle Ages. In particular, it offers an overview of the theme as it finds expression 
in the two key medieval traditions of Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism. In 
addition, it outlines the microcosmic theme present in alchemical thinking. This is 
done in order to establish the necessary background for the ideas of Paracelsus and 
Boehme, both of whom displayed a strong alchemical influence in their writings. 
Section One: Medieval Background to Renaissance 
Microcosm 
As we make our distinctions and assign labels to portions of history, it is important 
to remember that one period flows from that which precedes it and into that which 
follows. Time is a continuum and to imagine that each period is totally separate 
from those between which it is buffeted is to forget this. Thus, when we speak of 
the Renaissance as distinct from the Middle Ages, we must be conscious of the fact 
that those trends which made the Renaissance so distinctive were rooted in the 
preceding period. Cassirer suggests that it would be wrong to attempt to draw a 
clear distinction between Medieval and Renaissance man. Renaissance culture was 
deeply entrenched in medieval presuppositions, which largely were based upon 
. l' h 121 Anstote lan t eory. 
Coplestone would seem to support this view when he argues that it is important to 
remember that although there was a significant and not necessarily gradual 
transition from the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the contrast between them 
was not as dramatic as historians might choose to believe. He claims that the great 
121 E. Cassirer, The Individual & the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, (New York, Harper 
Torchbooks, Harper & Row, 1963), p.5. 
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discoveries of Renaissance science were rooted in the Middle Ages and were the 
product of a gradual dissatisfaction with the Aristotelian world-view in the light of 
new theories. 122 One of the themes prevalent in the Middle Ages and continuing 
into the Renaissance, with its roots in Greek thought, was that of microcosm. 123 
Microcosm means literally a little universe and is used to denote a sense in which 
the universal (i.e. the macrocosm) is manifest in the part. In medieval times, the 
relationship of God to humanity was described in microcosmic/macrocosmic terms 
and found particularly powerful expression in the Neoplatonic and Aristotelian 
world-views. 
Neoplatonism 
One of the philosophical systems that emerged out of the process of synthesis 
between Christianity and Hellenistic culture after the capture of Jerusalem in 70 
AD. was that ofNeoplatonism. It applied the basic tenets of Platonic philosophy to 
the pagan and Christian traditions, the result being a gradual assimilation of 
Platonic thought into pagan and Christian ideas. 
Neoplatonism was not one cohesive system, but a term used to embrace the many 
thinkers who sought to apply a philosophical system to religious practices. 
Platonism had many schools and so the variety of Neoplatonic schools was 
inevitable. 124 Nevertheless, in broad terms, Neoplatonists applied the Platonic 
principle of archetypal Ideas to their Christian or pagan world-view. Plato held that 
the phenomenal world was inferior to the world of Ideas, the former owing its 
existence to the latter. Thus, every object in the phenomenal world was a concrete 
expression of the archetype that formed it. 125 The phenomenal world could never 
122 F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol.3, (London, Burns, Outes & Washbourne Ltd., 
1953), p.17. 
123 Ibid., pp.20, 21. 
124 R.Tarnas, The Passion of the Western Mind, (New York, Ballantine Books, 1991), pp.lOI-
103. 
125 Ibid., pA. 
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access the perfection ofthe Ideas (or Forms), for the Ideas had a superior quality of 
being. Just as rays emanate from the Sun alone, so the world of matter emanated 
only from the archetypal Ideas that formed it. Thus, for Plato, the Ideas formed the 
world of matter and, at the same time, were beyond it. The Neoplatonists expressed 
this Platonic notion in terms of World Soul or the One, which was transcendent, but 
also issued divine Nous to the world. 126 
Plotinus 
Plotinus, considered to be the founding father of Neopiatonism,127 described the 
One as indefinable and transcendent. In his philosophy, he depicted a Holy Trinity: 
the supreme One, the Spirit (Nous), and the Soul. Spirit, or Nous, emanated from 
the One as its image. Nous was the light by which the One saw itself. The Soul 
was inferior to Nous, although it was the creator of all living things and the child of 
the divine Intellect. The Soul had two natures: the inner soul, focused upon Nous 
and the outer soul, focused upon the external world. In this way, Plotinus depicted 
a world-view in which the material world was the lowest quality of being, yet one 
that emanated from the One through the hierarchy of the Holy Trinity. Russell 
points out that emanation from the One was compared by Plotinus to the way in 
which light emanated from a candle flame. 128 Just like the light of a flame, the 
source of the divine emanation was at the centre. 
Thus, in his depiction of the hierarchy of being, Plotinus spoke in circular, spiralling 
terms - the source was at the centre. 129 The phenomenal world was on the 
periphery of the circular hierarchy and was, therefore, close to darkness, in just the 
same way as that on the edge of the candle flame was bordered by darkness. 
However, at the same time, that which was on the edge was still a part of that from 
which it was derived. Thus, although the phenomenal world was the lowest order 
126 Ibid., p.l 03. 
127 B. Russell, A History of Western Philosophy. (London, G.Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1946), pJ08. 
128 Ibid., p.85. 
129 The idea of the flame evokes circular imagery, while the idea of hierarchical order evokes 
spiralling imagery. 
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of being in the hierarchy, it was still part of the circular whole that emanated from 
the Source. The human being was connected to the divine source through the human 
imagination, which could access the divine Intellect. By casting off the shackles of 
the world of matter, the human being, through the imagination, could begin to 
return to the Source. 130 
Thus, the phenomenal world was a part of the divine emanation and part of a 
beautiful organic whole kept in universal harmony by the World Soul. Contained in 
this understanding was the idea of divine emanation and return, which took place 
through the hierarchy of the Trinity. Russell states: 
The entire universe exists in a continual outflow from the One 
to created multiplicity, which is then drawn back to the One - a 
process of emanation and return always moved by the One's 
superfluity of perfection. \3l 
This perpetual eternal emanation and return maintained the harmony and wholeness 
of the universe. Thus, when Plotinus spoke of the human being making the return 
to the source by freeing himself from materiality, the return was driven by the One. 
In the thinking of Plotinus is a microcosmic world-view. This is derived from the 
spiralling imagery of the hierarchy of being, 132 which depicts the organic wholeness 
of the universe, in which the One emanates from, and returns to itself. The human 
being owes its existence to the World Source and participates in it by virtue of its 
imagination, which can access Nous. Plotinus confirms this idea of microcosm 
when he speaks of the capacity for the philosopher to make a gradual ascent back to 
the Absolute by turning inwards and casting off the ties of the material world. 1. 
Gregory suggests: 
130 This evokes spiralling imagery: the human being both ascends and moves toward the centre, 
where resides the power of the Source. 
131 Ibid., p.86. 
132 From now on, spiralling will be used instead of circular, as the former contains within it the 
idea of the circle. 
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Plotinus was assured by personal experience that the individual 
human being is a microcosm of the universe. 133 
Pseudo-Dionysius 
Echoes of the thinking of Plotinus are found in the sixth century writings of Pseudo-
Dionysius. In a similar vein to Plotinus, he described the structure of the universe 
in terms of divine emanation and return through various hierarchies: the Celestial, 
the Ecclesiastical and the Legal. As in the thinking of Plotinus, he argued that the 
soul of the human being could return to God by ascending through the hierarchies. 
However, unlike Plotinus, he suggested that this ascension took place through a 
positive/negative dialectic. God was approached by the dialectical process of 
affirmative and negative theology, which led on to a reconciling superlative 
theology.134 In the affirmative phase, scriptural names, such as the One, Good, 
Living, etc. were applied to God. Having made these affirmations about God, in the 
negative phase, all predicates were denied, for God was utterly incomprehensible. 
The only way to God was through learned ignorance. The acceptance of God's 
incomprehensibility was expressed in the reconciling phase of the dialectical 
process, in which superlatives were attributed to God; God was Super-being, Super-
goodness, Super-life, etc.135 It was possible to state this because the universe had 
been created by God. Therefore, it participated in the Source but inevitably fell" 
short of it. The stages of the hierarchy closer to the Source were closer to the 
perfection of that Source, but inevitably never matched it. At the same time, the 
universe was never separated from the Source. It was thus a symbolic manifestation 
of it; the superlative attributes of God were symbolic expressions of the qualitative 
difference between the Source and the phenomenal world on the one hand, and of 
the connection between the two on the other. 136 The Source emanated from itself 
and, as a result, became the central point of that which was created through the 
133 J. Gregory, The Neoplatonists. (London, Routledge, 1999), p.12. 
134 J.R.Weinburg, A Short History of Medieval Philosophy. (Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1964), p. 46. 
135 Ibid., p.47. 
136 http://orb.rhodes.edu/encyclop!culture/Philos/coulter.html., January, 2002, p.2. 
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emanation. Thus, as in the thinking of Plotinus, the human being's hierarchical 
ascent to the Source was spiralling in nature. I 37 
As the universe was the emanation of the Source, and as there was an eternal 
procession from and return to the Source, the human soul could ascend the stages of 
the three hierarchies in its search for union with its Source by means of the return 
phase of this eternal procession. The soul's elevation was achieved through 
contemplative prayer (a yearning for union), faith and self-knowledge. In this way, 
the soul recognised the symbols hidden in the universe that were illuminations of 
the Source and it was through the deciphering of symbols that the soul could 
continue to ascend through the stages of the hierarchies until the ultimate goal, the 
mystical union with the Source, was achieved. 138 
Thus, in the work of Pseudo-Dionysius, we see the way in which the human being 
had to work the soul back to mystical union with God as God entered the return 
phase of the divine movement. This was achieved through a communion between 
God and the human creature, which took place through divine revelation in, and 
human interpretation of symbols that were hidden in the stages of the three 
hierarchies of being. Interpretation was achieved by means of a dialectical process, 
which demonstrated first, the immediacy and then the distance of God from the 
creature. The dialectic drew the human being to a realisation of the ineffability of 
God, which was the point of reunion of the human soul with the divine. 
Thus, we can see in the writings of Neoplatonists such as Plotinus and Pseudo-
Dionysius, reflections about God and the human being that were based upon a 
microcosmic view. What appeared to be common themes were firstly, a spiralling 
understanding of the hierarchical nature of the universe in relation to God, with God 
at the centre and emanating out; secondly, the appreciation of the universe as the 
137 Dionysius the Areopagite, On the Divine Names and the Mystical Theology, trans. C.E.Rolt 
(New York, Macmillan, 1940), p.99: The soul has spiralling movement when it is 
"enlightened with truths of Divine Knowledge". 
138Weinburg, Medieval Philosophy, pp.47,48. 
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effect of divine emanation, part of an eternal procession of emanation and return; 
thirdly, the assumption that the universe, although wholly inferior to God, was 
nevertheless, an expression of God. Finally, the view that the soul of the human 
being was able to return to its Source by virtue of the fact that it participated in the 
divine Intellect through the faculty of reason. 
It was against the backdrop of the principles of Neoplatonism that the works of 
Aristotle, rediscovered in the thirteenth century, were read. 
The Aristotelian World-View 
Guthrie suggests that the drive behind Aristotle's philosophy was his desire to 
understand the phenomenon of motion and change. 139 In this regard, he developed 
two concepts fundamental to his understanding of the universe, namely, the 
conceptions of immanent form and potentiality. 140 
Immanent Form 
Aristotle held that underlying the apparent change and flux of the world were basic 
unchanging principles, existing within the world of sensible objects, which could be 
distinguishable from the matter of the sensible object only by the process of 
thought. To explain this, he argued that each material thing found in the world 
consisted of a compound of substratum and form. The form (or formal nature) was 
that of opposites. 141 In other words, change, taking place in the substratum of 
matter, occurred in the world because of the principle of opposition underlying 
every sensible object. 
139 W.K.Guthrie, The Greek Philosophers: From Thales to Aristotle. (London, Routledge, 
1967), p.128. 
140 Ibid., p.122. 
141 Ibid., p.129. This idea was in keeping with the Ancient Greek view that change occurred 
through the dynamics of opposing forces. 
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Potentiality (dynamis) 
Aristotle argued that the phenomenon of change in the sensible world was driven by 
the inward urge of every sensible object to perfect itself. He called this drive physis 
(nature). 
This idea was rooted in his belief that life was derived from parenting: every new-
born creature had a parent, which served two functions: it caused the creature to 
exist in the first place, and to grow in a particular way. In other words, the nature of 
the creature to perfect itself was derived from the presence of the parent, who/which 
acted as a model for the new-born creature to grow. It was the purpose of every life 
to make actual the potential that was present at birth. Aristotle concluded that just 
as the new-born creature had a model of perfection in the parent, so too, there was a 
model of perfection which all life moved toward. As life was characterised by the 
movement (change) from potential to actuality, perfection was total actuality. 
Therefore, perfection had to be unchanging because as total actuality, there would 
be no potential to be fulfilled. It followed from this that perfection was, therefore, 
separate from matter, as matter was found only in the world of change. Perfection 
was pure form that existed apart from anything in the world. The world existed 
eternally because God, perfection, was eternal (God was not in the world of time 
and space because God did not change) and the world (characterised by change and 
movement) owed its existence to the presence of God, perfection (for the function 
of change was to move toward self-perfection). 142 
Thus, contained in Aristotle's notion of potentiality was the contrasting idea of 
actuality. Only God could be actual in its purest form. God, as pure actuality, 
meant eternal thought - God was Nous. However, every living creature had a 
blueprint, and the purpose of each creature was to bring its blueprint to full 
actuality. Thus every sensible object strove for its own perfection, although, this 
perfection was qualitatively different from the perfection of God. Aristotle 
suggested that there was a difference between the dynamic of growth and that of 
142 Ibid., pp. 13 I ,132. 
82 
. actuality. He described the former as kinesis, namely, the process of growing up, of 
moving from potential to actual. He attributed the term energeia to that energy 
which flowed once actuality had been achieved. However, energeia was not the 
same as Nous, for energiea was the flow of a fully actualised sensible object, which 
was qualitatively different from the flow of God (Nous). 
With regard to the human being, Aristotle suggested that it was possible to gain a 
fleeting insight into the Nous of God through the faculty of reason in the psyche 
(soul).143 This was only possible once the process of reason began its approach to 
perfection. Only a fleeting insight of Nous was possible, for the human being, as 
with all that lived in the world, was subject to change and flux. The soul (psyche) 
dwelt in the body of the creature, through which it found expression. For Aristotle, 
it represented the actuality of the body: without the soul, the body would be life-
less. 144 In this respect, humanity was set apart from other creatures. The soul in the 
human being, as the principle of actuality for the body, equated with the nature of 
God. In the faculty of the soul, the human being could access Nous. However, at 
the same time, the tapping into Nous could not be constant due to the fact that the 
human being also had the principle of opposition underlying his nature. The human 
being was the unity of physical form and soul. 145 
In this way, Aristotle displayed an understanding of humanity as the microcosm of 
God; the human creature possessed all the faculties that were present in the supreme 
being, although in partial form. Humanity, as the microcosm, was able to 
participate in God, the macrocosm. Only the human being was the microcosm 
because only the human being had the faculty that could access Nous. 
With regard to Aristotle's view of the universe, the concepts of form and potential 
applied in the same way. The universe was spherical, with the Earth at the centre 
and the fixed stars at the circumference, with the planets, the Sun and the Moon 
143 Ibid., p.l39. 
144 Ibid., p.144. 
145 Ibid., p.160. 
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lying between. Each sphere revolved at differing speeds, the respective movement 
of each being determined by a combination of its own revolution and those of the 
spheres above. The heavenly spheres consisted of aether, whereas the non-heavenly 
spheres consisted of the inferior elements of earth, water, air and fire. Each element 
had a natural movement: aether was circular because it was considered to be divine. 
I 
The sub-lunar elements were paired together: earth and water had a downward 
movement, compared with the upward movement of air and fire. 146 
All matter was made up of a combination of each of these four sub-lunar elements 
and what distinguished one sensible object from another were the different 
proportions and combinations of these elements inherent in it. To be consistent with 
his concept of immanent form, Aristotle argued that each element was made up of a 
pair of contrary properties; thus, fire consisted of hot and dry properties, air was 
made up of heat and moisture, water was a combination of cold and moisture, and 
earth a combination of cold and dry.147 
Matter could change because each element had the capacity to transform into its 
neighbouring element. Through the conflict between the downward movement of 
earth and water and the upward movement of air and fire, the transmutation of one 
element into another took place, the effect of which was the change of one sensible 
object into another. The transmutation of elements, then, coupled with the concept 
of dynamis, effected the process of transformation, characteristic oflife. 148 
Coplestone suggests that the Aristotelian idea of the cosmos had generally been 
accepted by the thirteenth century and argues that the discovery of the almost 
complete works of Aristotle by the Christian west is possibly the most important 
philosophical event in medieval philosophy. 149 Tarnas suggests that the rediscovery 
of Aristotle in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries sparked an extraordinary shift in 
146 Ibid., p.137. 
147 G.Roberts, The Mirror of Alchemy (London, The British Library, 1994), pp.45-48. 
148 E. Cassirer, The Individual & the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, (New York, Harper 
Torchbooks, Harper & Row, 1963), p.24. 
149 Copleston, History of Philosophy 3, p.3. 
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the Christian philosophical outlook. ISO Aristotelianism provided an alternative to the 
world-denying Neoplatonic world-view: the purpose of the soul was not to escape 
the body to ascend back to the divine Source, but to actualise the body to fulfill the 
potential of life. 
Medieval interest in Aristotle was not simply of an eccIesial nature. His views on 
the universe and on the human being's ability to reason encouraged a broader 
cultural interest in his work. There was, in the thirteenth century and beyond, an 
increasing interest in the natural world and an increasing confidence in the power of 
human reason. Roger Bacon, a pupil of Robert Grossesteste, combined the 
mathematical principles of the Neoplatonic tradition with the Aristotelian focus 
upon direct experience and applied both to scientific experimentation, expressed in 
the esoteric practice of alchemy. 151 In our later discussion of Renaissance thinkers, 
Paracelsus and Jacob Boehme, reference will be made to their respective interests in 
alchemy. For this reason, it is important to provide some background to the 
practice. 
Alchemy 
Central to the philosophy of alchemy was the premise that the human being was the 
microcosm of God and of the universe. ls2 Its principle of the transmutability of 
base metal into gold was derived from the Aristotelian principle of the 
transmutability of elements. The alchemist used this principle and extended it; not 
only could one element change into another; one material could also be transformed 
into another. According to Roberts, Aristotle claimed that the air surrounding the 
earth was moist and cold and contained exhalations from the earth that were hot and 
dry. The same earthly exhalations (or secretions) occurred below ground and the 
effect of this secretion was the production of minerals and metals. Minerals were 
the product of the interaction of the moist and dry elements of the secretion. Metals 
150 Tamas, Passion of the Western Mind, p.176. 
151 Ibid., p.200. 
152 c.Jung, Alchemical Studies, trans, R.F .C.Hull, (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), 
p.93,94. 
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were the product of the interaction of the moist and cold elements of the secretion~ a 
kind of liquid that solidified before the secretion became water. Fire affected all 
metals with the exception of gold. ls3 
The alchemists adopted this view and added an intermediate step to the process: the 
moist secretion was the secretion of mercury~ the dry was that of sulphur. Thus, it 
was the combination of mercury and sulphur in varying proportions that formed the 
metals and minerals. Therefore, mercury and sulphur' were key alchemical 
principles and became the basis of the alchemical theory of transmutation: nature 
was based upon mercury and sulphur. In accordance with Aristotelian ideas, nature 
strove for perfection and gold was that perfection because it was made from the 
brightest mercury with the clearest red sulphur in the correct proportions. 154 The 
aim of the alchemist was to assist nature and to speed up the natural process of 
purification and perfection: the achievement of this was the production of gold, the 
symbol of perfection. 
Why did the alchemists wish to turn base metal into gold? Were they simply in 
pursuit of material wealth? The key to the answer lies in the microcosmic world-
view central to alchemical practice. We have already seen that Aristotle held the 
human being to occupy a unique position in relation to the universe and to God 
(perfection): through the soul (psyche), the human being could access Nous, albeit 
fleetingly. In this regard, the human being was the microcosm of God. Equally, in 
so far as the soul of the human being was housed in a body, then the human being 
was fully participant in the world of matter. In this respect, he was a microcosm of 
nature. The alchemists used this presupposition as the basis for their belief in the 
pivotal role of the human being in the speeding up of the process of perfection in 
nature: the alchemist himself could bring nature to perfection (symbolised in the 
turning of a base metal into gold) by using his mind to access divine secrets and his 
153 Roberts, Mirror of Alchemy, p.SO. 
154 Ibid., p.Sl. 
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body to work with the material of nature. 155 In this way, the alchemist could 
provide the link between the world of matter and the world of Nous. H.H. Brinton 
states that in alchemy: 
Man was a denizen of all three worlds, natural, astral and 
celestial. Therefore he could know of all three. In the natural 
world knowledge is sensual, for the body is in nature; in the 
"astral" world knowledge is intellectual because through man 
flow the rational emanations of the stars; in the celestial world 
knowledge is intuitional, for a spark of infinite Deity dwells in 
the human soul. IS6 
It followed, therefore, that the alchemist should work alone, for he was doing God's 
work. He had to be guided by God in his laboratory. 157 It was the work of 
philosophers rather than commoners, for communion with God required the use of 
the reasoning faculty of the psyche to the point at which the divine Nous could be 
accessed. 
In the notion of gold as a symbol, we can perhaps detect the Pseudo-Dionysian 
notion that ascension back to the divine was facilitated by means of the discovery of 
hidden divine symbols. The alchemist was not only speeding up the process of 
perfection in nature; he was also making his own ascent back to God. Therefore, he 
had to be austere and pious in his work in order to purify his own soul, for the 
unearthing of the hidden divine symbols was possible only for those whose souls 
were returning to the Source. 
155 The term 'symbolised' should be understood as communicating the divine presence in the 
phenomenal world. Alchemical gold became the manifestation of God in the phenomenal 
world whilst still retaining its material form. Thus, alchemical gold connected the divine 
with the phenomenal world and in this way it was symbolic. 
156 H.H.Brinton, The Mystic Will. (London, Alien & Unwin Ltd., 1931), p.86. 
157 Roberts, Mirror of Alchemy, p.78. 
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However, the alchemist was doing more than unearthing divine symbols; he was 
actually seeking to create something that would become a symbol of the divine. 
Thus, in alchemy, the notion of microcosm found powerful expression: the 
alchemist was the microcosm of God in both a Neoplatonic and an Aristotelian 
sense. The alchemist was a man who sought his soul's return to the Source by 
means of inner knowledge, prayer and meditation. In this respect, we hear echoes 
of Neoplatonism. At the same time, by working on the transmutation of metals in 
his laboratory, he was assisting in the process of actualisation of nature, emphasised 
in the Aristotelian system. 
Unlike the Neoplatonic world-view, in which the human being had to unharness 
himself from the shackles of the material world in order to make the return to the 
Source, the alchemical world-view regarded the human being as capable of 
speeding up the natural process of material perfection in the world through a 
synchronous process of personal purification. It was the Aristotelian emphasis upon 
the natural movement toward perfection in the universe, coupled with the 
Neoplatonic insistence upon the soul's return to the Source that provided the 
synchronicity for the alchemist. 
Of interest here is the subtle shift in world-view of the human being that finds 
expression in alchemy. Whilst the draw toward the Source, away from the world of 
matter, so powerfully expressed in Neoplatonism, is also to be found in alchemical 
writings, the draw is expressed through material processes that are led by pious 
philosophers. Thus, we see the beginning of an awareness of the power of the 
human being to influence nature, but power always derived from the Source. 
Developing from this in later history, perhaps finding its fullest expression in the 
Enlightenment and beyond, is the awareness of the power of the human being to 
influence nature without making the synchronous return to the Source. 158 Copleston 
158 "Medieval alchemy prepared the way for the greatest intervention in the divine world order 
that man has ever attempted: alchemy was the dawn of the scientific age, when the daemon 
of the scientific spirit compelled the forces of nature to serve man to an extent that had 
never been known before." (Jung ,Alchemical studies, p. J 27). 
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suggests that one of the ways that the fourteenth century differed in character from 
the thirteenth was that the former witnessed a widening of the gap between theology 
and philosophy. This was a gap with its roots in the appearance of the convincing 
philosophy of Aristotle in the late twelfth, early thirteenth centuries, but a gap that 
had been contained within an apparent synthesis between philosophy and theology. 
If the thirteenth century was characterised by a philosophising done in the light of 
faith, then the fourteenth was characterised by a weakening of metaphysics in the 
light of logic and the emergent sciences.159 
In a similar vein, Tarnas describes the transition from the Medieval to Renaissance 
world-view as being characterised by an increasing awareness of the elevated role 
of the human being in the universe. This finds most powerful expression in the 
humanism of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, particularly in the humanistic 
Neoplatonism of the early Renaissance. If medieval Neoplatonism expressed the 
view that nature and humanity were permeated by the divine, from which they 
emanated, then humanistic Neoplatonism emphasised the power of the human being 
to discover within himselfthe image of the divine. In Tarnas' words: 
The human being was a noble microcosm of the divine macrocosm. 160 
The subtle shift in world-view in connection with alchemy is detectable here. The 
power of the human being to carry out the work of God, so central to alchemical 
thinking, would seem to epitomise the shift away from a medieval sense of 
dependence upon God to a Renaissance discovery of the potential of the human 
being. The power of reason had not yet reached the full force of Enlightenment 
philosophy, but the trend toward human autonomy could be detected in the late 
thirteenth, early fourteenth centuries. Thus, according to Copleston, with the 
beginning of the Renaissance, there came a gradual breakdown of the medieval 
social framework and the emergence ofa kind ofindividualism.161 
159 Copleston, History of Philosophy 3, pp.II-IS. 
160 Tamas, Passion of the Western Mind p.214. 
161 Copleston, History of Philosophy 3, p.18. 
89 
Section Two: Renaissance Microcosm 
By the fifteenth century, on the brink of the era of the Renaissance, there was a 
strong humanistic movement in Europe, which was intrigued by the potential of the 
human being and which expressed the exalted position of humanity in the universe. 
The notion of microcosm still remained, but it was transformed somewhat from that 
of the Middle Ages. The medieval appreciation of the microcosmic nature of 
humanity had been based upon the belief in the vital connection between the divine 
and the human intellect. Whilst this held, the synthesis between theology and 
philosophy could remain. The shackles of the material world hampered the human 
being in his microcosmic relation to the divine. Thus, the medieval microcosmic 
theme was theocentric. The early humanistic understanding of microcosm however, 
expressed a shift away from this vital connection toward a more potent sense of 
microcosm; the human being had the divine spark within, which was empowering. 
With this view, philosophy no longer needed to be the handmaiden of theology, for 
if the divine was within, philosophy, as well as theology, could find truth. 162 
Moreover, the human being no longer needed to escape the shackles of the material 
form. Rather, nature was to be celebrated. The human being could elevate himself 
spiritually because the divine spark was within. Thus, the microcosmic theme 
became increasingly anthropocentric. 
Nicholas Cusanus 
The humanistic sense of the ultimate separation between the divine and the human 
being is a theme that resounds in the work of Nicholas Cusanus. He was a thinker 
who stood on the brink of the Renaissance and, as such, produced writings that 
showed their roots to be in the Middle Ages, with their ideas thrusting into the new 
direction expressed in the Renaissance. 163 He had humanist friends and was greatly 
162 Tamas, Passion of the Western Mind, p.206. 
163 Copleston, History of Philosophy 3, p.231. 
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influenced by the mystical thinking of Meister Eckhart,164 but at the same time, 
expressed ideas that were rooted in the Neoplatonic tradition, as conveyed, for 
example, by Pseudo-Dionysius. 165 In his work, De Docta Ignorantia, we can see 
the way in which these influences converge and for that reason, examination of his 
thinking will be conducted through a consideration of this particular work.166 
Cusanus' main concern in De Docta Ignorantia was to show the way in which the 
human being was inevitably a finite creature, with no innate ability to access the 
nature of the divine, but who, nevertheless, had the capacity to transcend finitude 
through an ability to symbolise and think metaphorically. 167 This idea was 
expressed through four philosophical doctrines central to the work: docta 
ignorantia, coincidentia oppositorum, complicatio et explicatio and trinitas 
. .168 
umversl. 
Docta Ignorantia (Learned Ignorance) 
Central to the doctrine of Docta Ignorantia was the premise that the finite creature 
could not comprehend the true nature of the infinite because the infinite was 
absolute and the finite mind could only conceive in comparative, non-absolute 
terms. Cusanus argued that as the human mind was incapable of apprehending 
absolute knowledge, the object of thought had to be the discovery of human 
ignorance through the contemplation of God, nature and the Incarnation. 169 Thus, 
Cusanus promoted a negative theological approach to the contemplation of the 
divine. 
164 P.Moffatt-Watts, Nicolaus Cusanus: A Fifteenth-Century Vision of Man. (Leiden, EJ.Brill, 
1982), p.22. 
165 Ibid., p.22. 
166 Nicolas Cusanus, Of Learned Ignorance, trans.W.Stark, (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1954). 
167 Moffatt-Watts, Nicolaus Cusanus, p.85. 
168 P.E.Sigmund, Nicholas ofCusa & Medieval Political Thought. (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
Harvard University Press, 1963), p.246. 
169 Moffatt-Watts, Nicolaus Cusanus, p. 40. 
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For Cusanus, thinking was a dialectic between what was known and what was not 
known, which moved the thinker toward an approximation of truth but, because of 
the perpetual dialectical nature of the thinking process, never toward a precise 
knowledge of truth. Human truth was always relative and, from this, Cusanus 
derived his argument that knowledge of God was inevitably relative, never absolute. 
However, Cusanus did not imply that nothing could be said about God. Our 
knowledge of God could only be approximate, but because Cusanus accepted the 
microcosmic nature of the relationship between the infinite and the finite, he was 
able to argue that through our limited minds, our approximations approached God. 
He argued that God was in all things and, equally, everything was contained in God. 
Thus, in our approximations we were never removed from God. If we described 
God as the absolute maximum, we were as close to God as if we were to use the 
term absolute minimum. As maximum and minimum were contraries, the use of 
both terms would represent the limit of what we could say about God. Cusanus 
concluded from this that all the finite creature could say about God was that in Him 
maximum and minimum coincided. 170 This was the second doctrine of his De 
Docta Ignorantia. 
Coincidentia Oppositorum (the Coincidence of Opposites) 
Cusanus emphasised the importance of the human being accepting its inability to 
gain actual knowledge of God. The human mind only approached the divine when 
He was perceived as both absolute maximum and absolute minimum. Reason, 
which worked only within the realm of opposites, could say no more about God 
than that in Him, opposition coincided. Cusanus went on to suggest that to gain 
greater insight into God, the realm of reason had to be left at its perimeter fence and 
transcended by the intellect into the realm beyond words. 171 Only through an 
intellect that had transcended the need for language could the God that transcended 
170 Cusanus, Oj Learned Ignorance, trans. Stark, p.12. 
171 Moffatt-Watts, Nicolaus Cusanus, p.40. 
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contradictions be more accurately apprehended. Thus, God transcended all 
opposites. 
This claim marked a dramatic departure from the ideas of medieval scholasticism 
and shows Cusanus to be in the light of the Renaissance, for the scholastics of the 
late Middle Ages maintained the notion of the potential absoluta of God. 172 That is 
to say, God's power was absolute within the law of contradiction. By asserting that 
God transcended all opposites, Cusanus challenged the validity of the scholastic 
view of God. 
This challenge was of tremendous significance because the law of contradiction was 
based upon the presupposition that human reason contained the seed of divine 
Nous, a view held by the Neoplatonic tradition and derived from the ideas of both 
Plato and Aristotle. Thus, in his doctrine of the coincidence of opposites, Cusanus 
effectively denied the special connection between the human mind and the divine. 
Cusanus' God was totally free and human reason had no divine seed sown within it. 
However, it should not be concluded that Cusanus' God therefore, had no 
connection with creation. On the contrary, the connection was far more intimate 
than that promoted by medieval Neoplatonism, for his God embraced all things, and 
all things had God within them. 173 How, then, was this intimacy to be understood, if 
the human mind was an inadequate tool for apprehending the true nature of the 
divine? The answer lay in his final two doctrines: complicatio et explicatio and 
trinitas universi. 
J72 Ibid., p.46. 
173 Ibid., p.46. 
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Trinitas Universi (The Threefold Nature of the Universe) and 
Complicatio et Explicatio (Enfolding and Unfolding) 
The doctrine of the coincidence of opposites was used by Cusanus as a metaphor 
for, rather than as a definition of God, for it was important to remember that 
language could only approximate God. The value of metaphorical language in the 
approach to God was based upon two ancient views presupposed in Cusanus' work: 
firstly, the assumption that the visible world was a reflection of the invisible one, 174 
and secondly, the understanding that God was ultimately hidden from humanity and 
could only be discussed through riddles and paradox.175 Thus, through metaphor 
and symbol, human understanding could approach the unknown by seeing in them 
what was contrary to the reality of the unknown. To use an analogy; if I see 
something ugly, I can move toward its contrary, beauty, by observing the nature of 
ugliness. I do not know positively the true nature of beauty; nevertheless, I learn 
through ugliness what beauty is not and in that way begin to approach beauty. 176 
This idea holds when there is an understanding of the dialectical relation between 
opposites, an understanding clearly demonstrated in Cusanus' third doctrine, 
trinitas universi. 
In trinitas universi, Cusanus argued that the universe reflected God's threefold 
nature of Unity, Equality and Connection so that every unity was also three-fold. 177 
The mirror reflection of God was found in the visible world of plurality in which 
the human being was situated, but the reflection did not show God's face; rather it 
showed what God was not and therefore pointed the finite being in the direction of 
God via a negative route. Thus, for Cusanus, God was hidden, but at the same time, 
because the universe was perceived to be the reflection of God, God remained very 
present as we looked at ourselves. 
174 Ibid., p.49,50. 
175 Moffatt-Watts (p.51) suggests that such a view was expressed in the works of Dionysius and 
Proc1us. Roberts (p.68) suggests that the use of paradox was adopted by the alchemists to 
express transcendent value. 
176 Moffatt-Watts, Nicolaus Cusanus, p.5I, citing Proclus, In Platonis Rem Publicam 
Commentarii, ed. W.Kroll, (1954), lines 15-19. 
177 Moffatt-Watts, Nicolaus Cusanus, ".50. 
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Cusanus also assumed the dialectical relationship between opposites when he 
asserted that the plurality of creaturely existence led the mind to search for the unity 
that underlay it. Here, we see his thinking rooted in the ancient presupposition of 
the existence of two worlds: the visible world, which Cusanus expressed in terms of 
a world of plurality, was a reflection of the invisible world, expressed as unity. 
He went on to claim that plurality was the unfolding of the Unity and Unity was the 
enfolding of the plurality, a notion described in his doctrine of complicatio 
(enfolding) et explicatio (unfolding). 
The doctrine of complicato et explicato is an expreSSIon of the dialectical 
relationship between plurality and unity, which Cusanus used metaphorically to 
depict the relationship between the creature and God. His hypothesis was based 
upon the assumption that the visible universe was a reflection of the invisible 
one. I78 He used number as his symbolic language for God because, he claimed, 
along Pythagorean lines, that mathematics provided the firmest ground upon which 
to proceed toward the unknowable. God embraced all things in His unity and the 
plurality of things was a development of the unity that was God. 179 This idea 
appears to echo those of Dionysius and Plotinus, in which the universe was depicted 
as an emanation of the divine. However, unlike Dionysius and Plotinus, Cusanus 
did not regard there to be a hierarchy of beings leading toward the divine Source. 
Instead, he argued that there was a direct unfolding and enfolding between Creator 
and creature and the Creator was consequently imminent in the whole of the 
universe. Significant here was the value that was therefore attributed to the sensible 
world. The whole of creation, both the intellectual and sensible realms, was imbued 
with the presence of God. In this way, Cusanus revealed his inclination away from 
the more traditional Neoplatonic perspective, and toward one of a more mystical 
nature. 
178 Ibid., p.50. 
179 Sigmund, Nicholas ojCusa, p.250. 
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How did the human being grasp divine immanence if the faculty of reason was not 
the link? The answer to this lay in Cusanus' understanding of the microcosmic 
nature of the human being. Humanity alone was the microcosm of the universe 
because in this creature alone was found the realms of the senses and of the 
intellect. Angels were exclusively of the intellectual realm and animals of the 
sensory. Thus, the being of humanity mediated between the absolute being of God 
and the contingent being of the finite world. 180 It was inevitable, then, that the 
Incarnation took the form of a human life, as the purpose of the sending of Christ 
was to convey God's message to the universe through humanity. 
We see here in Cusanus' work a further shift in the notion of microcosm: man was 
no longer the microcosm of God by virtue of his reason, that faculty of mind, in 
which, according to medieval scholastics, the divine seed resided. Man was no 
longer the microcosm of God, despite the shackles of sin and earthly existence. 
Now man was the microcosm of God because of his intellectual capacity to 
transcend reason. Not only that, but he was the microcosm of the universe because 
he embraced both the intellectual realm of the divine and the sensory realm of the 
material world. Earthly existence was no longer a shackle, but a vital component of 
the microcosmic nature of the human being. Through involvement in both realms, 
the human being was elevated to the position of mediator, made possible through 
the incarnation of Christ. 
Thus, Cusanus was able to move on from the hierarchical relationship of Source to 
creature, characteristic ofNeoplatonic thinking, to proffer a God that was imminent 
to the creature through the Incarnation. At the same time, he preserved the utter 
transcendence of God by emphasising the inability of the finite, contingent mind 
fully to grasp the true nature of the absolute divine in the absence of the Incarnation. 
In Cusanus' work we do not yet witness a fully anthropocentric image of 
microcosm, for his thinking was too theocentric for that to emerge; the centre of his 
180 Moffatt-Watts, Nicolaus Cusanus, p.76. 
.. 
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world was still God, but by focusing upon human ignorance of God, a vital step in 
the direction toward human self-consciousness was taken. By considering the 
question of human ignorance in relation to the divine, Cusanus showed that the 
human mind functioned independently of both the divine and natural worlds. In the 
words of Moffatt Watts: 
Cusanus' conception of mind represents an important step on 
the road to Cartesianism. 181 
Paracelsus 
The century following the death of Nicholas Cusanus heralded the arrival of the 
Renaissance proper: the masterpieces of Leonardo Da Vinci, Michelangelo and 
Rapheal were created, Luther rebelled against the Catholic Church, Columbus 
reached America and Copemicus produced the outline of a heliocentric universe. l82 
Such landmarks in human discovery both reflected and contributed toward a greater 
sense of the potential of the human being. 
However, not all was positive, for this century was also characterised by 
tremendous religious strife, ravaging diseases, such as the Black Death, severe 
economic depression and the thriving of black magic and devil worship.183 
It would seem that the late fifteenth, early sixteenth centuries marked a Europe in 
transition; a shift toward a greater sense of human potential and creativity, which 
was shrouded in the vulnerability of the circumstance of human reality. Whilst the 
discoveries of the era highlighted the power and drive of the human spirit, the strife 
of disease and war was a reminder of the supernatural forces that overrode that 
spirit. In such an environment emerged Paracelsus, an enigmatic doctor, who 
181 Ibid., p.22S. 
182 Tamas, Passion of the Western Mind, p.224. 
183 J .Hargrave, The Life & Soul of Paracelsus, (London, Victor Gallanz Ltd., 1951), p.200 . 
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derided the wisdom of the establishment, and claimed that human knowledge was 
derived not from books, but from God alone. 
Paracelsus spent most of his life at loggerheads with the established medical 
profession, as he challenged the accepted medical authorities of the day on the basis 
that their wisdom was not derived from God, and was, therefore, nothing more than 
ignorance. 184 He provided his own medical system, which was based upon the 
principles of alchemy, the central principle of which was the microcosmic nature of 
the human being. 
His doctrine of Signatures was based upon the idea that every part of the human 
being corresponded to some part of the universe and that the connection was made 
obvious by a similarity of form or colour - its signature. Once the similarity had 
been established, that part of the natural world, be it a leaf that had the shape of a 
human kidney, or a plant root that resembled another human organ, could be used to 
effect a treatment for the diseased organ that it resembled. 185 
Such an idea may well sound bizarre to a mind steeped in modem scientific 
presuppositions. It did, nevertheless, resonate with the Neoplatonic view of the 
inseparability of the human being from the universe in which he lived. As with 
Neoplatonism, a sense of the microcosmic nature of the human being was being 
expressed. The doctor could find the hidden connection by means of his intellectual 
faculty, that gift from God, so prized by the Neoplatonists, but only if that very 
same doctor used his intellect in the light of absolute faith in God, and pious prayer. 
The intellect was to be turned inwards into the innermost depths of the doctor, as 
well as out into the natural world; the intellect had to understand from the heart if 
the connections that would make his healing effective were to be found. 
184 Paracelsus, The Archidoxes of Magic by Paracelsus. Intro. S Skinner, (London, Askin 
Publishers, & New York, Samuel Weiser, 1975), Introduction: The main authorities were 
the writings of Hippocrates, Avicenna and Galen. 
185 Ibid., Introduction. 
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Here are echoes of the ideas of Pseudo-Dionysius: Just as for him the hidden 
symbols of the divine could be discovered through prayer, faith and self-knowledge, 
so too, for Paracelsus, the healing of disease could be achieved only through the 
prayer, faith and self-knowledge of the doctor. 186 
However, Paracelsus went beyond Pseudo-Dionysius by showing through the work 
of the doctor that the human being, as a microcosm of God and of the universe, 
could be empowered to heal in the natural world; thus, he portrayed the doctor as a 
channel for the restoration of health and balance in the natural world. Paracelsus 
expressed the potential of the human being to influence the world in which he lived 
that was so characteristic of his era, but at the same time, highlighted the utter 
dependence upon God to achieve this. His criticism of medical contemporaries was 
based upon his view that by acquiring their skills through textbooks and 
universities, they were ignorant of the divine wisdom hidden in, and communicated 
through nature. The knowledge of medicine could be intuited totally through nature, 
for in nature resided the wisdom and power of God. 
Thus, unlike Cusanus, who stressed the importance of learning of our ignorance of 
God, Paracelsus emphasised the accessibility of divine secrets to the human being. 
In this respect, we can regard his image of microcosm as anthropocentric. 
However, the one big proviso that this accessibility depended upon the creature's 
total piety, prayer and self-knowledge showed that although the microcosmic image 
of Paracelsus was anthropocentric, it was the image of an anthropos absolutely 
focused upon God. 
Paracelsus' image of microcosm was an alchemical one. 187 He reiterates the 
alchemical anthropocentric image of microcosm that was, nevertheless, based upon 
a pious faith in the guidance of the divine. The relation between God and the 
universe remained intact: the divine secrets were accessible through nature, as long 
186 Ibid., p.30. 
187 Jung, Alchemical Studies, trans. Hull, p.124: Jung suggests that the spiritual aspect of 
Paracelsus' work and life can only be understood in the light of esoteric aspects of alchemy. 
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as the alchemist (or doctor) did not imagine he could access them apart from God. 
This is very important, for it demonstrates that although the microcosmic image was 
anthropocentric, God was still central in the alchemical and medical process. 188 
God's centrality, however, was of a different ilk from the centrality of the medieval 
scholastic microcosmic image. In the latter, the human being was on the perimeter 
of the realm of the divine. The focus of the human creature was fixed upon the 
emanating centre of the divine, which lay far removed from the natural world. The 
eyes of the creature looked out toward the source of life and light. The creature 
participated in the divine and sought to approach that Source, despite his material 
form. 
In the thinking of Cusanus, we detect a change in focus; the eyes of the creature 
become more introspective, although the aim of the introspection is to move toward 
that which lies beyond: look at ourselves to see what we do not know and then we 
can approach God. Here then, there is a greater acceptance of the importance of the 
material form: it has a role to play in the approach to God, albeit a negative role. 
In the thinking and alchemical methods of Paracelsus is a more intensive 
introspection; the eyes are focused upon natural processes, the process of perfecting 
nature or of restoring balance and health to the human being. 189 The eyes of the 
human being are no longer drawn away from his natural habitat toward a remote 
emanating centre, but rather the human being finds himself as the centre: God can 
be found hidden in the creature's own habitat. Focus turns upon the human creature 
and upon his natural domain as the means of accessing the divine. God at the centre 
has not been usurped by the human being; it is more a case of the human being 
discovering his central role in the universe and discovering the divine hidden in the 
heart of his centre - the kernel within the nut within the fruit, so to speak. The 
medieval spiralling ascent out of corporeal form toward the purity and perfection of 
188 C. Jung, Psychology & Alchemy, trans. R.F.C. Hull, (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1968), p.314: Jung asserts that all alchemists believed their work was sacred and could only 
be passed on with God's help. 
189 Jung, Alchemical Studies, p.122: Jung suggests that Paracelsus was unaware of the more 
sinister aspects of alchemy and used it principally as a tool for healing the sick. 
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the Source became much more a spiralling inwards through the natural world to 
reveal the divine within. 
A balanced nature was a perfected one and therefore one that expressed the divine. 
By means of alchemy, Paracelsus searched for a method of purifying mineral, plant 
and animal substances to release the active principles he believed to be contained in 
them. Under the guidance of God, the active principles could then be made into 
cures for diseases. Thus, Paracelsus' God dwelt in the hidden depths of the universe 
and was approached through experience and observations of nature, not through 
abstract thought. 
The universe of Paracelsus, as with other alchemists, was a unified one, embraced, 
as well as permeated by God. God's creation was characterised by plurality, which 
pointed toward God's unity, hidden within the plurality. Thus, Paracelsus' cures 
were tailored to the needs of the individual patient, for no person was the same as 
another. 190 
The One, symbolised by Paracelsus as the Sun, was the source of all life, but every 
expression of life was a unique combination of the varying proportions of the 
elements of sulphur, mercury and salt, which intermixed with the effects of 
astrological movement to create life. Sickness occurred when these three elements 
became separated. The aim of Paracelsus' alchemy was to find ways of restoring 
the delicate balance of the three elements and so to restore the health of the patient. 
Again, echoes of the Neoplatonic appreciation of the relationship between plurality 
and unity are heard. However, to suggest that Paracelsus was a Neoplatonist would 
be far too simplistic. It is perhaps impossible to attribute anyone influence upon 
him, as most of his life was spent wandering from country to country in search of 
the divine wisdom found not in books, but in the universe. 191 As an alchemist, his 
world-view would have been influenced by Neoplatonism, Aristotelianism and 
190 Paracelsus, Archidoxes of Magic, p.l 03. 
191 Hargrave, Life and Soul of Paracelsus, p.55. 
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possibly also Hermeticism. 192 We also know that he was impressed by the 
Shamanism of the Mongolians and the healing methods of the Russian Tartars. 193 
Hence, we must be wary of claiming an exclusively Neoplatonic influence upon his 
ideas. As with any genius, to attempt to pin down the source of his wisdom to a 
particular historical heritage is to deny the nature of his genius. He is perhaps best 
understood as standing outside tradition as a beacon of originality, which provided 
inspiration to many that followed, including Jacob Boehme, as well as being an 
uncomfortable thorn in the side of contemporary orthodoxy. 
That having been said, it is perhaps legitimate to suggest that although we may not 
claim his ideas to have been derived soley from Neoplatonism, there is, 
nevertheless, a resonance with that tradition in his thinking. Thus, although as an 
individual he stands alone as an enigma, in terms of his contribution to the historical 
evolution of thought, his ideas, in many respects, are consistent with general 
Neoplatonic themes of microcosm, of the relationship between plurality and unity, 
of the notion of the universe as a mirror reflection of the Creator, of the belief in the 
hidden secrets of the divine in the universe and, consequently, of the understanding 
of the symbolic nature of life. 
Where the resonance ended, however, was in Paracelsus' emphasis upon the earthly 
nature of the human being; mortals did not come down from Heaven, but grew out 
of the earth. 194 The human being was connected to the divine through the 
imagination, which imbued the body with life. The human being was unique within 
the creaturely world because through the imagination, the secrets of all life could be 
found within creaturely life, not beyond it. Although a product of the earth, at no 
point was the creature or any living thing separated from God, for God was hidden 
within all that had life. God was the light that gave life. The role of the doctor was 
to search for the light in the depths of his soul so that he could access the hidden 
192 Jung, Alchemical Studies, p.122: Jung suggests that the chief figure in philosophical 
alchemy was Hermes or Mercurius of the Hermetic tradition. 
193 Hargrave, Life and Soul of Paracelsus, p.55. 
194 Ibid., p.185. 
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light in all that existed in order to heal those whose light had been lost or obscured 
by the distortion of disease. 
Thus, Paracelsus' sense of microcosm placed the human being in a pivotal position: 
as a product of the earth, he embraced all the features of the earth, and as the 
astrological movements determined the nature of every individual human being, he 
also embraced the features of the universe. Not only that, but as God the Light 
Source permeated the universe, the human being also housed within himself that 
very same light. The light resided in the human imagination and through this 
faculty, the mysteries of the divine were accessible to him, for the latter was the 
microcosm of God and the microcosm ofthe universe. 195 This was not a pantheistic 
understanding of God and nature, but a deep understanding of the meaning of unity 
in relation to plurality. The One manifested itself in the many and therefore, the 
many were manifestations of the One. 
What distinguished this from pantheism was Paracelsus' understanding that the 
many did not possess the power of the divine; the tree, for example, did not have 
divine power within it, but rather the tree, or any other material thing, symbolised 
the power from which it emanated. The Paracelsan world was a deeply symbolic, 
metaphorical one. Such a world-view was certainly not unique to Paracelsus, for it 
was held by the Ancients and thus found expression in such medieval traditions as 
Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism. However, Paracelsus perhaps succeeded in 
taking the symbolism to a new depth: as symbolic of the divine Source, creation not 
only had the secret of self-perfection hidden within it, but also the power of 
healing. 196 The key to this secret lay in the human imagination and, therefore, the 
human being was pivotal. In this way, Paracelsus was able to depict a divine that 
was not simply the object of creaturely aspiration and identity. It was a divine that 
granted the human being the power of self-healing. However, this did not provide 
195 Paracelsus, Selected Writings, trans. N.Guterman, (Oxford, Princeton University Press, 
1951), pp.21,103. 
196 A.Weeks, Paracelsus: Speculative Theory and the Crisis of the Early Reformation, (Albany, 
State Unversity of New York Press, 1997), p.t 08. 
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humanity with autonomy, for the power was accessible only through total 
submission to divine guidance. In other words, the symbolism of the Paracelsan 
world-view promoted the potential of the human imagination to prolong life and to 
heal through its pious, self-less search for the divine Light within. 
Jacob Boehme 
Late sixteenth century Europe bore witness to tremendous mind-shifts: Tarnas 
points out that Lutheran protestation against Catholicism had become a powerful 
force, finding expression in the Reformation movement and being instrumental in 
the reawakening of the religiosity of the Catholic Church. 197 The ideas of 
Copemicus, Kepler and Galileo began to oust the Aristotelian and Ptolemaic 
astrological theories that had dominated up until this point. 198 What Copemicus 
suggested, and what Kepler and Galileo confirmed was that Aristotelian and 
Ptolemaic theories were wrong in supposing that the Earth was fixed and that 
planets revolved around it. Instead, it was the Sun that was fixed. Earth therefore, 
moved around the Sun, as did the other planets. This threw into jeopardy the whole 
Christian framework of cosmology, theology and morality. If the Earth was no 
longer at the centre of the universe, how could the human being be the central focus 
of the cosmos? What were the implications for God's special creature as the pivot 
connecting the spiritual and corporeal realms? 199 
Thus, the sixteenth century was a tumultuous period, and the turmoil reached even 
the backwaters of Europe. Weeks suggests that the trends of Renaissance and 
Reformation culture could be felt in such places as Lusatia and Silesia, territories 
within the kingdom of Bohemia, an area which experienced political, religious and 
cultural restlessness.200 
197 Tamas, Passion of the Western Mind, p.233. 
198 Ibid, pp. 248-250. 
199 Ibid., p.253. 
200 A. Weeks, Boehme: An Intellectual Biography o/the I1h Century Philosopher & Mystic, 
(Albany, State University of New York Press, 1991), pp.14,26. 
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This region was the birthplace of Jacob Boehme and Weeks suggests that his 
writings, often appearing contradictory, were perhaps so because of the diversity of 
beliefs and ideas that characterised the region. It would appear that there was a 
strong tradition of alchemical practice here, which antedated the Reformation 
movement and which may well have influenced the strongly alchemical flavour of 
much of Boehme's writings. There was also a tradition of Paracelsan medicine, the 
preferred medical method of many doctors in the Lusatian city of Gorlitz. One such 
doctor was Abraham Behem, an important mentor for Boehme.201 
Boehme, then, had connections with alchemy and Paracelsan medicine and, like 
Paracelsus, considered nature, not books, to be the source of philosophical 
knowledge.202 His writings had a strongly mystical theme, perhaps not surprising 
for a thinker born so close to Silesia, the "land of East German mysticism".203 
The main purpose of his work was to express the powerful harmony between the 
inner and the external life, which he had found and which he wished others to 
find.204 Perhaps the desire to communicate such a message was made stronger by 
the turmoil and darkness that he felt around him in daily life. The discovery of the 
heliocentric universe, the heretical bumings and the political warring epitomised the 
nature of the transition that the sixteenth century was experiencing; a transition 
away from a theocentric universe, in which humanity played centre stage under the 
all-embracing eye of God, toward an anthropocentric universe, in which humanity 
searched for knowledge, either with or without God. 205 
Brinton states, "the fundamental concept to Boehme's philosophy was life.,,206 His 
universe consisted of "living forces, whose outer aspects half concealed and half 
201 Ibid., p.29. 
202 H.H. Brinton, The Mystic Will, (London, Alien & Unwin Ltd., ] 93 ]), p.ll. 
203 Weeks, Boehme, p.14. 
204 Brinton, Mystic Will, p.8. 
205 Weeks, Boehme, p.33. 
206 Brinton, Mystic Will, p.8l. 
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revealed the inner vital essence.,,207 As Brinton suggests, the Renaissance emphasis 
upon life was a step away from the medieval emphasis upon idea, and a step short 
of the modem interest in matter and energy. Thus, by focusing upon life, Boehme 
showed himself to be part of the historical period bridging medieval and modem 
thinking.208 
For Boehme, the universe was driven by a powerful internal dynamic, the source of 
which was the abysmal energy of the divine Will, which had two aspects: a driving 
out-going Will and an introspective in-going Will.209 Divine consciousness was 
aroused through the tension generated between them. Sophia, the passive mirror of 
divine wisdom and the product of the out-going Will, provided the means by which 
the raw power of the divine could reflect upon itself, stirring divine consciousness. 
Thus, there was a triadic pattern, described by Brinton as trinitarian,210 to the 
dynamic underlying the universe; the tension between the two polar wills of the 
divine generated the third element, divine consciousness. A second trinity emerged 
out of this: the interaction between the divine and Sophia produced the divine Son 
and through the interaction between the Son (the principle of light) and the Father 
(the principle of darkness), the divine came to know itself.211 
As divine consciousness accumulated, Sophia, the mirror of divine consciousness, 
became the divine imagination. The Son was the principle of light because it was 
the product of divine reflection through the mirror of consciousness. Contained in 
this image is the understanding that consciousness occurs only through the relation 
of an object to a subject. In the first trinity, the passive Sophia provides the mirror 
through which the divine can reflect upon itself. In this way, the divine subject sees 
itself as an object in the mirror. The arousal of divine self-interest generates divine 
desire to acquire full self-knowledge, possible only by having an object wholly 
separate from the divine abyss. The Son is the light of the Father, the product of 
207 Ibid., p.ll. 
208 Ibid., p.2. 
209 Ibid., pp.13, 14. 
210 Ibid., p.169. 
211 Ibid., p.182. 
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consciousness. The Father remains the power of darkness, in terms of the hidden 
potential of the divine. The Holy Spirit is created through the interaction between 
Father and Son, i.e. the interaction between darkness and light. This forms the 
second trinity: Father, Son and Holy Spirit, which composes the divine plan of 
creation, referred to by Boehme as the divine imagination. Through the divine 
imagination, the unconditioned divine Wills become manifest and conditioned.212 
In this way, Boehme depicts the vital energies that lie at the heart of creation. His 
description of the way in which nature is created through the conflicting interaction 
~etween the opposing forces of ingoing Will and outgoing Will is of a seven stage 
process, the first two stages being the making of the two trinities, outlined above. 
At each stage, the interaction between opposing forces triggers an effect.213 In the 
third stage, for example, the opposing forces of the previous stage operate against 
each other in such a way as to generate a rotation, called by Boehme the wheel of 
nature, through which physical nature is produced. The wheel is moved by the 
tension and conflict generated by the opposing forces of the ingoing and outgoing 
Wills, which generates a spark - the creation of nature. 214 
Boehme depicts the continuing process of divine self-knowledge in a similar way, 
by showing the opposition between polar forces to build up to a crescendo, 
culminating in a sudden, dramatic spark or explosion, which brings about the 
creation of the next stage of the process. Upon the attainment of the seventh and 
final stage of nature, there is a harmonisation of the opposing forces of the divine 
Will; it has come full circle and achieved true self-knowledge through the creation 
of nature and the universe, that which stands in objective relation to the divine.2ls 
212 Ibid, p.t 06. 
213 Brinton, MystiC Will, p.t86: In Stage One, the interaction between Sophia and the divine 
power causes the creation of the Son, the principle of Light. In the second stage, the effect 
of the interaction between the Father and the Son is the creation of the Holy Spirit. 
214 J.Boehme, The Threefold Life of Man, trans. J .Sparrow, (London, lM. Watkins, 1909), 
p.xxv-xxix. 
215 Ibid., p.53. 
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Thus, Boehme depicts a multi-staged progression toward a return to the Source. In 
this respect, there are echoes of the Neoplatonic notion of the hierarchical ascension 
to the Source. However, whereas the Neoplatonists depict this as a creaturely 
ascension, Boehme describes it as both creaturely ascension and divine return. The 
journey of developing human consciousness interacts with the divine return to 
Source so that, upon the seventh stage of nature, there is a total harmonisation of 
human consciousness and divine self-consciousness, expressed as mystical union. 
What is the connection between the human creature and the divine? The answer to 
this lies in the microcosmic nature of humanity. In a very similar vein to Paracelsus, 
Boehme shows that human imagination is the potent link between the divine and the 
universe, for it is the microcosm of the divine imagination, which is accessed 
through vernunft (conceptual reasoning) and verstand (mystical understanding).216 
Reason, referred to by Boehme as vernunft, is the faculty by which the human being 
is able to recognise the outward forms of the divine power. These outward forms of 
the physical world are the effects of the inner dynamics of the divine life. The 
human being in the world of nature is therefore, able to perceive the outer layer of 
the divine life. However, vernunft enables the human being to perceive no more 
than this outer layer, which is nothing more than the effect of the dynamic clash of 
opposing Wills at the centre of life. As Brinton suggests, Vernunft knows 
"outwardly after the form" but not "inwardly after the power." 217 However, 
Vernunft houses true knowledge, expressed by Boehme as verstand and true 
knowledge is the means by which the human being accesses divine wisdom. For 
Boehme, the main weakness of vernunft is its incapacity for the reconciling of 
contradictions. Verstand, by contrast, penetrates the contradictions of form by 
accessing the source of wisdom. 
The two notions of vernunft and verstand are symbolic expressions of the ingoing 
and outgoing Wills of the divine. Vernunft represents the assertive, aggressive 
216 Brinton, Mystic will, pp. 1 00-1 02. 
217 Ibid. p.t 00. 
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outgoing will caught up in materiality and the world of distinction. Verstand 
represents the still, ingoing Will in pursuit of unity. Thus, by means of the two 
terms, Boehme shows the way in which the internal dynamics of divine life are 
reiterated in human life. 
He stresses the importance of vernunft' s being harnessed to verstand, for in that 
way, vernunft is fortified by the penetrating wisdom of verstand, allowing vernunft 
to become the vehicle of verstand. Verstand is mystical, vernunft conceptual. The 
former is superior to the latter, but the latter is necessary to the former as its 
h · 218 mout pIece. 
Thus, Boehme establishes the understanding that divine wisdom is accessible in 
human mystical experience. In this respect, his view reiterates that of the 
alchemists. By knowing the innermost depths of the self through verstand, one 
learns also the innermost depths of life. However, he does not promote verstand at 
the expense of vernunft. Knowledge of God is not simply through introspection, 
but also through knowledge of nature; in order to penetrate the secrets of nature, the 
secrets of the self must also be penetrated. In other words, Boehme promotes a 
microcosmic understanding of the human being. Through vernunft and verstand he 
can learn of the power of life in both his internal and external life. Here, echoes of 
Paracelsan thinking can be heard. It is the role of the human imagination to seek 
out the power of the divine hidden within nature and to do this, the divine power 
hidden within the self must be discovered. Human imagination is connected to that 
of the divine and, through this connection, the divine journey through the process of 
the seven stages of nature is executed. In other words, divine self-knowledge is 
facilitated through human consciousness.219 
218 Ibid., p.! 03: "What is opaque and meaningless and full of contradictions to vernunft is 
transparent to verstand because vernunft attempts to go through the external to the internal 
while verstand works through inner unity outward." 
219 Ibid., p.! 08. 
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Human consciousness, like that of the divine, requires an object upon which the 
subject may come to know itself. It is the divine that provides the object for the 
human creature and the human creature that provides the object for the divine. The 
consciousness of the human creature is reflected back to the divine through Sophia, 
the Mirror of Wisdom, which allows God to gain true self-knowledge and, again, 
through Sophia, divine consciousness is communicated to the human creature, for 
Sophia, as the agent of divine consciousness, is divine imagination. 
Thus Boehme ascribes an active role for the human being in the process of divine 
self-knowledge. Unlike the Neoplatonic ascent to the source, in which the divine 
return was independent of creaturely ascent, the Boehmic divine return was 
determined by the ascent of the creature. Through the consciousness of the 
creature, the divine return through self-knowledge was facilitated. Boehme 
depicted an utterly connected relationship between the universe and the divine, with 
the human imagination binding the two. Thus, Boehme's understanding of the way 
in which the universe mirrored the divine was far more dynamic and interactive 
than his predecessors', for, through his emphasis upon the subject's need for an 
object for the attainment of self-knowledge, not only did the universe reflect the 
divine, the divine also reflected the universe. As Brinton suggests: 
Life for Boehme is a circular process, which arises out of an 
organic union of subjective and objective.22o 
By establishing the objectivity of the creature, while preserving its vital connection 
with the divine, Boehme moved toward a far more anthropocentric sense of 
microcosm, in which the connection between the divine and the creature was 
expressed in terms of shared intrinsic dialectical forces in the lives of both. 
220 Brinton, Mystic Will, p.t 05. 
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Conclusion 
The Renaissance was a period in history that grew out of the soil of the Middle 
Ages. The fact that the microcosmic theme was central to the thinking of 
Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism made it a theme that would inevitably permeate 
the Renaissance as well as the Middle Ages, for both philosophies remained deeply 
entrenched in the European psyche into the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and 
beyond. 
The Renaissance retained the spiralling cosmology of the Middle Ages, until the 
scientific revolution shook those foundations. It also retained an acknowledgement 
of the connection between the creature and its Creator. The universe mirrored the 
divine; the multiplicity of the universe was in relative opposition to the unity of the 
divine. The universe was caught up in the dynamics of the divine. 
However, although the Renaissance was the offspring of its medieval parent, as 
with any offspring, it had its own voice that sang a tune very different from its 
parent. Although the above mentioned themes of the Middle Ages could be found 
in the Renaissance, they had evolved; cosmology was still of a spiralling nature, but 
the dynamics within it were different. Thus, between the time of Plotinus and 
Paracelsus, the creature's relation to God had dramatically changed. No longer was 
the creature on the periphery of the divine Light; he was centre stage with the divine 
accessible through the depths of his soul and the depths of nature. By the time of 
Boehme's writings, the status of humanity had been upgraded even more: the self-
sufficiency of Plotinus' divine was no longer valid. Human consciousness worked 
alongside that of the divine to facilitate God's return. The universe was still a 
mirror of the divine, but the nature of the reflection had changed: it was now a 
reflection that revealed the divine to Himself, not simply a passive reflection of a 
God, self-sufficient in His perfection. The medieval theme of the perfection of the 
Ideal, which lay beyond life, had now been replaced by the inner vitality of life 
itself. 
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The shift in mindset from the medieval theocentric universe to one of a more 
anthropocentric nature was reflected in the development of the microcosmic theme. 
For Cusanus, the human being was not the microcosm of God because he could 
ascend toward the Nous of God or because he had the potential of Nous within his 
soul, as medieval thinkers had maintained. Instead, God was qualitatively separate 
from creation. However, humanity had the ability to commune with God by going 
beyond reason and experiencing mystical unity with the divine. Moreover, God 
was also accessible through the human senses. The two qualities of mystical 
intuition and sensory perception made humanity the connecting link between God 
and the universe. Thus, Cusanus' microcosmic theme placed humanity in the role 
of mediator and conveyor of divine understanding. With Cusanus can be seen the 
beginning of a more dynamic and intimate relationship between God the 
macrocosm, and humanity the microcosm. 
What Paracelsus added to the microcosmic theme was the idea that the microcosm 
was capable of healing within the universe. Thus, not only could the human being 
assist nature in the process of perfection, as propounded by the alchemical tradition, 
he could also fathom the secrets of the universe in order to prolong life. There was 
no longer a sense of needing to escape the physical realm in order to return to God: 
God, it would seem, was present in the physical and accessible through the piety, 
self-knowledge and prayer of the microcosm. 
So, from the theocentric microcosm of the medieval Neoplatonists, we arrive at the 
anthropocentric microcosm of Paracelsus. The evolution of the microcosmic theme 
from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance was characterised by an intensifying sense 
of human empowerment. The ultimate empowerment came, however, with Jacob 
Boehme and his appreciation of the divine's need for humanity in the quest for 
divine self-knowledge. In his writing, humanity'S role was not simply to channel 
divine power for the benefit of the universe, but to bring divine consciousness to 
full realisation. The human being was the microcosm because he participated in the 
polar forces of the divine. Thus, Boehme's microcosmic theme was a thoroughly 
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dynamic one, elevating humanity and history to such a status that the divine purpose 
would be unfulfilled without it. 
The evolution of the theme of microcosm was one in which humanity was shown to 
be increasingly empowered. From a God-centred understanding of the universe, 
emerged a human-centred one. However, let us remember that this was not the 
anthropocentrism of the Modem and Post-Modem periods. It was anthropocentrism 
within the context of microcosm/macrocosm; the human being was empowered by 
the macrocosm, God. The relation with God was still very present and the harmony 
and unity of the universe was still preserved by God. There was a growing sense of 
empowerment, but empowerment in relation to the whole. The microcosmic theme 
of the Renaissance retained the sense of the organic, complete and harmonious 
nature of creation, which had been maintained in the Middle Ages, even though 
human consciousness began to show signs of the sense of empowerment that would 
later erode this unity. Before the ideas of the Renaissance fully matured into those 
of the Enlightenment, the microcosmic theme still retained the power of the spiral, 
that symbol of unity, perfection and empowerment that was broken when the force 
of reason became unleashed from that of imagination. 
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Chapter 3 
The Microcosmic Theme Underlying Tillich's 
Theology 
This chapter aims to expose the microcosmic theme in Tillich's theological system 
and to consider the way in which an appreciation of it brings Tillich's method of 
correlation into a new pattern of coherence. In particular, the chapter focuses upon 
four aspects of Tillich's theology: his insistence upon triadic formulation, in terms 
of both content and structure, his use of dialectic, the significance of symbol in his 
system and the centrality of the notion of creaturely freedom. Through a 
consideration of these aspects, it is hoped that the microcosmic theme underlying 
his theology will be made plain and that the method of correlation will be 
recognised as an integral part of that theme. 
Kenneth Hamilton offers a critique of Tillich's method of correlation. He argues 
that Tillich has a whole system into which he fits the elements he wishes to first and 
then applies the method to show the way in which everything interlocks.221 He 
suggests that this invalidates the method on the grounds that the questions and 
answers have been fabricated by Tillich in order that his system should be kept 
whole. There is, Hamilton argues, consequently, no clear distinction between 
question and answer. Tillich's attempt to show that analytical questions and 
religious answers are quite distinct and, at the same time, have a strong resonance 
makes his method "barren and incredible".222 
221 Kenneth Hamilton, The System and the Gospel: A Critique of Paul TilIich (London, SCM 
Press Ltd., 1963), p.28. 
222 Hamilton, The System & the Gospel, p.123. 
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He argues that with regard to the method of correlation, the questions asked and the 
answers given can only correlate when the asker shares with the respondent a 
common view of the universe. He questions this assumption with regard to modem 
humanity and the Christian message and accuses Tillich of "demanding that the 
message of Christianity" conforms "to the mental horizons obtaining to this 
theory".223 
Hamilton observes that Tillich's unity between question and answer is "the unity of 
the system itself',224 that the system is circular in nature, within which the method 
of correlation operates. 225 He argues that the circle is·· nothing other than the 
"fenced-off area circumscribed by his ontology".226 
Hamilton's claim that Tillich begins with a VIew of the whole and that his 
theological system evokes a sense of circle is a view with which this thesis would 
certainly concur. However, it would not agree that the circle was simply the 
parameters of his ontology. If Tillich does begin with the whole system, it is 
necessary to ask why he begins in that way. What underlying appreciation of 
wholeness did Tillich have that made him envisage the whole system first? What is 
the circular imagery that underlies the system? Is it nothing more than the limiting 
boundaries of his ontology? 
It is the argument of this thesis that the circular imagery is derived from a sense of 
the microcosmic/macrocosmic relationship between creature and Creator. This is an 
appreciation that is not created by Tillich and his ontology, but one that is rooted in 
the depths of the Christian tradition, into which Tillich was born. Tillich does not 
create a circle to fulfill his ambition of constructing a complete theological system, 
but does so out of the sense of wholeness that is generated by a microcosmic 
appreciation of life in relation to the divine. 
223 Ibid., p.121. 
224 Ibid., p.127. 
225 Ibid., p.l28. 
226 Ibid., p.l32. 
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To suggest that Tillich's system and, consequently, his method, are based upon a 
sense of microcosm, does not mean that Tillich had a conscious awareness of it. 
That he had a partial sense of it is quite apparent - he refers a total of seven times in 
the first two volumes of Systematic Theology to the Renaissance microcosmic 
world-view.227 However, he does not state explicitly in his theology that he speaks 
in microcosmic terms. It would be misleading, therefore, to assume that the circular 
nature of his system is a deliberate attempt to depict a microcosmic/macrocosmic 
relationship between creature and Creator. Nevertheless, it is possible to suggest 
that the circular nature of his ontology and his system are expression of a partially 
conscious and, therefore, partially unconscious sense of the microcosmic world-
view that had been so deeply entrenched in the western Christian psyche of Europe 
prior to the period of the Enlightenment. 
Hamilton assumes that TiIlich's theology is based upon a Platonic-Hegelian 
view.228 Whilst not wishing to contradict Hamilton in this respect with regard to the 
conscious aspects of Tillich's thinking, what this thesis wishes to argue is that 
TilIich's theology is also based subliminally upon the microcosmic world-view that 
predominated in his theological heritage of the Renaissance. Tillich's explicit 
theology concurred with such a world-view, but it was perhaps not fully realised by 
Tillich himself. Thus, his attempt to express the wholeness he instinctively felt led 
him to produce a system that was self-sufficient. It is the aim of this chapter to 
show the way in which his explicit theology concurs with a microcosmic world-
view. 
227 References to microcosmos in Systematic Theology appear in the following places: vol.l: 
pp.176, 190, 260, 261; vo1.2: pp.23, 120; vol.3: pp.18, 19, 34, 52, 84, 85, 322. In vol.l, p.176 
two references to microcosm are made in relation to Nicholas Cusanus. The later thinking of 
Leibniz is also mentioned. On p.260, reference is made to Paracelsus & Boehme. The later 
ideas of Schelling are also referred to. On p.261 both Paracelsus and Schell ing are 
mentioned again. In vol.2, pp.23 and 120, reference is made to microcosm in connection 
with the Renaissance, in general. The Enlightenment is also mentioned. In volJ, all 
references to microcosm are made in connection with the realms making up the multi-
dimensional unity of life. 
228 Hamilton, The System and the Gospel, p.121. 
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Section 1: Triadic Formulation in Tillich's System 
Triadic Formulation in the Content of Tillich's System 
In Chapter One, we discovered the presence of triadic formulation in Tillich's 
system with regard to the life of the divine, described as the unity of the three divine 
Principles of Godhead (power), Logos (structure) and Spirit (meaning). The 
polarities of Godhead and Logos are united by the third principle, Spirit. We saw 
also that this pattern is repeated in the life of the creature by virtue of the fact that 
finite life is grounded in that of the divine. However, in contrast to the harmonious 
unity of divine life, creaturely life is characterised by the tense dialectical 
relationship between eros (power in existential terms) and logos (structure in 
existential terms). The third element of the triad, Spirit, is made accessible to the 
creature through the dimension of spirit, manifest in existence through the reflective 
capacity of the human psyche. 
The triadic formulation is repeated in the content of Tillich's theological system; his 
depiction of the ontological structure of being has two polar elements, subject and 
object, which are given coherence through the third element, reality. Moreover, the 
ontological structural elements of being consist of the same triadic formulation: the 
polarities of individualisation and participation are reconciled by the transcending 
third element of self-integration; the polarities of dynamics and form find resolution 
in the third transcending element, self-creation, and freedom and destiny find 
reconciliation in self-transcendence. Through the process of life, the creature 
participates in the rhythmical phases of the ontological structure, expressed as self-
identity - self-alteration - return-to-self, which reiterate in existential terms the very 
rhythm of the divine life itself, described by Tillich as the eternal movement within 
God of emanation and return. 
Hence, the content of his theological system is based upon the principle of polar 
tension reconciled by a transcending, uniting principle. For the creature, the 
dialectical nature of existence is reconciled through the uniting principle of Spirit. 
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For the Creator, the unity becomes dialectical through the actualising process of 
existence. 
Having established above that there is a connection in Tillich's system between the 
three functions ofHfe (self-integration, self-creation and self-transcendence) and the 
rhythm of the divine life (emanation and return within unity), it is important to 
make very clear the precise nature of the connection because by so doing, the 
utterly dynamic resonance between divine and creaturely life is revealed. Through 
the resonance, the creature becomes ever more conscious of being itself fuelling 
creaturely existence. 
The Resonance between Divine Life and Creaturely Life 
In Chapter One, we learned that the ontological structure of being was based upon 
the self-world correlation. Only when a subject has an object can the subject come 
to know itself. In Chapter Two, we saw this idea featuring strongly in the thinking 
of Boehme.229 For him, the creature became the object for the divine, enabling the 
latter to come fully to know itself. Equally, the divine provided the object for the 
creature, necessary for the full realisation of human consciousness. A similar idea 
is expressed in Tillich's self-world correlation and subject-object structure of 
reality.230 
Thus, in the self-world correlation there is a three-phased movement: the starting 
point of self, which Tillich defines as self-identity; the movement away from self, 
which Tillich terms self-alteration, and finally, the return to self, referred to as self-
transcendence. This is the reiteration of the very rhythm of the divine life itself.23I 
229 John Dourley, 'A critical Evaluation of Paul Tillich's Appropriation of Jakob Boehme.' 
Presented at the European Tillich Society (May, 2000), p.1. Dourley suggests that 
Boehme's central assertion is, " ... that a deity unable to unite its own conflictual opposites in 
eternity created humanity out of necessity in order to perceive and resolve in human 
historical life the self-contradiction it could not resolve in its own." 
230 John Dourley, The Psyche as Sacrament: A Comparative Study ojc.G.Jung and Paul Tillich 
(Toronto, Inner City Books, 1981), p.19. 
231 See pp.21,22 above: for TilIich, divine life is an eternal process of emanation and return. 
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What distinguishes the latter from the former is the unity in which the principles of 
the divine life act. Hence, the three principles of the divine life appear to generate a 
two-fold rhythm of emanation and return. In contrast, in the self-world correlation, 
there is no unity and so in existential terms there are three distinct elements in the 
rhythm: self-identity, self-alteration and self-transcendence. (The significance of 
this distinction will be returned to later in this chapter. )232 
The ontological structure of being, argues Tillich, is of a thoroughly dynamic 
nature. It is energy, not mass. 233 Moreover, it is energy given structure by its 
dialectical nature. The force of self-identity - the introspective, contractive, 
structuring force - is in perpetual conflict with the force of self-alteration - the 
outgoing, expansive force. Both forces are equal, creating a tension that is utterly 
vibratory and oscillatory. Through the tremendous tension comes a breakthrough, a 
release, which Tillich describes as a transcending of both polar forces. 234 This 
breakthrough is a creative overcoming of mutual resistance, which generates a new 
identity of self. The scene is therefore set for the next creative breakthrough to 
occur through the next build up of tension generated from the new identity of self. 
The ontological structure itself is non-substantial, non-causal, non-spatial and non-
temporal. It is the very energy of the divine as the divine relates to the creature. In 
short, the creature is grounded in the dynamics of divine energy. 
Tillich then attempts in his discussion of the ontological elements of being to 
establish the connection between time, space, causality and substance on the one 
hand, and divine energy on the other. He attempts to show the way in which this 
energy finds expression in existential life. So he makes the very abstract principle 
of ontological structure more concrete by focusing upon life itself, rather than the 
232 See pp.150-156 below. 
233 Paul Tillich, Theology o/Culture, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1959), p.23: 
"Awareness of the Uncond itioned has not the character of' intu ition', for the U ncond itioned 
does not appear in this awareness as a "Gestalt" to be intuited, but as an element, a power, as 
demand." 
234 Tillich, Systematic Theology 3, pp.30-31. 
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dynamic structure underpinning life and, at the same time, showing life to be 
grounded in the ontological structure. 
He begins with the idea of the individual; the way one individual encounters 
another corresponds to the self-identity phase of the underlying rhythm of the divine 
forces. 235 The tension of the forces in this phase is expressed in creaturely life as 
the tension between being an individual and being a participant. The breakthrough 
is expressed as self-identity in creaturely life. Again, even in terms of creaturely 
life, it is important not to understand the dialectical process in categorical terms: we 
know, for example, that our need to be accepted as an individual and as a member 
of a group or of a community is simultaneous. Sometimes, we incline more toward 
one extreme than another, but even then, the fact that it is an inclination means that 
the draw toward the other pole is still present. There may well be, in the lives of 
each and everyone of us, examples of times when we wanted to be alone, or of 
places when we wished that we were not alone, but these are not to be confused 
with the non-temporal and non-spatial dynamic forces that underlie those 
experiences. 
Life is ambiguous at every moment because the forces in which we are grounded 
are oscillatory. The oscillation is undetectable because it is not conditioned by 
time, space, causality or substance. It is perhaps better described as vibratory. 
Tillich wishes to 'show us that as long as we are in existence, the power of the 
dynamic forces of being, in their mutual resistance, are inescapable. They are in 
our depths, not external to us. However, that does not mean that we are their passive 
victims. We are not like driftwood being tossed on a chaotic sea. We are rooted in 
them and therefore, they are part of our identity and an integral part of our 
humanity. Ifwe are to understand what it means to be human, we must realise that 
we are rooted in this way. Life is ambiguous because of forces in which we are 
grounded, but despite its appearance, they are not chaotic. The forces that underpin 
life are creatively held together as unity and so we, as the manifestation of those 
235 TiIlich, Systematic Theology 3, pJO. 
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forces, are part of the creative unity. Thus, with regard to the first function of life, 
the creative resolution of the tension between indvidualisation and participation is 
depicted as self-integration - the existential manifestation of the self-identity phase 
of the ontological forces. The process of consciousness starts here with the 
individual and corresponds to the introspective, structuring phase of the ontological 
forces. 
Tillich moves on to depict the self-alteration phase in existential terms as the 
dynamics and form polarity.236 Here, Tillich broadens the focus from the individual 
to culture. We see the way in which individuals look beyond themselves and create 
a community and the community looks beyond itself and blends with others. Out of 
this outgoing drive emerges culture. 237 The ambiguities of life are still present 
because the oscillating divine forces generating the ambiguities still underpin 
culture, as they do the individual within culture; but in cultural terms, they are 
present as the ambiguity between dynamics and form. The tension of the 
underlying forces finds expression in existence through the perpetual conflict 
between the drive of culture to create itself and the expression of that drive; creative 
expression is a perpetual battle between creativity and structure. Culture transcends 
the individual and yet, is generated by every individual's desire to go beyond self. 
Thus, this aspect of life naturally corresponds to the self-alteration phase of the 
dynamic rhythm. 
In the third set of polarities, we see a further broadening of focus from the self-
alteration phase of the ontological rhythm to the return-to-self phase. Tillich uses 
the polarities of freedom and destiny to depict this in existential terms. Chapter 
One depicted this as the crescendo in Tillich's theology, the point at which the finite 
creature reaches out beyond self, beyond culture, and finally beyond finitude. 238 
This is the point at which the finite creature asks what it means to be finite. In 
asking this question, the creature cries out for the object that will reveal the nature 
236 Ibid. p.31. 
237 See pp.35-37 above. 
238 See pp.36-39 above. 
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of finitude to it. The object is provided in the form of the infinite. But the crying 
out, as with any heart felt cry, is a cry from the depths as well as into the beyond, 
and through the depths as well as from the beyond the cry is answered. The answer 
received tells us that to be finite is to be grounded in the infinite, but to be grounded 
in such a way that the infinite cannot be embraced by us because we are embraced 
by it. Thus, the third set of polarities leads to the return to self: the creature 
discovers its humanity by means of venturing to go beyond itself. 
The third function of life, self-transcendence, is the transcending phase that satisfies 
the process generated by the two previous functions of self-identity and self-
alteration. The process generated is one of reaching out in search of our identity. In 
our movement out beyond ourselves we find the divine response, the effect of 
which is the triggering of the return to our creaturely selves in satisfaction and 
completeness. In this way, the third phase expresses the return-to-self phase of the 
self-world correlation. 
As suggested earlier, not only does the creature come to know itself through the 
reaching out to the divine, but the divine is also recognised as Creator. When the 
creature asks about the meaning of finitude, it effectively asks the infinite to reveal 
itself. In this revelation, the infinite is recognised as the Creator not only by the 
creature, but by the infinite as well. 
Now we must be very careful not to lead Tillich too far in the direction of Boehmic 
thinking at this point. It would be wrong to conclude from the above statement that 
Tillich therefore regarded the creature as necessary for divine actualisation, as 
Boehme's ideas suggest.239 Tillich retains the idea of God's utter self-sufficiency in 
his theology. He retains the notion of the abysmal nature and sheer perfection of 
God and therefore, the impossibility that God should be lacking in any way. So 
how does he do this if he asserts at the same time that the creature does have a 
function in the divine life? 
239 See Dourley, 'A critical Evaluation of Paul TilIich's Appropriation of Jakob Boehme'. 
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He achieves this by drawing a distinction between the infinite in relation to the 
finite and the infinite beyond the infinite. 240 The face of God that turns to the 
creature is that of the infinite Creator. Just as an individual can only know another 
as s/he relates to the individual, so too, the finite can only know the infinite as it 
relates to the finite. The nature of that relationship is one of Creator and creature. 
In other words, although the finite creature is grounded in the life of the divine, it is 
the life of the divine in its creative function that we recognise. Through the 
resonance, or as Tillich would perhaps prefer, through the correlation between 
Creator and creature, the creature comes to know itself as finite and the Creator 
comes to show itself as the creative ground of finite life. 
The question of the meaning of finitude is asked through culture and inevitably, 
therefore, through history, making human self-consciousness evolve and expand 
through the process of history. The nature of the question asked by the creature and 
the answer given is determined by the conditions of existence. Thus, through the 
conditions of existence, the divine as Creator comes to reveal itself to the creature. 
Through the reality of time, space, causality and substance, the fullness of the 
creative power of the divine is realised. 
Tillich's theology depicts the resonance between human self-consciousness and 
infinite consciousness, or the correlation between human self-manifestation and 
infinite manifestation. Existence is crucial for the infinite/finite relationship, for the 
finite creature comes to know itself as finite and the infinite Creator comes to show 
itself as infinitely creative. 
If we return to consider how the functions of the ontological structural elements of 
being correspond to the rhythm of the divine life, we can perhaps see a little more 
clearly the way in which the rhythm of self-identity, self-alteration and return-to-
self of the creaturely life correlates with that of the divine life. There is 
synchronicity between the two, brought about by the pivotal role that creation and 
240 TilIich, Systematic Theology I, p.191. 
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the creative process of life plays for both. Only through the historical process of 
creaturely consciousness can the Creator manifest its creativity.241 
In Chapter One, it was suggested that triadic formulation permeated the structure as 
well as the content of Tillich's theological system. Brief reference was made to 
Kelsey's observations of the structure of Tillich's Systematic Theology in this 
respect. It is necessary now to take a closer look at those observations. in order to 
illustrate the precise way in which the structure of Tillich's system reiterates the 
triadic pattern of the content of the system. 
Triadic Formulation in the Structure of Tillich 's System 
Kelsey argues that Tillich's three volumes of Systematic Theology are divided into 
five parts. Each part addresses specific existential questions, which are answered by 
reference to particular religious symbols, i.e. each question is correlated to an 
answer in the form of a religious symbol. He argues that Part One, Reason and 
Revelation, raises questions about the possibility of certain truth. which are 
answered by the religious symbol, Logos. In Part Two, Being and God. questions 
are asked about the nature of human finitude and correlated with the answering 
symbol, God. Part Three, Existence and the Christ, deals with questions raised with 
regard to the estrangement of humanity. The symbol proffered in response is that 
of Jesus as the Christ. Part Four offers Spirit as the answer to the questions raised 
by the ambiguities of religion, culture and morality. Finally, Part Five asks 
questions about the meaning of history, which is answered in the symbol, Kingdom 
of God. 
Kelsey goes on to suggest that the five parts do not form a sequential argument 
because Tillich's theology is arranged by a different principle. The five parts 
resolve into three distinct subdivisions. Parts One and Two deal with questions 
241 Tillich, Theology o/Culture, p.3): "What has happened in nature unconsciously happens in 
man and history consciously". 
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concernmg man's essential nature, Part Three considers the question of his 
existential nature and Parts Four and Five raise questions about the meaning of 
historical life. 
The relationship between the three subdivisions is not parallel, argues Kelsey: the 
third embraces the issues that are raised in the other twO. 242 The structure of 
Tillich's system reiterates the dialectical approach taken with regard to the content 
of his theology; the third subdivision of the question of history and its correlation to 
the symbols, Spirit and Kingdom of God, embraces the two previous subdivisions. 
Thus, it echoes the synthesising function of the third element of the dialectical 
method: from the yes of essential being to the no of existential being, onto the 
synthesising and transcending yes of Spirit and the Kingdom of God. Kelsey's 
observations help us to see that triadic formulation is present in the very structure of 
Tillich's system. 
Kelsey does not suggest a triadic connection between the structure and content of 
Tillich's theological system. Nevertheless, Kelsey's observations, outlined above, 
can be used to lend weight to the argument of this thesis that triadic formulation is 
crucial both to the structure and content of Tillich's theological system. It is the 
means by which the dialectical nature of the divine in relation to the creature is 
depicted. J. L. Adams comments upon this in a discussion about Tillich's interest in 
architecture. He suggests: 
.... Just as in his 'Address to Dedication' one observes in 
Tillich the impulse always to form an architectonic structure, so 
one may observe it also in his whole system of thought. One is 
reminded of Goethe's famous characterisation of the philosophy 
of Aristotle in which he compares it to a pyramid. Tillich's 
242 Ke]sey, The Fabric of Paul Tillich's Theology, p.14. 
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thought as can readily be observed In his 'System of the 
Sciences' also possesses pyramidal quality.243 
Now, what are we to make of Adams' and Kelsey's observations and of the 
presence in Tillich's theology of triadic patterns? Could it be simply confirmation 
of Hamilton's argument that the structure of Tillich's system demands a certain 
cohesive pattern for the contents of the system; that the outline is established first 
and the contents are made to fit into the shape? Or could it be that underlying his 
thinking and the consequent shape of his system is something much deeper than an 
idiosyncratic style of thinking? Could it be that this triadic style is determined by 
Tillich's deep sense of the microcosmic/macrocosmic relation between God and 
humanity? Could it be that the dialectical method of yes, no and on to a 
transcending yes is used by Tillich because it is a wholly appropriate way of 
depicting the microcosmic understanding of life? 
The same dialectical approach is detectable in the classical notion of divine 
emanation and return, discussed in Chapter Two. There, we saw that Pseudo-
Dionysius employed a dialectical method in his theology. For him, the approach to 
God was through the process of theological affirmation, followed by negation, 
leading to a resolving superlative theology. 
Nicholas Cusanus employed a similar method in his de Docta Ignorantia, in which 
he propounded his doctrine of the coincidence of opposites - God transcends all 
opposites; in other words the yes and no are transcended by the reconciling yes. 
Finally, Jacob Boehme depicted the relationship of the divine and the creature in 
terms of subject and object: the creature, the product of the outward dynamic of the 
divine will, provides the object upon which the divine can project, in order that the 
divine may achieve full self-knowledge. Here, he expresses the idea that in the 
divine emanation away from itself, the no that the creature as object represents 
243 J.L. Adams, Paul Tillich's Theology of Culture. Science and Religion (New York, Harper & 
Row, 1965), p.99. 
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provides the means by which the divine transcends its original yes as potential and 
finds expression as yes as actual. 
It would appear, therefore, that the method of dialectic is a wholly adequate way of 
depicting the classical idea of divine emanation and return, intimately connected 
with the understanding of the microcosmic relation of the human being to God. 
This is supported by Tillich's own words: 
... they [classical German philosophers] were right (and so were 
most classical theologians) in using the dialectics of life in order 
to describe the eternal process of the divine ground ofbeing.244 
What can be concluded from this is that Tillich's employment of a triadic, 
dialectical method in his theology, therefore, would not preclude him from having a 
microcosmic sense of the relation between the creature and the Creator. 
Now, to argue that his theology concurs with a microcosmic appreciation of life on 
the strength of his use of dialectic alone would be somewhat weak. However, to 
couple his use of dialectic with his understanding of finitude's relation to the divine 
would dramatically strengthen the argument. The idea that dialectic was the means 
by which Tillich chose to depict the life of the divine in relation to that of the finite 
creature would appear to be an approach consistent with the classical understanding 
of the microcosmic relationship between creature and Creator. Just as in the 
classical tradition, life was the product of divine emanation and, as such, was part of 
the unity that was held together by the divine, so too, for Tillich, the creature is 
grounded in the divine by virtue of the fact that the latter participates in the dynamic 
forces of the divine life. Tillich's assertion that the Doctrine of the Trinity is 
dialectical and reflects the dialectic of life, "namely the movement of separation and 
reunion" supports the view that Tillich's theological perspective was consistent with 
244 Tillich, Systematic Theology 3, p.284. 
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the classical tradition in this respect.245 He argues that the trinitarian statement that 
three is one and one is three is not paradoxical, but rather the description of "all life 
246 processes". 
The suggestion here is not that Tillich's use of dialectic was a deliberate tool for 
depicting a microcosmic theme, but that behind Tillich's deliberate choice of 
correlation and dialectic in his system was a sense of unity that he intuited but 
perhaps was unable to make fully explicit in his work. It was a theme that lay in the 
depths of the western Christian tradition and which was, therefore, part of Tillich's 
heritage, but it was a theme which had been covered over by a more recent heritage 
with which he was more consciously engaged. 
If this argument is to be upheld, it is necessary to consider what difference a 
microcosmic appreciation of life would make to Tillichian theology. More 
specifically, we must ask: what difference would it make to his method of 
correlation, if it were seen as an expression of a microcosmic world-view? 
In order to begin to answer this question, it is necessary to consider Tillich's use of 
symbol in his system, for symbol is the means by which Tillich shows the life of the 
creature to participate in the life of the divine in a meaningful way. For Tillich, 
divine life and creaturely life correlate through the vehicle of finite language, for 
language functions in a symbolic way to depict the Creator/creature relationship. 
245 Ibid., p.284. 
246 Ibid., p.285. 
128 
Section Two: Microcosm and Tillich's Method of 
Correlation 
Symbol 
One of the expressions used by Tillich to depict God is being itself.247 Everything 
that has life participates in being itself because being itself is the power that is in all 
life forms. It follows that, for Tillich, being itself, or the unconditioned, to use 
another of his terms, is present in the universe and in culture. 248 He argues that 
religion is not simply a sphere within culture, but is concerned to seek out the 
unconditioned. It is that which is ultimately concerned and expresses the dimension 
of depth in every cultural activity.249 In this way, Tillich shows everything in life to 
be grounded in being itself and to be a potential source of religious expression. By 
expressing God in such terms, he establishes firmly that existential life is rooted in 
the dynamic forces of the divine life through the ontological structure of being. God 
is in the depths and, indeed, is the depths of existence. The life-force of existence is 
the manifestation of the divine power. 
An awareness of this power is not gained through a particular mental faculty of the 
human being, but through the wholeness of the human being in the everyday 
activities of life. To live spiritually is not to separate oneself from everyday 
existence, but to recognise the dimension of depth in every activity, no matter how 
mundane that activity may be. 
Tillich argues that the capacity to live a spiritual life is rooted in our capacity for 
language. 250 This idea is derived from his understanding of the relationship 
between the psychic and spiritual dimensions in the human being, referred to in 
Chapter One. There, we learned that the dimension of spirit is born out of the total 
247 Tillich, Systematic Theology 1, p.243. 
248 Tillich, Theology of Culture, p.26. 
249 Ibid., pp.40,41. 
250 Ibid., p.42. 
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integration of all psychological contents in the personal centre of the psyche. For 
Tillich, this centre makes sense of the psychological material present around each 
individual. Every thought is based upon conscious and unconscious experiences in 
life, including sensory experiences. The personal centre is the reasoning faculty, in 
which these experiences are processed and integrated into a whole. Such 
integration represents a transcendence of the psychological contents, which Tillich 
calls a "manifestation of spirit.,,25\ 
Thus, for Tillich there is an intimate relationship between spirit and reason. To live 
spiritually is to live in an integrated way, possible only through the reflective 
process of reason in the psyche. Reflective thought requires language, be it "spoken 
or silent" ,252 and as spiritual life is the product of reflective thought, it too, requires 
language to become an active spiritual life. 
To suggest that to live spiritually is to live in an integrated way is to highlight the 
involvement of every aspect of humanity in the spiritual life. To be fully human is 
to live life meaningfully, which means to attend to the mundane in such a way that 
the dimension of depth is activated at every moment of life, whether we are 
washing dishes, playing football or facing death. The question is, how does the 
individual unlock those depths? For Tillich, symbol provides the key. 
Symbol, for Tillich, means two things: firstly, it is that which points beyond itself, 
and secondly, it is that which participates in that to which it points.253 For example, 
a king is a symbol of a nation in that he points beyond himself to the power or 
meaning of the nation.254 The pointing beyond, however, would not occur ifhe did 
not also participate in that very power or meaning. Thus, a symbol mediates a 
power or a meaning that goes beyond the immediacy of the object itself. He 
explains that a symbol, therefore, is both similar to, and different from a sign.25s 
251 TilIich, Systematic Theology 3, p.27. 
252 TiIlich, Theology of Culture, p.42. 
253 TilIich, Systematic Theology 1, pp.239-240. 
254 Kelsey, The Fabric of Paul Tillich's Theology, p.46. 
255 TiIlich, Systematic Theology 1, p.239. 
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While both point beyond themselves, the latter does not participate in that to which 
it points. So, for example, a red flag has a significance that lies beyond itself; it 
signifies danger. However, there is nothing inherently dangerous about the redness 
of the flag; it is simply a colour that has been chosen to denote danger. It is 
conceivable that another colour might be used to convey the same message, and as 
long as people were notified of the change, the new colour would function to 
signify danger as adequately as the red. Thus the sign does not participate in that 
toward which it points. A symbol, in contrast, cannot be chosen at random. There is 
something inherently meaningful or powerful about the person of the king that 
qualifies him to hold such a position over all other contenders. His power is 
recognised by those whom he rules, not simply because of the position he holds, but 
because of the kingly qualities of his inherent nature or of his line. Hence, the 
symbol of the king indicates an integration of the person of the king with his 
function as the king. 
Tillich argues that symbols are born out of the collective unconscious of a group 
and die when the collective unconscious no longer recognises their power or 
meaning. A symbol is born when an object, an action or a word opens up the 
dimension of depth in reality. For this opening up to be recognised, a similar 
process must be effected in the internal reality of an individual or group. A symbol, 
then, opens up the dimension of depth in the external and internal realities of an 
. d"d 1256 III IVI ua. 
This is most interesting, for here, Tillich shows the correlation between human 
inner reality and external reality, i.e. he shows the symbol to correlate the self and 
world. To put it another way, the subject-object correlation is achieved through the 
symbol. To express it in yet different terms, the external reality of the world is 
synchronised with the internal reality of the individual by means of the symbol. 
We are reminded of Tillich's appreciation of the resonance between self and world, 
referred to in Chapter One. There, it was argued that Tillich regards there to be a 
256 TilIich, Theology of Culture, pp.58,59. 
131 
resonance between the reality of the psyche and the reality of the external world, 
which is derived from the self-world correlation. Self and world correlate through 
the structure of reason present in both. The presence of reason in the human psyche 
enables the psyche to make sense of the external world in a meaningful way, and 
the presence of reason as the structure of the external world allows the human being 
to grasp and shape reality in a meaningful way. 
Hence, self and world oscillate in relation to each other: they are polar forces, held 
in relation by the unifying presence of reason. Reason acts in a pivotal way to hold 
the polar forces together while, at the same time, allowing those forces to work 
dialectically. Out of the dialectical correlation between self and world something 
happens that transcends both poles: on the individual level, through the personal 
centre, the experiences of life (i.e. the interaction of self with world) are integrated 
by means of reason and the individual becomes centred, integrated, balanced, 
aligned. At the same time, through the community of integrated, centred 
individuals, external reality takes on a sense of wholeness: the inner integration of 
the psyche is projected on to external reality and the wholeness of the external 
reality is absorbed through the integrative process of the personal centre of every 
individual. In this way, self and world correlate and the actualisation of being is 
processed within existence. Hence, actualisation of being takes place through 
synchronisation between self and world. 
What happens to permit the synchronisation to take place? Does Tillich suggest that 
centring and wholeness are natural features of reality as it is experienced today? 
Does such a suggestion not contradict his insistence upon the ambiguity of life, the 
presence of being and the threat of non-being at every moment of existence? Do we 
not find ourselves in a world of distortion and disintegration rather than one of 
wholeness and integration? What, then, are we to make of the notion of 
synchronisation? 
In the self-world correlation, Tillich depicts his sense of the ultimate unity between 
divine life and finite life; not the reality of existence on its own, but the reality of 
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existence in communion with God. When the dimension of depth is penetrated at 
every moment in existential life, synchronisation takes place. However, what stops 
this penetration from taking place is the ambiguity of existential life? We are 
unable to see the dimension of depth at every moment because finite life is under 
the constant threat of non-being, which renders obscure our root in being itself. The 
creature is tied to the categories of time, space, causality and substance, which bind 
every thought. sensation 8?d experience. The creature is rooted in being itself but 
is, at the same time, qualita~ively different from being itself. 
So the notion of centredness and wholeness is not one that Tillich wishes to suggest 
is present in the physicality and immediacy of time, space, causality and substance, 
rather it is one that is present in the depths of existence. It is a notion that depicts 
the relationship of finitude beyond its bounds, as part of the divine life. Although it 
is not manifest in existence, it can be felt at every moment because in the depths of 
our experience of ambiguity lies the power of being itself. Tillich then attempts to 
show the way in which this power is accessed by means of the symbol, despite the 
distortions and ambiguities of life. 
At the existential level, the symbol is a product of the presence of reason in 
existence. Through reason, the human being processes the experiences of life. As 
reason is the structure of the mind as well as the structure of the external world of 
the individual, the processing conforms to the structure of reality. In Chapter One, 
we saw reason to be born out of the Logos principle of the divine life. However, 
reason in existence is as vulnerable to the distortions and ambiguities of life as is 
every thing else in existence. Existential reason is bound by the categories of time, 
space, causality and substance. 
Nevertheless, by virtue of the fact that reason is derived from the Logos principle of 
the divine life, it is capable of providing a connection between the divine and the 
finite creature that breaks the bounds of the categories, impenetrable by the creature 
from the inside. The bounds are broken from beyond existence, by the divine itself. 
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Tillich argues that in the search for the dimension of depth, the human being calls 
out to God and God answers the cry through revelation.257 
The link between God and humanity is established through mutual participation. 
Through reason, the human being reaches out beyond and into the depths and 
through the very same reason, God speaks. Thus reason, or logos, becomes a 
symbol. Revelation shows the human being the divine power within logos and, at 
the same time, logos points toward the source of the power. The symbol of logos, 
therefore, becomes a channel through which the divine breaks through to the human 
being, caught up within the bounds of finitude, and reaches out to show the creature 
the power and meaning in the depths of creaturely existence. At this point, logos is 
empowered to become the symbol Logos. 
Returning to the subject-object correlation, we can begin to discern the way in 
which the logos (reason) functions as a pivot for the dialectical relationship between 
self and world on the one hand, and finitude and the infinite on the other. It is a 
pivot in that it acts not simply as the correlate for the self and world within 
existence, but also, through its function as a symbol, it becomes a correlate for the 
finite-infinite relation. In other words, it provides the vertical dimension within 
existence that enables the human being to access the depths of being and thus to 
find the meaning of life. 258 
As the correlate for self and world on the horizontal axis and the correlate for the 
creature and Creator on the vertical axis, Logos functions as the pivot for a cross, 
that powerful symbol, not just for Christianity, but for all walks of life. The cross is 
a symbol that depicts equilibrium prior to change. It has a still, pivotal point, which 
may anticipate great transformation. The power of the symbol of the cross, then, is 
its stillness, its centrality, its equilibrium, its alignment. The Christian symbol of 
257 TiIlich, Systematic Theology 1, pp.11 0-113. 
258 In so far as it relates to the self-world correlation, logos (lower case I) is appropriate. 
However, in so far as it relates to the finite-infinite relation, Logos (upper case L) is 
appropriate. For clarity, the upper case will be used to denote Logos as symbol. 
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the cross embodies each one of those ideas, for in it can be found the point of 
communion with the divine. It is a communion central within life, as the horizontal 
axis of the self-world correlation denotes. It is also a communion with that which 
lies beyond life, as the vertical axis of the human-divine correlation denotes. Most 
importantly for Tillich's theology, the meeting point of the cross lies in the heart of 
existence. Communion with God is not a denial of life, but a total absorption in life 
in its fullest sense of living. 
Thus, through symbol, Tillich attempts to show the way in which communion with 
God takes place in the heart of existence and penetrates its very depths. Symbol acts 
as the tool by which the power of being itself penetrates life and imbues it with the 
power to see through the distortions and ambiguity that clouds the Creator/creature 
reality. The symbol of the Logos as a correlate to the Creator/creature relationship 
causes the internal reality of the psyche to synchronise with external reality. If the 
Logos were not a symbol, but simply the correlate for the self and the world, then 
there would be no synchronisation. Indeed, this would be impossible in Tillich's 
system, for his method of correlation hinges upon the fundamental appreciation of 
the ultimate unity of life and such an appreciation is based upon a sense of the 
microcosmic relation of humanity to the divine. 
This means that correlation and symbol are intimately connected in Tillich's 
system. With the microcosmic motif underpinning Tillich's system, we are able to 
see correlation as a structural tool used to frame his concept of symbol. The symbol 
motif provides the connection between divine life and finite life that the 
microcosmic theme requires in the content of his theology, while the method of 
correlation provides the connection between the existential questions and the divine 
answers that the microcosmic theme requires in the structure of his theology. 
If we regard the method of correlation as merely a convenient tool for holding 
Tillich's personal ontological system in tact, as Hamilton suggests, we miss the 
powerful microcosmic theme that lies beneath the surface of his theology. Thus, 
with regard to the question asked earlier - what difference would it make to his 
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method of correlation, if it were seen as an expression of a microcosmic world-
view? we can say that the microcosmic theme allows us to regard the method of 
correlation as the means by which we look through Tillich's ontology to the depth 
of meaning that lies beyond. It renders Hamilton's critique of correlation 
superficial. In contrast to Hamilton's view, correlation becomes a structural method 
that facilitates a sense of integration and synchronisation between the content and 
the structure of Tillich' s system. 
Returning to Logos, it is a symbol because it is rooted in the power of being itself. 
This we know because we have seen that existential logos is derived from the Logos 
principle of the divine life.259 Logos is the symbol that communicates the creative 
structure of creaturely life as it correlates with divine life. Through the human 
psyche, the logos functions to structure reality according to the structure of the 
divine life. 
However, as illustrated in Chapter One, divine life does not consist of the principle 
of Logos alone, but also of the principles of Godhead and Spirit. If Tillich uses 
symbol to depict the human life as it correlates with that of the divine, then we 
would expect him to employ other symbols to show the resonance between the 
other principles of the divine life and that of the creature - and, as we will see 
below, this he does. 
In the divine life, Tillich referred to the principle of Godhead as the polarity of 
Logos, the abysmal power of the divine. Tillich argues that this abysmal power is 
found in finite life through the symbol, God. Kelsey points out that God is the 
answer to questions raised by humanity about the nature of finitude.26o God, Tillich 
argues, is the name that is given to man's ultimate concern. 261 Humanity is 
ultimately concerned with that which lies in the depths of being and which helps us 
to understand what it means to be human. Ifhumanity's question is concerned with 
259 See pp.54,55 above. 
260 Kelsey, The Fabric of Paul Tillich's Theology, p.14. 
261 Tillich, Systematic Theology I, p.220. 
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the nature of finitude, the answer must fully satisfy finitude. It cannot be the same 
as finitude and must, therefore, exceed it. God as the symbol of that which lies 
beyond finitude is therefore infinite. In so far as the infinite exceeds finitude, then 
God is unknowable to the finite creature. There is the infinite that lies beyond the 
infinite. At the same time, in so far as the very question of finitude leads us to a 
sense of the infinite, then we, as finite creatures, participate in the infinite. Thus, 
Tillich concludes that the symbol God expresses both the presence of divine power 
in existence and the abysmal nature of that power, with its consequent 
inaccessibility for the finite creature. By expressing the divine power in existence, 
God fulfills the first prerequisite of a symbol - to participate in that to which it 
points. By expressing the abysmal nature of that power, it fulfills the second 
requirement - to point beyond itself. 
We may recall that the divine life had a third principle, Spirit, the unifying principle 
that brought the polar principles of Godhead and Logos into a transcending unity. 
Kelsey argues that Tillich uses Spirit as the symbol that answers the questions 
raised by the ambiguities of life.262 We can see the appropriateness of this function 
in finite life, for it is a reiteration of its unifying function in the divine life. In 
Chapter One, we saw that the divine Principle of Spirit is the means by which the 
tension of the polar forces present in the ontological structural elements is 
transcended and resolved creatively.263 As the creative unifying principle of the 
divine life, the symbol Spirit in finite life serves a similar function. To see this 
more clearly, it is important fully to understand how Spirit functions as a symbol, 
i.e. how Spirit participates in that toward which it points and how it points toward 
that in which it participates. 
So, how does the symbol Spirit participate in that toward which it points, namely, 
the Spirit principle of the divine life? The answer to this lies in its intimacy with 
logos in finite life. We learned earlier that the manifestation of the dimension of 
262 Kelsey, Fabric of Paul Tillich 's Theology, p.l4. 
263 See p.4l above. 
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spirit in the human being is born out of the function of reason within the psyche.264 
Because reason is derived from the Logos principle of the divine life, it participates 
in the Spirit principle, for in the divine life, logos is integrated with Spirit. 
Furthermore, because Logos is integrated with Godhead as well as with Spirit in the 
divine life, finite reason also participates in the Godhead principle. In other words, 
reason provides the structure within finitude through which the power of the 
Godhead and the unifying function of Spirit can be received. Thus, the symbol 
Spirit participates in the divine principle of Spirit because it is rooted in reason. 
Here, in Tillich's thinking, we detect a very powerful microcosmic theme; through 
the structure of reason, finite life is imbued with the integrated forces of divine life. 
The finite creature, specifically the human being,265 receives the divine forces in 
their integrated fullness but fails to recognise them as such, due to the distorting 
influence of the conditions of time, space, causality and substance. The creature 
fails to see the clarity of the divine forces due to the haze of the categories that 
condition existential life. The symbol Spirit is the means by which the human 
creature is directed toward an understanding of the unity and integration of the 
forces of life in relation to those of the divine. However, the conditions of existence 
determine that the symbol does not reveal the fully integrated nature of those forces. 
Such integration lies beyond the power ofthe symbol. 
Thus, by referring to the symbols, God, Logos and Spirit, Tillich establishes the 
divine in the centre of existential life. The divine forces are imminent in existence. 
At the same time however, those forces are inaccessible to the creature because the 
conditions of existence distort their clarity. By demonstrating the divine presence in 
existence, specifically in the psyche of the human being, Tillich shows his 
understanding of life in relation to the divine to concur with the microcosmic world-
views of Renaissance thinkers. 
264 See pp.64-66 above. 
265 Tillich, Systematic Theology 3, p.25: Tillich argues that only the human being has the logos 
structure within its psyche. 
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There is more to be discussed on Tillich's use of symbol and on the microcosmic 
theme that emerges through it, for it is necessary to consider the two other symbols 
to which Kelsey refers in his analysis of the arrangement of Tillich's system.266 
Tillich uses the symbols, Jesus as the Christ and Kingdom of God, as well as the 
symbols of Logos, God and Spirit. If we are arguing that Tillich uses symbol to 
depict the way in which the divine life correlates with finite life, what place do the 
two additional symbols have? There were only three Principles in the divine life: 
Godhead, Logos and Spirit. Why then, does Tillich employ the symbols, Jesus as 
the Christ and Kingdom of God? 
So far, we have established the correlation between divine life and finite life in 
terms of the human psyche. We have established that human beings make sense of 
their environment through the ability to reflect and think. This process is 
determined by the logos structure of the human psyche and through this, the 
personal centre within the psyche of every individual turns environment into a 
world. Through the logos structure of the mind, self and world interact, facilitating 
the integration of the contents of experience in the personal centre of every 
individual. When this is achieved, the dimension of spirit is manifested. 
However, Tillich insists that the process of actualisation is not purely a psychic 
phenomenon, but a process that is also external to the individua1.267 It occurs within 
the individual, within history and within culture. The symbols, Jesus as the Christ 
and Kingdom of God are necessary in his system to demonstrate the essential 
placing of the psychic process of actualisation within history. The process requires 
time and place and therefore, must be grounded in actual circumstance. It has to be 
fully actual if, indeed, it is a process of actualisation. Thus, the fully actual event of 
the life and death of Jesus as the Christ is a vital element in the symbol, Jesus as the 
Christ. 
266 Kelsey, Fabric of Paul Tillich's Theology, pp.l3-l5. 
267 Tillich, Systematic Theology l, p.lll: "Revelation, as revelation of mystery which is our 
ultimate concern, is invariably revelation for someone in a concrete situation of concern ..... " 
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Tillich emphasises the importance of the correct labelling of the symbol as Jesus as 
the Christ, for Jesus denotes the humanity, concreteness and historical validity of 
the symbol. 268 Christ denotes the power and the infinite quality of the symbol. 
Jesus without Christ would not be a symbol because it would not fultill the two 
criteria of a symbol. Jesus alone would not participate in the power to which it 
points. Equally, Christ would have no grounding in the reality of the human 
situation. It would therefore, have no salvific significance for the human being. 
Jesus as the Christ however, fulfills both criteria completely. 
In this symbol, Tillich shows how the bounds of time, space, causality and 
substance are broken, thus lifting the haze that up until the Christ event had clouded 
the understanding of the Creator/creature relationship. Thus, Jesus as the Christ 
becomes the fullest symbol of that relationship because none of the other symbols 
are able to break through the conditions of existence in quite the same way. They 
fall short, for they are not symbols of an actual historical event. That is not to say 
that the symbol of Jesus as the Christ makes redundant all the other symbols. On 
the contrary, it fulfills them. Their function as correlates for the divine life and finite 
life is clarified through Jesus as the Christ. 
The Kingdom of God symbol proceeds naturally from the symbol, Jesus as the 
Christ. It is the answer to the questions raised by humanity about the meaning of 
history.269 It is the symbol that guides humanity in terms of the social, political and 
personal direction within history in light of the historical event of Jesus as the 
Christ. 
Let us be clear here that Tillich does not wish to suggest that the symbol proceeds 
historically from the historical Christ event. What we must remember when 
examining the symbols is that Tillich refers to them in terms of the way in which 
they act as the medium through which the Creator and creature commune. This 
takes into account the historical dimension, but is not wholly determined by it. 
268 Tillich, Systematic Theology 3, pp.144-149. 
269 Kelsey, The Fabric of Paul Tillich's Theology, p.14. 
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Tillich wishes to show that the temporal communes with the eternal. The eternal 
enters the temporal and that is the turning point of the trans-temporal relationship 
between Creator and creature. Thus, the symbol, Kingdom of God, should not be 
understood as proceeding sequentially from the Jesus as the Christ symbol. Both 
exist within time and beyond time.27o It is, instead, a qualitative proceeding to 
which Tillich refers. The Kingdom of God is the human response to the divine 
breaking through of the conditions of existence through the historical life and death 
of Jesus as the Christ. 
Thus, as God is eternal and humanity is temporal, the symbol is both temporal and 
eternal and this is the way in which it fulfills the two criteria of symbol. In so far as 
it points toward the power ofthe historical event of the life and death of Jesus as the 
Christ, it points beyond itself. In so far as it expresses the human response to the 
divine breaking through of the conditions of existence, it participates in that to 
which it points. 
Through the symbols of Jesus as the Christ and Kingdom of God then, Tillich 
shows that the creature/Creator relationship is not just an inner, psychic experience, 
but is also external and concrete. Therefore, he is able to conclude that this 
relationship takes place both in the depths of the human being and in the external 
world of history and culture. 
Through his symbol system, Tillich demonstrates how the principles of the divine 
life imbue the life of the creature, and how all three principles are concentrated in 
the comprehensive symbol, Jesus as the Christ. Thus, this symbol replaces Logos at 
the still-point of the cross, for Jesus as the Christ embraces Logos and surpasses it 
by symbolising the integration of Logos with historical circumstance.271 Jesus as 
270 Tillich, Systematic Theology 3, pp.356-359; 364-369. 
271 Ibid, p.364: TiIlich describes the appearance of Jesus as the Christ as "the centre of history". 
This is not a measurement in time, but an expression of" a moment in history for which 
everything before and after is both preparation and reception". 
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the Christ is the point at which self and world unify and Creator and creature 
become one. It is the point at which ambiguity is clarified and the oscillatory 
dynamics of polar tensions are aligned. In short, for Tillich, it symbolises the 
ultimate unity of being. 
This evokes a sense of Jesus as the Christ as the central point of a wheel, a wheel 
that is thoroughly dynamic in nature, but whose pivotal point keeps the dynamics 
centred. This is very reminiscent of the microcosmic ideas of the Middle Ages and 
Renaissance. A microcosmic understanding of Tillichian theology allows his 
method of correlation and dialectic to clarify the divinelhuman relationship. 
Through microcosmic imagery, these methods depict the ultimate unity of the 
diversity of life. The polarities of existence are held together by the one central, 
pivotal point, without which diversity would have no focus and would be chaotic. 
Without the central point, the paradoxes of dialectical thinking would not be 
reconciled. 
Microcosmic thinking is inevitably spiralling because of the need for the still-point 
of the centre. Medieval scholasticism placed God at the centre. Renaissance 
thinkers tended toward superimposing the human being upon God at the centre. 
Tillich places both the Logos and Jesus as the Christ at the centre and shows the 
significance of the Christ event to be born out ofthe integration of human drive and 
search for God within existence and the divine desire to break through history. 
Thus, Tillich communicates a sense of mutual participation between God the 
Creator and Sustainer, and humanity the creature and the sustained, characterised by 
creaturely freedom. The creature finds freedom in its relation to the divine and 
through that freedom, the fullness of the creativity of the divine is made manifest. 
The idea of creaturely freedom is very important in Tillichian theology and in the 
microcosmic theme that can be seen to underlie his thinking, and so it is necessary 
to consider it in depth. 
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Creaturely Freedom 
So far, it has been argued that the life of the creature is grounded in that of the 
divine. The rhythm of divine emanation and return is reiterated in finite life through 
the underlying structure of being, which consists of the dialectical relation between 
object and subject, self and world. Tillich argues that such a structure is present 
because of the presence of logos in existential reality. Logos is the ordering 
principle of the human psyche and of the world in which the human being lives. The 
logos of existence is the emanation of the Logos of the divine life. In its existential 
state, it is a logos conditioned by the categories of existence. Nevertheless, as the 
emanation of the Logos principle of the divine life, existential logos is grounded in 
the power from which it is derived and toward which it points. Thus, existential 
logos qualifies as the symbol for Logos. As bearers of psyches ordered by logos, 
human beings have the power to create a meaningful world and not to be bound by 
the environment in which we dwell. Through the gift of reason, the logos structure 
of the human psyche empowers humanity to make sense of existence, to interpret it 
and to transform it. For Tillich, this ability is what makes the human being free.272 
Freedom must be understood clearly, for it is not arbitrary, chaotic or wild. If the 
creature is gifted with the empowering principle of Logos, and if human freedom is 
gained through that principle, then freedom must be based in some way upon that 
very principle. The question is how is it based upon logos? How does Tillich avoid 
human freedom becoming nothing more than divine lip service if he argues that the 
creature is grounded in the divine life? How can the human being truly be free if 
freedom is based upon structure? How can the creature stand apart from the Creator 
in freedom? All of these questions raise one fundamental issue: what does freedom 
mean in human terms? 
This question is a fundamental one, for in order to understand the significance of 
freedom for the human being, it is necessary to understand the significance of being 
272 Paul Tillich, The Courage To Be (Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 1952), 
p.82,83. 
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human. In other words, only when we grasp fully what it means to be human, can 
we understand what it means to be free. Of course, only when we live in a fully 
human way can we understand what it means to be human, and only then are we in 
a position to understand the meaning of freedom. 
Tillich argues that being human means living in ambiguity. It means being finite 
and therefore, being threatened at every moment by non-being. At the same time, 
being threatened by non-being means being faced with the possibility, not the 
actuality of non-being. As long as non-being is nothing more than a threat, we 
know ourselves to be grounded in that which non-being threatens, namely, being 
itself. Our ambiguity in life is derived from this state of being grounded in being 
and, at the same time, being perpetually threatened by the possibility of non-being. 
Being human therefore, means to live creatively and anxiously at the same time. 
We can live creatively because we are grounded in the creativity of being itself. At 
the same time however, our creative drive must be harnessed by our need for self-
preservation, a need generated by the perpetual ontological threat to our very being. 
In one's desire to move away from oneself, eros finds expression and in the 
simultaneous desire not to lose oneself in the movement away, logos is expressed. 
To be human, then, is to be involved in the dynamics that underlie existence: to 
search beyond oneself and, at the same time, to preserve oneself. This ambiguity is 
the expression of the ontological structure of reality consisting of the dynamic 
correlation between self and world or, put another way, between subject and object. 
To be human is to live dynamically as a self in relation to a world and such 
existence demands two things of the human being: first, to have the freedom to let 
go of the self in search of the world and second, to have the freedom to let go of the 
world in search of the self. This is not a causal relationship, but one of resonance 
and reciprocity. 
Freedom in this respect is a balancing principle; we might even see it as a 
synchronising principle; to fail to search beyond the self, consciousness of self is 
stifled and distorted. At the same time, to lose one's sense of self in the crowd, so 
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to speak, leads, once again, to distortion. To live creatively is to live dynamically in 
relation to both poles of self and world, so that consciousness of self grows in a 
balanced way. This is the way in which freedom can be seen as a balancing 
principle. 
How then, is freedom to be seen as a synchronising principle? If our involvement 
in the world allows our sense of self to develop, it also follows that our sense of self 
colours our world and the way in which we participate in it. Our world becomes 
meaningful to us as we are in ourselves, and our sense of self becomes meaningful 
to us as we participate in the world. If we are unable to let go of our sense of self in 
response to our involvement in the world, then we begin to lose ourselves. We 
begin to be taken over by the polar force of participation and involvement and 
consequently, lose the ability to return to self in order to integrate our experience of 
involvement with our inner world of self. Tillich cites as illustrations of this kind of 
disintegration mental diseases in which dramatic personality changes take place. 
On the other hand, if we are so afraid to become involved in the world that we 
choose to hang onto what feels like a safe sense of world, then we run the risk of 
becoming detached from the external world and consequently, of living a life that is 
distorted by our lack of freedom to let go. Tillich regards psychoneurosis as a 
diseased expression of such distortion. 273 
However, if we have the freedom to let go of self on the one hand, and of world on 
the other, then self and world become synchronised: what is learned through 
involvement in world finds expression in the integrated personal centre, and the 
ever-evolving personal centre finds self-expression in its world. In this way, 
freedom may be understood to be a synchronising principle. 
Freedom, then, is not a being unleashed from controls or a free-for-all rampage in 
life. Such behaviour is displayed by those who have lost the connection between 
273 Tillich, The Meaning of Health, p.166. 
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inner drive and meaning. For those people, life has lost its meaning because the 
rhythm of the movement-away-from-self and return-to-self has been lost. The loss 
of rhythm, as with a piece of music, becomes loss of direction, loss of composition 
and loss of content. Creativity is distinguished from chaos by the inherent structure 
of the former and the inherent lack of structure of the latter. 
Thus freedom, for Tillich, is not chaos, but creativity that is inherently structured.274 
Freedom is meaningful creativity. It follows therefore, that human freedom means 
living creatively in a way that is meaningful to the human being. If the human 
being gains meaning and purpose through the presence of logos in the psyche and in 
the world, then to live creatively in a humanly meaningful way means to live 
creatively through the logos. 
We have already seen that the logos structure of the human psyche is the means by 
which the dimension of spirit becomes manifest in life. The process of integration 
between external world and internal meaning in the personal centre of every human 
being makes manifest the dimension of spirit in the inner world of the creature. At 
the same time, the way in which the internal psyche makes sense of the external 
world leads to the transformation of that very world. In other words, the unifying 
principle of spirit finds expression both within the personal centre and within the 
world. This expression allows the human being to become integrated and balanced 
and the world to become unified and whole. Once again, inner reality and external 
reality synchronise. The human being may live creatively because of the unifying 
function of spirit operating in the depths of every individual and in the external 
world of every individual. 
Thus, living creatively means living life in the dimension of spirit. If the human 
creature is able to do this, there is freedom, for the dimension of spirit is the 
unifying principle that works through the logos structure of the human psyche and 
of the world. Through the synchronisation between inner self and external world, 
274 TiIlich, Systematic Theology 1, pp.l82-185. 
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the latter becomes fully meaningful to the former and the former can find full 
expression by living in the latter. The world becomes my home, not an alien 
environment that is external to me. I find freedom in my sense of belonging to it 
and being an integral part of it. Only through the dimension of spirit can the human 
being understand what it means to be human. Being human means to be the bearer 
of spirit in the world for the world.275 One's sense of belonging is therefore, so 
deeply entrenched in one's very being that there is no sense of separation, but the 
overwhelming sense of unity. Freedom lies in the realisation that as bearer of spirit, 
the human being finds meaning in life for itself and for all that constitutes life and 
world. Thus, Tillich's understanding of freedom is intimately related to his 
understanding of the multi-dimensional unity of life. 
Once we have understood that, we are then able to realise that to live in a creative 
and meaningful way is to live in the dimension of spirit as that creature which 
makes the whole of life meaningful through its ability to integrate power and 
structure. To live in such a way gives us freedom, freedom, that is, to be fully 
human. Freedom, then, is not a running away, but an empowerment to act in the 
world, through the world, for the benefit of the world. 
However, the empowerment is not derived from the human being. It is channelled 
through the human being, but derived from that in which the human being is 
grounded - being itself. The freedom of humanity lies in its role as mediator 
between God and life. 
However, being a mediator should not imply distance between God and life. 
Instead, it should conjure up an image of the human creature at the hub of the wheel 
that is life. Humanity has a specific function, namely, to bring to consciousness the 
presence of the divine in life. Its authority for having such a function is its ability to 
recognise the divine forces underlying its very existence, and to participate in them. 
What pins the creature to the hub of the wheel are the symbols Logos, Spirit, God, 
275 TilIich, Systematic Theology 3, p.25. 
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kingdom of God and most significantly, Jesus as the Christ. the symbol that absorbs 
all others and fulfills them. 
With regard to freedom then, Tillich expresses a profoundly microcosmic 
understanding of the way in which humanity symbolises the whole of life through 
its ability to participate in the world and to retreat into the self. Through this 
process of movement away from, and return to self, the human creature grasps and 
shapes reality creatively to bring about the process of actualisation of that which is 
potential in life. The ability to grasp and shape reality however. is derived from the 
principles of the divine life, namely, the principles of Godhead, Logos and Spirit. 
Although all being is rooted in the principles, only the thinking, reflective being can 
bring them to consciousness. 
The ambiguity of life makes human freedom distinct from divine freedom. The 
perpetual threat of non-being requires the human creature to return to self and in 
this integrative process, the power of potential is made actual. Thus, human 
freedom brings to actualisation what is potential and latent. Freedom lies in the 
concrete circumstance of the human being. Specifically, freedom lies in the power 
of the human being to make concrete circumstance meaningful and creative. 
Freedom is integration of the whole being, not simply of the mind. For Tillich, 
freedom of the will alone does not indicate total integration. Freedom requires 
integration of all that makes up the human being: the physical. emotional, mental 
and spiritual aspects ofhumanity.276 
At this point, we can detect a close connection between freedom and health in 
Tillich's thinking. If freedom is the self-integration of every aspect of the being. and 
if self-integration requires the unification of the polarities of self-identity and self-
alteration, then freedom equates with balance and unity. Tillich argues that disease 
is the effect of the predominance of one pole over another, which generates a 
276 Tillich, Systematic Theology 1, p.183. 
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disturbance in the balance of life.277 Thus, health, like freedom, is equated with 
balance. For Tillich, the ambiguities of life cause disease.278 
We are now faced with somewhat of a paradox. On the one hand, it has been 
suggested that Tillich regards the ambiguity of life as that which distinguishes 
divine freedom from human freedom. On the other hand, Tillich appears to hold the 
ambiguities of life responsible for disease. We have equated health with freedom in 
so far as both represent balance. As disease represents imbalance and therefore, lack 
of health and freedom, how is it possible for life's ambiguities to be associated with 
freedom (Le. balance) and disease (Le.imbalance) at the same time? 
Let us remind ourselves what it means to be human in Tillich's eyes. It means to 
live as bearer of spirit in the inescapable ambiguities of life, inescapable because 
they are generated by the very dynamic forces of power and meaning, which make 
up the underlying ontological structure of being. To overcome ambiguity therefore, 
would mean no longer to be human. Now, if human freedom means living 
creatively and meaningfully in existence in a totally integrated way, does this mean 
the overcoming of ambiguity? The answer has to be no, for, as we have seen, the 
overcoming of ambiguity would mean ceasing to be human. So, what does total 
integration really mean and what does it mean to live creatively and meaningfully? 
Is Tillich simply describing a human state that is unachievable by humankind? If 
so, surely he is not describing human freedom at all? 
In Tillich's view, freedom is unachievable for the human being without the symbol 
Jesus as the Christ Despite being grounded in being itself, the human being is not 
capable of attaining the integration and balance that human freedom describes. 
Without the symbol Jesus as the Christ, the human being can never be integrated 
fully because of the perpetually distorting threat of non-being. The real meaning of 
human freedom is revealed through the symbol Jesus as the Christ, and this 
revelation is possible because of its two-fold nature. Firstly, and crucially, Jesus 
277 TilIich, Systematic Theology 3, p.277. 
278 Tillich, The Meaning of Health, p.167. 
149 
was a human being living in the circumstance of time and space. The symbol is 
grounded in the very humanity of Jesus, without which, it would be meaningless. 
Secondly, Christ is the Son of God. That is to say, Christ is beyond the conditions 
of time and space and therefore, beyond the ambiguities that those conditions 
impose upon finitude. Thus, this symbol unites finitude with the infinite. In the 
union of Jesus with Christ, a symbol is created that unifies creature and Creator. 
Jesus as the Christ thus becomes the umbilical cord between creature and Creator, 
ensuring the perpetual and eternal flow of the Creator's sustenance for the creature. 
This sustenance, when received by the creature, empowers it creatively to overcome 
the perpetual threat of non-being that makes finite existence ambiguous. Human 
freedom therefore, is living creatively in an integrated way, but this is achievable 
only through that which has already attained total integration and therefore, gone 
beyond finitude, namely, the symbol Jesus as the Christ. 
The symbol does not merely describe the power and authority of Jesus as the Christ, 
it is that power and authority. The symbol itself lives both eternally and within the 
circumstance of time and space. The symbol is life-force for it smashes through the 
conditions of existence. In so doing, it imbues the human creature with the power 
not simply to resist the threat of non-being at every moment, but creatively to 
transform that threat of meaninglessness into meaningfulness. Therefore, the human 
being has the freedom and the power to be diseased and to transform disease into 
health. If we stop short and say that we have the freedom to choose between health 
and disease, we deny our full humanity because we deny our role as bearer of spirit. 
To choose between two options is not to live in freedom because such a choice 
shows our imprisonment within the two. However, to know that disease can be 
creatively transformed is to recognise the third transcending position, the position of 
power and freedom. To be fully human means not to be caught in a tug-o-war 
between health and disease, clarity and distortion, self and world. Rather, it means 
to live through the struggle between poles and to find a creative resolution that 
transcends both. 
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Thus the symbol, Jesus as the Christ embodies the most powerful microcosmic 
imagery to be found in Tillich's theology. In it lies the freedom of the human 
creature to be fully human. At the same time, it reveals the Creator in its creative 
fullness. The freedom of the human creature is not simply divine lip service, for 
freedom is firmly situated within existence and embraces the full extent of the 
ambiguity that circumstance generates. The Creator's freedom to create and sustain 
finds full expression through the creature's freedom creatively to live through, and 
transform the ambiguities of existence. 
The claim that the symbol Jesus as the Christ embodies the most powerful 
microcosmic imagery in Tillich's theology must be explained clearly and carefully. 
It may be understood only in the light of the microcosmic theme of Tillich's 
theology as a whole. It is therefore, the aim of the next and final section of this 
chapter to spell out the exact nature of the microcosmic theme and to show 
precisely the way in which Jesus as the Christ is the most powerful expression of 
that theme. 
The Emerging Microcosmic Theme 
We learned earlier that Tillich's use of dialectic was found in both the content and 
the structure of his theology. It was suggested that the triadic formulation found in 
its content and structure was the way in which dialectic permeated his theological 
.. system. The triadic formulation was the way in which Tillich moved from 
affirmation to negation and onto a transcending affirmation, which represented the 
creative resolution of the tension between the polar forces of yes and no. It was 
argued that this approach was consistent with the dialectical methods of classical 
thinkers, such as Pseudo-Dionysius, Cusanus and Boehme. It was further suggested 
that such a method was rooted In the understanding of the 
microcosmic/macrocosmic relation of the human creature to the divine. Creation 
was the result of divine emanation. As such, divine nous was present in finitude and 
in the human soul. It was possible for the human being therefore, to free itself from 
the shackles of materiality through the nous present in the soul and to make the 
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ascent through the hierarchies that stood between creation and the divine Source, 
thus participating in the return phase of the divine movement. 
So, what is the connection between the dialectical method of classical theology and 
the notion of divine emanation and return? Before this can be answered, it is 
important to understand precisely what is meant by divine emanation and return. 
For the classical thinkers mentioned above, it meant emanation from eternal source 
into temporality and return to eternal source. The divine dynamic was of a two-fold 
nature: emanation from eternity into temporality and return to eternity. In terms of 
creaturely understanding of the divine dynamic, the classical thinkers recognised 
that although the divine movement was two-fold, creaturely understanding of that 
movement had to use a three-fold method - Why? 
The creature, tied to the realms of time and space had only one way of 
understanding movement into the eternal realm. It had to be by means of 
affirmation, negation and then transcending affirmation. In other words, the 
theologian had to use the fabric of existence to approach that which went beyond 
existence. That meant that he had to exhaust all possibilities of God in existential 
terms and then go beyond existential terms to approach an understanding of God. 
The natural route, therefore, was to say what God was in terms of existential 
experience, to negate that and then to say that God was both and more. As existence 
was understood in terms of polar possibilities, any claim to move toward God had 
to embrace both poles. Not only that, but to depict divine movement out of 
temporality and into eternity required more to be said of God than merely to claim 
that God embraced both poles. God that simply embraced the polar extremes of 
existence could not be the same as God that broke through the confines of 
existence. Therefore. having established that God embraced both polar extremes, it 
was necessary to speak in superlative terms about God to depict the eternal 
dimension that was God. Thus, classical theology used a dialectical method 
consisting of three aspects: the paradox of affirmative theology in relation to 
negative theology and the third, transcending superlative theology. The third aspect 
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represented the breaking through the limitations of finite existence to approach the 
dimension of the eternal. 
What was so significant about the three-fold method of understanding the two-fold 
dynamic of the divine was that it expressed the vital connection between God and 
the human being in terms of a spiral. The significance of the spiral will be discussed 
later, but first, it is necessary to clarify the way in which the two-fold movement of 
the divine and the three-phased dialectical method produce a spiral. 
For the moment, let us think spatially rather than theologically in order fully to 
grasp the idea of spiral. Let us substitute the term phase with coordinate and 
attempt to draw a graph to depict a two-fold movement (not necessarily of a divine 
nature at this point). It is possible to depict a two-fold movement using only two 
coordinates. 
X axis 
a b 
Yaxis 
In Fig.l, we have depicted movement from coordinate a to coordinate b and back to 
coordinate a using two axes, representing time and space. It is necessary to use both 
in order to generate the image of movement. In the words of Tillich: 
We can measure time only by space and space only in time. 
Motion, the universal character of life, needs time and space.279 
279 Tillich, Theology o/Culture, p.30. 
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We see a circular image, in which the starting point is the same as the returning 
point. 
The movement away phase appears not to have influenced the point of return in any 
way. There is nothing to suggest development, just circling. 
Let us now look at two-fold movement using three coordinates. 
Z axis 
X axis 
Y Axis 
In Fig.2, there are three axes: time ex axis), space (Y axis), and a third dimension, 
which we will call eternity (Z axis). The third dimension generates a new 
perspective on the original two axes. By introducing the third dimension and the 
third coordinate relating to that dimension, we add depth and height to the circular 
image. The return phase now appears to have been affected by the outward 
movement to coordinate b. What appears in terms of time and space to be circular 
movement, turns into spiralling movement with the introduction of the third 
dimension. In the return to coordinate a, there is a transcending of the original 
departure point, revealed by the third dimension. 
The diagrams attempt to represent pictorially the nature of the dialectical method 
employed by classical theologians. They show the way in which the third 
coordinate (or third phase) of the dialectical method makes the vital connection 
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between eternity and temporality. They demonstrate how the circle of bi-polar 
dialectic becomes empowered through the introduction of the third element. The 
impasse of the dialectic finds resolution through transcendence. 
For the classical theologians, the microcosmic/macrocosmic understanding of the 
creature in relation to the divine authorised them to use superlative theology born 
out of the dialectic generated between affirmative and negative theology. There 
was a route back to the originating Source of Nous, accessible to the human being 
because he participated in that very Nous. He was born out of the divine emanation 
from eternity and could make the ascent back to eternity because divine emanation 
and return were eternal. Dialectical theology, culminating in the transcending 
superlative theology, was the means by which God could be approached. 
So what is the significance of the spiral? The spiral denotes empowerment as well 
as transcendence. It evokes an image of theological ascension out of materiality 
through the hierarchies in search of the mystical union with the Source. 
In summary, it is being argued that the classical theologians who employed a 
dialectical theology did so because of their understanding of the intimate 
relationship between divine movement and creaturely ascension. Divine movement 
was of a twofold nature: emanation from eternity to temporality and return from 
temporality to eternity. Creaturely ascension back to the divine Source had to be 
done through dialectic - the means of deciphering the divine secrets that, when 
discovered, would empower the creaturely soul to find its way back to the Source. 
The belief in the possibility of creaturely return to the Source hinged upon a 
microcosmic/macrocosmic understanding of life in relation to God that was 
theocentric in nature: the soul of the creature, trapped in the realm of materiality, 
sought to return to God by gradually shedding its attachment to that realm through 
the dialectical process. 
Turning to Tillich, it has been argued that his dialectical approach is consistent with 
that of classical theology and, like classicism, is also rooted in the notion of divine 
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emanation and return. However, whereas classical theology depicted a divine 
movement that was self-sufficient, complete and independent of the activity of the 
creaturely soul, Tillich's divine movement is manifested through the process oflife. 
Thus, what the classical theologians depicted as divine emanation and return, 
Tillich expresses as correlation, which is his way of showing the two-fold 
movement of eternity to temporality and temporality to eternity. For classical 
theology, this flow was a wholly divine activity, which the creature sought to tap 
into in order to ascend back to eternity. This led the classical microcosmic theme to 
be theocentric. For Tillich, however, this flow is depicted in terms of resonance and 
reciprocity between the eternal Creator and the temporal creature, showing the way 
in which the creature is actively involved in the way the Creator makes the return. 
Tillich's microcosmic theme, therefore, is resonating and participatory rather than 
theocentric. 
However, at no point does Tillich suggest that the creature is of equal status to the 
divine: the resonance between creature and Creator is firmly grounded in being 
itself and in this way, Tillich shows that the creature in its resonating relationship 
with the Creator is also part of the divine life, and as such, should never fall into the 
trap of believing itself to be autonomous. To live freely as a fully functional human 
being means to live a participatory life in relation to all that has and is life. In short, 
to live a participatory life means life in awareness of the unity of being. Here is the 
microcosmic theme of Tillich's theology. This theme allows the symbol Jesus as 
the Christ to be pivotal. It symbolises the full spiralling ascension of temporality 
into eternity by means of the eternal breakthrough into the temporal. It is an 
empowering symbol, expressing the fullness of the two-fold movement of the 
divine. It shows the fullness in terms of divine involvement in history and culture 
(Le. time and space) and creaturely involvement in eternity through history and 
culture. 
Tillich's use of dialectic, as demonstrated through his extensive employment of 
triadic notions and structures, is the means by which he depicts the connection 
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between the divine and the human creature. The third phase of his dialectic as a 
transcending position created out of the tension between the two preceding polar 
phases, is the means by which the human creature spirals toward the eternal. The 
spiral does not denote a movement out of time and space, but rather a qualitative 
movement of transcendence and depth within time and space - it is a spiralling into 
the third dimension, that of the eternal, which is present wholly within time and 
space and which is accessed by going beyond the physical and immediate. 
Thus, through the microcosmic theme of Tillichian theology, those in modernity 
were reminded that the physical and the immediate are not the same as time and 
space. Moving beyond the physical does not mean escaping time. Looking beyond 
the immediate does not mean running away from the world. Rather, it means 
looking through the physical and the immediate, which are situated within time and 
space, to find the eternal, which is also situated within time and space. Classical 
theology understood this distinction between the physical and the immediate on the 
one hand, and time and space on the other. Alchemical practice provides a vivid 
example of the way in which such a distinction found expression.280 Modernity, 
however, with its great sense of empowerment through the discoveries of the 
physical sciences, had lost the distinction. 
Tillich explicitly wished to remind modernity of a half-forgotten theological truth, 
namely that being itself is one. 281 He did this by referring his readers to the 
microcosmic themes of classical thinkers. At the same time, implicit in that 
reminder is another half-forgotten truth - the distinction between time and space on 
the one hand, and physicality and immediacy on the other. To be reminded of this 
is to be reminded that real empowerment lies not in the physical and immediate of 
time and space, but in the depths that lurk beneath them. 
280 See pp.84-88, above. 
281 Tillich, Systematic Theology I, p.261. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that in order to fully understand Tillich's method of 
correlation, we must consider what drove him to use it. It has been suggested that 
underlying correlation is his sense of the microcosmic understanding of humanity in 
relation to the divine, a sense of which he appears to have been only partially aware. 
As it was only a partial awareness, the theme is argued to be implicit, not explicit, 
in his theology. 
The chapter has gone on to suggest that this implicit theme helps to clarify his 
method of correlation. It has been argued that TiIIich's use of dialectic is consistent 
with a microcosmic understanding of reality, as demonstrated by classical thinkers, 
such as Pseudo-Dionysius, Cusanus, and Boehme. His method of correlation 
concurs with the classical notion of divine emanation and return. However, that is 
not to say that TiIIich's theology is a simple reiteration of classical theology. Far 
from it; if there is underlying his theology a microcosmic world-view, his sense of 
microcosm is not identical with that of classical theology. 
Tillich's theology can be seen to be a further development of the microcosmic 
theme. His interest in, and emphasis upon the resonating relationship between 
Creator and creature reflects an understanding of the active and free role that the 
human being plays in the process of actualisation of potential. The creature is a 
microcosm in so far as it is grounded in being itself and participates in the process 
of divine consciousness by means of active involvement in the process of human 
consciousness. In this respect, we can find strong echoes of Boehmic thinking. 
However, in so far as creaturely freedom is depicted as freedom to function as 
bearer of spirit for all that has life, Tillich ensures that the creature does not fall into 
a sense of equality with the divine, or a sense that the divine is in need of the 
creature. In this regard, Tillich moves away from Boehme. In that moving away, 
Tillich expresses the freely resonating relationship between the creature and the 
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Creator, in which the former participates in the latter as the sustained and the latter 
participates in the former as the Sustainer. 
What may be extracted from Tillich's theology therefore, is a sense of microcosm 
that is neither theocentric nor anthropocentric, but more participatory and 
resonating. If classical theology expressed the dynamics underlying existence in 
terms of the rhythm of divine emanation and return, then Tillich expresses them in 
terms of the rhythm of the divine life in correlation with creaturely life. In 
creaturely terms, those dynamics are of a dialectical nature, making creaturely 
existence ambiguous. 
Through the method of correlation, Tillich demonstrates how the clarity of the 
eternal breaks in through the conditions of existence as the creature reaches out for 
that which empowers it to make sense of the ambiguities of existence. The creature 
taps into divine clarity by means of symbol, the most powerful and complete being 
Jesus as the Christ, that symbol of the ultimate correlation between creature and 
Creator, microcosm and macrocosm. 
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Part Two 
Questioning Tillich's Insistence upon 
Ontological Estrangement in Light of 
the Microcosmic Theme 
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Chapter 4 
Bridging the Great Divide 
This chapter considers the theme of the unconscious in Tillichian theology, a theme not 
so widely accepted as an important component of his system. Perhaps because the 
unconscious has such psychological connotations, theologians tend to overlook 
Tillich's interest in it. Nevertheless, a reading of Tillich's essays on matters of 
psychology and pastoral care demonstrates his deep interest in the subject.282 Indeed, 
an appreciation of this interest is very helpful in understanding Tillich's insistence upon 
the vertical dimension with regard to the creaturely relationship with the Creator. 
Transcendence is not simply a matter of upward movement, but also of movement 
down into the depths of the human psyche.283 
Tillich perceIves an intimate connection between theological and psychological 
language. Nowhere is this expressed more strongly than in his understanding of 
creaturely freedom and separation. For this reason, the chapter offers an exploration of 
the relationship between Tillich's understanding of the unconscious, creaturely freedom 
and existential separation. The discussion stemming from this exploration challenges, 
from the psychological perspective, Tillich's insistence upon the necessary existential 
state of separation. It questions the validity of the ontological nature of creaturely 
estrangement for his system as a whole. It suggests that in view of the fact that 
ontological estrangement is not simply a Tillichian idiosyncracy, but a theme inherited 
by Tillich from his western Christian background, it is necessary to step outside the 
Christian tradition, in order to assess the validity of such a presupposition. The final 
part of the chapter therefore, marks the stepping out of the western Christian tradition 
282 See P. TiIlich, Meaning of Health: Essays in Existentialism, Psychoanalysis, and Religion 
(Exploration Press, Chicago, 1984). 
283 Ibid., p.200. 
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into the Chinese tradition of Tao. Here, the personal and academic risks involved in 
exploring another tradition are explored, and the methodology adopted for this purpose 
is explained. 
Section One: Tillich and the Unconscious 
Tillich describes the unconscIOUS as power, 'potentia' , the power that fuels 
consciousness: 
The unconscious becomes actually what it potentially is, and for which it 
strives, by reaching the state of consciousness; and consciousness includes 
the potentialities driving within the unconscious as its vital reservoir.284 
As potential, the power of the unconscious is ambiguous: it can be devastating and 
destructive if repressed, or creative and unifying if brought into consciousness through 
"union with the objective structures of reality.,,285 Tillich's choice of language here is 
similar to the language used in his theological system to depict the divine forces of 
Godhead and Logos. Godhead, as with potentia, can be destructive and devastating if 
unleashed from the structuring influence of Logos, but creative if unified with 
Logos.286 
In Chapter One, the connection between eros and Godhead was established: eros was 
described as the finite expression of Godhead, the finite drive toward the Summum 
Bonum.287 It could be expressed in another way as the potential of God under the 
conditions of finite existence. If there is a parallel between Godhead and the 
unconscious as potentia, and if eros is the finite expression of Godhead, is it possible 
to make a connection between eros and the unconscious? More specifically, if the 
284 Ibid, p.51 
285 Ibid. 
286 See pp.18, 19 above. 
287 See pp.56-58 above. 
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unconscious is potential, that which drives into the conscious, and if eros is the drive 
toward the Summum Bonum, can we assert that the unconscious and eros are 
fundamentally the same? 
Tillich describes eros as the 'urge toward the reunion of the separated'. 288 In order to 
be better placed to address the question asked above, it is necessary to unpack this 
statement. Let us start by considering Tillich's understanding of the term separation. 
Separation 
In his discussion with Carl Rogers,289 Tillich makes reference to the symbol, dreaming 
innocence, which he describes as the mythological state of Adam and Eve present in 
each and every human being. 290 It is a symbol used to express human potential. 
Dreaming innocence is not to be confused with a historical state of innocence prior to a 
historical Fall, but is symbolic of the potential of humanity as a whole, which is 
situated within the human being as an individual.291 Tillich explains his choice of 
expression in the following way: Both dreaming and innocence point toward something 
that precedes actual existence.292 He describes dreaming as a state of mind 'which is 
real and non-real at the same time - just as is potentiality.,,293 For this reason, argues 
Tillich, dreaming is an appropriate term to describe the state of essential being.294 With 
regard to innocence, Tillich suggests there are three connotations, which are 
appropriate for its use in the term dreaming innocence: absence of actual experience, 
absence of personal responsibility and absence of moral guilt.295 
288 TiIlich, Systematic Theology, Vol.3, p.137. 
289 TiIlich, The Meaning of Health, pp.194-202. 
290 Ibid, p.197. 
291 'Theology must clearly and unambiguously represent ''the Fall" as a symbol for the human 
situation universally, not as the story of an event that happened "once upon a time.'" (Tillich, 
S;;stematic Theology vol.2, p.29). 
2 2 Ibid, p.33. 
293 Ibid. 
294 Ibid. 
295 Ibid. 
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Tillich asserts that the term, dreaming innocence can "provide a psychological 
approach to the state of essential or potential being.,,296 The Fall symbolises the 
transition from essence to existence?97 Essence was described in Chapter One as the 
potential that lies within being?98 It follows that if dreaming innocence is the state 
symbolically preceding the Fall, it is the state of potential,299 i.e. the state ofunrealised, 
non-actualised power. The myth of the Fall depicts the eating from the Tree of 
Knowledge as the act triggering the transition from potential to actuality. The 
association of this change with knowledge shows the state of potential preceding the 
Fall to be one of unconsciousness. In so far as there is nothing conscious, then, 
dreaming innocence is pure potential. What happens in the Garden of Eden is the 
movement out of the state of unconsciousness into consciousness. 
In the Fall, the notions of creaturely freedom and consciousness are entwined with that 
of sin. Tillich argues that the transition from essence (potential) to existence (actuality) 
is made possible by the reality of finite freedom.30o In Chapter Three, we learned that 
finite freedom stems from the human capacity to make sense of existence, to interpret it 
and to transform it.301 The logos principle in the human psyche empowers the creature 
to go beyond the immediacy of environment, and creatively to turn environment into a 
world of meaning.302 Finite freedom means having even the freedom to deny and to 
surrender one's humanity - to resist one's essential nature. This is where we see the 
ambiguity of existence. 
If it is possible to be so free that we deny our own essential nature, what is the meaning 
of such freedom? The meaning comes from the relation of freedom to its polarity, 
destiny. Human freedom is only meaningful in relation to destiny. To speak of 
freedom without its polarity, destiny, is not to speak of freedom at all, for, as we have 
296 Ibid, p.34 
297 Ibid, p.30 
298Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol.3, p.12. 
299 "The symbol, 'Adam before the Fall' must be understood as the dreaming innocence of 
undecided potentialities." (Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol.2, p.34). 
300 Ibid, p.31. 
301 TiIlich, The Courage to Be, p.82. 
302 Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol.2, p.31. 
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seen, freedom is not a running wild,303 but the ability creatively to transcend the 
immediacy of environment through the logos structure of the psyche. Human freedom, 
then, is empowerment in so far as it relates to, and resonates with, destiny. The 
ambiguity of life however, results from the human being's difficulty in seeing freedom 
within its polar relation to destiny. The ambiguity of life lies in the dialectical forces 
that threaten the alignment of freedom and destiny at every moment. 
The freedom of the human being to destroy itself is the expression of non-being as it 
overpowers the alliance between freedom and destiny. Self-destruction is the 
manifestation of freedom when drawn from its alignment with destiny. It is the 
expression of the human being's surrender to the power of non-being, compelling the 
creature, in apparent freedom, to fall into the meaninglessness of life. This is apparent 
freedom, for true finite freedom is the capacity creatively to transcend the immediate in 
a meaningful way. Where freedom leads the creature to the conclusion of 
meaninglessness, there is distorted freedom, freedom drawn from its moorings with 
destiny and drifting uncontrollably into oblivion by the power of non-being. 
Creaturely freedom is qualitatively different from that of the divine, for it is freedom 
made ambiguous by the perpetual threat of non-being. It is freedom either to live 
creatively in alignment with the polar force of destiny or to destroy oneself by denying 
the essential alignment with destiny. This is the choice that is made by the 
mythological figure of Adam in the Garden of Eden, after eating from the Tree of 
Knowledge. To know choice is to have consciousness, which means to move out of 
potentiality into actuality. To have consciousness is to fall from the state of dreaming 
innocence and to leave the blissful paradise of potential to enter the painful world of 
actuality. It is painful because of the process of actualisation, based upon choice and 
ambiguity. 
Thus, the Fall symbolises the separation that permeates life. In the story of Adam and 
the Garden of Eden, it is expressed as the separation between God and the human 
303 See p.142 above. 
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being, opted for by Adam, in his creaturely freedom. In psychological terms, the Fall 
symbolises, for TiIlich, the transition from unconsciousness to consciousness; the 
transition from essential being to existential being, from potential life to actual life. It 
is the transition from non-awareness to self-awareness, from unity to plurality and from 
union to separation. Dreaming innocence is the state preceding the transition to self-
awareness, preceding plurality and preceding separation. 
We learned earlier that Tillich attributes three connotations to innocence: absence of 
actual experience, absence of personal responsibility and absence of moral guilt. 304 He 
, 
argues that all three meanings are appropriate in dreaming innocence because the term 
'designates the state before actuality, existence, and history.,,305 A pre-actualised state, 
asserts Tillich, implies innocence in terms of absence of actual experience. A pre-
existential state implies innocence in terms of absence of personal responsibility, and a 
pre-historical state implies innocence in terms of absence of moral guilt. It is perhaps 
easy to see that a pre-actualised state implies absence of actual experience, for such a 
state is one of potential. However, it is perhaps not quite so clear to see why pre-
existential and pre-historical states imply absence of personal responsibility and moral 
guilt, respectively. It is therefore, necessary to spend a little time exploring this, in 
order to appreciate the significance of dreaming innocence as it relates to freedom, the 
Fall and sin. 
Innocence as it Relates to the Absence of Personal Responsibility and the State 
before Existence 
We have seen that the Fall depicts the transition from unconsciousness to 
consciousness, and implied in such a transition is the discovery of choice. Adam 
discovered his freedom to choose and, consequently, lost his innocence. But why does 
the freedom to choose imply the loss of innocence? 
304 See p.162 above. 
305 Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 2, p.34. 
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Freedom means creatively to live through the ambiguities of existence and freely to live 
in relation to our destiny. However, we have seen that freedom also means the 
possibility of moving away from our destiny and, in so doing, of losing ourselves. 
Freedom, therefore, means awareness of the potential that is ours and thus, awareness 
of the creative and destructive nature of that potential. Freedom, then, is 
consciousness: freedom in alignment with the constraining influence of destiny means 
creative consciousness, but tom away from its polar relation with destiny, means 
destructive consciousness. To live according to our destiny and our freedom is, for 
Tillich, to live a creative human life. 
So what precisely does Tillich mean by destiny? It is not something imposed upon us 
by an alien power. Rather, it is that pole that structures our freedom.306 To understand 
destiny, we must understand freedom, for destiny is the framework within which 
freedom operates. Equally, to understand freedom, we must understand destiny, for 
freedom is the power to act within the structure that destiny provides. Destiny is the 
circumstance of existence in which we act in freedom. The choices I make are 
determined by all that has shaped my being: family background, home environment, 
the community in which I live, conscious memories and unconscious ones and the 
value system within which I operate. All the choices I make in my life are made freely, 
but within the constraints of such conditions as those. 
However, destiny does not simply refer to the circumstance of individuals in existential 
terms, but also refers to the essential nature of the human being. We have already seen 
that the polarities of freedom and destiny represent the transcendent element of 
creaturely existence. In Chapter One, they were described as the ontological elemental 
polarities that mark the crescendo in Tillich's theology, the point at which the human 
being reaches out to God. 307 Thus, destiny also refers to the creature's essential 
connection with the ground of being. The ontological process of self-integration, self-
creation and self-transcendence, depicted in the ontological elements, is the process of 
reaching out to that which makes life meaningful. 
306 Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol.1, p.185. 
307 See p.39 above. 
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Freedom and destiny are related, not just on the horizontal axis, but on the vertical as 
well.308 It is the destiny of the creature to be reunited with the Creator and as long as 
the freedom exercised in existence is in alignment with that destiny, the creature enjoys 
creative freedom. However, if the freedom exercised is an expression of resistance to 
that ultimate destiny, it becomes destructive and distorted. My freedom is the power to 
act in existence, and my destiny is the structure within which I act, both in terms of my 
personal circumstance and history, and also in terms of the essential nature of humanity 
as a speCIes. 
Freedom in relation to destiny implies personal responsibility because it means making 
choices that lead one toward a realisation of one's full humanity through the process of 
self-integration, self-creation and self-transcendence. The ambiguities of life mean that 
every decision is an anxious one, where the drive for freedom may blind us to our 
destiny, or where our sense of true destiny is lost through circumstantial impositions 
upon our freedom. 
Freedom to choose, then, is a responsibility born out of consciousness and self-
awareness. Innocence is the lack of awareness of possibility and choice and therefore, 
the lack of personal responsibility. To have the freedom to choose means necessarily to 
have lost innocence. 
Innocence as it Relates to Personal Guilt and the State before History 
In the preceding section, destiny was shown to refer to both the existential 
circumstance in which freedom operated, and the essential connection between the 
human being and the ground of being. In this section, the focus is upon the aspect of 
destiny that expresses the universal separation of humanity from the divine. 
308 In Chapter 3, we learned that the logos as symbol became the correlate for the finite-infinite 
relation, i.e. the correlate for the vertical dimension. Freedom and destiny, as the polarities that 
lead to self-transcendence also find their place at that pivotal point. 
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According to Tillich, "the state of existence IS the state of estrangement." 309 
Estrangement is the separation of the existential creature from its essential nature. 
Expressed in psychological terms, estrangement is the separation of consciousness from 
unconsciousness. Estrangement is the universal destiny of humanity. It is a fact of life. 
To exist means necessarily to be estranged from one's essential state. This finds clearer 
expression if we use the terms potentiality and actuality. If the essential state is one of 
potentiality, to be actual means not to be potential. By using these terms, another 
notion integral to estrangement is thrown into relief. Actuality still has a relation to 
potentiality: out of the latter, the former emerges. Thus, estrangement means 
separation of those that are connected. Existential life is life separated from that to 
which it is fundamentally connected. 
Closely akin to the notion of estrangement is that of sin. For Tillich, sin is the state of 
personal, as opposed to universal, estrangement from God, from one's self and from 
one's world.3lO In so far as sin refers to the personal aspect of existence, it is directly 
related to the idea of personal responsibility, outlined in the section above. Tillich 
asserts: 
Man's predicament is estrangement, but his estrangement is sin. 
It is not a state of things like the laws of nature, but a matter of 
both personal freedom and universal destiny.311 
He goes on to argue that the disregarding of a law is not in itself sinful; however, 
through such disregard, the human being expresses estrangement from the three things 
to which s/he fundamentally belongs: God, self and fellow human beings. 
It follows from the universal state of estrangement and the personal expressions of 
estrangement, labelled sin, that the human being experiences personal guilt. This 
309 TiIlich, Systematic Theology. vot.2, p.44. 
310 Ibid., p.46. 
311 Ibid. 
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feeling is the consequence of human freedom to choose between creatively moving 
toward full humanity and destructively rejecting such a movement. As guilt is the 
product of the universal state of estrangement and personal sin, it is the product of 
freedom and destiny on both the personal and the universal levels. Estrangement as a 
universal "fact" and sin as a personal "act,,312 are interwoven. This means that the 
individual cannot be relieved of the burden of guilt. In so far as there is personal sin, 
one's guilt is justified. At the same time, it is important to realise the universal tragedy 
of estrangement, for which the individual is not responsible. As fact, estrangement is 
not a matter of personal guilt; however, as act, sin is. 
In so far as estrangement is universal, it is a condition of existence and, as such, is a 
quality of history in which the human being works toward reunion. Only in history can 
estrangement be felt because only in and through history is consciousness expressed. 
To live historically is to live consciously, for history is the product of conscious 
reflection. 
In so far as estrangement is personal, i.e. sin, it is, again, a phenomenon of history, for 
sin is expressed in actions and attitudes toward God, toward fellow human beings and 
toward self. Sin is thus, a phenomenon of society and culture and the product of human 
freedom in conflict with destiny. 
Participating in the world means participating in history, for our sense of world is based 
upon involvement and reflection under the conditions of time and space, causality and 
substance. To be human is to be estranged on two counts: firstly, by existing, all that 
lives, including humanity, participates in the universal estrangement of existence. 
Secondly, by living reflectively with the freedom to choose and discern, the human 
being, as distinct from all other living creatures, has the freedom to determine its own 
destiny, to shape history and therefore, to carry the burden of guilt when the choice 
made contradicts its true destiny. Therefore, innocence is a state that lies outside the 
realm of historical existence. 
312 Ibid, pp.SS-S8. 
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To conclude this section on separation, we have seen that Tillich regards the Fall as a 
mythological symbol expressing the transition from potentiality to actuality in 
ontological and psychological terms. Ontologically, it is the transition from essential 
being to existential being. Psychologically, it is the transition from unconsciousness, 
the state preceding personal responsibility and personal guilt, to consciousness, the 
state of awareness and discernment. The Fall marks the change in the creature's 
condition from one of dreaming innocence to one of separation. Ontologically, 
dreaming innocence is the state of potential - the essential state preceding existence and 
history. It does not precede in a temporal sense, for time is a condition of existence, 
not of essence. 
For the same reason, it does not precede in a spatial, causal or substantial sense. 
Dreaming innocence is not a state that existed "once upon a time",313 but one that 
differs qualitatively from that of separation. Dreaming innocence is the eternal state, 
out of which the existential state of separation emerges. 
Ontologically, separation is the state resulting from the movement out of dreaming 
innocence. It is the consequence of the freedom of the human being to choose and, 
therefore, the consequence of the human being's ability to think and reflect. At this 
point, ontology meets psychology in Tillich's system. The ontological state of 
separation is the product of the human psyche. Now, this should not be construed as 
solipsistic. Tillich did not understand separation to be nothing other than a product of 
the mind. Here, it is important to remember the microcosmic theme underlying his 
theology, for then we understand that the psyche of the human creature houses the 
dynamic forces of the divine life itself, just as the world of the human creature houses 
those forces.314 We must remember that in ontological terms, the divine dynamics of 
Godhead and Logos find expression in the human psyche as well as in the external 
world. We must also remember that the external world of meaning exists only by virtue 
313 TiIlich, Systematic Theology, vol.2, p.29. 
314 See pp.44-46 above. 
171 
of the ontological forces operating through the human psyche. Without the human 
power of reflection, there would be no meaningful world, simply environment. It is the 
logos structure of the psyche, coupled with psychic drive that makes environment 
meaningful and brings to consciousness that which is latent. 
In psychological terms, dreaming innocence is the state of unconsciousness. Separation 
is the state of consciousness, in which the human psyche takes on the responsibility of 
freedom, makes choices in the ambiguous light of existence, and suffers the guilt 
associated with those choices. The choices made are free within the constraints of 
human destiny, the circumstances of our existence. 
Destiny, like separation, has both ontological and psychological connotations: 
onto logically, existence means separation and, in that respect, separation is our destiny, 
our circumstance. Psychologically, our destiny is determined by the circumstance of 
our conscious lives - our environment, our family, our childhood and community - and 
our unconscious lives - the history into which we have been born. our individual 
emotional and family heritages, as well as the broader cultural heritages.31s In creative 
freedom, the centred self of the whole person makes choices in spontaneous alignment 
with one's destiny. This contrasts with distorted freedom. in which the will to freedom 
has been unleashed from the structuring influence of destiny. Such freedom is not the 
expression of a centred psyche and a whole human being. but of one who has lost the 
meaning of existence and who, consequently, drives toward self-destruction.316 
The purpose of this discussion has been to understand more fully the meaning of 
separation as it occurs in the phrase "the urge toward the reunion of the separated. ,,317 
This has been necessary to understand the relationship between eros and the 
unconscious. The question we asked earlier was whether both were fundamentally the 
same. Having considered separation, it is now necessary to consider eros. 
315 Tillich, Systematic Theology, voU, p.185. 
316 See pp.142-144 above. 
317 Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol.3, p.137. 
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Eros 
In Chapter One, eros was described as a quality that drives life toward fulfillment,318 
the urge for the reunion of the divine principles of Power, Logos and Spirit, which 
become separated in existence. From our discussion of the notion of separation, it 
perhaps becomes clear that eros is the drive within existence to return to the state of 
union. 
Earlier, it was argued that implied in separation is the sense of connection to that from 
which one has become separated. In this light, ontologically, eros may be seen as the 
drive that is activated upon the transition from essence to existence. It represents the 
driving principle of reason in its ontological sense. The ontological meaning of eros 
has already been considered in detail in Chapter One. 319 What has not yet been 
considered is the idea of eros in its psychological sense, and so it is to this that we must 
now turn our attention. 
In psychological terms, eros is the drive that is activated upon the transition from 
unconsciousness to consciousness. As such, it is a drive toward the union of 
consciousness with unconsciousness. Earlier, we learned that Tillich describes eros as 
the "urge toward the reunion of the separated.,,32o Mythologically, this statement 
presents no problems: it expresses the desire of the human being to return to God. from 
whom his own free will has distanced. However, in psychological terms it does 
become somewhat problematic. If eros is the urge toward the reunion of the separated, 
in psychological terms, what precisely is being reunited with what? If it is fair to 
equate unconsciousness with the dreaming innocent union of Adam and God in the 
Garden of Eden, as has been argued, and consciousness with Adam's separation from 
God, then, in what way is the drive of consciousness a drive toward a reunion with the 
unconscious? If the unconscious is the potential that powers the actuality of 
consciousness, is it reunion or union that is driven towards? Reunion suggests a return 
318 See p.56 above. 
319 See pp.56-58 above. 
320 Tillich, Systematic Theology, vo13, p.137. 
173 
to a previous state. In this sense, the drive toward reunion would be the drive toward a 
return to unconsciousness. Is this really what eros drives toward? Surely not, for a 
return to unconsciousness would suggest an undoing of the manifestation of 
consciousness. Such a return would be tantamount to admitting the folly of existence. 
It would be to deny the real freedom of humanity and to show that the human creature 
was, after all, nothing more than a puppet for the divine. Surely, the drive is not toward 
reunion with unconsciousness, but rather toward union with it. In mythological temls, 
Tillich's assertion is clear that eros is the drive toward reunion of the separated. 
However, in psychological terms, it is ambiguous. 
If there is genuine purpose in the process of life, namely, to actualise what is potential 
through the gift of human consciousness, as Tillich asserts,321 then, the state of union 
between consciousness and unconsciousness can never qualitatively precede creaturely 
life. Therefore, it is misleading to express the psychological connotation of eros as the 
urge toward the reunion of the separated because it suggests that the conscious process 
being worked out through life is already eternally present in the state of 
unconsciousness. 
This suggestion nullifies the very purpose of human consciousness, as Tillich expresses 
it. The statement must be changed to the urge toward the union of the separated, if 
human freedom in relation to the divine is to be preserved. In psychological terms, eros 
therefore, becomes the urge toward the union of consciousness separated from 
unconsciousness. However, we are still left with a problem. If union replaces reunion, 
is it also necessary to replace separated with another term? It has already been argued 
that separation has integral to it the idea of connection. Reunion collocates with 
separation, as both imply a preceding state of connection; union, on the other hand, 
does not. Does the replacement of reunion with union lead to a loss of the sense of 
connection implied in reunion? 
321 Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol.3, p.lll. 
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Consciousness is, in fact, closely connected to unconsciousness. Tillich describes the 
latter as the power that fuels consciousness, and consciousness as that for which the 
potential of the unconscious strives. There is resonance between the two. In existential 
terms, the human creature strives toward consciousness by means of the power of the 
unconscious. Implied in the expression, urge toward the union of consciousness 
separated from unconsciousness is the conscious realisation of the power of the 
unconscious in that very consciousness. This is not reunion, because, if Tillich is 
correct, only the human being has the consciousness to recognise the conncction.322 To 
replace reunion with union and to keep the term separation is to make a significant 
statement. It is to affirm the uniqueness of the purpose of humanity and the real power 
of the human being to create on the one hand, and on the other, to acknowledge the 
eternal connection between the consciousness that is so uniquely human and the 
unconscious that sustains it. 
Tillich would perhaps be very wary of such a suggestion, possibly regarding it as a step 
closer to the Boehmic view of the dependence of the divine upon the creature.323 
Tillich's insistence upon the holiness of God is expression of his reluctance to attribute 
a lack of any quality to the divine. Holiness depicts God's completeness, and implicit 
in the term is the idea of God's separateness from the creature. If, in psychological 
terms, eros is to be understood as the urge toward union of consciousness separated 
from the unconscious, implied in this idea is progressive movement toward union, 
which does not accommodate a sense of ultimate separation. To insist upon the 
ultimate separation of existence from essence or of consciousness from 
unconsciousness is to restrict such a progression. 
Tillich's response to this would perhaps be that a very dangerous course is being set if 
the assumption is made that consciousness and the unconscious may be united. In 
322 Ibid. 
323 J. Dourley argues that Tillich's "orthodoxy forces him to draw back from Boehme's even 
more compelling religious sense of an unconscious and conflicted divinity imbuing humanity 
with the inescapable vocation of cooperating in the redemption of the divine in history." ( 
J.Dourley, 'A Critical Evaluation of Paul Tillich's Appropriation of Jakob Bochme.' (European 
Tillich Society, May, 2000), p.18). 
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psychological terms, would not this imply the loss of distinction between the conscious 
and the unconscious? Is not Tillich's insistence upon the holy and ineffable nature of 
God his recognition of the importance of maintaining the distinction between the 
creature and the Creator? 
Indeed, from a psychological perspective, Jung shared a similar view. lIe warned of 
the dangers of identifying the ego with the centre of the self, which he regarded as the 
divine centre in every individual. For this to happen, the ego would effectively identify 
with God and fall into psychosis.324 
Is not Tillich's insistence upon the ineffability of the divine and the impossibility of the 
human being's knowing God, a theological parallel to Jung's understanding of the 
necessary separation of ego from the centre of self?325 Are not both men right to insist 
upon separation? 
The answer to the last question depends upon the nature of union. If, by union of 
consciousness with unconsciousness, one means the falling of the former into the latter 
and the subsequent loss of consciousness, then the dangers outlined above would, 
indeed, be very real and the need for separation would have to be maintained. 
However, such union would mean a surrendering of consciousness to the unconscious. 
Effectively, this would be a reunion of consciousness with the unconscious and a 
consequent nullifying of the process of actualisation that human consciousness had 
effected in and through history. 
What if, however, there could be another type of union, which did not involve the 
surrendering of consciousness to the unconscious, but, instead, involved resonance and 
mutual participation? What if, in such union, the full status of consciousness could be 
maintained in the presence of the unconscious? Would it be so necessary in that 
situation to insist upon separation? What if I could live life in such a way that my 
324 John Dourley, The Psyche as Sacrament: a Comparative Study ojC.G.Jung and Paul Tillich 
(Inner City Books, Toronto, 1981), p.57. 
325 Ibid., p.54-57. 
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conscious existence was fully informed by, and powered from, my unconscious depths? 
Would I need to be kept safe from that unconscious? Would I need an unbridgeable 
gulf between the depth of my being and my mortal life? It is possible to suggest that 
the answers to these questions might be no. 
When a person is weak and vulnerable, they feel threatened by anything more powerful 
than them. When a young child who has been playing in the mud, gets smacked by his 
mother for bringing dirt into the house, he learns not to trust his senses, for they led him 
to revel in the feel of the dirt on his skin and the sound of it squelching under his feet. 
His mother's smack taught him that he was wrong to indulge those senses. He had not 
thought about the consequences of his actions; if only he thought more and played less, 
he would not get into so much trouble. The confusion of such messages, if repeated 
regularly enough cause the child to become weak: he is weakened by his inability to 
judge. As he grows up, his inability to judge becomes amplified with every human 
encounter that reiterates his confusion. He sees those around him as being those able to 
judge because they can judge him well - they see him as naughty or stupid, and he 
knows that to be true because he was told that often enough as a child. Such a person 
lives in constant danger of being engulfed by those more powerful than he and, of 
course, such people are all around him for there is no one more powerless than he. 
What if the same theory applied to consciousness? What if the unconscious is a threat 
to our consciousness because we perceive it to be a threat? What if we perceive it that 
way because we have been told of the overwhelming power of God the Father, God the 
Judge, lurking in the unconscious? What if those stories have led us to live life in fear 
because we know ourselves to be sinners, to be inevitably separated from the Almighty 
because our consciousness is nothing in the presence of God? 
Tillich argues that sin is the turning of one's back upon God and the insistence of living 
life alone.326 He claims that God is eternally present in the midst of life and guides us, 
but that we, in our existential state, can only have glimpses of that presence. But 
326 TiIlich, Systematic Theology, vol.2, p.47. 
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perhaps the assumption that God may only be glimpsed should be challenged. If we 
can have glimpses of God's presence, what stops us from seeing it in every moment of 
our lives? Is it because of the tragic destiny of existence, or is it because we use that 
tragedy as an excuse not to look harder? Is God ultimately hidden from us or do we 
hide from God? If the latter is the case, then is that not a sinful action, according to 
Tillich's definition? If we insist upon the inevitable gulf between the human being and 
God, are we not committing the sin of turning away from our source of sustenance? 
In Tillich's system, the union of consciousness with the unconscious is not possible 
because of his insistence upon the estranged state of humanity. Eros may drive us 
toward the Summum Bonum but it can never fully be grasped because existence means 
separation. He equates consciousness and its evolution with separation. To be 
conscious is to make distinctions, to make choices and to live in ambiguity. 
In this respect, it is possible to answer the question asked at the beginning of this 
chapter, namely, are consciousness and eros, for Tillich, the same thing? The answer 
can perhaps quite plainly be seen to be no. The unconscious is potential, that essential 
state that qualitatively precedes and, at the same time, fuels consciousness. Therefore, 
qualitatively, it precedes finite being. It does not precede in a temporal sense: just as the 
infinite precedes finitude in a non-temporal, non-spatial sense, so the unconscious 
precedes consciousness. Eros, on the other hand, is the force that drives the finite 
creature to respond to the unconscious presence within finitude. Eros, then, is strictly a 
force operating within finitude: in Tillichian terms, it is a post-Fall drive toward 
reunIOn. 
Section Two: Stepping out of the Western Christian 
Tradition 
In contrast to the distinction between the unconscious and eros, clearly delineated by 
Tillich's insistence upon separation, suggested in the previous section was the 
possibility that the two might become more integrated. Consciousness is not just the 
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making of distinctions, but also the recognition of the unconscious power that fuels it. 
Consciousness depends upon the unconscious, and the more this is acknowledged, the 
closer the union of the two can be made. This does not mean that consciousness must 
fall at the feet of unconsciousness. Rather, the growth of consciousness through the 
drive of eros should be commensurate with the awareness of the unconsciousness that 
fuels it. 
This suggestion implies the abandonment of the presupposition of estrangement deeply 
entrenched in Tillich's Christian tradition. Is it, therefore, possible to abandon it and 
remain within a Christian structure? Moreover, for Tillich, it is a presupposition 
applicable to humanity as a species, not simply to the Christian. As such, estrangement 
is a fundamental statement about the state of human existence. Surely, in those terms it 
would be ridiculous to attempt to suggest it should be abandoned? However, it would 
only be ridiculous to do so if the presupposition of its ontological nature remained 
unchallenged. 
How would it be possible to assess the validity of Tillich' s Christian assumption of the 
ontological nature of separation? If I am a western Christian and have never ventured 
out of such an environment, how do I know whether or not my presuppositions are 
universally valid? How do I know whether the Christian assumption of human 
separation from God is a statement of universal truth or a product of the circumstantial 
destiny of the Christian tradition in which I nest? 
It is the aim of the second part of this thesis to step outside the nest, so to speak, in 
order to attempt to reflect upon Tillich's assumption of the psychological necessity of 
separation between unconsciousness and consciousness, and to consider the extent to 
which it is possible to go beyond the necessity of separation and toward union. 
Furthermore, the thesis intends to consider the implications of such a step toward union 
for the microcosmic theme underlying Tillich's theology. The following questions will 
be raised: What impact does a stepping into the Chinese tradition have upon our 
appreciation of Tillichian theology? Specifically, what are the implications for 
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Tillich's insistence upon separation and the microcosmic theme underlying his 
theology? 
This stepping-out is consistent with Tillich's own method of correlation, in which 
questions are raised about existence that are addressed by reference to that which stands 
beyond existence. Employing the same principle, this thesis raises questions about 
Tillichian ontology by going beyond the Christian fold in which his ontology is 
situated. Moreover, just as Tillich uses the beyond to return to the fold of human 
existence with fresh understanding, so this thesis uses the beyond represented by the 
Chinese tradition as the means by which fresh insight can be brought back to Tillichian 
theology.327 
This is a bold step, which carries with it many risks. The most obvious risk is that one 
leaves behind the tradition in which one has grown, knowing that upon return, things 
will not be the same. Exploring a non-Christian tradition will have inevitable 
consequences for the explorer upon her previously unchallenged Christian perceptions. 
But is that really a risk? Is it not simply a way of broadening one's horizons? The 
degree of risk depends upon how one chooses to step into the other tradition. If one 
enters in full possession of one's Christian values with no intent to have them 
challenged, then there is no risk. But just as a tourist taking photos of the desert cannot 
claim to know what it means to live in the desert, neither can such a person claim to 
have an insight into another tradition. Truly to wish to encounter another tradition is to 
be prepared to let go of those values and presuppositions within which one has been 
dressed. Here lies the risk, for one stands vulnerable and exposed in the presence of 
that which is not one's own. 
There is a further risk in such a venture: no matter how prepared one may be to undress 
oneself of presuppositions, it is impossible to do so fully. No matter how conscious 
327 See pp.l7-18 above for an in-depth discussion of Tillich's method of correlation. 
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one is of presuppositions, the unconscious that fuels that consciousness remains fully 
clothed. 
For this reason, it is impossible for a member of another cultural or religious tradition 
to come to know another tradition as it is meaningful to those born into it. So the next 
risk is that of being unable to participate meaningfully in the tradition into which one 
steps. 
With these two risks comes the danger of falling into a limbo, midway between two 
traditions, failing to find the unfamiliar tradition meaningful and, as a consequence of 
the journeying, finding one's own tradition no longer fully meaningful. 
Jung warns of this danger. In his discussion of archetypes and the collective 
unconscious, he advises against the adoption of eastern symbols by the west, on the 
grounds that their meanings are derived from the unconscious soil of eastern, not 
western culture.328 
Cultural expression, according to Jung, is a complex phenomenon based upon not only 
human consciousness, but also the the psychic forces of the personal and collective 
unconscious. The personal unconscious is based upon the powerful energy of 
archetypal forces residing in the collective unconscious, in which all members of a 
. I . .. 329 partICU ar SOCIety partIcIpate. 
Jung argues that human evolution has been concerned with stepping further and further 
away from the brink of the collective unconscious, the power of which would 
overwhelm the ego of anyone who ventured too close, and that religious symbolism, 
myth and dogma have been the means by which the individual seeks refuge from the 
unconscious forces in which s/he is rooted. 
328 C.G. Jung, The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious (part of The Collected Works of 
C. G.Jung Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1959), p.14. 
329 Ibid., p.22. 
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In an appreciation of symbol reminiscent of Tillich's own,330 Jung suggests that the 
power and meaning of such symbols come through the very evolution of the particular 
society in which they appear, deeply entrenched in its unconscious layers.33! Symbols 
are the means by which the archetypal forces underlying human existence are made 
tolerable for the individua1.332 
Jung argues that the breakdown in the protective layer of dogma and religious 
symbolism, evidenced in the rise of interest in the unconscious and in psychotherapy in 
the west, exposes modernity to the draw of the unconscious forces of the psyche. He 
also observes that the increasing fascination with the symbolism of the east is a further 
reflection of the poverty of western symbolism. However, on the grounds that eastern 
symbolism is the product of the historical evolution of the culture deeply entrenched in 
the eastern psyche, Jung warns of the dangers of a symbolically impoverished west 
adopting the symbols of the east.333 
Encountering the Chinese Tradition 
Do the words of Jung advise against exploration into Chinese culture? Should we 
search for new symbolism only from the soil of home territory? Do the dangers of 
adopting the symbols of the east extend to venturing onto their soil? The answer to all 
three questions has to be no, for Jung also spoke of the value of becoming acquainted 
with eastern thinking in our search for new meaning. According to J,J. Clarke, for 
lung, the east was the catalyst that would bring about spiritual transformation in the 
330 Tillich suggests that Jung's distinction between archetypes and symbols may be a means of 
resolving the historical conflict between the Catholic insistence upon the rational and 
unchanging nature of religious symbols and the Protestant insistence upon their dynamic 
character. (Tillich, The Meaning of Health, pp.174-178). 
331 C.G.Jung, Man and His Symbols (Macmillan Publishers, Oxford, 1978), pp.97-1 00. 
332 Jung, The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, p.ll. 
333 Ibid., p.lS. 
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west. Jung believed that out of western interest in the east, "new spiritual forms will 
arise.,,334 
There is a way of journeying that perhaps makes the stepping-out of one's own 
tradition into another a very meaningful exercise, indeed. If we approach the 
experience as a means of understanding our own tradition better, rather than as seeking 
to escape it or to become part of another, then we are able to return with light that 
might be used to guide our own tradition on to the new. 
Tillich perhaps would have been sympathetic to such an approach, for through his 
method of correlation he attempted a similar thing; to search beyond existence, in order 
better to understand the nature of that existence. 
If, in the process of the encounter with another tradition, we discover insights 
meaningful to us as outsiders, then we will have discovered the light of another 
tradition that resonates with our own.335 
With this approach in mind, how do we step into the other tradition? We must tread a 
fine line. We must enter the tradition with openness and a willingness to have our own 
presuppositions exposed, but, at the same time, with knowledge that the tradition in 
which we have stepped is not, and can never be, our own. We must reach out to 
embrace as fully as we can the heart of that tradition in the full knowledge that we can 
only know it from the outside, never from the inside. In other words, we must be 
constantly aware that what we experience is not the authenticity of the tradition as it is 
in itself, but as it resonates with our very own tradition. 
If we are able to tread such a fine line, we bring back to our own tradition something 
very precious indeed; we bring back a fresh light to shine on our own tradition that may 
well challenge previous perspectives, but will ultimately resonate with it. 
334 Jung, Jung on the East, p.17. 
335 Allinson (ed.), Understanding the Chinese Mind, p.3. 
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The Methodological Approach to the Chinese Tradition 
The purpose in exploring the Chinese tradition is to assess the validity of Tillich's 
assertion that creaturely estrangement is ontological in nature. The researcher wishes 
to test whether Tillich's assertion here has truly ontological validity, or whether it is 
one made within the parameters of a western Christian perspective. In view of the 
ambiguities discussed in the present chapter with regard to the themes of eros, 
estrangement, consciousness and the unconscious, it is necessary to test the validity of 
this claim. If estrangement is shown not to be ontological in nature, then it is possible 
to challenge Tillich's assumption in this respect, and to examine the effect on his 
theological system of the removal of the theme of estrangement. 
Hence, in accord with the principle of Tillich's method of correlation, the thesis looks 
out beyond the Christian tradition by examining the ontology of another tradition, in 
order to consider the extent to which the themes of separation or estrangement feature 
in it at the ontological level. Selected for this purpose is the Chinese tradition. As 
already outlined in the Thesis Introduction, the reasons for selecting this tradition are 
both academic and personal. 
From the academic perspective, at the heart of the Chinese tradition is a profoundly 
microcosmic/macrocosmic understanding of reality. This finds particularly clear 
expression in philosophical writings about the Tao - the process of life's natural change 
and natural movement. 336 
In View of the presence of a microcosmic theme underlying Tillich's theology 
established in this thesis, and in view also of the inconsistency in his theology with 
regard to the theme of estrangement, unearthed through the microcosmic theme, a 
dialogue with the Chinese tradition and its microcosmic theme will be illuminating. 
336 T. Cleary, The Essential Tao (San Francisco, Harper, 1991), p.l. 
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Moreover, the microcosmic theme exemplified in the principle of the Tao highlights a 
close connection between the phenomenal and noumenal aspects of life. 337 
Interestingly, the microcosmic theme underlying Tillich's theology also demonstrates 
intimacy at the ontological level between the human being and the Divine Life. 
However, his insistence, at the same time, upon ontological estrangement makes 
ambiguous the nature of that intimacy. This ambiguity would appear not to be present 
in the Chinese microcosmic theme. 
Thus, again, the Chinese tradition becomes an interesting conversation partner in 
relation to Tillichian theology, for there is both resonance and dissonance between the 
philosophy pertaining to the Tao and Tillichian theology. As with any good 
conversation partner, differences, as well as similarities, are essential for a dynamic 
conversation to take place, and for these reasons, on the academic level, the Tao of the 
Chinese tradition may be seen as a suitable one into which to step. 
On the personal level, the selection of the Chinese tradition was a natural choice for the 
researcher. Having been married to a Chinese man for twenty years and having two 
children who are therefore, both Chinese and European, it was natural for the 
researcher to opt for the Chinese tradition, when stepping out of the western Christian 
tradition. Through her marriage, the researcher has realised the way in which it is 
possible to understand one's own tradition by being exposed to that which is not one's 
own. Exposure of this kind does not necessarily mean either a relinquishing of one's 
own values in the light of those brought by one's partner, or the imposition of one's 
values onto the partner. Instead, it is possible to share each other's values and in so 
doing, to gain a deeper insight into the respective cultures and traditions of each. 
In view of this understanding and experience in marriage, the researcher considered a 
conversation between Tillich and Chinese philosophy pertaining to the Tao to be 
fruitful and dynamic. 
337 Leung, 'Tao and Logos', p.139. 
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For these reasons, therefore, the thesis examines the theme of the Tao in the context of 
the Chinese tradition. Specifically, it considers the Tao as communicated through two 
classical Chinese philosophical texts, the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu. The reasons for 
selecting the Tao are detailed below. 
Fung asserts that two of the most influential schools in the shaping of Chinese thought 
are Taoism and Confucianism.338 Allinson adds Buddhism as the third most influential 
school,339 and Liu suggests Mohism rather than Buddhism to be the third.340 Although 
there may be debate as to whether there were two or three main schools, and if there 
were three, whether the Mohist or the Buddhist school took third place, there is 
concensus among these scholars that Confucianism and Taoism provide the bedrock of 
the Chinese philosophical tradition. 
In view of the significant role played by both Confucianism and Taoism in the shaping 
of the Chinese philosophical tradition, the researcher sought a common theme that ran 
through both traditions, through which she could access the Chinese tradition. The 
theme discovered was the Tao, of central importance to the ontology of both schools, 
an ontology that only made full sense in relation to cosmology.341 
In view of the ontological significance of the Tao in both philosophical schools, the 
researcher selected the Tao as the instrument through which she would access the 
Chinese tradition. Moreover, it would be the Tao as expressed in the ancient texts 
preceding the Confucianist and Taoist schools, rather than the Tao as expounded in 
specifically Confucianist and/or Taoist terms. In view of the very different 
philosophical emphases of these schools, it was considered far beyond the scope of this 
thesis to attempt to explore the Tao through a Confucianist and/or Taoist perspective. 
As with any fundamental principle or tenet, ideas pertaining to the Tao evolve with the 
development of each school. Thus, an examination of the Tao from the perspective of a 
338 Fung, A Short History o/Chinese Philosoph, pJO. 
339 AlIinson (ed.), Understanding the Chinese Mind, pJ. 
340 Shu-Hsien Liu, Understanding Confucian Philosophy: Classical and Sung-Ming (Westport, 
Praeger, 1998), p.3. 
341 Cheng, 'Chinese Metaphysics as Non-Metaphysics', pp. 167,175. 
186 
particular school would demand the tracking of the evolution of the term, a task, again, 
that would lie beyond the limitations of this particular study. 
For these reasons, the researcher decided to limit her examination of thc Tao to two 
specific ancient classical texts that could be viewed independently of any philosophical 
school of thought, and which were compilcd within a specific time-fran1c, thus, 
minimising the risk of anachronism in the study of the Tao. Upon the advice of Prof. 
Xinzhong Yao, the texts selected for this purpose were the Lao Tzu and the Chuan1: 
Tzu.342 
The Loo Tzu has been selected in view of its widely acknowledged profound influencc 
on Chinese thought throughout the ages.343 Cheng argues that it is onc of only two 
primary Chinese texts that pertain to the Chinese search for cosmological becoming.344 
Moreover, central to the text, according to Ch'en, is thc theme of the Tao.345 Chang 
argues that the Loo Tzu was the text in which the Tao was originally expounded.346 As 
the purpose of the second part of this thesis is to explore ontology through the lens of 
the Too, the centrality of the Loo Tzu in the history of Chinese thought, and its focus 
upon the Too and becoming make it a wholly appropriate text for consideration. 
With regard to the Chuang Tzu, there are various reasons for its selection. Firstly, 
while it shares a close affinity with the Lao Tzu, 347 having as central to its philosophy 
342 These texts were selected upon the advice of Prof. XinZhong Yao at Lampeter University. 
Highlighting the importance of avoiding the danger of anachronism when examining the Too, 
he suggested that the Loo Tzu and the Chuang Tzu would be appropriate texts for my purpose, 
as both were written in a similar historical period, and both are recognised as formative in the 
shaping of classical thought on the Too. 
343 Lao Tzu Tao Te Ching, trans\. Lau, p.ix 
344 Cheng, 'Chinese Metaphysics as Non-Metaphysics' p.168. 
34S Ch'en ku-ying, Lao Tzu: Texts, Notes and Comments, (San Francisco, Chinese Materials 
Center, 1977), p.2. 
346 Chang Chung-Yuan, 'Tao: A New Way of Thinking,' Journal of Chinese Philosophy (1974), 
pp.137-152, at p.137. 
347 Victor H. Blair, 'Introduction and Notes for a Complete Translation of the Chuang Tzu,' 
Sino-Paltonic Papers No.48 (Sept. 1994, Pennsylvania, University of Pennsylvania), p.xv. 
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the Tao,348 unlike the Lao Tzu, it provides the reader with a well-developed philosophy 
of the individual. Thus, it offers an insight into the Tao as it pertains to the individual, 
rather than as it pertains to the political forum, the theme focused upon in the Lao Tzu. 
By considering both texts, it is possible to gain an appreciation of ontology from the 
perspective of both the individual and the group. In view of our intention to consider 
Chinese ontology in the light of Tillichian ontology, the obtaining of both the 
individual and group perspectives in this respect is most important.349 
An additional reason for utilising the Chuang Tzu is its distinctive literary style, in 
which much use is made of paradox and non-sequiturs. According to Watson, the 
purpose of such literary devices is to jolt the reader's 'mind into awareness of a truth 
outside the pale of ordinary logic. ,350 As will be shown in our discussion of the Tao, the 
need to go beyond logic and beyond the limits of language are central to the 
communication of the Tao in both the Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu. The distinctive style 
of the latter text, which exemplifies to extreme the effect of going beyond logic, is 
regarded by the researcher as a useful means of beginning to grasp the non-rational 
theme underlying the Tao. 
In this thesis, the terms Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu are used to denote texts rather than 
historical personages. Some of the literature on the text of the Lao Tzu refers also to 
Lao Tzu, the philosopher.351 However, there is considerable debate as to the identity of 
the philosopher attributed with this name. Indeed, Lau suggests that Lao Tzu was not a 
348 Chuang tzu: A New Selected Translation with an Exposition of the Philosophy of Kuo 
Hsiang, transl. Fung, Yu-Ian (Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 1989), p.5. 
349 Much of the first part ofthis thesis has emphasised Tillich's insistence upon the resonating 
relationship between individual and group; self and world. 
350 The Complete Works ofChuang Tzu, trans!' Burton Watson, (New York, London, Columbia 
University Press 1968), p.5. 
351 Lao Tzu, trans\. Ch'en, p.t. Ch'en refers to Lao Tzu as he rather than it. W.A. Callahan, 
'Discourse and Perspective in Daoism: A Linguistic Interpretation of Ziran', Philosophy East 
& West, 39.2 (1989), p.176 ofpp.171-189): a distinction is drawn between Dao De Jing(Tao 
Te Ching) the text, and Laozi (Lao Tzu), the author. 
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historical figure at all,352 and that the text bearing the name of Lao Tzu should be 
regarded as an anthology compiled by one or a series of editors from short passages.353 
In contrast, Ch' en ku-ying, although not explicitly discussing the authorship of the Lao 
Tzu text, assumes the historicity of the character bearing this name in the discussion of 
that text.354 
In view of the debate with respect to the historical authenticity of the historical 
character of Lao Tzu, the researcher deems it sensible to refer to Lao Tzu as the title of 
a text, and to prefix it with the to minimise the risk of the reader assuming Lao Tzu to 
pertain to a historical character. By so doing, the researcher seeks to remain outside the 
debate as to the historical authenticity of the philosophical figure of Lao Tzu, a debate 
which is beyond the scope of this thesis.35S 
For reasons of clarity, the Chuang Tzu will also be used to refer to the text by that 
name, although there does appear to be a large degree of consensus among scholars that 
there, indeed, was a historical figure by the name of Chuang TZU.356 
The aIm of the second part of this thesis therefore, is to examine the Tao as 
communicated through two primary Chinese texts, the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu, 
the purpose of which is threefold: firstly, to gain an appreciation of the Tau as it is 
expressed through those texts; secondly, to gain insight into the ontological perspective 
provided through the discussion of the Tao in those texts. Finally, to assess the extent to 
which the ontology communicated through those texts supports Tillich's claim that 
estrangement and separation are ontological in nature. Let us be reminded that the 
352 LaD Tzu Tao Te Ching, transl. Lau, p.xii. 
353 Ibid. 
354 LaD Tzu, transI.Ch'en, p.t. Ch'en refers to the humanism of Lao-tzu as 'his' humanism. 
thus alluding to LaD Tzu as the author, not the text. 
355 The adopting of this position was confirmed by Chinese Philosophy scholar, Professor 
Xinzhong Yao, to be a sensible way of avoiding the ongoing scholarly debate with regard to 
authorship of this text. (N.B. the LaD Tzu is also commonly known as the Tao Te Ching.) 
3561n view of general scholarly acceptance of the historicity ofChuang Tzu, the author, at least 
for the first seven chapters of the Chuang Tzu, occasional reference will be made to Chuang 
Tzu (non-italicised), the author. 
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broader purpose of exploring the Tao of the Chinese tradition is to permit the 
researcher to step outside the western Christian tradition in which TiIlich was 
entrenched, in order to ascertain whether TilIich's claim for the ontological nature of 
creaturely estrangement holds true from a non-Christian perspective, or whether it is 
simply a presupposition of TiIlich based upon his entrenchment in the western 
Christian tradition. This consideration has been made necessary in view of the 
ontological inconsistency in Tillich's theology, unearthed by the microcosmic theme 
underlying his system. 
In the chapters that follow, themes emerging from our exploration of the Chinese texts 
will be identified by both English and Chinese terminology. English terms will be used 
first, with the transliteration of Chinese equivalents following in parenthesis. The 
prioritising in this respect reflects the focus of the thesis, which is upon an examination 
of primary Chinese texts translated into English. This approach also echoes the 
methodology fundamental to the thesis, in which the researcher seeks not to attempt to 
understand the Tao through Chinese eyes, but through her own eyes, steeped in the 
western Christian tradition. In other words, in accord with Tillich's method of 
correlation, the researcher seeks to go beyond her own tradition, in order to return to it. 
As such, inevitably, she explores the Chinese tradition with a Christian mindset. 
This approach reiterates the point made in the Introduction that the thesis is not a 
comparative study of the Tao and Tillichian theology, For this reason, the 
methodological approach adopted with regard to exploration of the Tao has not 
included discussion of the substantial body of literature pertaining to comparative 
approaches, 
Instead, the researcher seeks to use the exploration of the Chinese texts as an 
instrument for creating distance between her and Tillichian theology, in order that she 
might then return to that theology with new insight generated through exposure to the 
Chinese tradition. The Chinese texts, therefore, are used to generate a dynamic 
dialogue between TilIich and the texts themselves, the catalyst for the dialogue being 
the researcher. 
190 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed Tillich's understanding of the unconscious and 
consciousness as potential and actuality. It has also explored his notions of separation 
and freedom and has suggested that Tillich regards separation to be a necessity of 
existence. While in terms of ontology and mythology, this may be clear in his system, 
with regard to consciousness and unconsciousness, there would appear to be ambiguity. 
It has been suggested that if human freedom is authentic and not simply divine lip-
service, then we cannot speak of the reunion of consciousness with unconsciousness, as 
that suggests a meaninglessness to the human process of evolving consciousness. 
Instead, we should speak in terms of movement toward union. Such a change in 
terminology, it has been argued, would move us some way toward narrowing, in 
psychological terms, the gulf between consciousness and unconsciousness, evoked by 
Tillich's insistence upon the inevitability of separation. 
The chapter recognises the fundamental position of the notion of separation not only in 
Tillich's theology, but also in the western Christian tradition, in general. It then asks 
whether it would be possible to bridge the gap between consciousness and 
unconsciousness in Christian terms without losing the integrity of the Christian 
message. 
With regard to the way in which such an issue might be broached, the chapter 
establishes the need to step out of the soil of the western Christian tradition, in which 
Tillichian theology is rooted, and to step into that of another, namely, the Tao of the 
Chinese tradtition. It has been argued that by encountering a tradition that is not one's 
own, it is possible to unearth presuppositions in which one is entrenched, which are 
perhaps not as fundamental to life as one had previously assumed. 
The specific aim of the engagement with the Tao is to examine the impact of this 
encounter upon Tillich's insistence upon separation from the psychological perspective, 
and upon the microcosmic theme underlying his thelogy. 
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Chapter 5 
The Tao 
As outlined in the previous chapter, the purpose of our consideration of the Chinese 
tradition is to assess the validity of Tillich's assertion that creaturely estrangement is 
ontological in nature. As estrangement is a theme that permeates the western Christian 
tradition in which Tillich was entrenched, the thesis has argued for the need to stand 
outside that tradition, in order to reflect more openly upon this assertion, and to make a 
judgment as to its validity. For reasons detailed both in the Thesis Introduction and in 
Chapter Four, the Chinese tradition has been that selected for this purpose. The 
exploration of this tradition will be limited to a consideration of the Chinese ontological 
perspective obtained through the exposition of the Tao in two primary Chinese texts: 
the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu. 
The aim of the next two chapters therefore, is to explore the Tao as presented in these 
texts, and to consider the ontological implications of the Tao discovered through them. 
Although reference will be made to Tillichian ontology where appropriate in these 
chapters, as their purpose is to present an appreciation of the Tao and Chinese ontology 
through the lens of the Tao, detailed comparative discussion of Chinese and TilIichian 
ontologies will be withheld until Chapter Seven. 
Chapter Five is divided into the following sections: Section One discusses the Tao in 
relation to the microcosmic/macrocosmic cosmology present in the Lao Tzu and the 
Chuang Tzu. Section Two considers the use of negative terminology in the Lao Tzu 
and paradoxical language in the Chuang Tzu as the means of communicating the Tao. 
Attention is paid to these particular themes in view of their significance in Tillichian 
theology. As argued in Chapter Three, Tillich's dialectical approach to communicating 
the dynamic relationship between divine life and creaturely life has integral to it the 
element of the classical via negativa. By communicating the dynamic nature of the 
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ontological structure of being in terms of polarities, TiIlich's theology hinges upon the 
relationship between opposites, and utilises the tension of paradoxical impasse as the 
point at which the transcendent breaks through. The aim of an exploration of the use of 
paradox and negative terminology in the two Chinese texts is to consider whether they 
are used to similar effect. 
Section Two focuses in particular upon two negative themes: firstly, 'non-being' (wu) 
is examined in the light of the Tillichian notion of 'non-being', already explored in 
Chapters One and Three. Secondly, 'non-action'(wu-wei) is examined and 
demonstrated to be a pivotal concept in the understanding of the Tao. 357 It is used to 
highlight the stark contrast between the utilisation of paradox in the Chinese texts under 
examination and its use in Tillichian theology. 
Section One: the Microcosmic 
Cosmology of the Lao Tzu and the 
Chuang Tzu 
The Tao and 
According to Leung, the original character for the Tao was composed of the Chinese 
characters for the head and the legs.358 Citing Duan Yu_Cai,359 Leung suggests that the 
Tao can be interpreted in the following way: 
The head denotes the goal that is reached by walking.360 
Thus for Leung, the Tao is a 'through road' that can be walked, a process of 
becoming.361 As such, the Tao is both dynamic and inexhaustible. That which is 
3S7 Loy, David, 'Wei-wu-wei: Nondual Action,' Philosophy East and West. 35 (1985). pp.73-
86, at p.73. 
358 Leung, 'Tao and Logos,' p.l31. 
359 Duan Yu-Cai was the translator of the ancient Chinese etymological dictionary, On Meaning 
and Word. 
360 Duang Yu Chai, The Commentary of "On Meaning and Words", cited in Leung, 'Tao and 
Logos,' p.131. 
193 
inexhaustible is bottomless, limitless and eternal. Thus, the Laa Tzu refers to the Taa in 
the following way: 
Tao is empty, like a bowl. 
It may be used but its capacity is inexhaustible. 
It is bottomless like an infinite abyss ... 362 
Francois Cheng suggests that both the Lao Tzu and the Chllang Tzu link the Tao with 
the notion of 'emptiness' (hsu). He asserts that 'emptiness' has both noumenal and 
phenomenal aspects in these texts, and that the two aspects are in a state of perpetual 
interaction. He argues: 
It is at one and the same time the supreme state of the origin and the 
central element in the workings of the world ofthings.363 
Cheng's view is shared by Leung, who suggests that in the Chuang Tzu, the Taa is 
beyond all things and simultaneously penetrates each living thing.364 
It is important here to consider the reason for Cheng's use of the terms 'noumenal' and 
'phenomenal' with regard to the Tao. To what extent does Cheng's use of this 
terminology accord with Tillich's use of it? 
For Tillich, the noumenal character of God is communicated through the creature's 
sense of God's holiness - the creature's consciousness of the intangible and 
unapproachable nature of the divine.365 For him, holiness is the experiencing of the 
noumenal aspect of God, rendering the noumenous an existential expression of the 
ineffability of man's ultimate concern.366 For Tillich, the noumenal is the aspect of the 
361 Ibid. 
362 Lao Tzu, Ch. 4, cited in Leung, 'Tao and Logos,' p.134. 
363 Cheng, Francois, Empty and Full, (Boston & London, Shambala Publ ications, 1994), p.44. 
364 Leung, 'Tao and Logos,' p.39. 
365 Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol.l, pp.21S-216. 
366 Ibid., p.2IS. 
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divine that lies beyond the realm of time and space, which we, as creatures confined to 
those categories, acknowledge and experience through our sense of the holy. In this 
way, noumenal expresses the ineffable present within the phenomenal and through its 
involvement in the phenomenal, the noumenal may be experienced as the holy. Thus, 
phenomena become vehicles for the holy. However, that is not to say that an object 
may be regarded as holy. Tillich warns of the idolatrous nature of such a perception. 
He reminds us: 
... holy ~bjects are not holy in and of themselves. They are holy only 
by negating themselves in pointing to the divine of which they are the 
mediums?67 
In contrast, Tillich's use of the terms 'transcendent' and 'immanent' do not include 
experience of the holy. Instead, these terms provide a sense of divine presence and 
distance that is less confessional and experiential, and more the product of reflection 
and abstracted thought.368 
In terms of Tillichian understanding of the terms 'noumenal' and 'phenomenal', the 
Chinese quotations above would appear not to suggest a holy aspect to the Tao. They 
appear not to confirm the human acknowledgement of the quality of the Tao as it is in 
itself. Instead, they suggest a far less existential expression of the relationship between 
the Tao and the human being. In light of this, is it possible to criticise Cheng's usc of 
the terms phenomenal and noumenal rather than transcendent and immanent? 
Cheng explains his preference for the terms noumenon and phenomenon over those of 
transcendence and immanence by asserting that the former express better the 
organically linked nature of the realm of potential and non-differentiation with the 
realm of the concrete and differentiated. He states: 
367 Ibid., p.216. 
368 Til\ich, Systematic Theology, vol.l, p.237. 
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Noumenon denotes that which is of the nature of the origin, which is 
still undifferentiated and potential. The term phenomenon designates the 
concrete aspects of the created universe. These two are neither separate 
nor in simple opposition; without being on the same level, they are 
organically linked.369 
Established later in this chapter is the intimate connection betwccn the Tao in its 
transcendent and immanent aspects, which finds expression through the world of 
phenomena and in particular, through the life of the true man, who has found his way. 
Discovered is the appropriateness of Cheng's use of the terms noumcnon and 
phenomenon to denote the Tao, for the Tao is so innate to human existence that the true 
man lives a life of spontaneous accord with the flow of the Tao. 
Thus, while Tillich's noumenon finds expression through the creature's sense of the 
holy, the sages in the LaD Tzu and the Chuang Tzu speak of the dynamic integration of 
the phenomenal with the noumenal, in which the phenomenal becomes the spontaneous 
expression of the dynamic flow of the noumenal Tao. Established later is the point that 
while Tillich's sense of the holy reflects his insistence upon mediation between the 
divine Creator and the creature, the LaD Tzu and the Chuang Tzu direct readers to an 
unmediated experience of the mysterious noumenon within the phenomenal world. 
The concern of both Chinese texts to promote acceptance of the Tao's mystery 
highlights the appropriateness of Cheng's use of the terms phenomenal and noumenal, 
for it points to the possibility and indeed, the necessity of breaking through the bounds 
of causal awareness, and therefore, of breaking through the bounds of time and space to 
integrate with the Tao. In contrast, Tillich's very insistence upon the impossibility of 
breaking those bounds leads to the need for the mediatory role of the holy. 
Further clarification of the point made above must wait until more detailed discussion 
of the ontological implications of the treatment of the Tao in the Lao Tzu and the 
369 Cheng, Empty and Full, p.150. 
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Chuang Tzu has been offered. The reason for delaying further discussion at this point 
is that through later discussion, we will discover that the exposition of the Tao in these 
Chinese texts depicts it not so much in ontological terms, as cosmo-ontological or onto-
cosmological terms. Only when this is grasped clearly is it possible to understand 
firstly, the appropriateness of Cheng's use of the terms noumenon and phenomenon to 
describe the Tao, and secondly, the stark contrast between those terms as they pertain 
to the Tao and as they are used by Tillich. 
Returning to our consideration of the Tao, established thus far is the idea that it is both 
noumenal and phenomenal, and that central to the noumenal aspect is the theme of 
emptiness (hsu). At the same time, emptiness is present in the phenomenal world and 
is integral to the process of human becoming. 
Leung highlights five principle meanings for the term Tao: as mentioned above, it 
means the process, the way; it means also the infinity of finiteness, the harmony in 
situations, and finally, the possibility of mutual understanding and interpenetration.37o 
Central to all of these meanings is a cosmology that is communicated through both the 
Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu: the microcosmic-macrocosmic understanding of human 
existence in relation to the world of nature. Only when the microcosmic-macrocosmic 
cosmology of these early Chinese texts is understood is it possible to begin to 
understand the paradox that is presented when we learn that the emptiness of the Tao 
can be fully present in the human process of becoming. In light of this, it is important to 
explore the microcosmic-macrocosmic cosmology that finds expression in the two texts 
under consideration. 
The cosmology of each text will be explored separately. This is necessary not because 
of any fundamental differences iry the cosmologies of each, but because of the 
distinctive style and focus of each text. As indicated in Chapter Four, the value for this 
thesis in exploring both the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu lies in the distinctness of their 
370 Ibid., p.l33. 
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focus. The Lao Tzu focuses upon the Tao from a political perspective. In contrast, the 
Chuang Tzu highlights the importance of the Tao for the individual. By considering 
each text separately, it is possible to situate the Tao within the broader microcosmic-
macrocosmic frame more clearly, first, as it pertains to the individual in the Chuang 
Tzu, and then as it relates to the political forum in the Lao Tzu. 
Microcosmic-macrocosmic Cosmology in the Chuang Tzu 
Watson defines the Tao of the Chuang Tzu as the Way, and interprets it as: 
the underlying unity that embraces man, nature and all that is in the 
• 371 
umverse. 
The Way is ineffable and therefore, cannot be described adequately through language. 
Watson argues that this ineffability is demonstrated in the Chuang Tzu by the use of 
literary devices such as non-sequiturs, poetical and paradoxical language to 
demonstrate the impossibility of speaking about the Tao. 372 An example of such a 
device can be found in the Chuang Tzu, Ch.II : 
If the gentleman finds he has no other choice than to direct and look after 
the world, then the best course for him is inaction.373 
Fung interprets this line as an attempt to express the ineffability of the Tao. The Tao is 
the originator of all things but does not itself fall into the category of a thing.374 
Elsewhere in the Chuang Tzu, the Tao is described as non-being.37s However, failure 
to communicate adequately the Tao does not mean that it lies beyond the realm of 
human experience. On the contrary, it is possible to gain real insight into the Tao, but 
371 The Complete Works ofChuang Tzu, trans!. Watson, p.6. 
372 Ibid., p.6. 
373 The Complete Works ofChuang Tzu, trans!. Watson, Ch.II (p.II6). 
374 Ibid. 
375 Ibid, p.63. 
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only by going beyond the limitations of reasoned discourse. The human being can 
experience it because the ineffable Tao is present within all that lives and is manifest in 
the individual in the form of le, translated by Watson as virtue.376 
According to Fung, le is derived from the Tao, and is translated as virtuc or power.377 
It is the spontaneity that an individual receives from the Tao.378 lie suggests that the 
relationship between virtue (te) and the Tao is as that between watcr in a river or a lake 
and water in general. In this way, Fung suggests that the Tao in its unitary nature finds 
expression in the particular as virtue (le). Just as water in general is watcr that is 
unrestrained and unlimited, so too is the Tao; and just as water in a lake is a limited and 
restrained manifestation of water in general, so too is virtue (le) a limited and restraincd 
expression of the unrestrainable and limitless Tao. This accords with Francois Cheng's 
view, mentioned earlier, that the Tao has both noumenal and phenomenal aspects. Fung 
elsewhere describes virtue (le) as depicted in the Chuang Tzu as that which is derived 
from the Tao and makes us what we are. Fung states: 
Thus our le is what makes us what we are. We are happy when this le 
or natural ability of ours is fully and freely exercised. that is, when our 
nature is fully and freely developed.379 
Here, then, is a clear expression of the microcosmic-macrocosmic cosmology that is 
present in the text of the Chuang Tzu. Through virtue (le), the human being is 
connected to the Tao of the Universe. Moreover, virtue (le) is part of our essential 
nature; it is that which makes us what we are. Fung suggests that the Chuang Tzu 
depicts virtue (le) as the source of happiness, and that pain and suffering result when 
there is movement away from nature. Thus, the conclusion drawn in the Chuang Tzu is 
376 The Complete Works ofChuang Tzu, transl. Watson, p.25. 
377 Fung, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, p.31. 
378 Chuang Tzu: A New Selected Translation with an Exposition of the Philosophy of Kuo 
Hsiang, transl. Fung, p.8. 
379 Ibid., p.t 05. 
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that in view of the fact that rules and government draw people away from their true 
nature, the best way to govern is not to govern at all.38o 
In the Chuang Tzu, then, there is no suggestion that le is something to be learned. On 
the contrary, it is our innate ability, our natural connection with the ineffable Tao, the 
originator and sustainer of life which is beyond the phenomenal world and, 
paradoxically, totally present within it at all times. 
The interpretation of le as natural, innate ability, found in the Chuang Tzu, was by no 
means universally accepted. The Confucian understanding of le, for example, placed 
great emphasis upon its cultivation through knowledge and moral and ethical 
leaming.381 However, as mentioned in Chapter four, discussion of le as it pertains to 
the broader forum of classical schools of thought lies beyond the scope of this thesis.382 
The emphasis placed upon the unlearned element of virtue (le) in the Chuang TZlI 
perhaps provides an insight into the historical context in which this text appeared. 
Watson argues that while the majority of the ancient Chinese philosophies sought to 
address the political and intellectual elite, the Chllang Tzu focused upon the spiritual 
elite.383 The writings promoted a turning away from the struggles of ordinary men in 
their craving for success, fame, wealth and security, and a movement towards a state of 
spontaneous mindlessness, the effect of merging with the Tao.384 
Thus, in the Chllang TZlI, virtue (te) is that innate power present in every living thing 
derived from the Tao. By connecting with our virtue (le), we live in, and according to, 
the Tao. In the Chuang TZlI we are told that knowledge and learning, rather than 
helping us to connect with virtue (le), as Confucian teachings would promote, in fact 
380 Ibid. 
381 Liu, Understanding Confucian Philosophy, p.20. 
382 See p.185 above. 
383 The Complete Works ofChuang Tzu, trans\. Watson, p.5. 
384 Ibid, p.6. Watson uses the tenn 'merges' to express the total hannonisation of sagely action 
with the flow of Tao that occurs when the sage lives in the dynamic state ofwu-wei. 
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move us further away from our connection with the Tao. Thus, in the Chuang Tzu, we 
read: 
Right is not right; so is not so. If right were really right, it would differ 
so clearly from not right that there would be no need for argument. If so 
were really so, it would differ so clearly from not so that there would be 
no need for argument. Forget distinctions. Leap into the boundless and 
make it your home!385 
In this passage, reasoned argument is combined with paradox to illustrate the limitation 
of reasoned discourse and to point to the value of going beyond the polarity and 
distinctions that the world of reason generates by leaping into the distinctionless unity 
that embraces the world of reason.386 This theme finds expression again later in the 
ChuangTzu: 
In all affairs, whether large or small, there are few men who reach a 
happy conclusion except through the Way [the Tao]. If you do not 
succeed, you are bound to suffer from the judgment of men. If you do 
succeed, you are bound to suffer from the yin and yang. To suffer no 
harm whether you succeed or not - only the man who has virtue [le] can 
do that.387 
Once agam, the text suggests that peace and happiness lie beyond the realm of 
aspiration and living according to distinctions and polarities such as success and failure. 
Rather, it is found in one's harmony with the Tao, a harmony that is made possible by 
our living according to virtue (le). 
385 Cited in The Complete Works ojChuang Tzu,transl. Watson, pp.48,49. 
386 That the Chuang Tzu sought to go beyond the limits of reason is supported by Blair, 
'Introduction and Notes for a Complete Translation of the Chuang Tzu,' p.xxvi. 
387 Cited in The Complete Works ojChuang Tzu, transl. Watson, p.59. 
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Thus, the human being not only is capable of living in the Tao, but also has the Tao, 
expressed as le, within him/her. In this respect, the human being is a microcosm of the 
macrocosm of the universal Tao. This is a view supported by Lukashevich in his 
structural exegesis of the Chuang Tzu. He argues: 
[A]s the microcosm of the Way of Heaven and Earth, man's 
consciousness is a reduced model of the Way. 388 
Our discussion of the relationship between virtue (te) and the Tao is somewhat 
evocative of the Tillichian notion of logos and Logos. It has been argued in the first 
part of this thesis that logos is the existential expression of the Logos of the divine life; 
that the logos is the seed of the divine Logos, allowing the creature to reach out in 
search of its divine ground, and at the same time, to receive the revelation of the divine 
in which the creature is grounded. Our discussion of the relationship of le to the Tao so 
far would appear to be similar: both virtue (te) and logos represent the phenomenal 
expression of their infinite, ineffable source. 
However, one should perhaps guard against making such comparisons, for there is a 
fundamental difference between the relationship between logos and Logos on the one 
hand, and that between virtue (le) and the Tao on the other, namely, the presence of a 
qualitative distinction between logos and Logos and the absence of any such distinction 
between virtue (te) and the Tao. While the logos in Tillichian theology remains 
qualitatively distinct from Logos, due to the limitations placed upon the former by the 
categories of existence, in the Chuang Tzu, there is no such qualitative distinction 
between virtue (le) and the Tao, for the text insists upon the equality of all things. The 
microcosmic-macrocosmic cosmology underlying the Chuang Tzu permits this 
perspective. Fung offers an interpretation of a passage in the Chuang Tzu which 
highlights the equality of all things in nature in the following terms: 
388 S. Lukashevich, Thus Spake Master Chuang: A structural Exegesis o/Taoist Philosophy. 
(New York, Paris, Peter Lang, 1987), p.17. 
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In the macrocosm, there is no real lord other than the variety of things. 
There is no God. In the microcosm, there is no real ruler other than the 
different parts of the body. There is no sou1.389 
Of interest here is the total equality between the macrocosm of nature and the 
microcosm of the human being. 390 Unlike the microcosmic-macrocosmic themes 
discussed in the earlier part of this thesis, in the Chuang Tzu, there is no sense of 
hierarchical relationship between macrocosm and microcosm. 
In our discussion of the medieval microcosmic motif, the sense of hierarchy was most 
pronounced: imperfect humanity sought to find its return to the perfect Source by 
elevating itself out of the base physicality of existential circumstance to commune with 
Nous. 
Likewise, in the Renaissance microcosmic motif the sense of hierarchy, although 
somewhat different in character, still remained. The import of the human being in the 
universal hierarchy had been dramatically elevated; human beings enjoyed a sense of 
empowerment generated by recognition of their ability to influence nature, permitting a 
far more anthropocentric microcosm to emerge. Nevertheless, the qualitative gulf 
between creature and Creator remained. 
With regard to the Tillichian microcosmic motif proferred in this thesis, the superiority 
of the Creator as the macrocosm remains. Tillich insists upon the qualitative 
distinction between Creator and creature, expressing this distinction in terms of the 
creature's ontological estrangement from its ground of being. The distinction is also 
expressed through his understanding of the function of holy objects - to mediate the 
noumenal to the realm of the phenomenal. 
389 Chuang Tzu: New Selected Translation, transl. Fung, pA2. 
390 Ibid, pAO. Fung asserts that heaven is an alternative to nature, as the Chinese character for 
heaven and nature is the same. 
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In the equality of all things in the Chuang Tzu text is the absence of hierarchy in the 
microcosmic-macrocosmic cosmology. The Tao is the originator and sustainer without 
any hint of a necessary consequential superiority of the Tao to 'all things that it 
originates,391 and this perspective is reflected in the appreciation of the presence of the 
noumenal within the phenomenal. Thus, the text states: 
A road is made by people walking on it; things are so because they are 
called so. What makes them so? Making them so makes them so. 
What makes them not so? Making them not so makes them not so ... 
For this reason, whether you point to a little stalk or a great pillar ... the 
way makes them all into one.392 
Here, the Chuang Tzu highlights the different hue of 'things' when viewed from a 
unitary perspective. The text is written from a consciousness that transcends the 
normal awareness of distinction and polarity. Thus, from a unitary position, there is 
total equality of all things because all things express the common nature of the whole. 
It would appear therefore, that a crucial distinction between the microcosmic theme in 
the Chuang Tzu and the themes explored earlier in this thesis results from the capacity 
for Chuang Tzu to enter a realm of consciousness in which all distinction becomes 
irrelevant.393 In the words ofWatson, 
The 'way up there' from which Chuang Tzu so often speaks, and in which 
he so persistently urges the reader to join him, is of course, the realm of 
non-dualistic thinking.394 
Consciousness, as the term pertains to Chuang Tzu, does not simply denote a higher 
level of mental or cognitive functioning. His is not simply a higher form of knowledge, 
391 Ibid, p.48. 
392 The Complete Works ofChuang Tzu, transl. Watson, pp.40, 41. 
393 Chuang Tzu here refers to the author of the Chuang Tzu text (see p.188, footnote 356). 
394 Burton Watson, 'Foreword to Experimental Essays on Chuang Tzu, , (Ed. Victor H. Mair), 
Asian Studies at Hawaii, No.29 (Hawaii, University of Hawaii Press, 1983), p.xiii. 
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but an integration of cognition and experience that is so complete, the need for the 
making of distinctions and the valuation of knowledge disappears. 
At the same time, it would be wrong to assume that such consciousness indicates a 
dissolving of self in a mystical sense. Human function in the world remains 
fundamental in the unitary consciousness of the Chuang Tzu. 
This is perhaps one area of subtle but significant difference between the understanding 
of consciousness communicated through the Chinese texts under study and 
consciousness communicated through the classical tradition in which Tillich's ideas 
were rooted, as explored in this thesis. This area of difference will be explored more 
fully later in this chapter in our discussion of the onto-cosmological/cosmo-ontological 
nature of the Tao. Argued later is that the Tao communicated through the Lao Tzu and 
the Chuang Tzu falls neither into the category of ontology nor cosmology, but rather 
demands an integration of both, for, unlike the classical tradition in which Tillich is 
rooted, there is no clear distinction between the realm of the noumenal and that of the 
phenomenal. As already intimated, the noumenal finds expression through the 
1 395 phenomena.
Returning to our present discussion of consciousness, important to acknowledge in the 
communication of the Tao in the texts under consideration is an appreciation of the 
human capacity to integrate experience with cognition to the point of unitary 
awareness. Moreover, the key to attainment of unitary awareness is the letting-go of 
attachment to knowledge and mental cognition.396 
That the distinction between God and man remains in the other microcosmic themes 
studied in this thesis illustrates the fact that the consciousness through which such 
themes emerged was not of the same ilk as that of Chuang Tzu. As with the themes of 
phenomenon and noumenon, this observation must wait until later to be developed, for 
395 See, for example, p.21 0 below. 
396 See pp. 232-234 below. 
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having explored a little the microcosmic-macrocosmic cosmology of the Chuang Tzu, it 
is necessary to turn now to consider the presence of such a cosmology in the Lao Tzu. 
As mentioned with regard to the microcosmic motif in Tillichian theology, it is the 
nature of such a motif that a huge number of themes pertain to it. It would be possible 
to continue our discussion of microcosm-macrocosm in the Chuang Tzu, and to 
incorporate into it themes such as 'non-action' (wu wei), 'non-being' (wu) and 
'spontaneity' (ziran). However, these themes will be explored more efficiently if they 
are considered in the light of both texts under examination, rather than in the light of 
the Chuang Tzu alone. Therefore, as with the microcosmic theme of Tillichian 
theology, it is hoped that the reader has the patience to wait for the deeper development 
of the microcosmic theme of the Chuang Tzu, which will emerge after our introduction 
to the Lao Tzu. 
Microcosmic-macrocosmic Cosmology in the Lao Tzu 
In accord with the Chuang Tzu, central to the thought of the Lao Tzu is the Tao.397 
Great emphasis is placed upon the impossibility of adequately expressing the Tao, and, 
in similar vein to the Chuang Tzu, the Lao Tzu communicates the inadequacy of 
language in depicting it: 
The way that can be spoken of 
Is not the constant way.398 
However, in contrast to the use of many paradoxical anecdotes in the Chuang Tzu. the 
Lao Tzu prefers to use opposing terminology in a non-anecdotal way to illustrate the 
ineffability of the Tao. Hence, it states: 
397 Lao Tzu Tao Te Ching, transl.Lau, p.xv. 
398 Ibid. 
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The whole world recognises the beautiful as the beautiful, yet this is 
only the ugly: the whole world recognises the good as the good, yet this 
is only the bad.399 
In the Lao Tzu, all that can be asserted of the Tao is that it is the source and sustenance 
of the universe.4oo Nothing more can be positively stated. Thus, through opposing 
language and a preference for negative terminology such as 'empty' and 'nothing', and 
'lower' terminology such as 'short' and 'weak' used as attributes of the Tao, the Lao 
Tzu helps the reader to recognise the ineffable nature of the Tao. 401 
Lau explains the traditional interpretation of such a method of referring to the Tao. If 
the Tao is described in terms of attributes, then each polar attribute must also be used. 
For example, if we were to describe the Tao as 'good', then the polar attribute 'bad' 
would also have to be used. Hence, the polar relation between terms such as 'good' and 
'bad', 'something' and 'nothing', etc, must be borne in mind when speaking of the Tao. 
Lau suggests degrees of polarity with regard to terminology pertaining to the Tao, in 
which terms such as 'something' and 'nothing' can be classified as high and low 
terminology, and terms such as 'long' and 'short' (degrees of something and nothing) 
may be classified as higher and lower terms respectively. In other words, in so far as 
'something' is an assertion which stands in polar relation to its negative, 'nothing', then 
'something' represents high terminology and 'nothing', low terminology. In so far as 
'short' is a diminution of 'long', then it is akin to the low/absolutely diminutive status 
attributed to 'nothing'. However, as 'short' is more assertive than 'nothing', it is not 
low in its absolute sense, simply oflower status than 'long'. Therefore, 'short' becomes 
a term that is relatively lower than 'long'. Thus, explains Lau, negative terminology, 
such as 'nothing' or 'emptiness', would be that which stands in polar relation to 
positive statements, such as something or 'fullness', while lower terminology, such as 
399 Ibid, 2.4, (p.5). 
400 Ibid, p.xvi. 
401 Ibid, p.xix. 
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'short' or 'weak', would stand in less antithetical relation to its counterpart, such as 
'long' or 'strong' .402 
Lau emphasises the impossibility of depicting the Tao adequately by means of positive 
attributes. He argues that by using negative attributes and lower terminology, the Lao 
Tzu steers its readers away from the assumption that the Tao can be understood through 
the making of assertive statements. 403 The use of lower terms is free from the 
limitations that positive terms impose upon the reader. As the Tao in the Lao Tzu (and 
in the Chuang Tzu) is the source and sustainer of the 'myriad creatures',404 it transcends 
all language and therefore, any positive statement or quality attributed to it inevitably 
fails to encapsulate it. To say what the Tao is not therefore, is more helpful to the 
reader than to say what it is. 
At first sight, there would appear to be parallels between the Lao Tzu IS use of lower 
and negative terms for depicting the Tao and Nicholas Cuasanus' De Docta Ignorantia, 
discussed in the first part of this thesis. It is useful briefly to explore this literary device 
used in the Lao Tzu in the light ofCusanus' doctrine, as it helps to shed light upon a the 
microcosmic cosmology present in the Tao as communicated in the Lao Tzu. 
In Chapter Two of this thesis, we learned that central to Cusanus' De Docta Ignorantia 
was the tenet that the finite creature could not comprehend the true nature of the infinite 
because the infinite was absolute and the finite mind could only conceive in 
comparative, non-absolute terms.405 In his Coincidentia Oppositorum, all that could be 
said of God was that in Him opposition coincided. For greater insight into God, the 
realm of language had to be transcended. 
402 One way to understand the relation between 'high' and 'Iow', and 'higher' and 'lower' is to 
substitute the hours on a clock-face with positive and negative terminology. Thus, the 
assertiveness of 'something' would render it at the 12 o'clock position, and hence, its polar 
counterpart, 'nothing' at the 6 o'clock position. Proceeding clockwise, language pertaining to 
the high would lie to the right of 'something', placing 'long' at the 1 o'clock position, and 
hence 'short', its counterpart, in the polar position of 7 O'clock. 
403 Ibid, p.xvii. 
404 Ibid, 1.2, (p.S7). 
405 See p. 90 above. 
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The Lao Tzu would appear to present a similar view with regard to the limitation of 
language, a view we have seen is shared in the Chuang Tzu. Because language is 
limited to notions of opposition and duality, the Lao Tzu declines to make assertions 
about the Tao, for it, like Cusanus's God, transcends duality and opposition. 
Thus, Cusanus' Coincidentia Opposi/orum is used as a metaphor for, rather than as a 
definition of God. It is a symbolic expression of that which cannot be expressed 
through the finite mind. This perception, we have learned, is based upon two ancient 
world-views presupposed in Cusanus' thinking: firstly, that the visible world is a 
reflection of the invisible; secondly, that God is ultimately hidden from humanity and is 
accessible only through riddles and paradox. 
We have already seen that the Chuang Tzu uses the literary devices of paradox and 
non-sequiturs extensively to communicate the inadequacy of reason and language in the 
communication of the Tao. The Lao Tzu's preference for lower and negative language 
is used to similar effect. 
Doeringer suggests that the presence of such devices in the early Taoist writings such 
as the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu reveals the use of a symbol theory that began in 
Chinese thinking as early as the 3rd Century BCE. Underlying the need for the symbol 
theory, according to Doeringer, was the assumption of such thinkers that reality by 
nature was paradoxical and therefore, enigmatic.406 
Thus, there would seem to be further parallel between the ideas of Cusanus and those 
found in the Lao Tzu (and, indeed, the Chuang Tzu): the work of both would appear to 
be based upon the presupposition that reality is paradoxical. Moreover, both appear to 
use symbol as the means for going beyond the limitation of language and therefore, as 
the vehicle for navigating the paradox of reality. 
406 F.M. Doeringer, 'Imaging the Imageless: Symbol and perception in Early Chinese Thought,' 
Journal o/Chinese Philosophy No.20 (1993), pp.5-28. at p.6. 
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Doeringer goes on to draw parallels between symbolism in the LaD Tzu and the Chuang 
Tzu and Tillich's use of symbol. He suggests that just as Tillich understands that 
symbolic language alone can express the ultimate,407 so too, the early Taoist writings, 
including the LaD Tzu used words symbolically to 'point beyond' their particular 
definitions to the inexpressible and unperceived in reality.408 
Certainly, Tillich's understanding of the role of symbol as examined in this thesis 
would seem, so far, to concur with Doeringer's assessment of the function of symbol in 
the early Taoist texts, including the LaD Tzu. 
It would appear therefore, that the ideas in the LaD Tzu and in the writings of Cusanus 
were based upon a similar presupposition with regard to the paradoxical nature of 
reality and the need therefore, to go beyond the parameters oflanguage. 
However, it is at this precise point of close similarity that a significant and fundamental 
point of departure between the two can be found. For Cusanus, the paradox is the 
product of the assumption firstly, that God is ultimately hidden from humanity, and 
secondly, that the visible world is a reflection of the invisible. In other words, God is 
ultimately separate from humanity. Symbolic language can point beyond itself toward 
that which is ultimately hidden, and by accessing the realm beyond language, the 
human being moves closer to God through the mediation of the figure of Christ. 
Nevertheless, mediation between God and humanity is necessary, even after the bounds 
of dualistic language have been broken. 
In contrast, in the LaD Tzu, the truth of reality is paradoxical and enigmatic and is 
therefore, present in the 'darkness'. 409 In this text, darkness is illuminating, in polar 
contrast to the 'light' of Christ that is needed to illuminate reality in Cusanus' work. 
Doeringer suggests that in terms of literary style in the LaD Tzu (and indeed, in the 
407 Ibid., p.14. 
408 Ibid., p.15. 
409 Ibid., p.6. 
210 
Chuang Tzu as well), this means the use of a paradoxical language that reflects the 'full 
ambiguity of things' rather than attempts to break through the ambiguity. 
Thus, the symbols used in the LaD Tzu and other early Taoist thinkers are not logical. 
The function of such symbols, then, intentionally fails to satisfy the intellect because it 
serves to shock the mind into acceptance of the ineffability and dark obscurity of the 
Tao. Realisation of the Tao requires the relinquishing of the controlling facuIty of the 
mind of reason. 
Making reference to the Ricoeurian symbol system, Doeringer suggests that the 
Chinese symbolism of texts such as the LaD Tzu point the reader to the latent meaning 
lying behind the primary meaning of language. Its latency cannot be assimilated 
intellectually; rather, the association between the primary and latent meanings is made 
. I 410 unconSCIOUS y. 
When the necessary associations have been made, the way (the Tao) is recognised 
spontaneously, without intellectual reflection and without the need for any form of 
mediation. The symbol system in the LaD Tzu and the early Chinese thinkers therefore, 
should be regarded not so much as a tool of mediation, as a key that opens the door to a 
world of spontaneity. 411 Furthermore, the enigmatic quality of reality renders it 
dynamic and fluid. Thus, the early Chinese philosophers regarded an interpretation of 
reality in dynamic, fluid and holistic terms a far more effective way of communicating 
reality than the use of descriptive language.412 
In support of this view, Doeringer reminds his readers of Tu Wei-Ming's observation 
that the early Chinese world is shaped by three basic motifs: 'continuity, wholeness and 
dynamism' .413 Acceptance of these assumptions led to the preference for early Chinese 
410 Ibid, p.7. 
411 See pp.229-231 below for further discussion of spontaneity (ziran). 
412 Doeringer, 'Imaging the ImageJess,' p.8. 
413 Doeringer, 'Imaging the Imageless,' p.9, citing Tu Wei-Ming Confucian Thought: Se/jhood 
a creative transformation, (New York, Albany State University Press), p.38. 
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texts, including the Lao Tzu, to direct readers to that which lay behind language and 
was inaccessible to the intellect. 
Here, then, we find a stark contrast with Cusanus' De Docta Ignorantia, for in that 
doctrine, reason is transcended by means of the intellect. The perimeter fence of the 
rational faculty is acknowledged and the symbol system activated, in order to elevate 
the human intellect beyond reason into the realm in which it may fulfil its function in 
the universal hierarchy as the mediator of God's message to the universe, a message 
mediated through Christ. The medieval hierarchical order of the universe remains in 
Cusanus' thinking, and along with it the need for mediation between the human being 
and God. Thus, Cusanus' symbolism plays a mediating role between the accessible 
world of man and the ultimately inaccessible realm of God. 
It becomes clear that although there is an apparent similarity between the writings of 
Cusanus and the Lao Tzu in so far as both can be seen to employ a symbol system as 
the result of recognition of the paradoxical nature of reality. that is where the similarity 
ends. While Cusanus seeks to make sense of the paradox by means of symbolism, 
demonstrating his concern to seek the 'light' of understanding, in the Lao Tzu, 
symbolism is used to communicate the darkness of reality, in this way accepting and 
recognising the enigmatic quality of the Tao. This view of the Lao Tzu is supported by 
Lau, who asserts that the use of 'Nothing' in the text as an indication of the nature of 
the Tao is indicative of the Taoist's acceptance that what exists cannot be real, for all 
that exists is subject to the limitations of the specific.414 
With regard to the Tillichian understanding of symbol, although a superficial reading of 
his writings on symbol suggests an affinity with the symbolism of the Lao Tzu, this 
thesis has demonstrated his symbolism to play very much a mediating role and 
therefore, is more closely aligned to the symbolism of Cusanus than that of the Lao 
Tzu. 
414 Tao Te Ching, transl. Lau, p.xix. 
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In terms of the microcosmic-macrocosmic cosmology of the Chinese text, this 
discussion reveals that the Lao Tzu shares the cosmology of the Chuang Tzu; the Tao is 
a dynamic unitary principle which is wholly present, although unrecognisable in the 
particularity of existence. It is unrecognisable because the apparent fixedness of 
particular things betrays the fluid and dynamic reality underlying them. Thus, ~he Tao 
is the dynamic Way of the universe, in which every living thing participates. 
At the same time however, there are certain points of departure between the Lao Tzu 
and the Chuang Tzu in terms of cosmology. While the latter attributes the term heaven 
(t'ien) to the creator of the universe, and retains the concept of heaven alongside that of 
the Tao, the Lao Tzu replaces heaven (t'ien) with Tao, and therefore, attributes the 
creation of the universe to the Tao.415 As a consequence, Lau argues that in the Lao 
Tzu, the Tao becomes not just the Way of something, but also an entity.416 
As a consequence of this, the Lao Tzu highlights the importance of human beings 
modelling their behaviour on heaven (Le. on the Tao).417 Unlike the Chuang Tzu's 
emphasis upon the presence of the Tao within the particularity of existence in the form 
of virtue (te), the emphasis in the Lao Tzu is upon the need for humanity to model itself 
upon the pattern of the universe emanating from the heavenly Tao in order to survive. 
As Ch'en points out, the naturalistic heaven labelled in the Lao Tzu as the Tao is utterly 
indifferent to the realm of the human being. Therefore, to survive the problems that 
beset us, it is wise to follow the pattern of the universe, the Tao, so that we do not 
interfere with the harmony of the universe, and so also that we come to realise our full 
. I h b' 418 potentIa as uman emgs. 
Thus, while both the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu share a microcosmic-macrocosmic 
cosmology, there is a subtle difference in emphasis between both. In the Lao Tzu, the 
415 Lao Tzu Tao Te Ching, trans!. Lau, p.xx. 
416 Ibid. 
417 Ibid. 
418Lao Tzu, transl. Ch'en, p.4S. 
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emphasis is upon the importance of the human being functioning as part of the 
macrocosm. In the words of Ch' en, the Lao Tzu: 
... views human life not as something independent and self-contained, 
but rather as an integral part of the cosmos ... [its] approach is 
macrocosmic.419 
In the Chuang Tzu, on the other hand, emphasis is placed upon the presence of the Tao 
within the human being, displayed in the text's concern for human happiness and the 
promotion of virtue (te) as the vehicle to happiness. This renders the focus of the text 
more upon the microcosm, than the macrocosm. 
This distinction is illustrated in the far more politically focused themes of the Lao 
Tzu,420 compared with the Chuang Tzu 's disinterest in politics and promotion of 
personal virtue (le). Lau argues that although the idea of virtue (le) is present in the Lao 
Tzu, it is not a particularly important concept in the text.421 
Having established the subtle difference in emphasis in the microcosmic-macrocosmic 
cosmologies of the Chuang Tzu and the Lao Tzu, they should not be emphasised to the 
detriment of the more striking similarities. Both texts regard the human being as part 
of an integrated universe, which runs according to the natural laws established by and 
through the Tao. Both recognise the innateness of those laws in the human being, 
manifest in virtue (te), the particular expression of the unitary Tao, and both 
acknowledge the importance of the human being living in harmony with the greater 
cosmos. Both understand the inadequacy of reasoned discourse to communicate the 
dynamic and spontaneous nature of reality, and both utilise particular literary devices in 
attempts to move their readers away from the primary meaning of language toward the 
intangible dynamic reality behind the words. When this is achieved, the dynamic 
spontaneity of reality finds expression not only in the universe, but also in the human 
419 . 1 Ibid., p .. 
420 LaD Tzu Tao Te Ching, transl. Lau, p.xxvii. 
421 Ibid., p.xxxiv. 
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being itself because the human being is a microcosm of that universe, and because te is 
the microcosmic manifestation of the macrocosmic Tao. This is the cosmology that is 
communicated in the texts of the Chuang Tzu and the Lao Tzu. 
In our discussion of the microcosmic-macrocosmic cosmology underlying the Chinese 
texts, a significant distinction between the microcosmic motif of these texts and the 
microcosmic theme of Nicholas Cusanus has been unearthed. In the process, the 
importance of the use of negative terminology to communicate the Tao has been 
explored in general terms. 
The aim of the next section is to go deeper into our examination of the Tao in these 
texts, and to facilitate this, we will return to the theme of negative terminology. In 
particular, four themes central to the understanding of the Tao will be examined: 'non-
being' (wu), 'non-action' (wu weij, 'emptiness' (hsu) and 'heart-mind' (hsin). 
Section Two: Negative Terminology in the Lao Tzu 
and the Cltuang Tzu 
In our earlier discussion of the Lao Tzu, the text's preference for the use of negative or 
lower terminology to depict the Tao was discussed. It was suggested that the reason for 
this lay in the presupposition underlying the text that reality was enigmatic. Thus, the 
best way to approach the Tao was through enigmatic, mysterious language, which led 
the reader away from a sense of knowledge about the Tao, and helped them towards a 
realisation of its mystery. 
Enigma necessarily implies dynamism, for the term suggests that which cannot be 
named or identified. As such, it necessarily has no form, for to have form would be to 
be capable of being named. As Doeringer points out, name (ming) "is the quest of 
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reality (shih)",422 but to attempt to describe reality and to attribute it with names is to 
give reality separate qualities. This is misguided because reality is dynamic, not 
static.423 
Doeringer suggests that the Chuang Tzu regards reality as having to be "grasped 
holistically as a dynamic process".424 Likewise, Lau suggests that the Lao Tzu depicts 
the Tao as "shadowy and indistinct".425 To promote a holistic appreciation of reality, 
which communicates its dynamic, unfathomable essence, negative terms such as 
'nameless' (wu_ming),426 'formless' (wu_hsing),427 'emptiness'I'void' (hsu) 428 are 
ascribed to the Tao in these texts. 
The aim of this section is to embark upon a deeper examination of the significance for 
our understanding of the Tao of the use of such negative terminology. This will be 
done by focusing upon two terms: 'non-being' (wu) and 'non-action' (wu_wei}.429 
Although focusing upon these terms in particular, the section will inevitably make 
reference to the other lower terms of 'nameless' (wu-ming), 'formless' (wu-hsing) and 
'emptiness' (hsu), mentioned in the previous chapter. To seek to offer a discrete 
account of each would be to miss the real essence of the literary style that renders the 
use of such terminology necessary; the subject of our study is the Tao, the dynamic 
enigma of reality that is best grasped 'holistically'. 430 It is therefore, necessary to 
consider the language used to communicate the Tao as holistically as possible. As with 
our exploration of Tillichian theology in the first part of this thesis, the interrelated 
nature of our subject requires an interrelated approach in our analysis. 
422 F .M. Doeringer, Imaging the Imageless, p.8, citing Chuang Tzu, transl. Doeringer, 1 (1.6a). 
423 Ibid. 
424 Ibid, p.9. 
425 Lao Tzu Tao Te Ching, transl. Lau, p.xvii. 
426 Lao Tzu Tao Te Ching, transl. Lau, 32 (p.317.) 
427 The Complete Works ofChuang Tzu, transl. Watson, ch.22 (p.238). 
428 Lao Tzu Tao Te Ching, transl. Lau, 16 (p.23). 
429 Wu-wei is a term that is open to a variety of interpretations. In view of the limitations of this 
thesis, wu-wei will be examined in terms of its paradoxical nature: 'the action of non-action' • 
more accurately expressed as wei-wu-wei. 
430 Ibid. 
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Non-being (Wu) 
In Chapter 1 of the Lao Tzu, we learn that the Tao is nameless (wu_ming).431 In this 
way, the Lao Tzu points to the eternal and unchanging nature of the Tao. However, the 
Tao is not unchanging in the sense of being fixed, but in the sense that its change and 
dynamism are perpetual. 432 The reality of the Tao is its perpetual dynamism, such 
dynamism rendering it formless. 
This is reiterated in the Chuang Tzu, where, according to Doeringer, reality is depicted 
in terms of the perpetual shaping and losing shape of matter.433 Hence, in the Chuang 
Tzu, we read: 
The formless moves to the realm of form; the formed moves back to 
the realm of formlessness [wu_hsing].434 
Further highlighting the enigmatic dynamism of reality, the first chapter of the Lao Tzu 
goes on to state not only that the Tao is real, but that what can be named and shaped is 
not, in fact, reality: 
The way that can be spoken of is not the constant way; 
The name that can be named is not the constant name.435 
What can be named is the product of the dynamics of the Tao. Thus, for the Lao Tzu, 
the Tao is the dynamic that underlies being (you) .436 As such, the most adequate term 
431 Lao Tzu Tao Te Ching, transl. Lau, 1.2 (p.3). 
432 Lao Tzu, transl. Ch'en, p.5. 
433 Doeringer, 'Imaging the Imageless,' p.1 O. 
434 The Complete Works ofChuang Tzu, transl. Watson, Ch.22 (p.240). 
435 Lao Tzu Tao Te Ching , transl. Lau, 1.1 (pJ). 
436 The Chuang Tzu presents a similar understanding of the Tao, e.g. "The ordered is born out 
of formlessness; pure spirit is born out of the Way. The body is born originally from this 
purity, and the ten thousand things give bodily form to one another through the process of 
birth." (The Complete Works ofChuang Tzu, transl. Watson, Ch.22 (p.238)). 
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for the Tao is non-being, as being cannot produce itself. Hence, Chapter 1 continues by 
stating: 
Non-being names the beginning of Heaven and earth; 
Being names the mother of the myriad things.437 
Important to note here is the reality that is attributed to non-being (wu) in this context. 
In contrast to the Tillichian understanding of non-being, which represents the perpetual 
threat to the being of the creature, generating the anxiety that characterises human 
life,438 in the Lao Tzu, non-being (wu) complements, rather than challenges being (you). 
Non-being (wu) is the driving force behind being (you). In this regard, the Lao Tzu's 
non-being shares a greater affinity with the Tillichian notion of dynamis, essential 
being or potential. 439 However, the parallel between the Lao Tzu IS non-being and 
Tillich's potential is limited. While Tillich insists upon the role of consciousness in 
turning the ambiguous nature of potential into creative power,440 in the Lao Tzu, there 
is no similar role played by consciousness. The Tao is spontaneously creative and has 
no need of the creative structure that Logos provides potential in the Tillichian 
441 
system. 
For Ch'en, the terms non-being (wu) and being (you) 'depict the process of the 
metaphysical Tao as it descends and actualises, producing all things ... '. 442 Thus, non-
being (wu) in the Lao Tzu is not a negation of being (you), but a statement of the 
ineffable presence of the formless within the realm of form. Non-being (wu) as the 
437 Ibid. 
438 See p.146 above. 
439 See p. 161 above. 
440 See p. 161 above. 
441 According to W.A. Callahan ("Discourse and perspective in Doasim: a Linguistic 
interpretation of ziran," in Philosophy East & West 39.2 (1989), pp.171-189, at p. 182, the term 
spontaneity (ziran), is one of the central motifs in Chinese philosophical literature, including 
the Chuang-tzu and the Lao-tzu. Spontaneity (ziran) communicates the natural reality of 
things, a reality which does not require human intervention. 
442 Lao Tzu, transl. Ch'en, p.7. 
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creative source of heaven and earth, and being (you) as the 'mother of the myriad 
creatures' together provide the unity ofreality.443 This is reiterated in the Chuang Tzu: 
He [the enlightened king] takes his stand on what cannot be fathomed 
and wanders where there is nothing at all.444 
Thus far, it becomes apparent that existence is rooted in non-being (wu)in the Lao Tzu 
and the Chuang Tzu. This would appear to contrast starkly with the Tillichian view 
that existence is rooted in being itself.445 
For Tillich, God, as being itself, is the creative source of all that has being. Non-being 
is present in existence, but only as a perpetual threat, rendering existence ambiguous. 
For Tillich, non-being is dependent upon being, and is swallowed up in the total unity 
of being that is God. How is it possible, then, to explain this apparently stark contrast 
between the understanding and function of being and non-being in TilIich and in these 
early Taoist texts? 
Cheng asserts that the Laa Tzu is one of two primary Chinese texts that deal with the 
Chinese search for cosmological becoming (the other text being Yi Jing).446 He argues 
that cosmology and ontology are intimately interrelated in Chinese philosophy in a way 
that is not evidenced in the ancient Greek quest for ontological being, the root of the 
western philosophical tradition.447 
Cheng suggests that one possible reason for this lies in a crucial difference between the 
nature of the Greek and Chinese language systems, the former being phonetic and the 
latter being image-based. In the image-based system of Chinese, abstraction is 
communicated through a sensory image.448 We learned at the beginning of this chapter 
443 Laa Tzu Taa Te Ching transl. D.C.Lau, 1.2 (pJ). 
444 The Complete works ofChuang Tzu, transl. Watson, p.94. 
445 See p. 21 above. 
446 Cheng, 'Chinese Metaphysics as Non-metaphysics,' p. t 68. 
447 Ibid., p.167. 
448 Ibid. 
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for example, that the original Chinese character for the Too comprised of two images: 
head, denoting a goal, and legs, denoting the action of walking. 449 Thus, the abstraction 
of the Tao is communicated through sensible objects and images. In contrast, argues 
Cheng, a phonetic language is comprised of symbols, i.e. letters which individually, 
have no inherent relationship to the sensory world.45o This renders such a language far 
more open to a separation between abstract concepts and sensory objects. lIe goes on 
to suggest that the abstract nature of the concept of being in a phonetic language system 
such as Greek is much more likely to be explored through other abstract notions, rather 
than through sensory images. . Thus, separation between the sensible and non-sensible 
realms is far more likely in a language system that is phonetically based. Following 
from this, he argues, Chinese metaphysics is not metaphysical in western terms because 
in the fanner there is no separation of the sensible from the non-sensible, or the 
transcendental from the physica1.451 
This is a most interesting theory for our discussion of the Too, for it helps us to begin to 
understand the apparently stark contrast between the Tillichian and Chinese notions of 
non-being as communicated through the texts of the Loo Tzu and the Chuang Tzu. It 
helps us to appreciate the necessity for the early Chinese writers to express the 
noumenal through the phenomenal. Moreover, it helps us to appreciate how that was 
possible, for the Chinese image-based system from the earliest times had the capacity 
to point to both the immediate and phenomenal and to the transcendent and noumenal 
at the same time. 
Established so far is the understanding that from the earliest times, the noumenal and 
transcendent could be communicated through the phenomenal and sensible. However, 
in our earlier discussion, it was established that both the Chuang Tzu and the Loo Tzu 
communicated the inadequacy of language. If the Chinese image-based language 
449 Duang Yu Chai, 'The Commentary of "On Meaning and Words",' cited in Leung, 'Tao and 
Logos', p.13 1. 
450 A similar observation is made by Chad Hansen, 'Language in the Heart-Mind,' R.E. 
Allinson (ed), Understanding the Chinese Mind (Hong Kong, Oxford University Press), pp.75-
123, at p.79. 
451 Cheng, 'Chinese Metaphysics as Non-Metaphysics.' p.167. 
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system has the capacity to communicate both the noumenal and phenomenal, why do 
the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu highlight the inadequacy of language to communicate 
the Tao? 
The answer to the above question relates to the nature of the Tao communicated 
through the image of the character for the Tao. As we have already learned, the 
character is represented by the two images of head, denoting goal, and legs, denoting 
the action of walking. As such, the Tao is a dynamic process in which action and goal 
are integrated. In other words, the character for the Tao conveys a process that is 
action-based, thus it conveys knowledge of a process, not of a tenet or a belief. 
In emphasising the inadequacy of language, the Chinese texts highlight the 
impossibility of knowing the Tao without living the process, or walking the Path. We 
cannot know the Tao without experiencing it. Thus, the Tao represents a process in 
life, a concept of becoming, not a concept of being. 452 For this reason, Leung suggests 
that the study of the Tao should be called 'Taology', rather than ontology, because it is 
not a study of the concept of 'being', but rather the study of a process.453 
When the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu refer to the Tao as non-being (wu), they inform 
their readers that the Tao cannot be known in the way an object that is named can be 
known, for the Tao can only be known through direct experience. Thus, when both 
texts refer to the Tao as nameless (wu-ming), formless (wu-hsing) and empty (hsu), 
readers are directed to look beyond the world of the immediate and the physical for 
their experience of the Tao. They are directed to consider the process that lies behind 
being (you), a process which therefore, cannot be called being (you), but can only be 
that which complements being (you): non-being (wu). 
Returning to Tillich's notion of non-being, we see that his concern is with ontology, i.e. 
with the knowledge of being. Non-being is fitted into the broader ontological 
framework of his theology. As God is the ground of being for existence, Tillich's 
452 Ibid., p.131. 
453 Ibid., p.l32. 
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concern in his theology is to explain the way in which God, the creative source of 
existence, interacts with the existential world through the human being, that bearer of 
spirit who becomes the bearer of Spirit through the symbol Jesus as the Christ. For 
TiIlich, his ontology demands mediation between Being itself and existence because of 
the perpetual threat of non-being, the rational negation of Being. 
At this point, we need to consider more closely why the Chinese texts' presentation of 
the Tao is not ontological in nature. Why does Tillich classify non-being within an 
ontological framework, and why do the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu to go one step 
further and place non-being (wu) and being (you) on a far more equal footing, having as 
their principle focus the unity of non-being (wu) and being (you)? 
Cheng argues that the study of the Tao is not exclusively ontological because the Tao is 
always simultaneously cosmological and ontological. As established earlier, the Tao is 
not a tenet, but a process that is both macrocosmic and microcosmic, noumenal and 
phenomenal, unitary and particular. In other words, the process that happens at the 
universal level happens in exactly the same way at the particular level. Thus, for 
Cheng, the Tao is best described in cosmo-ontological or onto-cosmological terms.454 
Tu Wei-Ming's observation that the early Chinese world is shaped by the motifs of 
'continuity, wholeness and dynamism' is an observation about the holistic and 
integrated perspective of those early Chinese thinkers;455 so too, is Cheng's observation 
about the cosmo-ontological nature of the Tao. Such a perspective is microcosmic-
macrocosmic in nature. 
Holism may well be promoted through the capacity of the image-based language 
system of Chinese to integrate the sensible with the non-sensible and the noumenal 
with the phenomenal. Is the language system the root cause of this holistic perspective 
or does the holistic perspective provide the environment for the development of such a 
454 Cheng, 'Chinese Metaphysics as Non-metaphysics,' p.174. 
455 Doeringer, Imaging the Imageless, citing Tu Wei-Ming Confucian Thought: Seljhood: a 
Creative Transformation, Albany State University Press of New York, p.38. 
222 
language system? Or perhaps holism is the manifestation of the dialogue between 
Chinese consciousness and the image-based language system? These are questions 
which lie beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, although further discussion of 
the role of the image-based language system in the Chinese understanding and 
communication of the Tao also lies beyond the scope of this thesis, it is perhaps 
important simply to be aware ofCheng's very interesting observations about the image-
based nature of the Chinese language system as we consider the differences between 
Tillichian ontology and the cosmo-ontology of the Tao. To be aware that Tillich's 
thinking and language are rooted in the Greek philosophical tradition and that the early 
Taoist philosophers' understanding of the Tao is expressed through a very different 
system may help us later to move toward a far more realistic comparative consideration 
of Tillichian ontology and the early Chinese cosmo-ontological understanding of the 
Tao. 
At this point in our discussion, it is perhaps adequate to suggest that the reason for 
Tillich's placing of non-being within the framework of his ontology is that his 
conscious focus is purely ontological. Non-being as the antithesis of being in a rational 
and in an ontological sense has to be regarded as a threat, for non-being in his system 
means the negation of being. Tillich's theology is dualistic in nature. In contrast, the 
Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu do not use non-being as the antithesis of being, but as the 
complement to being. This is possible because their frame of reference is cosmo-
ontological and unitary. 
The unitary nature of the Tao is central to both the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu, and 
finds particularly powerful expression in the notion of non-action (wu-wei). It is 
necessary to consider this notion in depth at this point, to help us understand the 
essential difference between the dualistic approach adopted by Tillich in his theology 
and the unitary approach of these early Chinese writers. 
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Non-action (Wu-wel1 
Loy suggests that non-action (wu-wei) is a central concept in the Taoist tradition, 
second only to the concept of the Tao.456 According to Loy, the term occurs repeatedly 
in both the LaD Tzu and the Chuang TZU,457 and can be defined in a variety of ways. Its 
simplest definition is 'doing nothing' ,458 which, in Loy's view, is an interpretation more 
appropriate for the LaD Tzu than the Chuang Tzu. For example, the LaD Tzu states: 
Hence the sage, because he does nothing, never ruins anything; and 
because he does not keep his hold, loses nothing.459 
Here is highlighted the importance of allowing the myriad things to run their natural 
course, for therein resides the process that is the Tao. Ch'en uses this quotation as an 
example of the way in which the LaD Tzu promotes a policy of non-interference for 
those in government. The natural development of the people is incompatible with 
1· c 460 governmenta mterlerence. 
To understand this position, it is important to recall the onto-cosmological perspective 
of the LaD Tzu with regard to the Tao. The process of the macrocosm is reiterated in 
the microcosm; hence, a leader who harmonises with the macrocosm will recognise that 
there is no need to interfere in the lives of the individuals he governs, for the process is 
present in each and every one of them. In fact, interference can lead to a distortion of 
the process, which in turn, will lead to unrest and disharmony. Thus, the LaD Tzu 
asserts: 
Hence the myriad creatures all revere the way and honour virtue. The 
456 Loy, 'Wei-wu-wei: NonduaI Action' p.73. 
457 Ibid, pp.75,77. 
458 Ibid, p.74. 
459 LaD Tzu Tao Te Ching, transl. Lau, 64 (p.235). 
460 LaD Tzu, transl. Ch' en, p.19. 
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Way in being revered, and virtue in being honoured are constantly so 
of themselves without anyone bestowing nobility on them.461 
Ch'en suggests that rather than being understood as doing nothing, 'non-action' (wu-
wei) should be understood as acting in accord with nature.462 Hence, non-action (wu-
wei) is the action of non-action (wei-wu-wei).463 
Another interpretation of 'non-action' (wu-wei) is 'yielding, not forceful action' .464 
For Loy, this is the action of passivity, and is illustrated with great humour in the 
Chuang Tzu, when it is observed that a drunk man who is not killed when falling out of 
his carriage owes his good fortune to the fact that he puts up no resistance to the fall. In 
the same way, good fortune comes to he who has no resistance to the way ofheaven.465 
Loy suggests that the Lao Tzu uses water as a metaphor for the yielding action of non-
action (wei-wu-wei) in this respect.466 For example, the Lao Tzu states: 
Highest good is like water. Because water excels in benefiting the 
myriad creatures without contending with them and settles where none 
would like to be, it comes close to the way.467 
Thus, 'non-action'(wu-wei) is interpreted in a variety of ways in the texts of the Lao 
Tzu and the Chuang Tzu. How then, are we to make sense of the term? How are we to 
understand how the natural process of the Tao is made manifest in the workings of life 
without apparently the requirement for human effort? 
461 Lao Tzu Tao Te Ching, transl. Lau, 51 (p.209). 
462 Lao Tzu, transl. Ch'en, pp.23-24. 
463 Loy, 'Wei-wu wei: Nondual Action', p.73. 
464 Ibid, p. 75. 
465 Ibid, p.75, citing Waley, The Way and its Power, (London, Alien and Un win, 1968). 
466 Ibid. 
467 Lao Tzu Tao Te Ching, transl. Lau, 8.20 (p.11). 
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Loy observes that 'the action of non-action' (wei-wu-wei) is a genuine paradox,468 for it 
unites the two opposing concepts of action (wei) and non-action (wu-wei). As a 
paradox, it cannot be resolved rationally. 
With regard to the paradoxes present in the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu, we have 
learnt that they serve to point the reader away from a desire to understand the Tao 
conceptually, and toward the need to experience it. Is it possible therefore, that the 
paradox presented in the notion of 'the action of non-action' (wei-wu-wei) also needs to 
be resolved through experience? 
Loy suggests that any interpretation of the action of non-action (wei-wu-wei) which 
does not include the concept of non-dual action is inadequate. He explains non-dual 
action as one in which: 
.... there is no bifurcation between subject and object: no awareness of 
an agent that is believed to do the action as being distinct from an 
action that is done.469 
In this way, Loy suggests that the resolution of the paradox does, indeed, lie in the 
realm of experience. Although not the words used by Loy, it is perhaps possible to 
suggest that it is an experience in which self-consciousness must be abandoned for a 
return to Tao-consciousness. In Loy's words: 
If consciousness of self is the ultimate source of unnatural action, then 
natural action must be that in which there is no such self-consciousness 
- in which there is no awareness of the agent as being distinct from 'his' 
t 470 ac. 
468 Loy, Wei-wu-wei: Nondual Action', p.76. 
469 Ibid., p.73. 
470 Ibid., p.76. 
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In other words, the action of non-action (wei-wu-wei) involves the presence of that 
which does not change in the action.471 An action that is centred in stillness (non-
action) would therefore, be illustrative ofwei-wu-wei. 
Loy argues that an intentional action is one in which duality is present. An action as the 
effect of a thought would be a dual action, for there is a clear distinction between the 
agent and the action.472 For example, if I pick up a pen with the intention of writing, 
then my action is dual; I first have the intention to write and as a consequence, I pick up 
the pen. Thus, causal thinking can be said to be dualistic, for there is a clear sense of a 
sequence in such thinking, the sequence being that of cause and effect. 
In contrast, non-dual action is that in which there is no sequence and therefore, no 
cause and effect. Consequently, non-dual action requires the absence of intention. 
Thus, if I pick up the pen and begin to write without any intent to do so, then my action 
is non-dual. It is empty in that it is devoid of intent; it is spontaneous. 
The Lao Tzu asserts that the original state of the myriad things was one of emptiness 
(hsu) and advocates that we should return to such a state.473 
Thus, it would appear that the action of non-action (wei-wu-wei) requires a return to the 
original state of emptiness. Before proceeding further with our discussion of the action 
of non-action (wei-wu-wei) therefore, it is necessary to consider in a little more detail 
the concept of emptiness (hsu).474 
471 Ibid., p.77. 
472 Ibid, p.79. 
473 Lao Tzu Tao Te Ching, transl. Lau,16.37 (p.23). 
474 Discussed here will be the concept of emptiness denoted by the Chinese term hsu, which is 
the corollary of shih (fullness), rather than k'ung, the term for emptiness highlighted in 
Buddhism (Cheng, Francois, Empty and Full, p.43). 
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Emptiness (Hsu) 
Cheng asserts that Taoist emptiness (hsu) is fundamental to the Taoist understanding of 
being (you) and is closely akin to the notion of non-being (wu). He suggests that the 
best way to distinguish the two is by reference to their corollaries; hence, the corollary 
of emptiness (hsu) is fullness (shih), while the corollary of non-being (wu), as we have 
already seen, is being (you).475 Emptiness (hsu) is ontological in nature,476 while non-
being (wu), as previously demonstrated, is cosmo-ontologica1.477 For this reason, in the 
Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu, non-being (wu) is used for cosmo-ontological concerns 
such as the origin of the universe, while emptiness (hsu) is used with regard to the 
original state toward which all in existence should move.478 For example, the Lao Tzu 
states: 
The myriad creatures in the world are born from 
Something, and Something from Nothing [wu].479 
In contrast, in an earlier chapter, it is stated: 
I do my best to attain emptiness [hsu]; 
I hold firmly to stillness. 
The myriad creatures all rise together 
And I watch their return.480 
Through these quotations, it is apparent that emptiness (hsu) is closely connected to the 
Tao.481 We have already established that the Tao is both ontological and cosmological 
in nature, that it is simultaneously noumenal and phenomenal. From our discussion 
475 Cheng, Francois, Empty and Full, p.43. 
476 Ibid. 
477 See pp. 217-221 above. 
478 Cheng, Francois, Empty and Full, p.43. 
479 Lao Tzu Tao Te Ching, transl. Lau, 40.89 (p.61). 
480 Ibid, 16.37 (p.23). 
481 Cheng, Francois, Empty and Full, p.44. 
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above, it would seem that non-being (wu) pertains to the noumenal nature of the Tao, 
and emptiness (hsu) to its phenomenal nature.482 
However, in view of our recent exploration into non-dualistic and dualistic language, it 
is necessary to remain alert to the danger of making such a clear distinction between the 
two terms. In drawing the distinction, we are possibly making clear our own dualistic 
position more than clarifying the subtle nature of the Tao. Nevertheless, this is perhaps 
a limitation that has to be accepted in an academic study of the Tao communicated 
through the medium of English. Let us be reminded of the facility open to the Chinese 
language system that, for Cheng, is absent from a phonetic language system such as 
English, namely, the far greater capacity to integrate the noumenal with the 
phenomenal without losing the essence of either.483 
It is therefore, perhaps wise to accept that only in conceptual terms can a distinction be 
made between emptiness (hsu) and non-being (wu), and that in experiential terms, all 
distinctions dissolve. This then, is to accept the teaching of the Lao Tzu and the 
Chuang Tzu, both of which promote the ineffability of the Tao and the impossibility of 
knowing the T ao through language and conceptual thought. 
That limitation having been accepted, let us proceed to seek to understand a little better 
the meaning of the term emptiness (hsu). 
In his translation of a passage in Ch.VI of the Chuang Tzu, Fung links the notion of 
emptiness (hsu) with that of spontaneity (ziran): 
The appearance of the true man of old was like something that is lofty, 
but with no danger of a downfall, something that seems to be 
insufficient but has no need of addition..... His emptiness was 
manifest, yet there was no display .... He responded spontaneously. as 
if there were no choice ... Thus he acts spontaneously. yet people 
482 Ibid. 
483 Cheng, 'Chinese Metaphysics as Non-metaphysics,' p.167. 
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think it was with special effort ... Neither nature nor man should 
overthrow the other. This is the true man.484 
Fung cites the interpretation of this text made by Kuo Hsiang.485 According to Fung, 
Kuo Hsiang states: 
The true man unifies nature and man and equalises all things. To him, 
there is no mutual opposition in all things. There is no mutual 
conquest of nature and man. Therefore, he is empty and is everything. 
He is unconscious and is everywhere. He thus mysteriously unifies his 
own self with its other.486 
Here then, the true man is one who ~alls into unitary awareness of all things. That is to 
say, all dualistic awareness has disappeared so that all things no longer appear in their 
distinction, but rather in their equality. This renders the true man empty; empty of 
consciousness and of intent. To remind ourselves of the words of Loy, the true man in 
the Chuang Tzu is one in whom 'there is no bifurcation between subject and object: no 
awareness of an agent that is believed to do the action as being distinct from an action 
that is done. ,487 
Thus, in the Chuang Tzu, the true man is one who acts through non-action (wei-wu-
we;). This he is able to do because by transcending consciousness of self, he has 
becomes empty. Consciousness of self means consciousness of that which is not self, 
and so is a dualistic state of awareness. The true man then, is one who has transcended 
dualistic awareness to unitary awareness, the consciousness of the unitary nature of all 
484 Chuang Tzu: A New Selected Translation, transl. Fung, pp.93,94. Although in Watson's 
translation (Watson, Chuang Tzu, p.80), there is no explicit connection between emptiness 
(hsu) and spontaneity (ziran), the general tone of his translation accords with the commentary 
below by Kuo Hsiang, to which Fung makes reference. 
485 A 3rd Century A.D. commentator on the Chuang Tzu, who wrote the Commentary on the 
Chuang Tzu. In Fung's view, this is one of the greatest philosophical works of this period. 
(Fung, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, p.220.) 
486 Chuang Tzu: A New Selected Translation, transl. Fung, p.94. 
487 Loy, 'Wei-wu-wei: Nondual Action', p.73. 
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that is. As such, holistic consciousness permits the true man to live in the unity of 
emptiness (hsu) and non-being (wu). The man who has attained such awareness has 
united with the Tao in its macrocosmic nature so that the microcosm of the man can 
then be said to become "empty and everything".488 All tension between opposites and 
all distinction between nature and man have been overcome in such awareness, 
enabling the true man to live spontaneously, without intent and without effort. 
Moreover, this is not so much a state as a dynamic awareness, for we have already 
learned that the Tao is a dynamic process rather than an entity. To harmonise with the 
Tao therefore, means to fall in line with the flow of the Tao. This harmonisation 
effectively is the integration of the phenomenal with the noumenal, achieved through 
the relinquishing of dualistic awareness and entry into holistic, unitary consciousness. 
The human capacity for such integration is not only ignored in Tillichian theology, but 
effectively denied. Tillich's insistence upon the realm of the holy as the medium 
through which the noumenal finds expression in the phenomenal is a blatant 
contradiction of the human capacity for the type of unitary consciousness proferred in 
the texts of the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu. From the perspective of the Chinese texts 
under examination, Tillichian theology remains firmly situated within the confines of 
dualistic consciousness. Tillich's holiness remains within the bounds imposed by the 
categories of time, space, causality and substance, while the Chinese texts' holism 
breaks through those bounds. 
As mentioned earlier, the true man, according to the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu, 
lives in the flow of the Tao. This point is significant because it highlights the active 
nature, rather than a mystical state of the true man. The true man is not removed from 
the action of life. On the contrary, by virtue of the presence of the Tao as dynamic 
process in life, the true man lives totally within the flow of life. What differentiates 
him from the normal man is the former's effortlessness in his actions and the efficacy 
of his spontaneous actions. His spontaneity is effective because his action is fully 
synchronised with the action of the Tao. He acts at absolutely the right time and in the 
488 Chuang Tzu: A New Selected Translation, transl. Fung, pp.93,94. 
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right way because he instinctively knows when and how to act through his emptiness 
(hsu) and simultaneous harmony with the Tao. He acts without pre-meditation. 
Mair describes the true man depicted in the Chuang Tzu in the following way: 
The man who reacts with pure spontaneity can do so only at one 
moment and in one way; by attending to the situation until it moves 
him, he discovers the move which is 'inevitable' (pu te yi - the one in 
which he 'has no alternative') like a physical reflex. But he hits on it 
only ifhe perceives with perfect clarity, as though in a mirror.489 
Spontaneity (ziran) is itself a dynamic state that should not be understood as a 
passively mindless action. Rather, it is a dynamic mindlessness, in which the true man 
is able to respond instinctively to any situation through total awareness. The 
mindlessness of spontaneity (ziran) is the effect of expansion of the mind beyond the 
awareness of distinction. 
The Chuang Tzu cites as an example of such awareness the story of a master cook, who 
was so skilled at his trade that he had used the same knife for nineteen years. The cook 
explained that the knife had lasted so long because he had mastered the art of meat 
cutting so well that he no longer hacked the meat as an average cook would do; neither 
did he cut the meat as a good cook would do; instead, he was able to divide up the flesh 
of an animal by going beyond the functions of his senses and working through his 
mind. The cook stated: 
When I first began cutting up oxen, all I could see was the ox itself. 
After three years, I no longer saw the whole ox. And now - now I go at 
it by spirit and do not look with my eyes. Perception and 
understanding have come to a stop and spirit moves where it wants. I 
489 A.C. Graham, 'Taoist Spontaneity and the Dichotomy of "is" and "ought",' in Experimental 
Essays on Chuang Tzu, Asian Studies at Hawaii No. 29, ed. V.H. Mair, (Hawaii, University of 
Hawaii Press, 1983), pp. 1-11, at p. 9. 
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go along with the natural makeup, strike in the big hollows, guide the 
knife through the big openings, and follow things as they are.490 
Here, we have an excellent illustration of the way in which a craftsman's merging with 
emptiness (hsu) allows him to perform his craft with a degree of perfection impossible 
to attain through normal awareness. By being empty, the craftsman simply follows the 
flow of emptiness (hsu) through the bullock he is dissecting. Rather than attempting to 
cut through mass and bone, he seeks out the empty parts of the body - the cavities, and 
the spaces between muscles and sinews, etc. Hence, he takes the line of least 
resistance to achieve his task. 
This particular anecdote gives a very clear insight into the meaning of the action of 
non-action (wei-wu-wei); the action of non-action is the ability to harmonise with the 
Tao that flows through the object of a particular task. By opening his mind to the Tao 
of the universe and entering into a unitary awareness, the cook was able not only to 
harmonise his bodily movements perfectly with the movements of the knife, but also to 
harmonise with the Tao of the bullock. This illustrates the appropriateness of the use 
by Cheng of the terms noumenal and phenomenal with reference to the Tao. In his 
meditative state, the cook is able to execute his skill with a degree of perfection that 
transcends normal human capacity. While Tillich highlights the importance of the 
realm of the holy as the means by which the human being can transcend himself and 
experience the noumenal presence of the divine, transcendence is possible, according to 
the Chuang Tzu, by an unmediated direct experience of the dynamic presence of the 
noumenal Tao in the phenomenal world. 
How, then, is it possible to transcend dualistic awareness and achieve unitary 
consciousness? For the Chuang Tzu, it is achieved through the emptying of one's 
'heart mind' (hsin) and entry into the dynamic state of 'sagely forgetfulness' .491 
490 The Complete Works ofChuang Tzu, transl.Watson, Ch.3 (pp.SO-Sl). 
491 Ibid., Ch.19 (p.207). 
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Heart-mind (Hsin) 
Oshima suggests that the Chinese term hsin used in the Chuang Tzu is, to a large 
degree, untranslatable into English. 492 He explains that the pictogram for hsin is a 
heart, reflecting its original meaning. However, as hsin in Chinese communicates the 
idea of thought, it is often translated as 'mind'. Oshima points out however, that hsin 
communicates much more than is communicated in the English term 'mind' ,493 a view 
supported by Hansen.494 For this reason, hsin tends to be translated as 'heart-mind' .495 
According to Oshima, 'heart-mind' is used in the Chuang Tzu both literally, to mean 
the physical heart, and metaphorically, to denote the vehicle through which the Tao 
flows. 496 Therefore, in accord also with Cheng's claims about the capacity for the 
Chinese language to accommodate both sensible and non-sensible themes, hsin 
operates both as the physical organ of the human body and as the connection between 
the microcosm of the man and the macrocosm of the universe.497 
In the Chuang Tzu, heart-mind (hsin) is the crucial organ in the quest for perfection, 
and what differentiates a sage from an ordinary man is the condition of this organ.498 
. 
The heart-mind (hsin) of the sage is clear and free-flowing, unlike that of the ordinary 
man, whose heart-mind (hsin) will be clogged and blocked. The Chuang Tzu 
emphasises the importance of keeping the heart-mind (hsin) clear. It suggests that 
heaven opens up the passages in a man's body, and goes on: 
But man on the contrary blocks up the holes. The cavity of the body is 
a many storeyed vault; the hsin has its heavenly wanderings. But if its 
492 Oshima, 'A Metaphysical Analysis of the Concept of Mind in the Chuang Tzu,' 
Experimental Essays on Chuang Tzu, ed. Mair (Hawaii, University of Hawaii Press, 1983), 
£.63. 
93 Ibid., p.65. 
494 Hansen Chad, 'Language of the Heart-Mind', Understanding the Chinese Mind, p. 95. 
495 Oshima, 'A Metaphysical Analysis of the Concept of Mind', p.65. 
496 Ibid, p.69. 
497 Ibid. 
498 Ibid., p.64. 
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chambers are not empty, then wife and mother-in-law will fall into 
11' 499 quarre mg. 
The Chuang Tzu advocates the importance therefore, of emptying one's hsin in order to 
keep it clear of blockages that would impede the flow of the Tao. SOD Thus, the Chuang 
Tzu states: 
It is the nature of water that if it is not mixed with other things, it will 
be clear, and if nothing stirs it, it will be level. But if it is dammed and 
hemmed in and not allowed to flow, then, too, it cannot be c1ear.sol 
Here, the Chuang Tzu illustrates the close connection between clarity of heart-mind 
(hsin), emptiness (hsu) and the flow of the Tao. Indeed. as the Tao is emptiness (hsu), 
we can say that it is the dynamic nature of emptiness (hsu) that clears the heart-mind 
(hsin). Thus, the emptying of the heart-mind (hsin) is a dynamic process of letting go 
of that which contaminates the Tao. The quotation above illustrates that contamination 
is the result of a blocked and opaque heart-mind (hsin). Oshima points out that the 
blockages are caused by the distractions of the sensory world, such as likes and 
dislikes, sounds, colours, smells, etc.502 
The sage is the man who has let go of his attachment to the sensory world, and is able 
to live his life "going after nothing, welcoming nothing, responding but not 
storing ... ,,503 By so doing, the void of the heart-mind (hsin) accommodates the Tao, 
for the "Tao gathers in emptiness alone ... ,,504 This process of letting-go is expressed in 
the Chuang Tzu as the process of 'sagely forgetfulness', described in detail in Chapter 6 
of the text. 505 This process requires the letting-go of attachment to knowledge as well 
as to the senses, for knowledge, as with sensory awareness, is based upon the capacity 
499 Ibid., citing Chuang-tzu, transl.Watson, ppJOO-30 1. 
500 Ibid., p.70. 
501 Ibid., p. 71, citing Chuang-tzu, transl. Watson, p.169. 
502 Ibid., p.71. 
503 Ibid., p.74, citing Chuang-tzu, transl. Watson, p.97. 
504 Ibid., citing Chuang-fzu, transl. Watson, p.58. 
sos Ibid., p.69. 
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for discrimination. In the Chuang Tzu, discrimination destroys the flow of the Tao. 506 
When all discrimination has been eliminated, there is pure experience; that is, 
experience as we feel it, not as we reflect upon it. 507 
Thus, for the Chinese texts, the life of the true man - the sage - is one of cultivated 
naturalness, of sagely forgetfulness, which is not the same as the naturalness of a child, 
for example.508 The difference is that the latter lives naturally with attachment to the 
sensory world. Through that attachment, the child gradually learns to discriminate and 
to move away from naturalness toward a more dualistic awareness of life. Thus, the 
young child is far closer to what the Chuang Tzu terms original ignorance than to 
sagely forgetfulness. In contrast, the sage has made a return to naturalness, and as 
such, has the wisdom accumulated through the process of letting-go that the child lacks. 
Thus, the Chuang Tzu asserts that pure experience and freedom " ... are not the gift from 
the hand of nature", but are the fruits of the process of letting_go.509 In the words of 
Fung, human beings have two harmonies: the harmony of the innocence of childhood, 
and the harmony of pure experience resulting from the "labour and culture of the 
. 't" 510 spm . 
There is a paradox here however, for although we observe the distinction between 
original innocence and sagely forgetfulness, once sagely forgetfulness has been 
attained, there is no distinction between it and original innocence. The paradox, of 
course, presents itself as the consequence of our dualistic, analytical discussion of the 
subject. Thus, we must be aware that the subtleties of the distinction between original 
innocence and sagely forgetfulness exist only in a dualistic mind. For the sage who has 
forgotten all distinctions, his freedom is exactly the same as that of a child. This 
paradox therefore, serves an important function; to shock the dualistic thinker into 
recognising the limitation of such a frame of mind and of language with regard to 
understanding of the Tao. 
506 Chuang Tzu: A New Selected Translation, Fung, p.lS. 
507 Ibid., p.14. 
508 Ibid., p.20. 
509 Ibid., p.20. 
510 Ibid. 
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Returning to the story of the master cook, we can see that his skill was the physical 
manifestation of a quality of heart-mind (hsin) that differed fundamentally from that of 
a good or an average cook. While the latter two cooks still operated within a dualistic 
frame of reference, the master cook had transcended such a framework to operate at a 
level where there was no distinction between he as the cutter of the meat, and the action 
of cutting. In other words, he was working intuitively, at the level of unitary 
awareness. This he was able to achieve by having let go of his attachment to 
knowledge and discrimination, which permitted the merging of his heart-mind (hsin) 
with the emptiness (hsu) of the Tao; that is, with the unitary nature of the Tao, labelled 
both emptiness (hsu) and non-being (wu). His identification with emptiness (hsu) 
however, did not mean a mystical withdrawal from the world, but a dynamic expansion 
of awareness in which the cook practised his skill through spontaneity and intuitive 
wisdom. 
Ifwe return to the notion of the action of non-action (wei-wu-wei), we can begin to see 
how the paradox of the action of non-action (wei-wu-wei) is resolved by the 
experiential realisation of the unitary nature of reality. As a concept to be reflected 
upon, the action of non-action (wei-wu-wei) is paradoxical. The paradox points beyond 
the limits of knowledge and language - expressions of dualistic awareness - towards 
pure experience, an awareness of the dynamic unitary nature of reality. Unitary 
awareness is communicated in the Chuang Tzu and the Lao Tzu through the term 
'emptiness' (hsu), which, from a dualistic perspective, is the ontological expression of 
the Tao. When one no longer perceives reality to be dualistic, then all things, including 
emptiness (hsu) and non-being (wu), are equal. Thus, the sage who has transcended 
dualistic awareness connects through the emptiness (hsu) ofthe Too with the non-being 
(wu) of the Tao, and lives in a dynamic state of spontaneity (ziran) , in which the 
microcosm of his particular existence is so fully harmonised with the macrocosm of the 
universe that the flow of the Tao of the universe is expressed through his spontaneous 
actions. 
Our discussion of the action of non-action (wei-wu-wei) highlights the stark contrast 
between the use of paradox in the Chinese texts under examination, and its use in 
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Tillichian theology. Discussion of the action of non-action (wei-wu-wei) has revealed 
that paradox is resolved through the human spiritual cultivation that takes place firmly 
within the realm of the phenomenal. The sage has cleared the blockages of his heart-
mind (hsin) in both its physical and spiritual senses, leading to a dynamic state of 
conscious awareness that exceeds the limitations of dualistic consciousness. Thus, the 
sage lives in spontaneous accord with the dynamic flow of the Tao. 
In stark contrast, Tillich uses paradox as the point of human impasse in our search for 
the divine. It represents the point at which the divine reaches out to the human being as 
the human being reaches out for the divine. Paradox signals the point at which the 
symbol mediates the unbridgeable gulf between finite and divine life. In similar vein to 
symbol, the realm of the holy mediates between noumenon and phenomenon. Thus, in 
the Tillichian system, the spontaneous harmonisation with the dynamic flow of reality 
enjoyed by the Taoist sage in unattainable because Tillich insists upon the mediating 
third party of the symbol and of the holy object. This he does because, unlike the 
Taoist sage, his theology is a reflection upon the nature of reality, and as such, is 
intellectual and dualistic in approach. The systematic rigour of his theology requires 
him to stay within the limitations of conceptual awareness, of which paradox represents 
the perimeter fence. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an in-depth discussion of the notion of the Tao as 
communicated through the early Taoist texts of the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu. It has 
demonstrated that present in those texts is a powerful microcosmic-macrocosmic 
perception of the Tao, which is the means by which its simultaneous ineffability and 
presence is expressed. In the words of Francois Cheng, the Tao is both noumenal and 
1511 phenomena. 
We have learned that virtue (te) is the term used for the Tao as it is present in the 
human being. Virtue (te) is one's innate nature, which accords with the Tao. To live 
through te is to live in peace and happiness. Movement away from virtue (le) leads to 
pain and suffering, for it means a shift away from one's natural affinities and abilities, 
and therefore, movement against the Tao. 
Thus, for both the Chuang Tzu and the Lao Tzu, to live according to one's le means to 
live a natural life, in which spontaneity is more highly valued than knowledge. 
However, a natural life does not mean a primitive existence. We have learned of the 
distinction between simple and primitive living; the true man lives a simple, natural life 
of sagely forgetfulness, in contrast to the naturalness of a child, who lives in a state of 
innocence, a more primitive form of existence than that of the sage. The sage's return 
to naturalness is the product of the wisdom accumulated through the process of letting-
go, which is lacking in the child. 
There is a paradox here however, for although we observe the distinction between 
original innocence and sagely forgetfulness, once sagely forgetfulness has been 
attained, there is no distinction between it and original innocence. This paradox 
presents itself as the consequence of our dualistic, analytical discussion of the subject. 
Thus, we must be aware that the subtleties of the distinction between original 
innocence and sagely forgetfulness exist only in a dualistic mind. For the sage who has 
511 Cheng, Francois, Empty and Full, p.44. 
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forgotten all distinctions, his freedom is exactly the same as that of a child. This 
paradox therefore, serves an important function; to shock the dualistic thinker into 
recognising the limitation of such a frame of mind and of language with regard to 
understanding of the Tao. 
This use of paradox has been demonstrated to contrast starkly with Tillich's use of the 
device. If the Chinese texts use paradox to shock the reader into an altered state of 
consciousness, Tillich uses it to confirm the inevitability of human limitation. This 
limitation is highlighted by the function of symbols to mediate between the Creator and 
the creature, and the function of holy objects to mediate between the noumenal and the 
phenomenal. By using it in this way, Tillich acknowledges conceptual thought as the 
supreme mode of human consciousness, a status which conceptualisation does not have 
in the Chinese texts under examination. 
We have learned in this chapter that the capacity for paradox to highlight the 
limitations of reason and language explains its presence in both the Lao Tzu and the 
Chuang Tzu. Their use of it is deliberate, for the centrality of the Tao in both texts 
renders it necessary for a means to be found of leading the reader out of a dualistic state 
of awareness. In the Chuang Tzu, this is achieved by use of various literary devices, 
including non-sequiturs, humour and paradox; in the Lao Tzu, paradox and negative or 
lower terminology to denote the Tao are used. 
Although different techniques are used, the effect is the same - the affirmation that the 
Tao resides not in the light of knowledge and reason, but in the darkness of enigma and 
mystery, which becomes light only when the striving for knowledge and understanding 
has been relinquished. 
Any apparent similarities between the use of paradox and negative terminology in the 
Chinese texts and in the philosophy of Nicholas Cusanus end here, for Cusanus, as an 
important foundation for Tillichian thinking, retains the need for the mediation of the 
figure of Christ to provide the light that reason alone cannot provide. Thus, Cusanus's 
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De Docta Ignorantia upholds the qualitative distinction between God and humanity, a 
distinction that has no place in the Chinese texts under consideration. 
In these Chinese texts, reason is portrayed as an expression of a consciousness that 
cannot approach the wisdom of the Tao. The intuitive wisdom of the sage in his state of 
forgetfulness should not be construed as knowledge. We have learned in this chapter 
that the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu both maintain that knowledge clutters and blocks 
the heart-mind (hsin), which should be clear to allow the free-flow of the Tao. Rather, 
wisdom in this sense is better understood as instinct Of intuition. 
In light of this, we can argue that the spontaneity (ziran) that is possible for the sage 
represents, from our inevitably dualistic perspective, a fonn of conscious awareness 
that might appear to be the same as that evident in a child, but in fact, is a mature 
awareness that has evolved beyond dualistic awareness. It is ~nitary awareness, a state 
that permeates not just the mind of the sage, but his body as well as his actions. Thus, 
unitary awareness is an integrative consciousness, in which the sage is able to 
harmonise his entire being with the dynamic flow of the Tao to such an extent that his 
actions are spontaneous and effortless. This, we have learned, is expressed in both the 
Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu as acting through non-action (wei-wu-wei), a way of 
acting which expresses the unmediated presence of the noumenal in the phenomenal, 
and the phenomenal in the noumenal. Unitary awareness is a fonn of consciousness in 
which the sage has freedom - freedom in tenns of effortlessness; freedom in terms of 
harmony between his being and doing; and freedom from the pain and suffering that 
results from attachment to one's senses. The sage is free because he is empty; that is, 
he is empty of intent and devoid of self-consciousness, for he has merged with the 
dynamic flow of life that is termed the Tao. 
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Chapter 6 
Ontological Implications of the Tao, as presented 
in the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu 
Having explored in depth the principal themes contained in the concept of the Tao as 
communicated through the texts of the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu, it is time now to 
reflect upon what has been learned. The purpose in exploring the concept of the Tao in 
Chapter Five was to expose the ontology present in the two Chinese texts under 
consideration. The present chapter sets out to highlight the ontological themes in this 
respect. and to consider the extent to which the theme of estrangement is present in the 
texts' treatment of the Tao. This will then prepare us to address, in Chapter Seven, the 
broader purpose of exploring the Tao, namely, to ascertain the extent to which Tillich's 
claim that estrangement is ontological in nature holds true for the philosophy of a 
tradition not steeped in Christian presuppositions. 
The present chapter examines the ontological perspective emerging from the Chinese 
texts, with particular attention being paid to the theme of return and the 
interrelationship between ontology, and the cosmology that this theme proffers. It will 
then consider the extent to which there is present in the ontology of these texts the 
theme of estrangement. 
Section One: Cosmo-ontology and Unitary Awareness 
In our exploration of the Tao in Chapter Five, we learned of the 
microcosmic/macrocosmic understanding of the relationship between the human being 
and the universe. We learned that the noumenal Tao is present in the phenomenal 
world as virtue (fe). The Tao was established as the term used to denote the ineffable 
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dynamic upon which the world of phenomena is based. Virtue (le) is the term used to 
denote the essential nature of each and every thing in the phenomenal world. As virtue 
(te) is the phenomenal expression of the Tao, and as the Tao is the term used to denote 
the dynamic reality that underlies phenomenal existence, the chapter established that 
virtue (te) denotes the dynamic reality that is the essence of everything in the world of 
sense and knowledge. 
We also learned that the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu direct their readers away from 
phenomenal and discriminatory awareness towards unitary awareness. This they do by 
employing literary devices that highlight the inadequacy of language to communicate 
the Tao. In these texts, the letting-go of discriminatory awareness, reason and 
knowledge is the key to discovering the Tao, for by letting go of them, the heart-mind 
(hsin) is cleared of the blockages that impede the flow of the Tao. By letting go, one is 
able to merge with emptiness (hsu); that is, to free oneself from all intent and self-
consciousness, and to reside in pure experience, which is to understand with one's 
whole being the equality of all things. 
Thus, in these early Taoist texts is a powerful awareness of the intimate presence of the 
ineffable Tao in the midst of the phenomenal world, which cannot be grasped until the 
dualistic perceptions of that phenomenal world are relinquished. The noumenal nature 
of the Tao is not superior to the nature of phenomena;Sl2 unlike Tillichian theology, 
there is no qualitative distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal. 513 
Instead, the distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal is the distinction 
necessary on the dualistic level to point toward a changed state of conscious awareness, 
in which communion with the Tao can be experienced in its purity. Hence, as Cheng 
pointed out, the Tao is the term used to denote a process of becoming, rather than a 
state of being.S14 That is to say, the term Tao is a symbol that points to an altered 
awareness of reality. It is not a symbol that points to another realm removed from the 
world of phenomena and discrimination, for such a symbol would function to reiterate 
512 Chuang Tzu: A New Selected Translation, transl. Fung, p.42. 
513 See pp.23,24 above. 
514 Cheng, 'Chinese Metaphysics as Non-metaphysics', p.l67. 
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a dualistic awareness - this world in contrast to that world. It is of the utmost 
importance that this point is grasped fully. To suggest that the Tao is a state of being 
removed from normal phenomenal existence is entirely to miss its symbolism. The Tao 
is not an entity, for entities are elements of a dualistic awareness of reality. An entity 
can be named and identified; the Tao cannot because the term functions as the Path that 
leads toward, and at the same time, expresses the unitary nature of all things. There is 
no distinction between the term Tao and the mystery that it expresses, for it represents 
the bridge between dualistic and unitary awareness, the gateway between self-
conscious discrimination and Tao-conscious flow.slS 
The terms 'bridge' and 'gateway' are themselves symbols of the writer's dualistic 
attempts to communicate that which is beyond duality. Only from a dualistic 
perspective can one regard the Tao as a bridge or as a gateway between dualistic and 
unitary awareness, for such language, as with all language, discriminates between one 
point and another, one side of the bridge and the other. The Tao is the term used to 
locate, from the vantage point of dualistic perception, the point at which one lets go of 
discrimination and swims in the dynamic flow of reality. Again, the limitation of 
language generates frustration, for once one has let go, the particular point at which one 
lets go disappears. In the letting-go, all is forgotten, as in the dynamic state of sagely 
forgetfulness. 516 This is the paradox of the Tao, and the reason that language fails 
US. SI7 This is the point at which language and knowledge are shed, and intuitive 
wisdom and spontaneity take over. 
Thus, the Tao is the dynamic flow of life into which we fall when we relinquish 
dualistic awareness. But at the same time, the letting-go does not lead to a removal 
from life. It does not mean ascending or retreating from life, but rather, functioning 
within life in an altered state of awareness, in which one harmonises fully with the flow 
515 Tao-consciousness is a term created by the researcher and used in Chapter Five to express 
Loy's explanation of natural action as that in which self-consciousness has dissolved, allowing 
the sage to act through non-action (wei-wu-wei). (Loy, 'Wei-wu-wei: Non-dual Action', p.76). 
516 'Ifthere is no other, there will be no I. Ifthere is no I, there will be none to make 
distinctions: (Chuang Tzu: A NewSelected Translation, transl. Fung, p.42.) 
517 Lao Tzu Tao Te Ching, transl. Lau, p.xv. 
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of Tao and acts spontaneously in accord with it. Thus, to describe the Tao in static 
terms is equally to misunderstand it. If we are to understand it onto logically , it is 
crucial that when we do so, we fully acknowledge its dynamic flow and do not fall into 
the trap of depicting it in static terms. This was a trap of which the Chinese texts were 
acutely aware, and which led them to favour the use of lower and negative terminology 
in their treatment of the Tao. 518 Equally, we should not be tempted to think in terms of 
a western metaphysical ontology, in which the noumenal is separated from the 
phenomenal. As Cheng points out, Chinese metaphysics does not require the separation 
of the sensible from the non-sensible. 519 
Thus, it becomes clear that any discussion of the Tao in ontological terms must be one 
that embraces the cosmological, for the Tao is to be perceived holistically rather than 
discriminatorily. This was established as a valid approach in Chapter Five, where we 
learned of Cheng's suggestion that discussion of the Tao should be seen in an onto-
cosmological, or indeed, a cosmo-ontological light. 520 Cheng illuminates the subtle 
distinction between both terms in the following way. In cosmo-ontological terms, the 
Tao is the dynamic force of the macrocosm, the process of things as they return to their 
origin. In onto-cosmological terms, the Tao is the force of the universe as it works 
toward the differentiation of reality. 521 
Of interest in this distinction is Cheng's allusion to the process of return with regard to 
the dynamics of the Tao. As this thesis has already discussed at length the theme of 
divine return both in Tillichian theology and in the classical thinking in which his 
theology is rooted, it is important to explore this idea in greater depth to consider where 
our earlier discussions lie in relation to the Tao in this respect. 
518 See Chapter 5 above. 
519 Cheng, 'Chinese Metaphysics as Non-metaphysics', pp.167 & 168. 
520 Ibid., p.175. 
521 Ibid. 
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Tao and the Theme of Return 
We learned in Chapter Five that in the Lao Tzu, the term Tao replaces the term t'ien 
(heaven),522 and that this replacement is reflected in the text's emphasis upon the 
importance of the human being modelling his behaviour on the way of heaven, i.e. on 
the Tao. In order to do this, it is necessary for the Lao Tzu to explain how heaven or 
the Tao functions, which it does in the following verse: 
Reversal is the movement of the way; 
Weakness is the use of the way. 523 
Lau explains the traditional understanding of the expression 'reversal' or 'turning back' 
as the cyclical process of change generated by the Tao. s24 Ch'en expands upon this 
traditional interpretation of 'turning back', stating that in the Lao Tzu, underlying all 
natural growth is the principle of circularity, a 'process of development' ,525 which leads 
all things back to their originating point. Thus, the natural world is in constant flux, in 
which a cyclical pattern of movement is followed, which leads to an extreme. Upon 
reaching the extreme, the pattern of movement leads in the opposite direction until 
reaching the polar extreme. Ch'en asserts: 
This principle of antithetical rotation is central to Lao Tzu's 
philosophical system and central to his understanding of the cosmos.S26 
Thus, the principle of return is the way the Tao functions and is the dynamic basis upon 
which all processes are grounded. The cosmos and all that is contained within it have 
as their essential nature the principle of circular development, which always leads back 
522 Lao Tzu Tao Te Ching, Transl. Lau, p.xxi. 
523 Lao Tzu Tao Te Ching Transl. Lau Ch.40 (p.l95). 
524 Lao Tzu Tao Te Ching, Transl.. Lau, p.xxii. Here, Lau translates Ch.40 differently from 
above, as "Turning back is how the way moves; Weakness is the means the way employs". 
525 Lao Tzu, transl. Ch' en, p.t3. 
526 b'd 9 I 1 ., p .. 
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to the originating point. This is the principle of constancy in the early Taoist writings; 
constancy in terms of perpetual dynamism, rather than in terms of being unchanging. 527 
In this way, the Lao Tzu alludes to an understanding of reality as a network of 
processes, all of which harmonise with the ultimate process. Harmonisation is possible 
because through virtue (te), the individual elements of the cosmos have a dynamic path 
to follow, which is an expression of the ultimate Tao. Thus, the principle of return is 
central to the microcosmic-macrocosmic understanding of reality in the Lao Tzu. 
Resonance and Synchronicity 
Central also to the Chuang Tzu's philosophy is a similar understanding of the process 
of the Tao. In that text, we learn that all things follow the Tao and unify into 'one great 
process' . 528 Of import here is the understanding that the unification into 'one great 
process' does not mean the ruling of the Tao over the elements that make up the 
cosmos; there is no sense of a cloning principle here, for the process of each individual 
element in the cosmos is particular and unique because of the virtue (le) of each 
element. Instead, it is more appropriate to think in terms of the interdependence and 
resonance of all of the elements as they follow their particular and individual 
expressions of the ultimate process. 
In his consideration of spontaneity (ziran), Callahan argues that the Tao cannot rule 
because it: 
. . . constitutes the process in which there is interdependence and 
mutuality among particulars .... The capacity of each of us as part to 
distinguish ourselves is de [te]. 529 
Emerging from our discussion of return is the sense of a dynamic process in which the 
Tao finds particular expression through the virtue (te) of individual elements of the 
527 Leung, 'Tao and Logos', p.l3S. 
528 Ibid., p.139. 
529 Callahan, 'Discourse and Perspective in Daoism'. p.180. 
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cosmos, and the virtue (te) of the individual elements leads each element back to its 
point of origin. Thus, for the sage, the process has led both to an emptying of heart-
mind (hsin) and to emptiness (hsu). This means at the same time being led back to non-
being (wu), for the process is that of movement from dualistic awareness to unitary 
awareness, a consciousness in which there is no discrimination, and therefore, no 
distinction between emptiness (hsu) and non-being (WU).530 
Important to highlight here is the point that emptiness (hsu) and the process of 
emptying the heart-mind (hsin) are the same, for as with the Tao, we should not 
understand emptiness as a state, but as a dynamic process of unitary realisation. Let us 
be reminded of the inadequacy of language to communicate the Tao. Linguistically, 
'emptiness' is a noun and 'emptying' a verb. As the function of the latter is to denote 
action or process, and the function of the former is to denote an entity or a state, it is 
tempting to assume that the action of emptying leads to the state of emptiness. This, 
however, is to think in causal terms. 
As noted in Chapter Five in our discussion of non-action (wu-wei), causal thinking is 
dualistic in nature.m It denotes a distinction between the agent of an action and the 
action of an agent. Instead, it is necessary to move away from dualistic thinking toward 
a unitary appreciation if we are to begin to grasp the absence of distinction between 
emptying and emptiness (hsu). 
As already established, language does not permit a total movement into unitary 
awareness, for such awareness is experiential, not simply conceptual. Perhaps the 
nearest we can approach such awareness conceptually is to speak in terms of the 
synchronicity between emptying and emptiness (hsu). That is to say, the emptying of 
the sage's heart-mind (hsin), i.e. the internal microcosmic process of opening up to the 
Tao, is at the same time, a merging with the emptiness (hsu) of the Tao on the 
macrocosmic level. In other words, the synchronicity between emptying and emptiness 
530 Chapter Five established that the distinction between emptiness (hsu) and non-being (wu) 
was necessary from a dualistic perpective only. 
531 See p.22S above. 
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is the symbolic expression of the harmonisation that takes place between the internal 
and external process of the Tao, i.e. between the phenomenal and noumenal process of 
the Tao. 
In view of the discussion in Chapter Five, where it was explained that the 
understanding of the term the action of non-action (wei-wu-wei) requires a non-causal 
approach, it is perhaps illuminating briefly to consider Carl Jung's position with regard 
to synchronicity, a term he suggests helps us to move away from total dependence upon 
the law of causality.532 In this way, it may be possible to clarify the significance of 
synchronicity as it is used in the context of emptiness (hsu) and emptying, discussed 
above. In view of Jung's strong interest in Taoist philosophy, 533 as well as his 
fascination for the European Medieval alchemical tradition,534 Jung has provided a 
powerful guide to the present researcher in her attempt to communicate in dualistic 
terms the unitary level of consciousness necessary to understand the Tao. 
Carl lung's understanding of synchronicity, which he expresses as the coincidence 
between an external event and an internal psychic event, and the meaning of the 
coincidence, would appear to approximate the meaning of synchronicity as it pertains 
to the harmonisation between the internal/phenomenal and external/noumenal process 
of the Tao. 535 
However, this is, indeed, an approximation rather than a perfect match, as lung's 
discussion of synchronicity would appear to highlight the role of the psyche over the 
physical, in contrast to the emphasis in the Chuang Tzu, for example, upon the equality 
between psyche and soma.536 We have seen that the sage who falls into emptiness 
532 Jung, synchronicity, p.7. 
533 Jung had a profound interest in the Chinese Taoism, as evidenced in his writing of the 
foreword to Willhelm's translation of I Ching. 
534 His fascination for alchemy is demonstrated in his writings on psychology and alchemy 
(C.O. Jung, 'Psychology and Alchemy', in The Collected Works oiCG. Jung, vo.12, Transl. 
R.F.C. Hull (London, RoutIedge & Kegan Paul, 1968). 
535 C.G. Jung, On Synchronicity and the Paranormal, p.89. 
536 The Complete Works ofChuang Tzu, transl. Watson, Ch.2 (p.38). Any suggestion that the 
psyche is superior to the physical would contradict the text's attempt to lead its readers towards 
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(hsu) is one who lives spontaneously, free from intent and purpose, and therefore, free 
from meaning. He lives in a state of meaninglessness - the complement of meaning, 
just as non-being (wu) is the complement of being (you), and noumenon is the 
complement of phenomenon. In other words, meaninglessness depicts the unitary 
nature of reality in which discrimination is surpassed. 
Meaning is an assertive statement, which stands against that which has no meaning. It 
is, therefore, an expression of dualistic awareness, and not expression of the awareness 
of the sage who lives in spontaneous accord with the Tao. In view of this, it is perhaps 
necessary to highlight the disparity between lung's notion of synchronicity, and 
synchronicity as it pertains to the process of emptying and falling into emptiness (hsu). 
As the process of emptying is characterised by the gradual falling into meaninglessness, 
Synchronicity, in terms of sagely forgetfulness, sheds the sense of meaning that lung 
attributes to the term. 
Nevertheless, lung comes very close to an understanding of the synchronistic nature of 
the sagely process of emptying. His appreciation of the alchemical 'Unus Mundus' as 
awareness in which one's individuality is 'at one' with the totality would seem to 
match very closely the Taoist understanding of the way in which the virtue (le) of the 
h . . h th T 537 M . h· I . . sage armomses WIt e 1 aD. oreover, In IS exp oratIOn of synchromcity, he 
argues that the term expresses the: 
... parallelism and analogy between events in so far as they are non-
causal.. .. the parallelism of time and meaning between psychic and 
psychophysical events.538 
unitary awareness, in which discrimination. becomes irrelevant. As all things are equal, 
discussion about preferences is irrelevant. 
S37 'Unus Mundus' is interpreted by Jung as referring to the psychic state in which one's 
individuality is experienced as 'at one' with the totality. For Jung, it implies the underlying 
unity between matter and spirit. 
538 Jung, On Synchronicity and the Paranormal, p.89. 
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From the above quotation, it is evident that Jung acknowledges a non-causal state of 
awareness with regard to synchronicity. However, in light of our earlier observations 
with regard to the role of meaning in his understanding of synchronicity, whether he 
goes all the way to full understanding of the unitary awareness proferred in the Chuang 
Tzu and the Lao Tzu, is perhaps doubtful. Unitary awareness renders the significance of 
the meaningful element of synchronicity unnecessary. By retaining the notion of 
meaning, Jung's definition of synchronicity perhaps illustrates the boundary of Jung's 
movement toward unitary awareness. 
Further discussion of Jung in this respect falls beyond the scope of this thesis. Our 
consideration of Jung has been simply to expand upon the idea of synchronicity as a 
means of moving out of a strictly dualistic state of awareness, and in the direction of 
unitary awareness. As mentioned earlier, the notion of synchronicity, precisely because 
it is a notion, inevitably leads us short of full unitary awareness, as in such 
consciousness, the need for conceptualisation and discrimination disappears. What the 
term synchronicity does achieve however, is the early stage of the formulation of a 
frame of thought in which we move beyond the extremes of discrimination and causal 
awareness, and begin a return to a holistic appreciation of events and inner experiences. 
As such, it is perhaps a term that helps human consciousness to follow the circular 
process of the Tao. 
Ontological Implications of the Theme of Return 
So, what does our discussion of return with regard to the Tao tell us about the 
ontological perspective of the Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu? Firstly, it highlights the 
thoroughly dynamic nature of the Tao: it is a process, not an entity or a state. 
Secondly, it communicates the microcosmic/macrocosmic understanding of the Tao, in 
which its noumenal aspect finds expression in the phenomenal as the virtue (le) of each 
and everything. Virtue (te) symbolises the process of the Tao in onto-cosmological 
terms, i.e. the dynamic force of the macrocosm as it works toward the differentiation of 
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reality. The Tao as the complement of the te symbolises the cosmo-ontological process, 
Le, the dynamic process of things as they return to their origin.539 
Next, the onto-cosmological and cosmo-ontological process is synchronistic in the 
sense that the sage's process of emptying of heart-mind (hsin) is at the same time, the 
merging with the emptiness (hsu) of the noumenal Tao. However, this process is not 
meaningful to the sage, for in the process of letting-go, all meaning is surrendered. 
This is necessarily so because the process symbolised by the term Tao is an expansion 
of consciousness from dualistic to unitary awareness. 
Medieval and TilIichian Return in the Light of Return Pertaining to 
the Tao 
Let us consider this notion of return in the light of the Medieval and Tillichian notions 
discussed earlier in the thesis. 
In Chapter Two, we discovered that central to the philosophy of thinkers such as 
Plotinus and Pseudo-Dionysius was the understanding of a microcosmic-macrocosmic 
relation between the phenomenal world and the World Soul. The entire universe owed 
its existence to the continual process of emanation and return generated by the unity 
and perfection of the One, the World Soul. 540 This notion was presupposed in the work 
of the alchemists, who perceived their purpose in terms of a synchronistic assisting of 
God in the process of perfecting nature, and the making of their own ascent back to 
\ 
God. The unearthing of the hidden divine symbols on earth was possible for those 
whose souls were returning to the Source. 
We learned also that the Medieval understanding of emanation and return was present 
in the ideas of Cusanus, although he moved from the strictly hierarchical perception of 
539 Cheng, 'Chinese Metaphysics as Non-metaphysics,' p.175. 
540 Russell, A history of Western Philosophy, p.86. 
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emanation and return to one that was more immanent.54 ! Nevertheless, he was not able 
to shed completely the hierarchical mindset of Medieval philosophy because he still 
adhered to the necessity for mediation between man and God through the figure of 
Christ. 
Likewise, Paracelsus echoed the views of Plotinus and Pseudo-Dionysius with his 
emphasis upon the importance of a doctor's using his intellect in the light of faith and 
piety to be guided by God toward the discovery of the divine secrets present in nature. 
However, he expressed the return to God in terms of introspection and the searching of 
the depths of the physical world, rather than seeking to leave behind the realm of the 
physical. Thus, the divine emanation and return became centred more upon the 
intellectual capacity of the human being as part of the physical world. However, at the 
same time, God remained the Being of Perfection and therefore, qualitatively different 
from the phenomenal world.542 
Finally, we learned that the work of Boehme also communicated the idea of divine 
return, although, unlike the Neoplatonic emphasis upon creaturely hierarchical 
ascension to the unchanging Source, Boehme spoke of the simultaneous creaturely 
ascension and divine return, leading ultimately to the total harmonisation of human 
consciousness and divine self-consciousness, expressed as mystical union. 
At first sight, this might appear to echo the theme of return discussed in the Lao Tzu 
and the Chuang Tzu, for, as with these Chinese texts, the writings of Boehme 
emphasised the noumenal both in dynamic terms and in terms of process. 543 
Furthermore, more than any of his predecessors, Boehme highlighted the equality 
between creature and the noumenal, in so far as noumenal self-knowledge was 
facilitated through human consciousness. 
541 See p.94 above. 
542 See p.l 0 1-1 02 above. 
543 The term noumenal rather than divine is used here to avoid the risk of the reader associating 
the Tao with divinity. Although Taoist religion consists of divine images, our concern is with 
the philosophical Tao presented in the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu. In this limited context, the 
noumenal aspect of the Tao is not depicted as God, but as the enigmatic dynamic process that 
underlies and permeates life. 
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However, there is a significant point of departure between the two Chinese 
philosophies and that of Boehme; unlike the former, Boehme established the 
accessibility of the noumenal to the human being through the intellect, i.e. through 
conceptual reasoning (vernunft) and mystical understanding (verstand).544 
As mystical understanding is accessed through conceptual reasoning, Boehme's 
mystical understanding can be seen to be very different from the sagely wisdom of the 
Chinese texts. Although acknowledging the limitations of conceptual reasoning, 
Boehme advocates ascension to mystical understanding through the vehicle of 
conceptual reasoning. 
In contrast, the Chinese texts speak of letting go of the intellectual grasp of life and 
living a life of harmony with nature, which means the spontaneous harmonisation with 
the dynamics of the Tao.545 Unlike Boehme, in the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu, no 
human effort is required to harmonise with the Tao, for it is innate to us. In contrast, 
Boehme advocates a process in which self-consciousness becomes so fully developed 
that it merges with divine consciousness. Hence, while Boehme speaks in terms of 
mystical communion with God, the Chinese texts speak of spontaneous action in the 
world and mindless existence as the effect of harmonising with the Tao. 
In short, despite both the Chinese texts on the one hand, and Boehme on the other, 
having many points of contact, such as their understanding of the dynamic process of 
reality, the equality of the human being with the noumenal in terms of that process, and 
the ultimately harmonious and microcosmic/macrocosmic nature of reality, Boehme's 
connecting the microcosm with the macrocosm by means of the intellect leads to the 
ultimate harmonisation between the human being and the divine being a state of 
mystical union removed from the world of phenomena. In contrast, the unitary 
awareness proferred in the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu is not mystical and removed 
from life, but rooted wholly within the dynamics of life. 
544 See p.107-108 above. 
545 The Complete Works ofChuang Tzu. transl. Watson, Ch.3 (pp.50-53). 
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Turning to Tillichian notions of emanation and return highlighted in this thesis, we 
have learned that they are deeply influenced by classical understanding of divine 
emanation and return, as outlined above. However, Tillich speaks in terms of 
correlation rather than emanation and return as the way in which the eternal moves into 
the temporal and the temporal into the etemal.S46 We have also discovered that in this 
way, Tillich denotes this movement in terms of resonance and reciprocity between 
Creator and creature. 
However, Tillichian resonance is not based upon a Boehmic sense of equality between 
creature and Creator, but retains the classical presupposition of qualititative distinction 
between Creator and creature. The creature participates in the Creator on the basis of 
being firmly grounded in the Divine life itself. The Divine life embraces and 
transcends creaturely life, while creaturely life is the expression of the outward 
movement of that Divine life.547 Thus, Tillich presents a picture of a Creator that is 
both transcendent and immanent for the creature. In so far as the creature is grounded 
in the Divine life itself, then the Divine is wholly present for the creature. 
The presence however, has to be mediated through the symbol Jesus as the Christ, for 
creaturely existence fails to recognise its grounding in the Divine because of the 
limitations imposed upon it by the categories of existence, which shape the way in 
which we think and perceive. Thus, the limitations imposed upon existence by the 
categories of time, space, causality and substance create an existential barrier between 
the Creator and the creature, and render the former wholly transcendent, despite the 
creature's grounding in the Divine life. 
With regard to the theme of return found in the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu, there are 
some striking points of connection with Tillichian thought. Both the Chinese texts and 
Tillich establish the noumenal as the ground of phenomenal reality. For Tillich, this is 
expressed as the ground of being; in the Chinese texts, this is referred to as non-being 
546 See pp.154-155 above. 
547 See p.155 above. 
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(wu), or the Tao. 548 Both perceive the presence of the noumenal in dynamic terms; for 
Tillich, the dynamic of the Divine life pulsates through the ontological structure of 
being and thus, provides the very dynamic that characterises existential life and 
communicates the microcosmic-macrocosmic motif in Tillich's system.S49 In the Lao 
Tzu and the Chuang Tzu, the dynamic of the Tao is expressed in virtue (le), and this 
link establishes the microcosmic-macrocosmic understanding of the universe in these 
texts. 
However, at the same time, there is a fundamental difference between the 
understanding of return in Tillich and in the Chinese texts under consideration. Once 
again, the difference lies in Tillich's focus upon the intellectual connection between the 
Creator and the creature and the Chinese texts' disregard for the intellectual. For 
Tillich, it is reason, logos, that provides the vital connection between the human being 
and God. The reasoning faculty provides the human being with the capacity to function 
as the bearer of spirit for all that lives. 
In Chapter Three of this thesis, we discovered that the logos functions as a pivot for the 
dialectical relationship between self and world on the one hand, and finitude and the 
infinite on the other. Through logos, the human being not only makes sense of its inner 
and external worlds, but also reaches out to that which transcends existence and at the 
same time, provides the ground for that existence.55o In contrast, as we have already 
established, in the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu, the connection with the Tao lies in our 
naturalness rather than our intellect. 
Moreover, Tillich's focus upon logos and the faculty of reason leads him to highlight 
the ambiguities of life, which can only be transcended by means of symbols that have a 
mediatory function. 
548 See p. 219 above. 
549 See Chapter 3 for an in-depth discussiono of this. 
550 See p.133 above. 
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Focusing upon the intellect, Tillich's theology employs mediating symbols to scale the 
barriers of paradox and causal thinking, both of which are penned in by the categories 
of time, space, causality and substance. The effect is to maintain a gulf between God 
and the human being, which can only be bridged through the mediation of the symbol. 
Jesus as the Christ. 
In contrast, we have seen that in the Chinese texts, paradox serves as the key that 
unlocks the enigma of the Tao. This it does by shocking the reader into realisation of 
the limits of conceptual thought, and by highlighting the importance of letting go of the 
intellect as the means of progressing from dualistic to unitary awareness. Thus, we 
may suggest that Tillichian insistence upon the role of logos in his theological system 
demonstrates his entrenchment in dualistic awareness, in contrast to the unitary 
consciousness communicated in the Chinese texts under examination. 
Through our survey of the theme of return, what begins to emerge is a significant 
contrast between that theme as presented in the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu on the one 
hand, and on the other, the theme as it pertains to Tillichian theology and to the 
classical tradition in which Tillich was rooted. The sense of separation that 
predominates in the classical tradition and Tillichian theology is absent from the 
Chinese principle of return. 
The dualistic approach of Tillich and the classical tradition promotes a powerful sense 
of the static nature of reality; of It and us. Consequently, Tillich's ontology, although 
in many ways focusing upon the dynamic structure of reality underlying creaturely 
existence, impedes the flow of the dynamic by insisting upon the constructing of 
concepts to communicate the dynamic nature of reality. This leads him inevitably to 
approach reality from a dualistic perspective, thus, rendering the theme of separation 
integral to his perspective. 
We have already learned that in dualistic awareness, distinctions are drawn. Tillich's 
insistence upon the ambiguous nature of existence betrays the dualistic limit of his 
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understanding. For him, the tension between the poles of existence is insurmountable 
without mediating intervention from the realm of the noumenal and transcendent. 
In contrast, in the Chinese texts the conceptual impasse of paradox is used to break into 
an altered consciousness in which distinctions diappear. This is achieved by 
relinquishing the need to conceptualise about reality and instead, to experience reality 
through the process of letting-go. This effectively is a process of integration of the 
microcosm of the individual with the macrocosm of the universe, for the letting-go of 
conceptual and sensory dependence is synchronous with the merging with the dynamic 
flow of the Tao. 
In terms of ontology then, the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu perceive reality as a 
dynamic process of integration rather than a state of being; integration between the 
microcosm of an individual and the macrocosm of the universe, which is achieved 
through the integration of virtue (fe), the microcosmic expression of the Tao, and 
Tao in its macrocosmic aspect; hence,. ontology is utterly integrated with 
cosmology, as illustrated in the terms used by Cheng, cosmo-ontology and onto-
cosmology.551 
Not only is it necessary to refer to ontology in the light of cosmology, it is also 
necessary to understand onto-cosmology in the light of cosmo-ontology, for the two 
terms together express the dynamic process of return referred to in the Chinese texts. 
Onto-cosmologically, the Tao symbolises the process of non-differentiated origin 
moving toward the differentiation of reality. 
Cosmo-ontologically, the Tao is the process of differentiation returning to non-
differentiated origin and source. Hence, the Tao symbolises process; the process 
toward differentiation, and the process back toward non-differentiation. The human 
being is simply an expression of this dynamic process, and to achieve true wisdom, it is 
necessary to move in harmony with the dynamics of that reality. This requires the 
5Sl Cheng, 'Chinese Metaphysics as Non-metaphysics', pp. 173-174. 
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letting-go of those aspects oflife which create blockages for the Tao as it emanates and 
returns through the human being. 
Hence, in the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu, there is no universal need for the human 
being to harmonise with the dynamic flow of reality. In contrast to Boehme, there is 
no sense of the noumenal's dependence upon the human being for its expression. 
Again, in contrast to Tillich' s claim that the human being is the bearer of spirit, 552 there 
is no unique role for the human being to play in the fulfilment of the universal order of 
things. Instead, the Chuang Tzu highlights the benefits to the human being of 
realigning with the Tao; to do so is to escape the pain and suffering that occurs as the 
result of not living a natural life. 
Equally, the Lao Tzu promotes the living according to the Tao as the way to minimise 
the risk of disorder in the world; by following the way of heaven, one harmonises 
rather than works against the natural order of things. 553 
Admittedly, the Lao Tzu does promote a political harmonisation with the Tao as a 
means of maintaining the delicate dynamic equilibrium of empires, 554 and 
acknowledges that empires are as much a part of the natural order as the world of 
inanimate objects.sss By this token, the role of the sage king is to adhere to the Tao in 
his political affairs so that the delicate balance of the empire is not disturbed, therefore, 
by inference, preserving the delicate balance of the entire natural order. 
However, there is no suggestion that those political leaders who rule according to the 
Tao perform a function beyond the parameters of their particular realms or empires; 
there is no hint of the elevated functions attributed to the human being by Boehme and 
Tillich. Whilst these thinkers speak of the human being as having a special, unique 
function by virtue of its possession of the gift of understanding, the Lao Tzu's concern 
552 See p.60 above. 
SS) Lao Tzu, transl. Ch'en, p.l4. See also Lao Tzu Tao Te Ching, transl. Lau, pp.xxv & xxvii. 
554 Lao Tzu Tao Te Ching, transl.Lau, p.xxviii. 
555' ... Ibid., p.XXVIII. 
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is more focused upon the destructive capacity of the human being within the political 
domain when operating through the intellect, and therefore, operating out of synch with 
the Tao. 556 As the microcosm of the empire resonates with the macrocosm, any 
disorder in the empire will be echoed in the universe.557 
Section Two: Estrangement 
Before we conclude our exploration of the Tao and its ontological implications, it is 
necessary to ascertain the extent to which there is present in the ontology of the Tao 
the theme of estrangement. Let us be reminded of the broader purpose in exploring the 
ontological implications of the Tao, namely, to seek to ascertain the extent to which 
Tillich's claim that estrangement IS ontological in nature holds true for the 
philosophical discourse on the Tao. 
We have already established that it is inappropriate to consider the Tao in exclusively 
ontological terms because it should be approached holistically. In light of this, it 
perhaps becomes clear that the theme of estrangement in Tillichian terms of creaturely 
alienation from the divine ground of being is also inappropriate with regard to the Tao. 
Firstly, the Tao is not expressed in the Chinese texts as an entity or as a supreme being, 
but as the noumenal dynamic that is wholly present in the phenomenal world. 
Secondly, as the Tao should be perceived holistic ally, the movement from, and return 
to, the source cannot be regarded as two separate expressions of the Tao, but rather as 
synchronistic expressions. Holism demands the awareness of the interrelation between 
outward movement and return, and unitary awareness of this interrelation renders 
language such as estrangement or alienation irrelevant. In short, holism demands that 
we see the whole movement at one and the same time. 
556 Ibid. 
557 Ibid. 
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In contrast, the dualistic nature of the Tillichian approach, where discriminating 
language is the sole medium for communicating the dynamic nature of the structure of 
reality, renders it impossible to see the integrated nature of divine emanation and 
return. In dualistic terms, if the human creature is part of the divine emanation, then it 
is logical to suppose that it must be distinct from the divine return. Verbal 
conceptualisation, which is inevitably rational, prevents us from seeing the whole 
picture, for the interrelationship of that whole picture is not based upon causal 
connection, but non-causal, synchronistic connection. 
Thus, the use of paradox and negative terminology in the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu 
is the method by which both texts lead the reader away from dependence upon verbal 
conceptualisation towards a direct experience of the mystery of the Tao, attained 
through the synchronistic process of emptying and merging with emptiness (hsu). 
There is no estrangement to be overcome, except perhaps the estrangement generated 
by dependence upon knowledge and desire. It may be possible to argue that 
dependence upon such phenomena renders the individual estranged from one's virtue 
(te). As the Chuang Tzu points out, movement away from one's true nature, one's 
virtue (te) leads to pain and suffering.558 
However, this is hardly the same form of estrangement as that proffered by Tillich in 
his theological system. One may choose to move away from one's true nature, but one 
could equally return to it at any time, for it is intrinsic to US. 559 In contrast, for Tillich, 
the human being is onto logically and tragically estranged from God. Hence, the human 
being cannot escape his suffering, except through the mediation of the symbol Jesus as 
the Christ. 
Furthermore, the judgment on humanity made through the Tillichian assumption of 
ontological estrangement is simply not present in the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu. We 
learned in Chapter Four of this thesis that Tillich links the Fall of Adam and Eve with 
the notion of creaturely estrangement and sin. As such, he perpetuates the judgment 
558 Chuang Tzu: A New Selected Translation, transl. Fung, p.9. 
559 Ibid. 
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that humanity is ontologically estranged from its ground of being as the consequence of 
wilful rejection of that to which we essentially belong: God, self and fellow human 
beings. 56o By speaking of the consequence of this rejection in terms of guilt, Tillich 
paints the picture of a rebellious humanity that has done wrong. 
In contrast, in the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu, there is no sense in which the 
individual should let go out of moral duty or responsibility, but rather because it is 
simply natural to do so. Thus, even if it can successfully be argued that clinging to the 
world of knowledge and sensory attachment leads to estrangement from one's innate 
nature, this estrangement does not have the gravitas associated with the Tillichian 
notion. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have sought to explore the ontological implications of the Tao that 
emerged from our examination of the Tao in Chapter Five. What has been discovered 
is that to speak purely in ontological terms with regard to the Tao is inappropriate. The 
Tao is a symbol used to communicate a dynamic process underlying existence that is 
holistic, and is as cosmological as it is ontological. To speak in exclusively ontological 
terms is to lose the essence of the holistic nature of the process. The ontology of the 
Tao must be discussed in relation to its cosmology, for the process that the term 
symbolises is not simply one that can be seen in exclusively ontological or 
cosmological terms, but is one that when viewed from the ontological perspective, is 
fully understood only when the cosmological aspect is brought into focus, and vice 
versa. In other words, the process is one of dynamic resonance and interrelation 
between the microcosm and the macrocosm. 
560 See p.169 above. 
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We have learned that from the perspective of the human being, the Tao is the process 
of letting-go; the individual who has managed to let go of sensory and intellectual 
attachment to the world of phenomena and knowledge is the sage who lives a life of 
forgetfulness. However, by virtue of the fact that the ineffability of the Tao lies in the 
heart of existence and not in a realm wholly removed from the phenomenal world, 
sagely forgetfulness is not a mystical state. On the contrary, the sage is able to 
function freely and spontaneously in life, for his non-attachment allows him to flow 
with the dynamic process that the term Tao symbolises. Thus, letting go is the 
synchronistic process of emptying and merging with emptiness (hsu). 
This is where we begin to understand the interrelation between ontology and 
cosmology. Emptiness (hsu) denotes the ineffable nature of the Tao as the source or 
origin of all things, the Tao as non-being (wu), for merging with emptiness (hsu) 
symbolises the sage's altered state of awareness from dualistic consciousness, in which 
emptiness (hsu) and non-being (wu) are distinct, to unitary consciousness, where they 
are the same. Thus, the merging with emptiness (hsu) is the sage's harmonisation with 
the dynamic process of the cosmos, and is therefore, his return to the source. That he is 
able to function freely and spontaneously in the phenomenal world having merged with 
emptiness highlights the interrelation of cosmology and ontology. If ontology is the 
study of being, then to study the sage who exists and functions spontaneously by virtue 
of his harmonisation with the cosmos means to study his being in the light of his 
cosmological connection. 
Following from the process of integration illustrated in the sage's emptying of heart-
mind (hsin), and the total interrelation between ontology and cosmology, the Lao Tzu 
and the Chuang Tzu communicate no sense of ontological estrangement for the human 
being in relation either to the Tao or to the Universe. The integration of the sage occurs 
by virtue of his essential nature, his virtue (le), which is the phenomenal expression of 
the noumenal Tao. Let us remind ourselves once again of a very important point. the 
Tao is not an entity or a state, but the term used to symbolise the dynamic reality of the 
universe in both its noumenal and phenomenal aspects. Unlike Tillichian notions of the 
Divine life, the Chinese texts do not depict the Tao as in a realm qualitatively separate 
263 
from that of existence. The Tao is the process of life, the Path, the Way.561 At the 
same time, it is the enigmatic dynamic that is present, although mysteriously hidden, in 
the physical and manifest aspects of existence. The Tao is the dynamic mystery and 
source of life; not the Perfect Source of the Neoplatonists, which is qualitatively 
superior to the physical realm, nor the Tillichian Divine life, which is shrouded from 
existence through the veil imposed by the categories of existence. The dynamism of 
the Tao is holistic and all-pervading, its holism providing the network of 
interrelationships that characterises the universe and all that reside in it. 
Recognition of this dynamic reality requires a fundamental mindshift, or perhaps we 
should say heart-mind shift, away from dualistic awareness - dependence upon 
knowledge, reason and causal thinking - into unitary awareness, in which all 
distinctions, be they between actions and agents, or between polar concepts, disappear, 
and are replaced by the recognition of the equality of all things. In unitary 
consciousness, action becomes non-causal, for the agent of an action and the action of 
an agent become so utterly integrated that the agent acts in a state of non-action (wu-
wei). Such action is spontaneous and synchronous with the dynamic of the Tao, 
allowing the actor total freedom from intent, attachment and discrimination. The sage 
lives and acts with no thought, no premeditation. Instead, he acts through the intuitive 
wisdom flowing freely through his clear heart-mind (hsin). He lives in synchronistic 
alignment with the Tao of the macrocosm because his intuitive wisdom is the Tao. In 
this dynamic state, there is a total absence of estrangement between the sage and his 
action, the sage and his environment, the sage and his universe, and the sage and the 
Tao. In short, the action of non-action (wei-wu-wei) expresses the dynamic unity of the 
sage and the Tao. This is the clearest illustration of the importance of speaking 
cosmologically when discussing the ontology of the Tao, and of speaking ontologically 
when discussing the cosmology of the Tao. 
Cosmology and ontology are expressions of discriminatory awareness, as are terms 
such as separation and estrangement. As such, they are symbols of dualistic awareness. 
561 Leung, 'Tao and Logos', p.t3l. 
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The Tao has to be understood holistically in a state of unitary awareness. Thus, 
recognition of the need to speak cosmologically about ontology in relation to the Tao is 
recognition of our inability to proceed any further through discrimination and reasoned 
argument. Recognition of the cosmological nature of ontology and the ontological 
nature of cosmology with reference to the Tao is recognition of the need to let go of 
reason and fall into experience, for, as Leung observes, the Tao is a process of 
actions.562 It is thus, to be lived and intuited, not discussed and rationalised. 
562 Ibid., p.131. 
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Part Three 
Assessing the Value of Ontological 
Estrangement for Tillich's System in 
Light of Microcosm and Tao 
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Chapter 7 
Tillich's Theological System in the Light of the 
Exploration into the Chinese Tradition of Tao 
Having explored in depth the theme of the Tao as communicated through the the Lao 
Tzu and the Chuang Tzu, it is time now to assess the impact of our exploration in terms 
of Tillichian theology. Let us be reminded of the purpose in exploring the Tao, 
namely, to assess the validity of Tillich's assertion that creaturely estrangement is 
ontological in nature. However, before discussing our findings in this respect, it is 
useful briefly to remind ourselves of the need to assess the validity of this assertion. 
Highlighted in Chapter Four was an inconsistency in Tillich's system with regard to the 
theme of creaturely freedom and estrangement, exposed by consideration of the 
psychological implications of his definition of eros as the "urge toward reunion of the 
separated".563 By establishing the close conn'ection between ontology and psychology 
in Tillich's theology, the chapter established that the Fall symbolised the ontological 
separation between essential and existential being, and the psychological separation 
between unconsciousness (the state of dreaming innocence) and consciousness (the 
post-Fall state of humanity in existence). The chapter considered Tillich's definition of 
eros as "the urge toward the reunion of the separated".564 Although from an ontological 
perspective, this definition was unproblematic, from a psychological viewpoint, it 
raised a serious question: if eros is the urge toward the reunion of the separated, and if, 
in psychological terms, that which is separated pertains to consciousness and 
563 See p.l72 above. 
564 Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol.3, p.137. 
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unconsciousness, then what precisely does Tillich mean by suggesting that eros is the 
urge toward the reunion of consciousness with unconsciousness? 
It was argued that if taken literally, such a reunion would be tantamount to a denial of 
the role of human consciousness, and a refutation of the freedom of the human being in 
relation to the divine. If the function of consciousness were simply to return to 
unconsciousness, then implicit in this would be the sense that the actualising function 
attributed to human consciousness had, for Tillich, no real value. It would suggest one 
of two things: that the conscious process being worked out through life is already 
eternally present in the state of unconsciousness, thus nullifying the freedom of the 
human being creatively to move toward actualisation of the potential of 
unconsciousness. Alternatively, it would suggest that there was no ultimate purpose in 
the process of conscious actualisation executed by the human being in existence.565 
In view of the fact that such an interpretation of human consciousness was clearly not 
what Tillich intended in his system, the chapter went on to suggest a subtle revision of 
Tillich's definition of eros from the psychological perspective. Rather than defining 
eros as the urge toward reunion of the separated, there would be less ambiguity from 
the psychological aspect of Tillich's system if it were redefined as the urge toward the 
union of the separated. By so doing, eros would denote the conscious realisation of the 
power of the unconscious in that very consciousness - the role unique to the human 
being as bearer of spirit in and for the world.566 
Highlighted in the chapter was the implication of such a change; the progressive 
movement toward union of consciousness with unconsciousness, which would 
necessarily have no sense of ultimate separation. Also highlighted was the important 
point that progression toward union would not mean a dissolving of consciousness into 
unconsciousness, but instead, a resonating mutual participation between the two. If this 
565 See pp.173-174 above. 
566 See p.174 above. 
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were the case, the question as to the necessity of an unbridgeable gulf between one's 
depth of being and one's mortal existence was raised.567 
Finally, in light of this argument, the chapter established that Tillich's insistence upon 
the ontological nature of existential separation from its ultimate concern, reflected in 
his system in the vital mediatory role of the realm of the holy, rendered his claims 
about creaturely freedom ambiguous. Moreover, the presence of a microcosmic theme 
implicit in his system, established in Chapter Three, accentuated the disparity between 
the implicit sense of wholeness and unity in his system and his explicit insistence upon 
ultimate separation and estrangement between finite existence and its ultimate concern. 
For these reasons, the question as to the ontological necessity of estrangement and 
separation was raised in Chapter Four568 Would not Tillich's system be less ambiguous 
if the theme of ontological estrangement were removed from his system, as it appeared 
that adherence to this notion became somewhat of a sticking point for his theology? 
This, then, was the reason for seeking to assess the validity of Tillich's assertion about 
the ontological nature of creaturely estrangement, a claim, which if valid, would be 
applicable to humanity universally, not simply to those within the Christian tradition. 
The aim of this chapter therefore, is to assess the validity of Tillich's assertion that 
estrangement is ontological in nature in light of the microcosmic theme established as 
implicit in his theology, and in light of our in-depth consideration of the Tao as 
communicated through the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu. 
The chapter sets out to achieve two things: firstly, to expose an inconsistency at the 
ontological level in Tillich's theology pertaining to the themes of estrangement and 
freedom, revealed by the microcosmic theme underlying his system. Secondly, to 
consider the impact on his system of our consideration of the Lao Tzu and the Chuang 
Tzu with regard to the themes of freedom and estrangement. 
567 See pp.176-178 above. 
568 See pp. 178-179 above. 
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It will be argued that consideration of the Tao highlights the exclusively dualistic 
approach of Tillich in his theological system, an approach which forces him to accept 
as inevitable the ontological separation between humanity and its ultimate concern. 
Moreover, it will be argued that the unitary consciousness promoted in the Chinese 
texts demonstrates the way in which Tillich's claims with regard to the ontological 
nature of separation may be rendered invalid. 
Finally, the chapter considers the possible impact of removing the theme of ontological 
estrangement from Tillich's system, and suggests that by so doing, the microcosmic 
theme will be brought to the fore, allowing much of the ambiguity of Tillichian ideas to 
dissolve into a far more holistic, unitary consciousness of the Creator/creature 
relationship. 
Tillichian Estrangement in the Light of the Microcosmic Theme 
Underlying his Theology 
As mentioned above, Chapter Four summarised Tillich's understanding of the 
mythological Fall of humanity as a symbol of the separation that permeates life. It 
symbolises the transition from unconsciousness to consciousness, from potential to 
actual life, from unity to plurality and thus, from union to separation. Separation is 
therefore, an integral and inescapable part of being human. 569 
We also learned of the close association in his system between the state of existential 
estrangement and that of creaturely freedom. At every moment, the creature in 
existence is free to make choices - that is what the symbol of the Fall depicts: the 
transition from unconsciousness to consciousness marks a transition from innocence to 
personal responsibility. The transition from ignorance to knowledge enables the 
creature to make choices. To choose means to be free and, at the same time, to be 
569 Ibid., p.1 O. 
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responsible for the choices made. The ontological nature of creaturely freedom means 
that it has total freedom, freedom even, according to Tillich, to decide between creative 
living in alignment with one's destiny, and surrendering one's humanity. 570 Thus, 
Tillich maintains that the creature is free to choose between being and non-being at 
every moment and to every degree. 
However, In Chapter Three, we learned that for Tillich, human freedom is gained 
through the ability to make environment meaningful.S71 This is possible because of the 
logos structure of the human psyche. In this light, human freedom is not chaotic and 
wild, but creative and based upon the divine gift of logos. To be free in this context 
means to be fully human, which means to live through the ambiguities of life in the 
creative ground of being itself, in which existence is rooted. S72 
Now, there would appear to be a contradiction at a fundamental level in Tillich's use of 
the term freedom. On the one hand, he argues for the creature's freedom to choose 
between creative living and the surrendering of one's humanity. On the other hand, he 
argues that true freedom is living creatively through the logos. If finite life is, as Tillich 
asserts, rooted in being itself, then the definition of finitude must include being itself as 
its root. To be finite is to be rooted in the creative ground out of which finitude is born. 
Earlier chapters demonstrated the way Tillich depicts this through the content of his 
theology and the structure of his system.573 However, to suggest that the creature has 
the freedom to choose between creative living and the surrendering of one's humanity 
would appear to suggest that the finite creature is rooted in something other than the 
creative ground of being. It would appear to suggest that the definition of finitude does 
not, in fact, include its root in being itself. 
If this root is part of my identity as a human being, how is it possible for me to stand 
apart from it? How is it possible for me to reject the source of my being at the 
570 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol.2, p.32. 
S7I Ibid.,p.31. 
572 See pp.l43-145 above. 
573 See pp.25,26 & 116,117 above. 
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ontological level? When speaking of true freedom as living creatively in the ground of 
being itself, he asserts that to know how to be free means to know what it means to be 
fully human, and to be fully human means creatively to transcend the ambiguities of 
life. Now, if one chooses to surrender one's humanity, surely, according to Tillich's 
definition, one is not living a fully human life? Surely, the so-called freedom to choose 
the path of surrender is not the freedom he defines in terms of creative transcendence? 
It is rather more of the quality of chaos and wildness, which he dismisses as not true 
creaturely freedom at all. 574 
It would appear that Tillich knows two kinds of freedom: the freedom to choose to be 
rooted or not in the creative ground of being itself, and the freedom to live a fully 
human life in the light of the divine gift of logos. How is it possible for these two 
understandings of creaturely freedom to co-exist in his system? 
The first idea is derived from the symbol of the Fall and from the notion of the 
ontological estrangement of the creature from its creative source. Tillich argues that 
finitude, by definition, means estrangement. 575 However, finitude also means, 
according to his own system, being rooted in the Creator.576 Thus, the Fall symbolises 
not so much the inescapable ontological fact of creaturely separation, as Tillich asserts, 
as the freedom for the creature to ignore its onto logically rooted connection with the 
Creator. The creature is equipped by the divine, through the gift of logos, to choose to 
look away from its Creator. Thus, at the ontological level, the creature is not inevitably 
estranged from God. Rather, it remains rooted in God, despite the creature's freedom to 
refuse to accept it. 
Tillich's assertion that creaturely estrangement is ontological in nature suggests that the 
creature at the ontological level has no connection with the creative source from which 
it was born. It attributes to the creature an autonomy that contradicts Tillich's whole 
574 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, voU, pp.182 - 185. 
575 See pp. 162 - 163 above. 
576 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 1 p.236: "God ... is the power of being in everything 
and above everything, the infinite power of being." 
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system, in which he repeatedly points to the creature's grounding in being itself. To 
suggest that the creature is in a state of estrangement from which it cannot escape, no 
matter how much it may wish to, is tantamount to announcing that the creature is not 
rooted in the ground of being. Thus, Tillich's suggestion that the creature is estranged 
at the ontological level contradicts his system as a whole. 
The contradiction would disappear, however, if we were to abandon the notion of 
ontological estrangement and redefine the Fall as symbolising the freedom, given to the 
creature from the Creator through the gift of Logos, to choose not to accept and 
acknowledge its grounding in being itself. Such rewording makes a subtle but 
significant shift in Tillich's argument, for it affirms the ontological connection between 
Creator and creature and maintains creaturely freedom to sin,577 but it does not 
accommodate the view that the creature is inescapably estranged from the Creator. 
Thus, Tillich's reference to the creature's freedom to choose between creative 
transcendence of the ambiguities of existence and self-destruction would be re-
expressed as the creature's freedom not to accept the creative capacity to transcend the 
ambiguities of existence present in each and every finite creature. Such creativity is 
present by virtue of the creature's grounding in the creative source of life itself. 
With regard to his second appreciation of creaturely freedom, Tillich presents a view 
that is more aligned with the general tone of the system as a whole. The creature 
creatively transcends the ambiguities of existence through the dimension of spirit in 
life. Spirit is present in existence by virtue of the divine presence through logos in the 
human being, making humanity the bearer of spirit in the world, for the world. He then 
happily acknowledges the connection between humanity and being itself. 
The contradiction in his system with regard to creaturely freedom and ontological 
estrangement illustrates the extent to which he remained unconscious of the 
microcosmic theme underlying his system. If he had fully recognised the microcosmic 
577 Chapter 4 established TiIlich's definition of sin as focusing upon personal acts of 
estrangement from God, from oneself and from one's world. (p.169). 
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hue of his theology, he would have realised the impossibility of the creature being free 
to choose to surrender its humanity. As a microcosm of the macrocosm, the creature is 
simply what it is. In his system, the human creature resonates with the rhythm of the 
divine life and that relationship is what defines the creature's humanity. How, then, 
would it be possible for the creature to decide that it was not in relation to the divine? 
One may wish to be separated, but wishing and asserting such separation as an 
ontological fact are two very different things. The microcosmic theme underlying his 
system reveals the ambiguity of the language he employs to depict creaturely freedom 
and estrangement. 
The creature does not have the freedom to take the path that leads to surrender. Rather, 
it has the freedom to refuse to acknowledge the creative ground of its very being, and 
such refusal leads to the loss of one's humanity. This is the inevitable consequence 
because failure to recognise what we truly are, i.e. grounded in being itself, means the 
inability to become fully integrated human beings. In this light, our connection with 
God, not our estrangement, is ontological. In this light, the creature sees the presence 
of God within itself, not across the abyss that Tillich's emphasis upon separation 
creates. 
The suggested shift in emphasis from ontological estrangement to ontological 
connection brings Tillichian ontology closer to the cosmo-ontology of the Chuang Tzu. 
Just as this Chinese text emphasises the innate connection between the innate nature or 
virtue (te) of the human microcosm and the Tao of the macrocosm,578 so too, by 
shifting the focus of Tillichian ontology toward the connection between the creature 
and its creative ground and away from the separation between the two, sin becomes the 
distortion that arises through one's refusal or inability to recognise what one essentially 
is, i.e. innately connected to the macrocosm of the divine life.579 This idea will be 
578 Chuang Tzu: A New Selected Translation, transl. Fung, pp.S, 9, 105. 
579 Tillich distinguishes between the tragic inevitability of human estrangement and the personal 
responsibility of sin, described as personal estrangement from God, from one's self and from 
one's world. In removing the idea of estrangement, the separation between the microcosm and 
macrocosm is no longer regarded as tragic, but is shown to be the consequence of our 
inability/refusal to recognise our essential nature. 
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developed further later in this chapter, but it is important to introduce it here, as it 
indicates the extent to which our sojourn in the microcosmic/macrocosmic ideas 
contained in the Chinese texts helps us to see the potential of the microcosmic theme 
implicit in Tillichian theology to overcome the ambiguities explicit in his system. As 
argued later, the Chinese texts allow us to dare to challenge the presupposition in 
Tillich's theology that estrangement is ontological in nature, and therefore, an 
inevitable, inescapable fact of life. 
Tillich's insistence upon the state of estrangement paints a static picture, in which God 
remains in the Garden of Eden and the creature falls into existence. This static 
approach supports the view that there is a contradiction in his system with regard to 
freedom and estrangement, for we have seen his system as a whole to portray the 
dynamic nature of life and of the correlation between the Creator and the creature. The 
microcosmic theme reveals the pulsating rhythm of divine life as it interacts with that 
of the creature, and the circular, horizontal and vertical dynamics of the ontological 
structure of being.58o Through the microcosmic theme, we can feel the energy of the 
resonance between creature and Creator - God interacts with humanity every step of the 
way. 
However, when dealing with the symbol of the Fall, all energy seems to fade from his 
writing; God is on one side of the fence and humanity is on the other. The claim that 
estrangement is inevitable and inescapable drains his system of the energy that can be 
felt elsewhere. Estrangement becomes somewhat of a brick wall for his system as a 
whole and an impasse for the human being, which contradicts the sense of 
empowerment that is discerned in his presentation of human freedom as creative 
transcendence.581 
It is the microcosmic theme underlying the system that has highlighted both the 
presence of powerful dynamics in his thinking and the inconsistency between his 
580 See pp.32,41-44 above. 
581 See p.136 above. 
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notion of creaturely freedom and estrangement on the one hand, and his system as a 
whole, on the other. 
Why did Tillich not recognise such a serious contradiction in his system? After all, his 
theology is highly sophisticated and rigorous. Could it be that the rigour of his logic 
failed him? That is not what the present chapter wishes to argue. Instead, it intends to 
suggest that the flaw was not in his reasoning, but in his exclusively dualistic approach, 
an approach that accentuated the lack of integration between the rational argument that 
produced his system and the intuition that fuelled his thinking. Rather than suggesting 
that his system was lacking in rational rigour, it is argued that his rational argument 
was so logically rigorous that the intuition of the microcosmic/macrocosmic relation 
between the creature and Creator remained largely unconscious for him and therefore, 
unrecognised in his system. In short, there was a lack of integration between his 
unconscious and conscious being because of his entrenchment in conceptual thinking, a 
mode of consciousness established in the two preceding chapters as dualistic in nature. 
As a result, the inconsistency between the tone of the system as a whole and his 
handling of creaturely freedom and estrangement went unnoticed. 
Tillich's insistence upon the truly free nature of the human being was the product of his 
determination to show that freedom in life was real and not merely divine lip-service. 
He wished to portray the Creator/creature relationship as a resonating and participatory 
one, but was only too well aware of the pitfalls of so doing. One such pitfall arose with 
regard to the omnipotence and omniscience of the Creator. To guard against the 
creature being overpowered by such a Creator, Tillich emphasised creaturely freedom, 
to the extent that it was free even to surrender its humanity. At the same time, his desire 
not to suggest that the Creator was in any way in need of the creature led him to be 
wary of going too far in the direction of creaturely influence over the Creator, a 
direction taken by Jacob Boehme. 582 His solution to the problem of divine 
omnipotence and creaturely freedom was a strictly dualistic one; to keep the two utterly 
distinct by preserving the notion of creaturely Fall as ontological separation from God. 
582 See p.I 08 above. 
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The dichotomy he faced with regard to this issue gives an insight into the degree to 
which he himself was integrated. Divine omnipotence challenges creaturely freedom 
only when the two are seen as distinct. If the power of the divine is both external to, 
and removed from me, and if that power is regarded as utterly superior to what little I 
may have myself, then of course, my reaction is to be anxious about such a power. If I 
were to assert my own freedom in relation to such a being, I would have to say that the 
divine itself granted me the freedom to live alone and to seek Him out when I wished. 
The relationship would not be one of equality, but one based upon divine grace. 
However, what if divine omnipotence and creaturely freedom were not seen as distinct? 
What would be the relationship between Creator and creature then? Indeed, how would 
it be possible not to see them as distinct without losing the essential nature of both? 
These questions both pertain to a more fundamental question, namely, to one regarding 
the perception of the relationship between Creator and creature. As such, the question 
pertains to the nature of creaturely consciousness in relation to the Creator. If the 
understanding of the ultimate separation between creature and Creator is expression of 
a dualistic perception, then expression of the absence of distinction between the two is 
clearly one that approaches unitary awareness. 
In light of this, and in view of our extensive discussion of unitary awareness in the two 
preceding chapters, it is useful to make reference back to the Chinese texts already 
examined to help us begin to address this issue. Thus, the question that underlies the 
two questions raised above may be expressed in the following way: in what way must 
consciousness of the Creator !creature relationship in Tillichian theology change, in 
order to overcome the sense of distinction between divine omnipotence and creaturely 
freedom without losing the essential nature of both? 
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The Microcosmic Theme in the Chinese Tradition of Tao 
In Chapters Five and Six, we learned that the depiction of the Tao in the Lao Tzu and 
the Chuang Tzu was onto-cosmological and simultaneously cosmo-ontological. In 
onto-cosmological tenns, the Tao is the force of the universe as it works toward the 
differentiation of reality. In cosmo-ontological tenns, it is the dynamic force of the 
macrocosm, the process of things as they return to their origin. S83 In other words, the 
Tao expresses the dynamic relationship between the macrocosm of the noumenal and 
the microcosm of the phenomenal. The Tao is not an entity or a state, but a dynamic 
process of differentiation and return to non-differentiation that is both macrocosmic and 
microcosmic in nature. 
We learned also that the human being flows with the same dynamic of differentiation 
and return as that of the universe, for the fonner is a microcosm of the latter.584 As 
such, the Tao is innate to the human being, and finds expression through the innate 
nature or virtue (fe) of every individual. In the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu, the true 
man - the sage - is one who has cultivated himself from the original ignorance of the 
child to the dynamic state of sagely forgetfulness. This is a process of spiritual 
cultivation in which the childhood dynamic of evolving differentiation gradually and 
ultimately turns into the dynamic process of spiritual maturity, in which differentiation 
returns to its source, non-differentiated unity. Thus, the true man falls into sagely 
forgetfulness, the dynamic state of non-action (wu-wei). In this state, self-consciousness 
and differentiation have been returned to their source, unitary consciousness and 
mindlessness, allowing the sage to act spontaneously and effortlessly. His actions are 
effortless because he has relinquished all responsibility for them and allows himself to 
flow with the dynamic of the Tao. Thus, the actions of the sage are no longer his 
actions, but expression of the dynamic Tao. In short, the sage lives in total integration; 
his being and doing are utterly harmonised with the flow of the Tao. Thus, the sage has 
no conscious awareness of distinction between he as actor and the act he performs; 
583 See p.243 above. 
584 Ibid. 
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neither is he aware of any distinction between he as microcosm and the macrocosm of 
the universe, within which the sage acts spontaneously. Thus, in the state of sagely 
forgetfulness, the noumenal expression of the Tao is fully integrated with its 
phenomenal expression of the sage's virtue (le). 
Moreover, we have learned in Chapters Five and Six that sagely forgetfulness is not a 
mystical state in which the sage is removed from life. On the contrary, through the 
story of the master cook presented in Chapter Five, we have seen that acting through 
non-action (wei-wu-wei) affords the actor skills and abilities that far exceed the 
capacity of an individual operating through a normal, dual istic mode of awareness. S8S 
In terms of the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu, then, it is clear that a total integration of 
the noumenal with the phenomenal is possible without the individual losing the ability 
to act in the phenomenal world. Rather, by relinquishing control of one's actions and 
awareness of self, it is possible to act in a far more effective way than is possible in a 
self-conscious state. Thus, unitary awareness should not be regarded as a condition in 
which the differentiated reality of the phenomenal dissolves, but rather is the condition 
in which consciousness of the differentiated reality of the phenomenal dissolves. This 
is a most significant distinction for it highlights the crucial point that in the texts of the 
Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu, reality is not characterised by humanly perceived 
distinctions between phenomena, but by the dynamic mystery of the Tao. In other 
words, reality does not change as the result of changes in human perception, but as the 
result ofthe enigma ofthe Tao. 
We learned earlier that the emgma of the Tao, by definition, renders the Tao 
perpetually changing. That human beings attach themselves to knowledge and 
statements of truth, as well as to the senses, highlights the mistaken nature of their 
understanding of reality, according to the Chinese texts. Reality is the dynamic and 
enigmatic quality of the Tao, which is therefore, ineffable precisely because it is 
dynamic and enigmatic. Thus, unitary awareness represents the relinquishing of the 
585 See pp. 221-225 above. 
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confusion generated by the false assumption that the human being can know reality 
through perception. Reality cannot be known, just experienced. It therefore, cannot be 
reflected upon, but lived spontaneously with mindlessness. 
In light of this discussion, it is perhaps apparent that the Chinese texts have a powerful 
sense not simply of the possibility of the noumenal being integrated with the 
phenomenal, but the absolute necessity of this for the true freedom of the human being. 
In the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu, true freedom is the consequence of the letting-go 
of attachment to the phenomenal world, which includes the letting-go of conceptual 
awareness and knowledge. As highlighted above, this letting-go does not equate to the 
realisation of the unreality of the phenomenal world; rather it pertains specifically to 
one's consciousness of the phenomenal world. By letting go of the distorted 
consciousness of conceptualisation, one is able to flow within the reality of the 
phenomenal world without living and operating through misconception. 586 The 
allusion in the texts to the cleaning of one's mirror with regard to the purifying of the 
heart-mind provides an important insight into the reality of the phenomenal world, 
which stands independent of the human being's perception of its reality.s87 The true 
man's heart-mind is so clear of blemish and transparent that it simply reflects reality as 
it is without projecting distorted images of it that arise through the conceptualisation of 
dualistic awareness. This reiterates the point made in Chapter Six that the Lao Tzu 
denotes no sense in which the human being plays a significant role in the workings of 
the universe. The text promotes the falling in line with the flow of the Tao, not so that 
586 Hence, in the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu. a common metaphor for the heart-mind (hsin) of 
the sage is a mirror, for a mirror simply reflects what is without distortion. The complete 
Works ofChuang Tzu, transl. Watson, p.97: "The Perfect Man uses his mind like a mirror-
~oing after nothing, welcoming nothing, responding but not storing." 
87 Doeringer explains the significance of the mirror metaphor in the Chuang Tzu in the 
following way: "The enlightened mind is one in which the process of self-aware thought has 
stopped, 'so that consciousness is not discriminatory nor focused upon individualised forms. 
For only then can it mirror the formless, the ground out of which the formed emerges' 
(Chuang-tzu, 4:2.7a) and into which it passes" F.M. Doeringer: 'Imaging the lmageless', pp. 1-
28, at 13). 
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the human being can fulfil a universal role, but rather to avoid the pain to the individual 
of trying to live and work against the natural flow oflife.588 
This contrasts starkly with Tillichian theology. Tillich's entire system is based upon the 
premise that humanity is the instrument of the divine, the bearer of spirit in the world, 
for the world. This is the consequence of the presence of the logos in the essential and 
existential composition of humanity. Moreover, in utter opposition to the view 
presented in the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu, for Tillich, reality is shaped by the 
perception of the human being. There is an intimate connection between the world and 
self, and the way in which the self reflects upon the world and acts within the world 
that determines the nature of the world itself. We have seen that this is so because the 
principles of the Divine life pulsate through the structure of finitude, and find 
expression through the logos structure of reality present in both the external world and 
the internal being ofhumanity.589 
In view of this, to claim that reality is shaped by human perception is not to make a 
solipsistic statement. As established in Chapter Four and reiterated in our present 
discussion, the microcosmic hue of the relation between creaturely and divine life 
renders the human being the vehicle for divine actualisation, and human perception the 
means by which the potential of the divine life is realised. 590 
Thus, in antithesis to the Chinese texts considered above, for TiIlich, human 
consciousness does, indeed, shape the reality of the phenomenal world, and history 
provides the context for, as well as the record of, the way in which it has been shaped. 
Time and space provide the circumstance and context within which the human being 
acts. These conditions of existence, along with causality and substance, are those which 
facilitate the process of actualisation of that which is potential. It is humanity, with the 
gift of logos - the power of reason - firmly rooted in its psyche, which is charged with 
588 See p.256 above. 
589 The idea of the Divine pulse providing the dynamic for the ontological structure of being 
was established in Chapter One (see pp. 17 - 27). 
590 See p. 173-175 above. 
281 
the responsibility of making actual that which would otherwise remain potential. In 
short, the human being is the instrument of the divine, and the task of the former is to 
overcome the ambiguities of existence so that it may become an effective instrument. 
The symbol Jesus as the Christ is the means by which the human being is empowered 
to fulfil its responsibilities. 
The contrast between the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu on the one hand, and Tillichian 
theology on the other in this respect appears to be so stark that it would seem to be 
impossible to utilise the theme of integration between the noumenal and phenomenal in 
the Chinese texts to help us to address the question currently being considered, namely: 
in what way must consciousness of the Creatoricreature relationship in Tillichian 
theology change, in order to overcome the sense of distinction between divine 
omnipotence and creaturely freedom without losing the essential nature of both? To 
attempt to adopt the type of unitary awareness that is promoted in the Lao Tzu and the 
Chuang Tzu with regard to the Tillichian understanding of the Creator/creature 
relationship would be to relinquish the essential nature of the creature as bearer of 
spirit. The creature would, therefore, cease to operate as the vehicle of divine 
actualisation in the world. This then, would not be a possible answer to the question 
under consideration. 
However, perhaps the contrast is not as stark as it seems at first sight. Although the 
Chinese texts dismiss conceptualisation as the means to grasping the reality of the 
enigma of the Tao, they maintain an intimate connection between the phenomenal and 
the noumenal in so far as the macrocosmic Tao finds expression in the innate virtue (le) 
of every living thing, including the human being.59l 
Likewise, as alluded to earlier in this chapter, Tillich maintains the intimate connection 
between the divine life and finite life through the logos, a connection that not only runs 
through the human being, but also every living thing. Life is described by Tillich as a 
multi-dimensional unity, in which the realms and dimensions that compose the universe 
591 Chuang Tzu: A New Selected Translation, Transl. Fung, p.9. 
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are dynamically interrelated. Key to their interrelatedness is the logos principle present 
in the world. Tillich argues that each realm is distinguished from others by the 
particular dimension that predominates, but that all dimensions are potentially present 
in each realm. Hence, the realm of the inorganic has the dimension of the spirit 
potentially present, although the spiritual dimension requires the realm of history to 
become actualised. 592 As established earlier in this thesis, the dimension of spirit 
requires the logos principle to find expression. 593 It follows, therefore, that if the 
dimension of spirit is present as potential in every realm, then so is the logos principle. 
In short, the logos principle is innate to every realm of reality, just as the virtue (le) of 
the Chinese texts is present in every living thing in the universe. 
There is therefore, a point of contact between Tillichian theology and the philosophies 
of the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu in this respect. The connection is the 
microcosmic/macrocosmic understanding of the interrelatedness of reality. Moreover, 
all three recognise the utterly dynamic nature of that reality. 
However, the Chinese texts and Tillich part company in their understanding of the 
precise nature of that reality. While the Chinese texts denote the dynamic nature of 
reality in terms of enigma, and the consequential inability to grasp that reality through 
the wisdom of knowledge, Tillich describes the dynamism as one that is structured 
upon the logos principle, a dynamism therefore, that is not only accessible to the human 
being, whose psyche is structured by the same principle, but is also grasped and shaped 
by the human being. 
In short, what distinguishes the position of the Chinese texts from that of Tillich with 
regard to reality is the former's willingness to adopt a far more macrocosmic centred 
vision of reality, and the latter's far more microcosmic vision. That is to say. the 
Chinese texts adopt a far more holistic approach, which places primary focus upon the 
reality of the macrocosmic Tao, rather than the human being. Thus, the Lao Tzu and the 
592 See p. 65 above. 
593 See p. 66 above. 
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Chuang Tzu speak of the sage as one who lets go of self to harmonise with the flow of 
reality. 
In contrast, Tillich promotes a far more critically reflective, self-conscious vision of 
reality, in which the starting point of his theology is the human situation and 
circumstance in time and space, and the macrocosm represents a projection out beyond 
the human being. 
Both the Chinese texts and Tillich uphold the mystery of the macrocosm, but while the 
former embrace the mystery as part of the reality of human existence, Tillich insists 
upon detaching the mystery from human reality by placing it in a realm that is 
inaccessible to the finite creature, except through the mediation of symbols. In other 
words, while the Chinese texts promote the capacity for the human being to merge with 
the mystery of the macrocosm, Tillich denies this capacity as innate to the human being 
and upholds the need for mediation between the reality of human existence and the 
mystery of the divine. Thus, the Chinese texts promote an ontology that is integrated 
with cosmology,594 while Tillich promotes an ontology that is qualitatively distinct 
from cosmology. 
While both the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu on the one hand, and TilIich on the other 
speak of the importance of integration, there is a subtle distinction between their 
respective perspectives on the nature of such integration. For the Chinese texts, the 
human being falls in line with the flow of the dynamic reality of the enigmatic Tao, and 
to do so, requires the relinquishing of the quest for knowledge in preference for the 
spontaneity of intuitive wisdom, attained through the process of letting-go of 
attachment to the phenomenal world. Due to the intimate connection between ontology 
and cosmology in the Chinese texts, letting go of the phenomenal affords access to the 
noumenal. Hence, integration in terms of these Chinese texts means harmonisation 
between one's heart-mind (hsin) and the Tao to permit the enigmatic flow of the Tao to 
travel unimpaired through one's entire being. Such integration requires a clearing of 
594 See, for example, p.217 above. 
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blockages that are physical, emotional, mental and spiritual, so that onc's being 
becomes a clear channel for the flow of the Tao. The effect is an integration of being 
and doing that is so total, there is no distinction between the actor and the action that is 
being performed;595 this is the attainment ofwei-wu-wei.s96 
Tillich promotes the responsibility of humanity for the universe in which it is situated, a 
responsibility given through its role as bearer of spirit in and for the world. Thus, for 
Tillich, integration pertains to the presence of the dimension of spirit in the human 
being, afforded through the logos structure of the human psyche. Integration pertains to 
the coming together of the drive of eros with the structure of reason,597 which is 
achieved through the unifying function of the dimension of spirit. However, in stark 
contrast to the Chinese texts, although the integrative process takes place in the 
phenomenal world, for Tillich, total integration is not directly achievable for the human 
being because the phenomenal realm in which the human being is situated is 
ontologically separated from the noumenal realm. Thus, the integration of which 
Tillich speaks is necessarily mediated through the symbol of Jesus as the Christ, which 
links the phenomenal with the noumenal and the microcosm with the macrocosm.598 
What can be concluded is that the holistic focus of the Chinese texts accommodates a 
total and unmediated integration of the human being. In contrast, Tillich's focus upon 
the human situation promotes an integration that is based more upon human 
incompleteness than innate capacity. Although Tillich explicitly alludes to a holistic 
understanding of reality in his discussion of the multi-dimensional unity of Ii fe, and has 
implicit in his system a microcosmic-macrocosmic cosmology,S99 his insistence upon 
the ontological separation between the realms of the phenomenal and noumenal inhibits 
this holistic vision and prevents his cosmology from finding full expression. 
595 Loy, 'Wei-Wu-Wei: Non-dual Action,' p.73. 
596 See discussion ofwei-wu-wei in Ch.S, pp.221-22S above. 
597 See p.67 above. 
598 See pp. 140, 141 above. 
599 Cosmology of this nature is inevitably holistic, for central to it is the understanding of the 
presence of the whole, i.e. the macrocosm, within the part, i.e. the microcosm. 
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In light of this discussion, then, how can the Chinese texts under consideration help us 
to seek the answer to the question raised earlier, namely: in what way must 
consciousness of the Creatorlcreature relationship in Ti/licllian theology change, in 
order to overcome the sense of distinction between divine omnipotence and creaturely 
freedom, without losing the essential nature of both? 
The texts bring into relief a microcosmic world-view in which there is no sense of 
anxiety between the microcosm and the macrocosm, and no sense of ontological 
distinction between the two. Moreover, the absence of distinction is so profound that 
they speak in cosmo-ontological and onto-cosmological terms, rather than in 
exclusively ontological terms with regard to the Tao and the human being.60o This is the 
novelty of their perspective, which has not been evident in our discussions of the 
previous microcosmic themes. From the medieval microcosmic perspective, although 
the wholly connected nature of the relation between man and God was upheld, there 
was also present the understanding that God was qualitatively different: God was 
perfection. Man as the microcosm was hampered by his corporeal body in his return to 
the Source, which tied him to the realms of time and space. 601 In the Renaissance 
perspective, the connection between God as macrocosm and man as microcosm 
remained, but the focus shifted more toward the possibility of human achievement and 
power to discover truths than had been previously the case.602 In Tillichian theology, 
the microcosmic theme is further developed by highlighting the participatory and 
resonating relationship between the creature as sustained and the Creator as Sustainer. 
However, as with the microcosmic themes of the Renaissance and Middle Ages, TiIlich 
preserves the qualitative distinction between the Creator and the creature. This he 
defines in terms of the ontological estrangement of the latter from the former and the 
gift of grace from the former to the latter. 603 
600 See p.220 above. 
601 See pp. 76 & 80 above. 
602 See p.ll 0 above. 
603 See p.l58 above. 
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In the the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu however, for the first time, we see no sense of 
qualitative separation between the macrocosm and the microcosm. Rather. there is the 
possibility of harmonious accord between the two, in which the microcosm can connect 
up to the macrocosm. The result of this is the empowerment of the microcosm to 
perform acts to degrees of perfection that are not obtainable in a normal dualistic state 
of awareness. The Chinese texts show us that it is possible to live without a sense of 
separation from the macrocosm and the consequent anxiety and ambiguity that is 
generated by such a sense. 
Tillich's microcosmic theme remains implicit because his theology lacks the sense of 
harmony that permeates the microcosmic/macrocosmic onto-cosmology of the Chinese 
texts. This is due to Tillich's insistence upon the inevitable separation between 
humanity and God. His insistence upon separation impedes the dynamism that 
permeates his system as a whole. For Tillich, the presence of the dimension of spirit in 
the human being affords creative resolution of the ambiguities of life, and drives the 
process of spiritual consciousness throughout history. However, part of the ambiguity 
in life is, for Tillich, the difficulty in living according to the Spirit. llis argument for 
ontological separation between Creator and creature is the reason he gives for this 
difficulty. He suggests that the divine can only be glimpsed in life because of the 
existential state of estrangement.604 
The logical necessity for ambiguity and estrangement is derived from the pride of place 
given in his system to reflective consciousness. For him, consciousness of self and 
world results from one's ability to stand apart from the world on the one hand, and 
from one's self on the other. This is a strictly dualistic awareness of reality, which 
produces a system that hinges upon the dynamic tension between polarities. 
To reflect upon something means to stand apart from it. Thus, integral to reflective 
consciousness is the notion of distance and separation. As Tillich's system hinges upon 
604 See p.l77 above. 
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the reasoning faculty of the creature to bring to consciousness the dimension of spirit in 
the world, the notion of separation must remain integral to his system. 
The emphasis in the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu upon non-rcl1cctive, unitary 
consciousness eliminates the need for separation. It establishes much more easily the 
resonance between the macrocosm and the microcosm as a consequence. Thus, it may 
be argued that examination of the microcosmic theme in the Lao Tzu and the ChllanK 
Tzu has shown Tillich's claim for the ontological nature of estrangement to be a false 
claim, or at least a claim not shared by all philosophical traditions standing outside that 
of Christianity. As such, Tillich has no authority for arguing the ontological nature of 
estrangement, for to give estrangement such a status is to establish it as a fact of life 
that is universal in nature and not limited to the perceptions of a particular tradition. 
Now, our argument must proceed with great care at this point. Acknowledged earlier 
in this chapter is the profound difference between Tillich on the onc hand, and the 
Chinese texts on the other with regard to the relationship between the noumenal and 
phenomenal. This difference hinges upon a fundamental difference in the recognition 
of the position of the human being in the world in which it lives. In the Lao Tzu and 
the Chuang Tzu, the human being has no significant role to play in the world or in 
. history, for reality is not a perception, but the dynamic enigma of the Tao. For this 
reason, the integrated nature of cosmology with ontology is far more easily established 
in these texts than it would be in the Tillichian system. If there is no universal purposc 
in the human conceptual faculty, but instead, a recognition of the reality of enigmatic 
dynamism as that which drives life, then, the relinquishing of the power and hold of 
conceptualisation in the normal world of sensory and dualistic perception is perhaps not 
only desirable, but also necessary, to allow the dynamic flow of reality to take its 
natural course, unimpeded by human misconception. Thus, the relinquishing of the 
potent status of the human being in history and in existence in general leads to an 
ontology that naturally integrates with cosmology and dismisses the value of 
epistemology. 
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In stark contrast however, as we have already demonstrated, is TilIich's high valuation 
of the human being in existence. There is purpose in human life, and that results from 
the logos structure of the human psyche, which correlates with the logos structure of 
existence itself, and in turn, correlates with the Logos principle of the Divine life. For 
Tillich, the gift of the logos structure of the human psyche renders humanity the 
instrument of the divine, and as such, it must be used if the potential of the Creator is to 
be made actual in creation. The gift of logos is also the gift of creaturely freedom. 
Surely, then, in light of this, ontology - the knowledge of being - is absolutely pivotal in 
the process of actualisation that is existence? Surely, also, as a vital instrument in the 
knowledge of being, critical reflection, i.e. epistemology, which is not only absent from 
the texts of the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu, but also somewhat demeaned, is key in 
that process? 
Tillich's insistence upon critical reflection and his high valuation of epistemology 
however, leads him in a direction that blinkers him from the powerful presence of the 
Divine pulse within creaturely life. His focus upon the existential responsibility of the 
human being blinds him to the presence of the power of the divine in existence. llis 
sense of human freedom and responsibility overshadows the larger presence of the 
divine. To express this in the terminology used in this thesis. the sense of 
microcosmic/macrocosmic relation between creature and Creator is overshadowed by 
the sense of creaturely autonomy. 
There is no suggestion here that Tillichian theology should move toward a Taoist sense 
of microcosm/macrocosm. To do so would be to ignore the profundity of the 
differences between the two perspectives. The former is based upon a powerful 
understanding of the role of human consciousness in the evolution of history, which is 
absent from the latter. 
Instead, the suggestion is that to overcome the ambiguities and inconsistencies with 
regard to creaturely freedom and estrangement, it is necessary for Tillich to 
acknowledge far. more explicitly than he does the ereaturely connection with the 
Creator, so that the divine life, shown by the microcosmic theme implicit in his 
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theology to pulsate through the life of the creature, may do so far more strongly than it 
does in his system as it stands. 
Consideration of the Chinese texts has shown that Tillich's claim for the ontological 
nature of estrangement should not necessarily be accepted as the irrefutable fact of life 
that Tillich wishes us to believe. 
Let us return to the question currently under consideration, i.e. in what way mll.\'1 
consciousness of the Creatorlcreature relationship in Til/ie/lian theology change, ill 
order to overcome the sense of distinction between divine omnipotence amI cre(ltllrely 
freedom, without losing the essential nature of both? It is perhaps increasingly clear 
that the key to the answer lies in the presence of the microcosmic theme underlying 
Tillich's system. For that theme to find full voice in Tillich's system, it is necessary to 
find a way of resolving his insistence upon the theme of separation. From what has 
been argued above, it would appear that in order to do this, it is necessary to find a way 
of going beyond reflective consciousness, which is strictly dualistic in nature. 
Separation: the Cause of Tillichian Ambiguity 
According to the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu, harmony is achieved when the being 
and doing of an individual fall into alignment both with each other, and with the 
external environment of the macrocosm. This is the dynamic state expressed in the 
. f . (. n 605 term, the actIOn 0 non-actIOn wel-wu-wel/. 
In Tillich's system the difficulty in being fully human lies in the ambiguities of life. To 
be fully human means to be free - to live creatively by transcending the ambiguities of 
life. But could it be that these ambiguities are created by Tillich's insistence upon his 
cool, reflective, rational approach? Could it be that the difficulty TilIieh secs in being 
605 See pp.222-225 above. 
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human is derived from his disproportionately high valuation of epistemology in relation 
to the concern shown in his system for uncritical experience, instinct and intuition? 
The Chinese tradition has demonstrated the importance of living through one's heart-
mind (hsin). To live in such a way is to act intuitively, instinctively and spontaneously 
in harmonious accord with the Tao as it flows through one's entire being, including the 
physical body, the emotions and the spirit.606 
Reflective consciousness, in contrast, emphasises the head of the human being without 
a commensurate valuation of other aspects of the organism, such as direct unscJf-
conscious experience and intuition. Where Tillich does make reference to the non-
rational aspects of the human being, he tends to depict them as being controlled by 
cognition. For example, he states: 
Emotion is the vehicle for receiving cognition. But the vehicle is far 
from making the content itself emotional. The content is rational, 
something to be verified, to be looked at with critical caution ... No union 
of subject and object is possible without emotional participation.607 
Here, although he recognises emotion as playing a role in the integration of subject and 
object, it is a role that confirms the supremacy of cognition in the process of 
integration. 
606 The term 'spirit' in the context Dfthe Chinese texts under examination should not be 
interpreted in the TilIichian sense of the term. Watson uses the term "Spirit Storehouse" in his 
translation of Chuang Tzu Ch.S and explains this expression as "a Taoist term for the mind" 
(The Complete works ofChuang Tzu, transl. Watson, p.74.). Chan translates 'spirit' as shen in 
Chinese, and suggests that in the Lao Tzu, shen pertains both to the connection between human 
energy and that of the Tao. (A.K.L.Chan, A Tale of Two Commentaries: 'Ho-shang-kung and 
Wang Pi on the Lao-tzu', L.Kohn & M. LaFargue (eds.), Lao Tzu & the Tao-te-ching (State 
University of New York Press, Albany 1998), p.93. The connection between spirit (.~hen) 
and Tao is developed more clearly in Traditional Chinese Medicine and the ancient breathing 
art ofQi Gong. There, spirit (shen) has both pre-natal and post-natal aspects, as well as 
microcosmic and macrocosmic aspects. In view of the complexity and ambiguity of the term, it 
lies beyond the scope of this thesis to explore the term any further. The purpose of making 
reference to the term here is simply to highlight the Chinese texts' far more holistic and 
integrated understanding of life in relation to the Tao compared with Tillichian theology, 
607 Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol.l, p.98. 
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Tillich's high valuation of the faculty of reason finds particularly clear expression in his 
insistence upon the gulf generated between dreaming innocence and post-Fall 
consciousness. This gulf, expressed by the term ontological estrangement. perhaps 
suggests Tillich's fear of the unconscious. Tillich equates dreaming innocence with 
unconsciousness and although he argues that this is the reservoir from which 
consciousness draws, his insistence upon the ontological estrangement that the Fall 
symbolises would seem to reveal his wish not to draw too much from such a reservoir. 
The theme of estrangement effectively establishes a safe haven for conscious reflection. 
where the human reasoning faculty can reign supreme as the bearer of spirit for the 
world. 
Tillich's suggestion that encounter of the divine can only be fragmentary ensures the 
safety of the faculty of reason from a deluge of unconsciousness that might threaten to 
overwhelm it. Let us have access to the divine, yes, but please Lord, let it only be a 
trickle. His symbol system provides the channel through which the divine life finds 
expression in creaturely life, but because this system is entrenched in the faculty of 
reason and language, the extent to which Spirit imbues creaturely life is determined by 
the creature. It is necessary to expand upon this assertion a little. How does Tillich's 
symbol system enable the creature to do this? 
In Chapter Three, the significance of Tillich's symbol system was discussed. A symbol 
is the means of accessing the divine that dwells in our hidden depths.60s This it does by 
virtue of its two qualities: firstly, it points to the power or meaning that lies beyond the 
immediacy of the physical aspect of the symbol itself. Secondly, it participates in that 
power or meaning toward which it points. For Tillich, a symbol springs spontaneously 
from the depths of the collective unconscious. It therefore, has the capacity to unlock 
the dimension of depth in reality, and to open up this dimension both in the world and 
in the soul of an individua1.609 
608 See p.l33 above. 
609 Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture, p.57. 
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Thus, the symbol mediates the subject-object correlation. Through the symbol's 
mediation, a process of integration begins between the inner and outer aspects of the 
human being. In short, the symbol acts as the channel between the potential that is 
unconsciousness and actuality that is consciousness. It acts as the channel for 
communion between the Creator and the creature. 
By defining symbol as participating in meaning and pointing beyond itself toward the 
depth of meaning, Tillich affirms symbol as a tool of reflective consciousness. The 
power of the symbol lies in its entrenchment in reflective thought. The power of the 
divine in the depths of the human unconscious speaks through human consciousness by 
means of the symbol. 
His symbol system reiterates his insistence upon separation. There is no direct 
accessing of the unconscious aspect of our creatureliness; it may only be accessed 
through the controlling influence of conscious reflection, of which the symbol is a tool. 
Tillich's high valuation of the human faculty of reason shows his theology to demand 
that the ground of being speaks our language. In this way, his symbol system enables 
the creature to regulate the extent to which the divine life can find expression in 
creaturely life. 
This use of symbolism contrasts starkly with that used in the Lao Tzu. In Chapter Five. 
although reference was made to Doeringer's drawing of parallels between Tillich's use 
of symbol and the symbolism of the Lao Tzu, this thesis argued that TilIich's use of 
symbolism was more in line with that of Cusanus than that of the Lao Tzu. It was 
suggested that both Cusanus and Tillich shared a sense of the mediatory role of 
symbolism to point toward that which lies qualitatively removed from the realm of 
existence.610 In contrast, the symbolism of the Lao Tzu was shown to be intentionally 
illogical and paradoxical, the means by which the symbol functioned as a tool for 
shocking the reader into recognition of the inadequacy of conceptual thought.611 The 
non-rational nature of the symbolism of the Chinese text highlighted the need to let go 
6\0 See p.21 0 above. 
6Jl The Complete Works ofChuang Tzu, transl. Watson, p.6. 
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of conceptualisation in the process of integration. This process was one that was 
unmediated and wholly accessible to the human being. 
In stark contrast, Tillich's emphasis upon symbolism as the mediator of meaning 
emphasises Tillich's high valuation of the faculty of reason and conceptualisation. Its 
mediatory role accentuates Tillich's insistence upon the qualitative gulf between the 
realms of the human and the divine, and the consequent incompleteness of the human 
being in existence. 
The symbolism of the Chinese texts alludes to a process of integration in which the 
human being expands out beyond the confines of dualistic awareness into a dynamic 
state in which an individual functions in total harmony with the dynamic power of the 
macrocosm. Thus, the Chinese symbolism expresses the holistic understanding of 
human existence in relation to the macrocosm, and provides further illustration of the 
cosmo-ontology/onto-cosmological nature of reality. Unlike Tillich's system, 
integration with the macrocosm does not leave the individual with a sense of 
incompleteness. Instead, integration empowers the individual. 
The Partial Nature of Tillich's Integration 
Tillich makes reference to spontaneity in his system. He states: 
a reaction to a stimulus is spontaneous if it comes from the 
centred and self-related whole of a being. 612 
He claims that the relationship between spontaneity and law is analogous to that 
between freedom and destiny: to be spontaneous is to act in full accord with the 
612 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, voU, p.185. 
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structure of one's being.613 As the law of the human being is based upon the rational 
structure of the creature, spontaneity is the acting of a being that has become· centred 
and whole through the resonance between one's inner rational structure and the 
external rational structure of the world. 
From this, it would appear that Tillich's understanding of spontaneity is not far 
removed from that found in the Chinese texts. As discussed in Chapter Five, 
spontaneity (ziran) in the Chuang Tzu is a dynamic state in which the sage is able to 
respond instinctively to any situation through an awareness that has expanded beyond 
the limits of normality. Both imply that spontaneity is the effect of integration, and 
both suggest that there is an integrating principle that facilitates this. In the Chinese 
texts, virtue (te), the microcosmic expression of the Tao, permits the human being to 
integrate with the macrocosmic flow of the Tao; for Tillich it is logos, the structure of 
reason. 
However, in contrast to the Chinese texts, which depict the spontaneous nature of 
sagely integration,614 Tillich insists upon the mediation of the symbol system to bring 
about integration of the internal self and external world. 
Tillich does not permit human integration to be so complete that experience of the 
divine is spontaneous. His insistence upon the mediating role of symbol establishes 
that human integration remains only partial. The gulf between the creature and Creator 
is unbridgeable for the creature, despite the divine integrating principle of logos 
residing in the very structure of the creature's being. Despite his insistence that reason 
pertains to one's whole being, and not simply to one's mind, his refusal to allow 
spontaneous experience of the divine to be unmediated betra~s the fact that his 
theology pays only lip service to the presence of the logos structure in the entire 
organism of the human being. His insistence upon the importance of reflective 
consciousness as the expression of logos undermines the presence of the logos structure 
in non-reflective human experience. 
613 Ibid. 
614 See p.228 above. 
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Tillich's sense of integration lacks experiential impact upon the individual. The 
integration of which he speaks does not happen within the individual, but in some 
abstract, intangible midway point between the inner being of the individual and their 
external world. What is more, it requires a third element to bring it about. Thus, 
Tillich's sense of integration is not rooted within the human creature at all; it hovers 
close to it, but it does not work within it. 
If the creature's function in life is to act as bearer of Spirit, as Tillich claims, and if the 
dimension of spirit is activated through the creature's capacity to transcend the 
ambiguities of life, then it is necessary to speak in very concrete terms, not in abstract 
notions. Reflective thought must be anchored by the concrete circumstance of personal 
experience and feeling. The integration between self and world must be exemplified in 
the actual life of a particular human being, not in the theoretical life of 'the creature'. 
To speak of the human creature accessing its depths is to speak in an abstract way. For 
that to have any meaning whatsoever, it must be pinned down to the reality of 
individual people experiencing the effects of accessing their personal depths. 
Tillich, indeed, realised the importance of situating integration within a particular 
human being and therefore, of grounding his theology in concrete circumstance. This 
he did by means of the symbol, Jesus as the Christ. This is the pivotal symbol in his 
system that integrates the vertical dimension of divine life with the horizontal 
dimension of historical creaturely life.615 However, his insistence upon the symbolic 
nature of Jesus as the Christ reiterates his own failure to become integrated through this 
figure, for we have seen that a symbol is the mediator between the potentiality of our 
unconsciousness and the actuality of consciousness. With Jesus as the Christ as a 
symbol, Tillich repeats his sense of the separation between unconsciousness and 
consciousness. The symbolic nature of this figure shows that its function is a mediating 
one, and mediation is needed only when there is separation or estrangement between 
two parties. His insistence upon Jesus as the Christ as the perfect symbol that fulfills 
all others brings integration closer to the human being, but the fact that it remains a 
615 See pp.139-141 above. 
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symbol indicates that even this is not powerful enough to overcome the estrangement 
that Tillich insists upon. 
He maintains that only Jesus as the Christ is integrated because only this figure 
embodies the concrete circumstance of Jesus of Nazareth and the divine authority of 
Jesus Christ.616 Yet, if Tillich is able to assert that we are all grounded in being itself 
and that we live with the divine in our depths, why is it not possible for Jesus as the 
Christ to be integral to us, rather than a mediating channel for us? 
The salvific function of Jesus as the Christ is one of integration; Tillich himself defines 
salvation as making whole, making complete. 617 If Jesus as the Christ provides 
salvation in terms of making whole that which is separated, and if that which is 
separated is the conscious life of the creature from the unconscious depths of its being, 
as Tillich asserts in his discussion of the Fall, then salvation means integrating 
consciousness with unconsciousness. Through such integration there would no longer 
be the need for the mediating function of the symbol. 
Therefore, if Jesus as the Christ is the Saviour, he does not do so as a symbol. Rather, 
the power of his presence within the soul of the human being and within the external 
world functions to connect human consciousness with its unconscious depths. Such a 
connection would facilitate the spontaneity in the creature that is lacking in the 
estranged creature depicted in Tillich's system. 
Tillich's claim that the power of Jesus as the Christ is a mediating symbol reveals his 
own failure to accept the integrative power of this figure. It perhaps betrays the fact that 
Tillich's inner being was not so moved by that power that he could let go of his hold 
upon conscious reflection to allow himself to act spontaneously and fall into his own 
divine depths, knowing that the Saviour was there to ensure that he did not fall into 
oblivion. 
616 See p.139 above. 
617 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, voU, p.l46. 
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Tillich's insistence upon symbol as the means by which the depths of being are 
accessed portrays the distance that he must have felt between those depths and the 
conscious life of the individual. To claim that the unconscious is the reservoir from 
which consciousness draws and, at the same time, to suggest that mediation is needed 
to draw from that reservoir reveals the extent to which his own consciousness perhaps 
needed protection from his unconscious depths. lIe must have been afraid of those 
depths, for why else would he insist upon separation, if he knew that his consciollsness 
depended upon the sustenance of the power residing in them? 
In the Chinese texts, we have learned of no sense of fear with regard to the power of the 
Too. On the contrary, readers are shown the way in which the Tao empowers the sage 
by flowing through him as he aligns his whole microcosmic being with the macrocosm. 
The holistic nature of reality presented in these texts renders unnecessary allusions to 
fear with regard to the macrocosm. 
Tillich depicts the ineffability of God by asserting that God " ... is that which lies 
beyond the polarity of finitude and infinite self-transcendence". 618 By lIsing this 
expression however, Tillich, does more than express God's ineffability: effectively, he 
removes God from finite reference. He turns his back upon God: the mind cannot 
conceive of the infinite beyond the infinite and therefore, God is out of our frame of 
reference. 
In the Chinese texts, in contrast, the ineffability of the Too is openly acknowledged and 
accepted without any sense of foreboding. This ineffability is not so much a comment 
upon the Too, as a comment upon the human limitation to comprehend. 619 
Furthermore, despite its incomprehensibility. the Too can be experienced.62o 
618 Ibid., p.191. 
619 Lao Tzu, transl. Ch'en p.3: "Since Lao Tzu's Tao by definition cannot be restricted, there is 
no way that he can use language to designate it while preserving the scope of its existence." 
620 Ibid., p.16. 
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This would appear to contrast starkly with Tillich's removal from the finite frame of 
reference of the infinite "beyond the polarity of finitude and infinite self-
transcendence".621 In an attempt to express the immanence of God, Tillich speaks of 
the divine as Creator and thus, offers a divine face that appears somewhat less incffuble 
than the infinite beyond the infinite. 
The Chinese texts succeed in integrating the ineffability of the Tao with its presence in 
the world far more effectively than does Tillich's system because the Lao Tzu and the 
Chuang Tzu recognise the capacity of the human being to develop consciousness to 
universal proportions, not as a means of dissolving the self, but as a means of 
functioning more powerfully as a human being. In contrast, Tillich's insistence upon 
the immanence of God in our depths on the one hand, and the gulf between the 
unconsciousness of those depths and consciousness on the other, demonstrates the 
clumsiness of Tillich's method. 
To eliminate the clumsiness, it is necessary to relinquish the excessive control enjoyed 
by the faculty of reason in his system, to allow the potential lying in the depths of 
humanity to find full expression. The grasping and shaping,622 so characteristic of 
Tillichian theology, evoke images of control and fear; we grasp something when we do 
not want to let it go, when we want to keep it for ourselves. We shape something in our 
own image because that is the image with which we are familiar. 
However, at the same time, the relinquishing of control does not mean a letting-go to 
the extent that all reflective consciousness disappears. This is the way promoted by the 
LaD Tzu and the Chuang TzU. 623 However, this is not appropriate for Tillichian 
theology, entrenched as it is in the western Christian tradition. In Christian terms, to let 
go to such an extent would mean the relinquishing of the reason that structures our 
being. This, in turn, would mean the impossibility of spontaneous action in the world in 
621 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol.l, p.146. 
622 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol.l, p.75. 
623 "Forget distinctions. Leap into the boundless and make it your home!" (The Complete 
Works ojChuang-tzu, Transl. Watson, p.49.) 
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the Tillichian sense of spontaneity. To do so would be not to function as a human 
being, for the role of humanity is, for Tillich, to act as bearer of the dimension of spirit 
to the world. 
In contrast, the Chinese texts, with their powerful sense of onto-cosmology, coupled 
with their lack of interest in human purpose in and for the world,624 are able to let go 
without losing human identity. This is possible because the human being functions 
through the universe and likewise, the universe functions through the human being. 
There is total interrelation and no suggestion of human uniqueness as part of its 
identity. 
In short, the total relinquishing of reflective consciousness in the Chinese texts leads to 
a human freedom that is fundamentally different from that proffercd by Tillich. 
Freedom for the Chinese texts means intentionless, spontaneous accord with the flow of 
the Tao. The macrocosmic Tao drives the actions of the sage because reality is not 
determined by human consciousness, but rather by the Tao.625 
In contrast, in Tillichian terms, freedom is the spontaneous action that is produced from 
the centred and self-related whole of a being.626 As such, it is the expression of the 
integration of the drive of eros and the structure of reason within an individual, which 
is also the integration of the inner being of individuals with their external function. 
Thus, the contrast with the Chinese notion of freedom, once again, as with other themes 
discussed in this chapter, is one of focus. For Tillich, integration and freedom focus 
upon the individual - the microcosm - and its function within the macrocosm, while for 
the Chinese texts, the focus is upon the macrocosm, not the individual. Once again, the 
reason for this contrast lies in the fundamentally divergent views of reality betwecn the 
624 " Whoever takes the empire and wishes to do anything to it I see will have not respite. The 
empire is a sacred vessel and nothing should be done to it. Whoever does anything to it will 
ruin it; whoever lays hold of it will lose it. (Lao Tzu, xxix,66, cited in Lao Tzu Tao re Chil% 
trans!. Lau, p.xxviii.) 
625 In less dualistic terms, the intent ofthe sage is so integrated with the flow of the Tao that the 
two cannot be differentiated; all distinctions have dissolved. 
626 P. TiIlich, Systematic Theology, voU, p.158. 
300 
Chinese texts and Tillich. For the Chinese texts, the macrocosmic Tao is reality; for 
Tillich, human perception, as the vehicle of the divine, determines reality. 
However, while accepting that a total letting-go of reflective consciousness is 
inappropriate in Tillichian theology, the elimination of the clumsiness of his approach 
requires a much stronger sense of the resonance between the creature's faculty of 
reason and the unconscious reservoir that fuels it. There must be a sense in which the 
flow between the two is much more powerful than a mere trickle. 
The question remains as to how the resonance and flow can be made more powerful. 
Although we have learned in the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu of the powerful 
resonance experienced by the sage in the dynamic state of non-action (wu-wei), it is not 
possible to suggest that the Chinese texts in this respect can lead Tillichian theology 
toward a more powerful theme of resonance and flow. The tension in Tillich's system 
and his insistence upon the importance of the faculty of reason is not simply his own 
idiosyncracy; it is a tension rooted in the western Christian tradition, in which he was 
steeped. Thus, the solution must be one that is compatible with, and meaningful to, that 
very tradition. 
The Chinese heritage of non-reflective consciousness and function is certainly not 
compatible with the Christian valuation of the unique role of humanity in the process of 
actualisation. For this reason, it is clear that the solution to Tillich's problem must be 
one that is compatible with the western heritage of reflective consciousness, 
creature/Creator relationship and historical process. 
Tillich's theology emphasises the resonating relationship between creature and Creator. 
It is a relationship of mutual participation expressed in terms of grace and faith: the 
Creator, through grace, reaches out to the creature to bridge the gap, unbridgeable by 
the creature, which is generated by the Fall. The correct response to the gracious divine 
act is to live a life of faith. Through faith, the ambiguities of life are transcended, for 
faith is the expression of the activation of the dimension of the spirit in life. Faith, 
however, cannot eliminate the ambiguities oflife, the products of the ontological nature 
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of estrangement. Thus, for Tillich, all that faith empowers the human creature to do is 
to live life courageously. It provides the creature with the 'courage to be. ,627 In stark 
contrast to the Chinese texts, despite Tillich's theoretical understanding of spontaneity. 
there is no reference to joyous and spontaneous living in his system. 
Thus, Tillich's understanding of faith highlights the separation between the divine and 
the creature. It suggests that, once again, God is with us, but not totally. God is clarity, 
but the human being lives a life of ambiguity. We can access God's clarity, but only to 
help reduce the mist that is the reality of life because of the ontological nature of our 
estrangement from God. He claims we should live life in faith, but his system denies 
us the opportunity to do that because his insistence upon ontological separation means 
that God cannot be with us every step of the way, even though he asserts that God is the 
ground of our being and is present in our depths. Here again, is the inconsistency in his 
system. 
Tillich's insistence upon creaturely estrangement means that we cannot have faith in 
ourselves because we are estranged from our root of being. Just as the integrative 
power of Jesus as the Christ is prevented from working from within, this fundamental 
estrangement denies us the possibility of resting in ourselves. 
Effectively, being human means knowing that we are not complete. Thus, our faith in 
God is a projection out in search of completeness, from the creaturely position of 
incompleteness. Our faith in the light of estrangement is not absolute trust in the solid 
root within ourselves, but a hope and a wish projected out in fear and anxiety. There is 
little wonder then, that the language of God is of a grasping and controlling nature, for 
what we seek is that rock which holds us as we drown in our estrangement. We need to 
have that rock. 
627 P.Tillich, The Courage to Be, (Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 1952). pp.178-
190. 
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The need to have something is a further demonstration of separation. It indicates a lack 
of integration within a being, for the desire to have is an admission of something 
lacking within ourselves. 
Removing the Theme of Estrangement from Tillich's System 
Now, if, as was proposed earlier, the notion of ontological separation were to be 
removed from Tillich's system, what would be the effect on his ideas of faith and 
grace? If I were to awake tomorrow knowing that there was no longer an unbridgeable 
gulf between my Creator and me, what would happen to my faith? Would I claim that I 
was now as powerful as God? Would I see no distinction between God and me'? 
The answer to that would depend upon the way in which my life changed as a result of 
this discovery. It would depend not upon rational discourse, but upon experiential 
circumstance. If I felt nothing different as a consequence of this knowing, then perhaps 
I would learn to despise the Creator to whom I had attributed so much power when I 
had believed myself to be in estrangement. 
However, if the recognition of the lack of estrangement were to result in the 
overwhelming presence of the divine in my life, then I would fall to my knees and 
rejoice. The power of the presence of the divine would show me my finitude and my 
powerlessness. I would not need a theological discourse to point this out. That very 
power and presence would not allow me to presume my equality with God. However, 
unlike rational discourse, the experience of the divine would comfort me in my 
powerlessness because my weakness would be expression of my resonance with the 
strength of the divine. 
If the presence of the Creator were to be felt through the realisation of the lack of 
estrangement, I would no longer need to have faith, for I could live in faith. Equally, I 
would no longer need to have the symbol of Jesus as the Christ because I would be able 
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to live in the power ofthat figure. If I knew my Creator to reside in my depths. I could 
trust in myself as a human being to be a creature of God. Faith would therefore, cease 
to be an external projection and would become an internal reality. Faith would become 
an expression of my very being and, as a consequence, my actions in life could become 
fully integrated with the experience of God in my depths. My being and doing could 
integrate and I would be able to live spontaneously as bearer of spirit in the world. 
Through such integration I would live in completeness; in short, I would enjoy 
wholeness - salvation. 
The removal of Tillich's insistence upon ontological estrangement would not threaten 
the ineffable status of the divine. Such a threat is the product of the limitations of 
reasoned discourse and strictly dualistic consciousness. It is the product of 
epistemology, which lacks the scope to extend beyond the limits of paradox. Reason 
must hold God at a distance in order to uphold God's ineffability. Ilowever. personal 
experience and intuition know no such limitation. 
The removal of ontological estrangement allows God's ineffability to be felt in God's 
immanent presence. By removing the insistence upon estrangement, the voice of being 
itself may ring out loud and clear from our depths without being muftled by a 
theologian's fear of what he may hear. 
In other words, to move beyond the controlling language employed by Tillich, it is 
necessary to let go; to let go of estrangement and thus, to let go of the protective barrier 
between conscious reflection and the unconscious depths of being. This, in turn, means 
letting go of the predominance of reasoned discourse over the intuitions coming from 
our unconscious depths. If Tillich is right when he claims that the logos structure is 
present in our entire being, then it will be as present in our intuition and instincts as it is 
in our faculty of reason. 
This does not mean a saying goodbye to reason itself. On the contrary, to be human in 
Tillichian terms means to live in the dimension of spirit, which is rooted in the faculty 
of reason. What it does mean however, is that reason must learn to listen to intuition 
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and to be fuelled by it to such an extent that critical awareness in life becomes the 
product of divine guidance from the depths of our unconsciousness. Tillich himself 
intuited this and his discussion of the ontological and epistemological natures of reason 
illustrate this.628 However, his inability to live according to his system is revealed in 
his insistence upon separation between God and humanity, and human consciousness 
and unconsciousness. 
Earlier, the following question was raised: in what way must consciollsneu of the 
Creatorlcreature relationship in Tillie/,ian theology change, in order to overcome tlte 
sense of distinction between divine omnipotence and creaturely freedom, with()ut 
losing the essential nature of both? Perhaps we are now in a position to answer it. To 
be distinct from something does not require that we live separately from that thing. If I 
ride a bike, I do not fear losing my identity in the process. What make something 
distinct from something else are the functions that distinguish them. In the case of the 
creature and the Creator, we have seen that Tillich intuited there to be a resonating 
relationship between both, in which the creature participates as the sustained and the 
Creator as the Sustainer. However, we have also seen that Tillich emphasises the role 
of the human being to act as bearer of spirit in the world, for the world. These two 
identities: the sustained and the bearer of spirit, must not be seen in isolation, but as an 
integrated unity. 
The identity of the creature as the sustained relates to the being of the creature. The 
identity of bearer of spirit relates to the task of the creature. If the power of Jesus as the 
Christ as the Saviour means the power to make whole, then the function of the human 
being in and for the world can only be understood in terms of its relation to the Creator. 
In other words, the power of Jesus as the Christ as Saviour must be to integrate the 
being and doing of the creature: in terms of being, the creature must recognise itself as 
being sustained by its Creator. In terms of its function (its 'doing'), the creature must 
recognise its function to bear the divine Spirit in the world, for the world. 
628 See pp.50-53 above. 
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Integration provides us with our identity in relation to God and in relation to the world. 
In other words, our purpose is derived from our connection to God and our involvement 
in the world. Separation from God impedes our purpose, for the flow of the divine 
Spirit becomes restricted and fragmentary, as Tillich maintains in his theology. The 
recognition of our identity as the sustained means that the divine function as Sustainer 
emanating from the depths of human unconsciousness finds full expression in the 
creature's activity in the world as bearer of spirit. 
By letting go of the notion of separation expressed in Tillich's term estrangement. there 
is no dissolving of the conscious state of the creature into the unconscious abyss of the 
divine. On the contrary, the creature's consciousness is given a practical application; it 
is given a function - to be the vehicle of Spirit for the world. Moreover. it is not just 
given a function, but the very function that fulfills its entire nature as the sustained 
creature. By letting go of separation from its Creator, the creature is able to live as the 
microcosm of the divine, which implies a fulfilling of both creature and Creator, not a 
dissolving of distinction between them. 
Fulfilment comes through function. By letting go of the fear of the unconscious depths, 
creature and Creator can connect through resonance; consciousness opens to the 
unconscious depths to be fuelled by it, and then converts that fuel into spontaneous 
spiritual Hving in the world, for the benefit of the world. 
We have seen that the Chinese cook connects up to the macrocosm through his innate 
connection with the macrocosmic Too, in order to extend his awareness beyond the 
limitations of normal everyday living, and to execute his skill with a degree of 
perfection not attainable in a normal dualistic state of awareness.629 Our suggested way 
of moving beyond the dualistic reflective consciousness evident in Tillich's system has 
been inspired by the microcosmic cosmology presented in the Loo Tzu and the Chllang 
Tzu. 
629 See pp.230-231 above. 
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However, we have also gone beyond the cosmology of the Chinese texts by 
accommodating in our suggestion the unique function of the human being as bearer of 
spirit in and for the world, so central in Tillichian theology and the Christian tradition 
in which he was entrenched. 
In other words, the Chinese microcosmic/macrocosmic approach has hel ped to 
illuminate a way to integrate Tillichian notions of consciousness and unconsciousness. 
The result is the discovery of the possibility of a far more balanced relationship, in 
which consciousness does not run away from unconsciousness, but instead. moves 
toward it, and is able to do so by virtue of the presence of the logos structure in both. 
There is no dissolving of the former into the latter, but instead, an expanding of 
consciousness beyond the confines of reason, although always maintaining the critical 
awareness of human reason as the means by which the expanded consciousness 
functions within the world. 
Through this approach, it becomes possible to live in far greater clarity than Tillich's 
theology permits. Clarity comes from the full and spontaneous realisation of our 
purpose as bearer of spirit, made possible by our recognition of the utterly sustained 
nature of our being. Just as the Chinese master cook can carve up the bullock in a 
dynamic state of non-action (wu-wei), in which his whole being is integrated with the 
macrocosm, so the human creature can learn to live in creative freedom, in which the 
effort of living in the tension of ambiguity is converted into the effortless flow of 
clarity. In such a life, it is not the courage to be that we find through faith, but rather 
the joy to be that we find in faith. 
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Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter has been to address the question raised at the cnd of Part 
One of the thesis: How would it be possible to assess the validity of Tillich IS Christian 
assumption of the ontological nature of estrangement? With this in mind. two main 
points have been argued: firstly, the microcosmic theme underlying Tillich's system 
reveals a contradiction in his theology with regard to creaturely freedom and his notion 
of ontological creaturely estrangement from the ground of being. 
The microcosmic motif reveals the theme of dynamic resonance betwccn the life of the 
divine and that of the creature, which characterises Tillich's system as a whole. Ilis 
insistence upon the creature's freedom to choose between creative living and the 
surrendering of one's humanity however, contradicts its generally resonating hue. llis 
insistence upon the ontological nature of creaturely estrangement from the ground of 
being is responsible for this contradiction and creates the tension and ambiguity present 
in both the content and structure of his system. Reflective and rational discourse, 
heavily employed by Tillich in both the structure and the content of his theology, is 
characterised by the making of distinctions and thus, the use of such a method promotes 
themes of separation. 
Secondly, through the Chinese microcosmic theme, which offers no sense of 
estrangement between the human being as microcosm and the universe as macrocosm. 
Tillich's insistence upon the ontological nature of estrangement can be challenged. The 
Chinese microcosmic motif, as expressed through the Lao Tzu and the Chuang TZlI, 
contrasts in this respect with the two western expressions of microcosm that have been 
considered in this study: that of the Renaissance and that underlying TiIlich's theology. 
The Chinese microcosmic theme maintains the ineffable nature of the Too without 
resorting to the theme of separation. At the same time, it is able to depict the presence 
of the Tao in the midst of life without having to grapple with inconsistency and 
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contradiction. This is achieved by emphasis upon the utter integration of the sage with 
the flow of the Tao, attained by the letting-go of attachment to the phenomenal world. 
including the reliquishing of attachment to reflective thought and conccptualisation. 
The chapter however, warns the reader not to presume that the Chinese texts provide 
the answers to the inconsistencies inherent in Tillich's system. The very stark 
differences with regard to the understanding of the nature of reality Hnd expression in 
the two fundamental differences in focus in their respective microcosmic themes. 
While the Chinese texts' focus is far more macrocosmic, reflecting their understanding 
of reality in terms of the enigmatic flow of the Tao, the Tillichian focus is more 
microcosmic, echoing Tillich's emphasis upon the role of human perception in the 
grasping and shaping of reality. In view of this fundamental difference, any 
presumption as to the power of the Chinese texts directly to address the inconsistencies 
in Tillich's system is naIve and ill-advised. 
Instead, the microcosmic theme of the Chinese texts, in which there has been found no 
sense of ontological estrangement for the human being, has enabled the researcher to 
dare to challenge Tillich's presupposition as to the ontological nature of creaturely 
estrangement. Proposed in this respect has been a shift in emphasis away from the 
ontological nature of estrangement toward a much stronger emphasis upon the 
ontological nature of the creature's connection with the Creator. This was not possible 
for Tillich because of his own lack of integration. 
The Chinese theme of non-action (wu-wei), with its emphasis upon the alignment of the 
being and doing of the sage and his connection to the macrocosm, has brought into 
relief a lack of conscious recognition in Tillich's system of the importance of the 
alignment between being and doing. That he intuited the importance of such integration 
has been revealed by the microcosmic theme found to underlie his theology. That such 
a theme was not overtly expressed revealed his failure consciously to express what he 
intuited and thus, revealed his own lack of integration. 
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This chapter has established that Tillich's assumption of the ontological nature of 
estrangement is not validated by his system as a whole. Neither is it validated by our 
investigation into the Chinese texts, for they have been found to communicate no sense 
of the ontological estrangement that Tillich insists upon. The tension and ambiguity 
generated by his insistence upon estrangement contradicts the microcosmic theme 
underlying his system and the principles of dynamic harmony and resonance that 
characterise that theme. 
The chapter has gone on to consider the implications of removing the theme of 
estrangement for the Tillichian understanding of the creature/Creator relationship, and 
for the relationship between human consciousness and unconsciousness. It has 
suggested that its removal would lead neither to a dissolving of consciousness into the 
depths of the unconscious, nor to an overpowering of the creature by the Creator. On 
the contrary, it would lead to an expanding of consciousness, in which the critical 
awareness of the rational faculty of the mind would still maintain its vital function, but 
would lose its imperious status over the unconscious, which TilIich maintained in his 
theological system. As a consequence, the creature would not be overpowered. but 
empowered by its ability to access its unconscious depths, in which the sustaining 
power of the divine dwelt and found expression through the logos structure of the 
unconscious. The creature would then be in a position to recognise and accept its one 
essential function - to act as bearer of spirit for the world and, like the Chinese master 
cook enjoying the freedom and clarity of non-action (wu-wei), the ambiguities of life 
for the creature would be lifted by its recognition and acceptance of its ontological 
connection with God, the Creator and Sustainer. 
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Thesis Conclusion 
This thesis set out to demonstrate an inconsistency at the ontological level in Paul 
Tillich's theological system. This was achieved by establishing the presence of a 
microcosmic theme underlying his system. The theme established Tillich's powerful 
sense of the intimate connection between divine life and human li fe, in which the 
rhythm of the divine life became the dynamic ground of being of the creature, imbuing 
the creature with life. This dynamic interrelation he communicated through his method 
of correlation and dialectical approach. The microcosmic theme revealed the intimacy 
between the Creator and creature, to the extent that the creature's being was grounded 
in the very pulse of the life of the Creator. 
In light of this intimacy, established by the microcosmic theme, TiIlich's insistence 
upon creature1y estrangement at the ontological level was shown to be problematic. 
The thesis questioned how estrangement could be ontological if the very being of the 
creature was so grounded in the life of the divine. It argued that the separation from the 
divine life, implied in Tillich's notion of ontological estrangement, was tantamount to a 
denial of the nature of human being, namely, being grounded in the divine. This had 
implications for Tillich's understanding of creaturely freedom. 
The thesis observed that Tillich's system, as it stood, was ambiguous with regard to 
creature1y freedom; on the one hand, the creature was apparently free to choose 
between being and non-being at every moment, and on the other, to be free creatively 
to transcend the ambiguities of life. The thesis argued that in light of the creature's 
grounding in the life of the divine, the human being could not be free to choose 
between being and non-being; to be human was to be connected to the divine. Thus, 
the microcosmic theme raised serious doubts about the value of ontological 
estrangement for Tillich's theological system as a whole. 
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In acknowledgement of the consistency between Tillichian thinking in this respcct and 
the Christian tradition's emphasis upon the qualitative separation between humanity 
and God, the thesis sought to consider the validity of Tillich's claims for ontological 
estrangement by stepping out of the Christian tradition and into the Chinese tradition of 
Tao. This was done by examining the Tao as communicated in two classical texts, Ihe 
Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu. These texts were selected on the basis that thcy were 
widely acknowledged among Chinese scholars to be two of the most authoritative texts 
on the Tao, and central to the formulation of Taoist philosophy.630 Discovered through 
exploration of these texts was the absence of a sense of separation bctween the 
phenomenal world and the noumenal unity that creatcd and sustained life. 
The absence of a sense of separation between the human being as microcosm and the 
universe as macrocosm found expression in the texts' cosmo-ontological depiction of 
the Tao. The Tao was expressed in terms of the dynamic process of differentiation and 
return to non-differentiation. The texts communicated the TclO in terms of both the 
universal force that worked toward differentiation of reality, and the process of things 
as they returned to their origin. As a microcosm of the macrocosmic Tao, the human 
being was able to live in synchronistic accord with the Tao, for the Tao - the dynamic 
process of life - was innate to the human being as much as it was innate to every living 
thing.631 
The texts also emphasised the non-causal implications of such synchronisation. To be 
so synchronised with the Tao required the letting-go of causal awareness, characterised 
by discriminating, conceptual thinking. Once such consciousness had been 
relinquished, it would be possible to enter the dynamic state of non-action (\i'u-we;), in 
which there was no sense of distinction between the actor and the action being 
performed. In short, non-action (wu-wei) represented the utter synchronisation between 
internal being and external doing, to the extent that being and action could become 
fully integrated. The effect of such integration was spontaneous acting in Iifc.632 
630 See p.186 above. 
631 See p.238 above. 
632 See p.228 above. 
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Thus, the consideration of the Chinese texts brought to light a philosophical tradition 
which was based upon a microcosmic/macrocosmic cosmology, in which ontology was 
integral to cosmology, and vice versa. Such integration was possible because of the 
absence of the sense of separation between the phenomenal and the noumcnal. 
In light of the exploration of these Chinese texts, the thesis argued that it was possible 
to challenge Tillich's insistence upon the ontological nature of estrangement. To 
suggest that estrangement was ontological was to make an assertion that would he 
applicable to all of human existence, not simply to those within the Christian fold. That 
there was evidence of a tradition in which estrangement played no role whatsoever, 
provided the thesis with the grounds for challenging TiIlich in this respect. 
Moreover, in view of the fact that the microcosmic theme, argued to underlie Tillich' s 
theological system, highlighted an implicit sense of holism in his theology, Tillich's 
insistence upon the ontological estrangement between human being and the ground of 
being appeared to create tension and ambiguity in his system. In short, the thesis 
argued that Tillich's insistence upon ontological estrangement prevented his system 
from communicating the wholeness and dynamic integration between the divine and 
finitude that the microcosmic theme brought to the fore. 
The reasons for Tillich's insistence upon ontological estrangement were attributed to 
his excessive valuation of dualistic, conceptual thought, at the expense of other human 
attributes, such as intuition. 633 The thesis contended that inherent in the reflective 
nature of reasoned. conceptual discourse was the principle of separation, as reflection 
itself demanded the distinction to be drawn between object and subject. Thus, if 
reasoned discourse dominated the structure and content of a theological system, it 
would inevitably highlight the theme of separation, rather than integration. 
Exploration of the Chinese texts demonstrated that integration meant harmony within 
the human organism at all levels - physical, emotional and spiritual - achieved through 
633 See p.273 above. 
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synchronistic harmony between the individual and the environmcnt, and the individual 
d h . 634 an t e unIverse. 
Exploration of the Tao demonstrated the possibility of the microcosm of the human 
being resonating with the macrocosm without any sense of fear of the ineffable aspect 
of the macrocosm. On the contrary, the ineffability of the unitary aspect of the 
macrocosm was used to empower the microcosm, enabling the human being to perform 
creative acts in the phenomenal world. Moreover, empowerment was achieved through 
the relinquishing of the need for dualistic thought. 
Consideration of the Tao also revealed a great degree of resonance bctween the Chinese 
texts' communication of non-action (wu-wei) and spontaneity (ziran) and TiIlich's 
system in terms of creative freedom and spontaneity. Both expressed the theme of 
integration. 
In the Chinese texts, non-action (wu-wei) expressed the state of total integration, which 
went beyond normal sensory-consciousness. It was a state in which the microcosm of 
the individual integrated with the macrocosm to the point of dynamic unity. Ilowever, 
it was not a mystical evaporation of self, but rather, a highly functional state in which 
the individual was empowered through integration with the unitary nature of the 
macrocosm to perform actions that surpassed those possible in a normally conscious 
state. It was not a state of unconsciousness, but one of expanded sensory awareness, in 
which the function of the individual took on a higher level of performance. The utter 
integration of the individual meant that the performance was effortless and hamlonious 
and thus, was spontaneous. 
Creative freedom, in Tillichian terms was a balancing and a synchronising principle. In 
terms of balance, freedom meant the ability to live dynamically in relation to self and 
world. That meant the ability to let go of self in search of world, and to let go of world 
634 See p.287 above. 
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in search of self. If there were resonance between both poles in this way, the human 
being would be able to grow in an integrated and therefore, balanced way. 
In terms of synchronicity, the ability to let go of both world and self meant the power 
of world to influence self, and vice versa. Freedom therefore, referred to the 
synchronicity and balance between self and world. Such resonating dynamism was 
possible because of the logos structure of both self and world. Thus, logos became the 
vehicle for integration and the vehicle also for spontaneity, for spontaneity was the 
acting of a being that had become centred and whole through the resonance bctwcen 
the rational structure of inner self and the rational structure of the world.635 
The parallels between the Chinese and Tillichian viewpoints in this respect were quite 
apparent: both emphasised integration as crucial for spontaneity. Both also highlighted 
the importance of resonance between the internal and external worlds of the human 
being and because of this, both evoked microcosmic imagery. 
However, significant distinctions were also drawn between the two perspectives. 
While Tillich insisted upon the mediating role of the logos symbol as the channel 
through which integration was attained, the Chinese texts regarded integration to occur 
in a much more direct way, with no need for mediation between macrocosmic energies 
and those of the microcosm. Thus, Chinese spontaneity took on a much more 
instinctive hue, with the emphasis upon the unpremeditated aspect of spontaneity 
(ziran). 
Tillich's view of spontaneity, in contrast, was of a more learned nature, acquired 
through the human being's learning in life. Although spontaneity, by definition, meant 
the acting according to impulse or natural law, Tillich's view implied that the natural 
law had first to be learned before the human being could act spontaneously. 
635 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, voU, p.185. 
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This distinction demonstrated a fundamental and highly significant difference between 
the Chinese and Tillichian perspectives. It highlighted the Chinese texts' emphasis 
upon the human being as part of the natural order. No mediation was required in the 
Chinese perspective because the human being belonged totally to the natural order. The 
human being functioned within the natural order, and did not have a role to fulfil that 
set it in any way apart from nature. 
In contrast, Tillich's insistence upon the mediating role of the logos symbol highlighted 
his valuation of the rational structure permeating both the human being and the natural 
order of the world. For Tillich, the unique function of the human being was to bring 
that structure to full consciousness in and for the world, and this uniqueness set it apart 
from other aspects of nature, although he also emphasised the importance of the 
ultimate multi-dimensional unity of all that lives. 
In view of such a fundamental difference in perspective with respect to integration and 
spontaneity, the resonance between wu-wei as communicated through the Chinese texts 
and creaturely freedom in Tillichian terms was limited.636 
However, what our exploration into the Chinese texts demonstrated was the existence 
of a philosophical tradition that was not based upon the primacy of rational, conceptual 
thought, with its inevitably detached and reflective character, but rather one that 
promoted a unitary awareness in which intuitive spontaneity had pride of place. 
Moreover, unitary awareness demonstrated the utterly integrated nature of human and 
universal energy. The human being was a microcosm of the universal macrocosm, and 
as such, was imbued with the same creative and sustaining energy of the universe - the 
Tao. 
Thus, our exploration into the Chinese texts provided insights into existence that 
allowed the ontological assumptions of Tillichian theology to be challenged. Not only 
did these texts not share Tillich's sense of ontological estrangement, neither did they 
636 See pp.281,288 above. 
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share his high valuation of reason. In fact, reasoned discourse. which was based upon 
dualistic awareness, was somewhat demeaned in those texts. They advocated the 
importance of merging with the enigmatic process of the Tao, a merging with the 
darkness of the mystery of the Tao. This contrasted starkly with the searching for light 
of Tillichian theology, communicated through his recognition of the primacy of 
rational, conceptual thinking, and the role of logos in human destiny. The thesis argued 
that in this respect, Tillichian theology, influenced profoundly as it was by the classical 
ideas of Cusanus, Boehme, Paracelsus, and Neo-platonists such as Pseudo-Dionysius 
and Plotinus, sought to resist the dangers lurking in the darkness of the mystery of the 
creative ground of being by establishing an unbridgeable gulfbetwecn human cxistcnce 
and that very ground. The gulf was established by the limits of human consciousness, 
represented in Tillich's theology by the categories of time, space, causality and 
substance. These provided the perimeter fence for human reason; the boundary 
between conscious existence and the unconscious potential that fuelled existence.637 
The establishment of the close association between theology and psychology in 
Tillich's thinking in Chapter Four, and later developed in Chapter Seven, showed 
Tillich's ontological assertions about the qualitative distinction betwccn esscntial and 
existential being also to be assertions about the qualititative distinction between 
consciousness and unconsciousness.638 Yet, at the same time, the microcosmic theme, 
demonstrated in this thesis to be implicit in his theology, brought to the fore Tillich's 
profound sense of the dynamic power of the divine residing in the potential reservoir of 
human consciousness - the unconscious. Hence, the microcosmic theme highlighted 
inconsistency at a profound level in Tillich's theology. 
In light of this, the thesis suggested that the tension and ambiguity of Tillichian 
theology was the product of the inconsistency between the unconscious thrust of his 
thinking, made evident by the unearthing of the implicit microcosmic theme, and the 
rational, reflective dualistic nature of his system. His desire to remain in the light, so to 
speak, denied him access to the profound clarity that resided in the murky waters of his 
637 See pp.44 - 58 above. 
638 See pp.161-163 above. 
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unconscIOUS depths, a clarity which the Chinese texts argued could be achieved 
spontaneously by relinquishing one's hold on reflective thought. 
However, the clarity of the Chinese texts was not the same as the light of Tillichian 
theology. Clarity in the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu was the simple reflection of 
reality as it was, namely, the dynamic process that was the Tao.639 In contrast, the light 
of Tillichian theology was that dynamic Divine Principle with which the human being 
was imbued - Spirit, the integrating Principle of Divine Life - which provided the 
human being with its unique identity and function. In terms of identity, it was the 
creature of the Divine; in terms of function, the bearer of spirit.640 
Tillich's theology fell short in his failure to allow the light of the logos principle to be 
fully fuelled by the power of the divine pulsating through his unconscious depths. His 
clinging to reason blinded him to the clarity that could have been his ifhe had sought to 
listen to the mystery that spoke to him intuitively in his unconscious depths. Just as 
the Spirit Principle of the Divine life functioned to integrate the abysmal power of the 
Godhead with the Principle of Reason,641 so could TilIich have produced a far more 
integrated theological system if he had recognised his own microcosmic relation to the 
Divine. By recognising this, he would have realised that the power of the unconscious 
and the structure of reason were integrated by means of the Spirit. lie woulJ have 
realised that not only was it not necessary for reason to be protected from the potential 
that resided in the unconscious, but that by creating barriers to the unconscious, he was 
effectively impeding the integrative function of Spirit. 
In short, the potential of Tillich's theological insight was impedeJ by his failure to 
recognise the microcosmic nature of his system. His failure fully to appreciate the 
dynamics of the Divine life pulsating though his own human life blinded him to the fact 
that the structure of logos was only one aspect of human identity, human freedom and 
human destiny. The dynamis of human unconsciousness was as important as the 
639 See p.233 above. 
640 See p.146 above. 
641 See p.67 above. 
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structure of reason, and only when both aspects of human life, emanating from the 
Divine Life pulsating through the structure of our being, were fully present in the 
human life could the integrative function of the Spirit Principle weave its magic. Only 
by letting go of the need to stay permanently in the light of knowledge and conccptual 
understanding could we experience the power of the mystery of the Divine in our 
unconsciousness. Only then could Spirit function as the intcgrative principle within us 
that would make us bearers of spirit in and for the world. 
Tillich's claim that humanity is onto logically estranged from the ground of being 
denies the integrative capacity of Spirit, and ignores the microcosmic relation of the 
human being to the ground of being. It therefore, contradicts his theological system as 
a whole, for throughout, he asserts that the human being has a unique and divinely 
ordained role in and for the world - to be bearer of spirit. 
Exploration of the Chinese texts has allowed us to dare to challenge Tillich's 
ontological presupposition with regard to estrangement. Not only that, it has also 
shown us that it is possible to let go of conceptualisation and still be able to operate as 
human beings, without falling into the abyss of unconscious non-difTerentiation. 
However, it has not provided us with a means of reconciling the ambiguities of the 
Tillichian theological system, for the LaD Tzu and the Chuang TZlI do not share 
Tillich's profound understanding of the unique function of humanity as bearer of spirit 
in and for the world. In short, the power of human consciousness to grasp and shape 
reality does not feature in these texts. 
Nevertheless, we can use the experience of our exploration into the Chinese texts to 
help us to illuminate a way that overcomes the ambiguity of Tillich's theological 
system as it stands. By showing us the presence of a way of being in which reason 
does not rule supreme, the Chinese texts have allowed us to detect an imbalance in 
Tillich's system, derived from his insistence upon a rational, reflective approach to 
human life in relation to the divine. 
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Moreover, by recalling Tillich's own depiction of the Divine life in terms of the three 
Principles of Godhead, Logos and Spirit, in which Spirit represents the Principle of 
integration, we begin to see that by redressing the imbalance in his system. it is possible 
to turn his system into an integrative theology. That is to say, by relaxing the hold of 
rational reflection upon his system and strengthening the input of the power emanating 
from the unconscious, the microcosmic intuit ions implicit in this rational system arc 
allowed to surface. The effect of this is the creation of a theology that no longer 
grapples with the impasse of logical paradox and polar tension, but instead. vibrates 
with the resonance of human life as it acknowledges its microcosmic connection to the 
dynamic ground of its being. 
Integrative theology is inevitably no longer abstract critical reflection. but profound 
reflection upon the powerful experience of the divine presence in the depth of human 
existence. It is reflection not upon the qualitative distinction between the realms of the 
Divine and the finite creature, but instead, reflection upon the resonance between the 
two that stems from the one Divine energy that creates and sustains. 
If the microcosmic theme, implicit in Tillich's theology, is made explicit. then the 
effect is to amplify the message of resonance between human existence and the ground 
of being, and consequently, to fade out the theme of estrangement. The subtle shift in 
theological emphasis in this respect has an impact on Tillich's ontology, for such 
amplification makes it increasingly impossible to speak in ontological terms without at 
the same time speaking cosmologically. If human existence is recognised as being 
dynamically structured by the pulsating rhythm of the Divine Life, as established in this 
thesis, then it is impossible to have knowledge about human being without having a 
fundamental experience of the nature of Divine Being. 
In short, a microcosmic understanding of the relation of the human being to the ground 
of being demands that ontology must stand in relation to cosmology. Moreover, the 
microcosmic theme provides the authority for the human being to claim to participate 
in the nature of Divine Being, for as a microcosm of the macrocosm, the very essence 
of the Divine energy imbues the human being. 
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The suggestion here is not that the human being can know the nature of the Divine. 
rather that human beings can participate in and experience the Divine. This is a most 
significant distinction, for while knowledge pertains to reason. conceptual thinking and 
dualistic awareness, experience embraces knowledge and extends beyond the 
parameters of duality. In other words, if human existence is based upon the triadic 
rhythm of the Principles of Divine Life, then TilIich's ontology must pay us much 
attention to the power of the Godhead in the depths of unconsciousness as it does to the 
structure of Logos that shapes human consciousness. 
Paying attention does not mean reflecting critically upon the theoretical nature of the 
Divine power, but acknowledging that power for what it is - the ineffable force that 
empowers the human being to be. To theorise about the Divine power would be to strip 
it of its divinity; to make assertions about such power would be to make it impotent. 
However, to feel the power of the Divine, to intuit it with onc's entire bcing and to fail 
to be able to express it in words but, nevertheless, to be driven by it. would be to 
acknowledge such power in all of its glory, and in that acknowledgement. to feel 
Divine power energising one's very being. 
To suggest that Tillichian ontology must stand in relation to cosmology to make 
explicit the microcosmic theme underlying his system is to demand that the status of 
epistemology in his theology be reduced. Only by attributing less authority to the 
knowledge of knowing is it possible to begin to feel the power of being that is our 
essence as much as is the power of reason. Only by being as receptive to the 
unknowable power of the Godhead as we are to the power of Reason are we able to 
serve as channels for the integrative function of Spirit. Being receptive to the 
unknowable power does not mean closing one's self off from the power through the 
making of abstract statements about the incomprehensibility of the Divine. Instead, it 
means feeling that power and being moved by it. Only then are we in a position to 
function as bearers of spirit in and for the world, for only then does the Spirit work to 
integrate the Principles of Godhead and Logos that flow through us, the microcosm of 
the Divine. 
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If the microcosmic theme can be made explicit by aligning Tillich's ontology with 
cosmology, then Tillich's theology is brought to a new level of consciousness. 
Effectively, his theology adopts an onto-cosmological perspective. in which the 
resonance between the dynamic ground of being and human being is brought to the 
point of integration. In this integration there is no dissolving of consciousness into the 
abyss of unconsciousness; instead, there is an amplified resonance between the power 
of Reason and the power of Godhead through the vehicle of human being situated in 
the time and space of existence. Through such resonance, the identity of the human 
being as the sustained and that of the Creator as Sustainer are firmly established, and 
the purpose ofthe human being as the bearer of spirit in and for the world is actualised. 
The possibility of integrating ontology and cosmology was established by our 
discussion of the Chinese texts. However, let it not be assumed that the Chinese onto-
cosmological perspective is the same as that suggested with regard to Tillichian 
theology. The latter is of a very different ilk from the former. While the onto-
cosmology pertaining to the Tao represents an integration of the phenomenal with the 
noumenal that highlights the dynamic natural order of reality,642 the onto-cosmology 
pertaining to Tillichian theology highlights an integration of a far more human-centred 
dynamic, in which human being is empowered to shape reality through a consciousness 
fuelled and driven by the creative energy of the Godhead. Thus, the state of 
consciousness derived from a Tillichian onto-cosmology is not one that is characterised 
by sagely unitary awareness, but one that demands deliberate human action in the 
world for the sake of the world. However, at the same time, the responsibility for this 
action is not upon the shoulders of the human being, for the source of human action is 
derived ultimately and immediately from the Divine, which breathes the power of Spirit 
into the creature, guiding that creature every step ofthe way. 
Thus, our discovery of a microcosmic theme implicit in Tillich's theology has exposed 
inconsistency in his system at a profound, indeed, ontological level. Our exploration 
into the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu has helped us to clarify the nature of the 
642 See pp. 275-276 above. 
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inconsistency, namely, Tillich's insistence upon the qualitative separation of the realm 
of the divine from humanity. Only exploration of a non-Christian tradition would be 
able to assist in this way; Tillich's unquestioning acceptance of the ontological nature 
of human separation from the divine was the consequence of his entrenchment in the 
values and assumptions of the western Christian tradition, in which the qualitative 
distinction between humanity and the divine is central. 
Consideration of the Chinese texts has also assisted us in providing a possible 
explanation for the centrality of the theme of separation in TiIlich's system, namely. the 
primacy of the role of reason and conceptualisation in his consideration of the 
Creator/creature relationship. The critically reflective nature of such a mindset makes 
inevitable a dualistic awareness of reality. 
The Chinese texts have also illuminated a way in which the inconsistency and 
ambiguities ofTillich's system can be reconciled with the powerful sense of holism and 
integration underlying that system, as revealed by the microcosmic theme. The onto-
cosmological hue of these Chinese writings with regard to the Tao has not only 
provided confinnation that separation is not, indeed, a tragic and inescapable fact of 
life; it has also shown that it is not necessary to be afraid of what cannot be known. 
The texts' emphasis upon the empowering nature of the mysterious darkness of the Tuo 
has made it possible for us to detect an excess in Tillich's insistence upon the light of 
knowledge with regard to the mystery of the Creator/creature relationship. 
Thus, the value of the exploration into the Chinese texts has been to illuminate excess 
and unchallenged presuppositions in Tillichian theology. Their light in thcse respects 
has allowed the researcher to see Tillichian theology through eyes that have very 
briefly looked beyond the Christian frame of reference, in order to look back into that 
frame and reflect upon what can be seen. Perhaps Tillich himself would have approved 
of such an approach, for his method of correlation was very much a reference out 
beyond the limits of circumstance, in order to return to make bctter sense of that 
circumstance. 
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What has become apparent in the process of looking beyond is that the Chinese texts do 
not provide the answers to inconsistencies in Tillich's theology, for their contexts arc 
utterly different from Tillich's. Therefore, there is no suggestion that the themes of the 
Chinese texts presented in this thesis might, in some way, be grafted onll) TiIlich's 
system to produce a hybrid theo-philosophy. 
Instead, those texts have simply shown us a different way of experiencing reality, 
which has provided fuel for reflection. In the reflection, it is clear that Tillich's 
theology was not an integrated system because his ontology was based upon the theme 
of separation and estrangement, while his intuition was based upon the holism of a 
microcosmic/macrocosmic understanding of reality. 
Reflection has also revealed that in order for Tillich's theology to become integrated. it 
is necessary to acknowledge the power of the Divine in the unconscious aspects of 
being as much as he acknowledged the power of reason, and to acknowledge that 
power in experiential rather than abstract conceptual terms. 
Only a methodology based upon integration could expose the lack of integration in 
Tillich's system. Thus, crucial to the findings of this thesis has been the way in which 
the researcher has conducted the study. As mentioned in the thesis Introduction, the 
entire study has been conducted through meditation as well as by means of thorough 
academic research.643 Meditation demanded that the researcher focused upon her inner 
personal journey in relation to the study at the same time as conducting the more formal 
aspects of academic research. Through meditation, it was possible to access depths of 
intuition that would not otherwise have been accessible to the researcher; and those 
intuitions led the direction of the study from its inception. 
The mandala referred to in the thesis Introduction (see Appendix 1).644 drawn in a 
meditational state by the researcher in the early stages of research, established the 
presence of the microcosmic theme in Tillich's theology. The subsequent study and 
643 See p.9 above. 
644 See p.l 0 above. 
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academic reflection on Tillich's thinking were conducted to clarify the significance of 
the microcosmic theme, which although seen by the researcher through the diagram. 
made very little conceptual sense to her initially. What ensued in her attempt to make 
sense of the mandala, was a powerful personal journey into her depths of being. which 
progressed synchronistically with the in-depth academic study ofTillichian theology. 
What was achieved through this original methodological approach was a resonance 
between intuitive flow and critical conscious reflection. Without critical ret1ection, the 
intuitive flow would have been undirected and unexpressed. At the smlle time, it was 
necessary to ensure that critical reflection followed the intuitive flow, rather than 
allowing the latter to become stifled and controlled by the former. 
In short, the methodology of this research project was based upon a process of 
integration - integration between rational reflection and intuitive insight. but also 
integration between inner being and external action - The research was lived, not 
simply conducted. The journey was fuelled throughout by the energy emanating from 
the unconscious aspects of the researchers' being, and navigated by her faculty of 
reason and reflection. 
What such a methodology achieves, which would not perhaps have been possible with 
a more conventional approach, is the recognition of the means by which Tillichian 
theology can be taken to a different level of consciousness. Tillich's system fell short 
of integration because he failed to allow the creative power of his unconscious depths 
to direct his critical awareness. Instead, he stifled his unconscious by insisting upon the 
unbridgeable gulf between it and consciousness. His insistence upon the primacy of 
rational reflection impeded the creative, integrative function of Spirit, rendering the 
microcosmic theme present in his intuition nothing more than a whisper. 
By employing a methodology that was led by an intuitive awareness supported by 
critical reflection, the researcher was able to hear the whisper of the microcosmic 
theme and to bring it to the surface. By so doing, Tillich's theology has taken on a 
different hue, and has been demonstrated to be permeated by a powerful sense of the 
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holistic, integrated correlation between the human being and the dynamic ground of 
being. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Mandala: Above is a representation of a diagram drawn by th re al" h ' r durin I 
the early stages of research. It was the final in erie of diagram drawn whil t 
studying in-depth Tillich's three volumes of stematic rh ~ology. At the tim f 
drawing, the researcher understood it to be a pictur filii h und r tanding r 
the relationship between the lives of the creature and th divine whi h h" had b n 
unable to express in words. 
The diagram, which the researcher later understood to be a mandala, pr id "d th' 
focus for her Tillichian research. Reference t it help d h r t ring t full 
consciousness her intuitions about the microcosmic them llnd rI ing Tilli hian 
theology. 
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